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So I've been reading Armageddon, a fairly recent (2004) work by Max Hastings, and I have to ask; what is it with British writers and their admiration of German Wank?

Hastings continues to insist that the German soldier was superior to all; despite all the evidence that has come out since the early 1980s; when serious historical research began; rather than accepting the Germn Generals at their word.

One thing that Hastings keeps harping on is the fact that the Germans almost always mounted near immediate counterattacks following an attack by the Allies; usually causing a town or strategic point to continue to be contested for several more hours or days after an allied attack.

My thoughts (mixed in with some of Sea Skimmer's) follow:

Immediate counterattacks worked over and over in WWI; where you could quickly bring up fresh troops from trenches a bit back to throw the enemy out of a trenchline he captured via great cost in blood; and continued to work great in the early days of WWII (1939-1942).

It's basically contigent on the people you're counter-attacking having no decent combined arms doctrine at all.

That was Germany's greatest advantage in WWII - they had a decent workable combined arms doctrine in 1939; which integrated all the weapons they had into coherent battlegroups -- this was a lesson which was pounded over and over into the British Eighth's Army's head over and over again by the Afrika Korps.

While Eighth Army eventually did learn a modicum of combined arms tactics; the rest of the British Army didn't; you still had unsupported attacks by British tank battalions in Normandy, which of course got shot to pieces by the Germans.

The Red Army, far from being the brutal, unsubtle "smash the enemy with bodies" caricatures so beloved by post war Nazi-wank apologists, actually did develop efficient combined arms doctrine beginning in 1943; and developed their own unique idea of combined arms doctrine in time for the great offensives of 1944.

The Soviet multi-echeloned attack; far from being a crude "bury the enemy in bodies" tactic, that some deride it as; is actually a quite brilliant idea and the near-ideal counter to the German counterattack doctrine using the equipment and tools available to the Red Army at the time (even by 1944; the Red Army still had significant command and control gaps and restrictions).

Basically, while the first echelon in any attack will be severely degraded in combat, and will most likely be thrown back by the inevitable German counterattack, the second echelon is coming close behind, and is in an ideal position to destroy the counter-attack with fresh troops.

Post-war the echelonment of forces was developed further by the Soviets as their primary offensive concept for any general European war with NATO.

Continuing this train of thought further, the conclusion develops that Walther Model was really the only German general who adopted to the reality of late-WWII/Modern era combat.

While Model's competitors continued to stick to the doctrine of using infantry strongpoints backed up by mobile reserve mechanized/armored battlegroups for immediate counterattacks; Model developed his elastic defense doctrine, which was probably the correct answer to the multi-echeloned attacks increasingly common from the Allied Armies.

Instead of having a screen of infantry strongpoints which would get destroyed in any serious attack; and relying on scarce mechanized units which were only good for a few counterattacks before their strength was worn down; Model concentrated on multiple lines of defenses echeloned in depth; so that each successive echelon attack was bled against a fresh line of defense.

Thinking further, I can't help but wonder how much Model's elastic defense in depth doctrine was influenced by his experience as Ninth Army commander at Kursk, and having to grind his way through layer after layer of Soviet defenses there.....

EDIT: And a hunch paid off -- I just checked Model's wartime record; and he ended up as CINC of Army Group B in the West from August 1944 onwards -- the time of the "miraculous" German revival of forces in the West. So it's no wonder that the Allied advance began to slow down by the Fall of 1944, with Model in charge, and espousing a multi-echeloned defensive doctrine -- which does explain the astonishingly good performance of German troops in that period -- you can get a bunch of retreads and Volkssturm, and they can fight a good defensive battle with only a little training; but they're useless offensively.

MKSheppard wrote:So I've been reading Armageddon, a fairly recent (2004) work by Max Hastings, and I have to ask; what is it with British writers and their admiration of German Wank?

Hastings continues to insist that the German soldier was superior to all; despite all the evidence that has come out since the early 1980s; when serious historical research began; rather than accepting the Germn Generals at their word.

Max Hastings is, altogether, a pretty piss poor historian and suggesting that his opinion represents that of the majority of British writers is a great disservice to historians like Richard Overy (and to a lesser extent Beevor), who have done much of that serious historical research.

However, I think you're misrepresenting his position here somewhat. Hastings argues that the German soldier was pound for pound the best in the world; not that the Wehrmacht was the best. It's an extremely subjective call that but not that unreasonable given they've only got one serious challenger (Red Army). Citing the superiority of RKKA operational-level doctrine doesn't really disprove his point; if anything, Hastings actually agrees with you.

Immediate counterattacks worked over and over in WWI; where you could quickly bring up fresh troops from trenches a bit back to throw the enemy out of a trenchline he captured via great cost in blood; and continued to work great in the early days of WWII (1939-1942).

It's basically contigent on the people you're counter-attacking having no decent combined arms doctrine at all.

No, it's contingent on the opponents being disorganised and vulnerable after an attack. Here's a letter from an Australian soldier in WW1 that gives the basic gist:

The taking is easy enough + great sport, but the damage is done in holding it; for they know to the very inch the distance they [something –setue] + therefore can shell our newly taken trenches to a nicety + they rely mostly on their biggest shells 9’5” which although not as severe as our 12in naval gun or our 15in gun, throw up mountains of dirt + if it lobs a few yard from trench, the stuff that comes down is enough to fill the trench + bury you. We have nearly all had a turn at being buried, some several times, but I have not yet + if you are not noticed at the time, you are almost certain to have already found your grave.

This was written after the soldier had taken part in the battle of Pozieres, in which the trench they defended was described as 'a watery ditch', and as described in the letter could be caved in by near misses, let alone hits. These lines were held because the Australian infantry had survived the initial attacks largely intact, and thus had numbers available to make a defence even after 12 hours of German shelling had inflicted ~50% casualty rates; they had resupply of ammunition (particularly bombs), and perhaps most crucially of all had proper artillery support. Contrast that to the earlier attack at Fromelles, where the 5th Division's attacking battalions were gutted in the initial attacks, had no support from the flanks and poor artillery support. Even then the decisive element in the battle was the ability of German artillery to cut off the captured trenches at will, so that the remnants of the attacking battalions ran out of ammunition and warm bodies.

Nature of WW2 warfare limited this somewhat, but even in 1944 US infantry units had to learn the value of consolidation the hard way after capturing parts of the Siegfried Line; they'd take a few pillboxes, the German would start shelling, they'd take refuge in the pillboxes, and the German infantry would move up and force a surrender.

Thinking further, I can't help but wonder how much Model's elastic defense in depth doctrine was influenced by his experience as Ninth Army commander at Kursk, and having to grind his way through layer after layer of Soviet defenses there.....

EDIT: And a hunch paid off -- I just checked Model's wartime record; and he ended up as CINC of Army Group B in the West from August 1944 onwards -- the time of the "miraculous" German revival of forces in the West. So it's no wonder that the Allied advance began to slow down by the Fall of 1944, with Model in charge, and espousing a multi-echeloned defensive doctrine -- which does explain the astonishingly good performance of German troops in that period -- you can get a bunch of retreads and Volkssturm, and they can fight a good defensive battle with only a little training; but they're useless offensively.

???

My understanding was that elastic defence was the concept advocated by von Manstein et al and routinely practiced by them on the Russian steppe, and the one which you described above - maintenance of the shoulders of a breakthrough in infantry strongpoints and then the use of mobile reserves (often at operational depth) to counter attack. Everything I've read about Model (and a brief scan of Wikipedia) suggests his defensive tactic was not to give ground but to throw every man available into the maintenance of the frontline, and a doctrine of immediate counterattack. It should be noted that he never faced an offensive from the Red Army when it had perfected 'deep war' in 44-45, and the miraculous revival of the Germans on the West Wall probably owed far more to the man above him at OB West (von Rundstedt) and the calibre of his opponents.

MKSheppard wrote:Hastings continues to insist that the German soldier was superior to all; despite all the evidence that has come out since the early 1980s; when serious historical research began; rather than accepting the Germn Generals at their word.

I think that's good enough reasons not to read the work at all. If you make a book in 2004 not acknowledging 30 years of historiography and recently opened archives, you're a piss poor historian in my book.

I'll second thejester, lumping someone with that bad an attitude with people like Overy or even Beevor is wrong.

As for strategic echelons, that's pretty certain that this concept rose both in the Soviet and German armies simultaneously, but only one had the chance to refine it post-war - the victorious army.

MKSheppard wrote:So I've been reading Armageddon, a fairly recent (2004) work by Max Hastings, and I have to ask; what is it with British writers and their admiration of German Wank?

My guess is it's because people of British descent (including many Americans) are often referred to as Anglo-Saxons, and the Saxons were a Germanic tribe. Basically, they're wanking people with whom they share common ancestors.

Sidewinder wrote:

MKSheppard wrote:So I've been reading Armageddon, a fairly recent (2004) work by Max Hastings, and I have to ask; what is it with British writers and their admiration of German Wank?

My guess is it's because people of British descent (including many Americans) are often referred to as Anglo-Saxons, and the Saxons were a Germanic tribe. Basically, they're wanking people with whom they share common ancestors.

Wow. Ahem...no. The English are not some people who cling to debatable ancestry roots who are about 1600 years old. When the wanking first appears I really cannot say, but the first time was in the 1930s when the media falsely attributed Germany's economic "boom" to Hitler. Before the first world war, most English probably thought little of Prussia if the caricatures in the "Punch" are any indication.

The wanking of Nazis is actually quite a common phenomena which is not confined to british literature. You just tend to notice it a bit more since most of what you read is english. I have for example read very bad Nazi wank in Spanish and French literature for example.

The French probably needed some excuse to explain their terrible performance during WWII.

It would seem that German wank is more the result of their performance during earlier conflicts, such as credit for Waterloo up to the conquest in Alsace Lorraine. The creation of a German Staff was hailed as revolutionary and adopted by the rest of continental armies....

Afterall, it isn't odd to find comments about how if the Germans could break through trenches, the British/French couldn't in WW1 from contemporary records.

PainRack wrote:It would seem that German wank is more the result of their performance during earlier conflicts, such as credit for Waterloo up to the conquest in Alsace Lorraine. The creation of a German Staff was hailed as revolutionary and adopted by the rest of continental armies....

Afterall, it isn't odd to find comments about how if the Germans could break through trenches, the British/French couldn't in WW1 from contemporary records.

Well, that is part of the reason. A very huge part, mind you, starting with 1866 and then moving on to 1871 etc.

However, whenever I read bad german wank it always seems to start with an image of "brilliant german leader on his panzer with lightning speed crushes enemies while supported by the almighty stuka". I'd say the lightning victories in the war did much to give credence to the rise. That and the fact that they inflicted horrendous casualties on the soviets despite having already lost the fight in 1941.

Thanas wrote:Well, that is part of the reason. A very huge part, mind you, starting with 1866 and then moving on to 1871 etc.

However, whenever I read bad german wank it always seems to start with an image of "brilliant german leader on his panzer with lightning speed crushes enemies while supported by the almighty stuka". I'd say the lightning victories in the war did much to give credence to the rise. That and the fact that they inflicted horrendous casualties on the soviets despite having already lost the fight in 1941.

I won't be surprised part of this wank came from the anti-communist sentiment in the late 1940s onwards. Doesn't help that the Germans who were the perpetrators of atrocities in WWII are now US Allies.

That and the fact that they inflicted horrendous casualties on the soviets despite having already lost the fight in 1941.

I think Stas posted statistics showing that this is not actually true, and the Red Army actually got a reasonable kill ratio, all things considered.

A lot of German kills were achieved by murdering captured POWs, too. Hardly a show of great strategic prowess.

PeZook wrote:

That and the fact that they inflicted horrendous casualties on the soviets despite having already lost the fight in 1941.

I think Stas posted statistics showing that this is not actually true, and the Red Army actually got a reasonable kill ratio, all things considered.

A lot of German kills were achieved by murdering captured POWs, too. Hardly a show of great strategic prowess.

IIRC weren't his statistics for the end of the war and not 1941/42?

Straha wrote: IIRC weren't his statistics for the end of the war and not 1941/42?

Well, yeah. But it's misleading to just quote casualty figures from one operation and think they are representative of general quality of military forces ; The Germans achieved strategic surprise in 1941, and then lost the war.

The Wehrmacht may have been the best right then and there in the correct conditions which made that happen, but it doesn't say much. I could easily cite the Arsenal Action, and then go on and claim that Polish resistance fighters were better soldiers than any german, because they achieved a 4:0 kill rate!

IIRC weren't his statistics for the end of the war and not 1941/42?

Why take 1941-1942 alone, instead of a 1941-1945 summary? Also, my count included not only the German Wehrmacht on the Eastern front, but not mobilized Austrians, SS units, and auxillaries (collaborators from the Reich's fascist satellites).

Me, in debate with Voluntaryist wrote:For statistics, I will use the Russian post-war statistical assessment using all loss documents on all fronts by Krivosheev, and for the Germans, I will use the FRG Statistical Institutes official assessment, which is also the official data for Germany (and satellites).

RKKA lost 11.944.100 men as "irrecoverable losses" during the conflicts with Germany and Japan. "Irrecoverable losses" mean KIA, MIA and POW. Of those, 11.932.069 men were lost in the European Front, and 7.373.369 were KIA.

The opposing forces in the European, German-Russian Front were not just Germany alone, but Nazi satellites too. The factual "irrecoverable losses" of Germany (Wehrmacht+battle SS) and satellites were: 8.725.600 men.

Of those, 4.948.300 men of the German Wehrmacht, SS battle formations, including foreign collaborators, and from the Armies of Nazi satellites were KIA on the Eastern Front.

If we compare the German irrecoverable Eastern losses, to the USSR's German front irrecoverable losses, we will get 1:1,36, or the USSR losing on the average around 36% more men. If we compare the KIA ratio, it will be 1,49:1, or the USSR losing on the average around 50% more men.

Is that too drastic a difference? In such a large war, actually no. Especially considering the incredibly high losses inflicted on the yet undeployed Soviet army by the German Wehrmacht in the early war months, and the fact that Germany was far more brutal towards the USSR than it was towards any other adversary.

So people might wonder - what makes up a large part of the disparity between German and Soviet losses? I'll answer. The POWs, upon return, are calculated and substracted from the military "irrecoverable losses".

Out of USSR's POWs, of whom there were 3 396 400 men, over a half - 1 783 000 - were murdered by the Nazis. If we substract those murdered POWs, or at least lower the death toll on Soviet POWs to the relative number of Axis POWs dying in Soviet captivity after Stalingrad and onwards - 11,9% of Axis POWs died in Soviet captivity. That rate applied to the Soviet POWs in the Reich, would mean a total of 373 000 Soviet POW dead - we would have to substract 1 410 000 men from the Soviet total military dead, meaning the ratio of Axis to Soviet losses would be lowered to almost 1:1.

So the higher ratio is not really a testament to Germany's superior warfightng abilities, or it's particular care about it's soldiers - when the war turned on Germany, their army quickly started losing water and 1943-1944 was a breakback where Germany started losing mega-large 500,000-1,000,000 groups in encirclements, just as the USSR lost in 1941 after the German attack.

The higher loss ratio is a profound testament to the brutality of Germany towards the USSR POWs.

Stas Bush wrote:

IIRC weren't his statistics for the end of the war and not 1941/42?

Why take 1941-1942 alone, instead of a 1941-1945 summary?

Because Thanas' post was referring to what took place in 1941 with the initial lightning strikes and not to the entirety of the war.

Straha wrote: Because Thanas' post was referring to what took place in 1941 with the initial lightning strikes and not to the entirety of the war.

Hmm, yeah. I guess you're right: Thanas was writing why idiots think Germans were awesome, after all.

PeZook wrote:

Straha wrote: Because Thanas' post was referring to what took place in 1941 with the initial lightning strikes and not to the entirety of the war.

Hmm, yeah. I guess you're right: Thanas was writing why idiots think Germans were awesome, after all.

To give them due credit, the German advance in 1941 and 42 was an amazing accomplishment. No other advance in history to that point ever capture so much land in so short a time. What they conveniently forget is that the German Army then lost that place in the record book in 1944-45 when they lost more land than any other army had in history to the Red Army.