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Okay, this has been turning over in my head for the past day or so. How might the Nazi invasion of France have worked out in World War 2 if the French had bothered to learn from history and extended the Maginot Line across the Belgian border as well as the German one?

On the strategic level, there are a whole slew of feedback effects that would have come from such a move.
First and most obvious, if the Germans really are facing a consistent, gapless fortress line, they're going to have to come up with a different plan. Possibly an entirely different doctrine of combat- and certainly the specialised tools for the job.

Politically, this one is interesting; it represents hanging the Belgians out to dry, sending a clear message that in the event of hostilities, they are on their own- and that the French do indeed expect hostilities.
Neither of which would constitute a bad thing, IMO; Belgian neutrality benefited no-one, least of all themselves, and a France prepared to take up a more energetically deterrent posture could have done a lot of good in the political atmosphere of the thirties.

Considering how long a fortress line takes to build- as far as I recall the rate and extent of construction of the Maginot line was a matter of budget limitations, not physically moving concrete- it would have needed a more settled political will to do so, from the mid thirties at the latest;
and the real danger there is that you could get another Grandmaison, a gung- ho idiot who moves clear past 'thorough and effective defence' to 'tout le mode a la bataille'- the balance here is delicate, and I don't know enough of the French government of the day to pick an individual or a movement who would be capable of striking that balance. Any suggestions?

So, the French Army has a solid shield. What about the sword? Unless there is more comprehensive remilitarisation and more extensive economic growth kicked of by that, there's going to be less money for anything resembling an offensive arm, and possibly less interest- the actual armoured forces, and inantry doctrine, might be cut to pay for the fortifications.

And there's the southern extension to worry about; the Franco-Italian border. That needs to be protected too.

Any actual direct attack on the Maginot Line would have been very bloody, and probably a failure. It wasn't until much later in the war that there were concrete- piercing bombs capable of doing the mass structural amage needed to reduce something like that, and the Luftwaffe never really did go for them.
The Germans would have needed to find another way round- via Italy, most likely, although there would have been para and perhaps amphibious operations- bloody failures in all probability, unable to get the numbers necessary in place fast enough.

Unless something surprising happens, enormous casualties for slow progress. The Armee de'l Air becomes the most offensive- minded element of the french armed forces; the Luftwaffe gets a kick in the pants pushing it in the direction of heavy bombers- although whether they're smart enough to take the hint is doubtful.

Germany probably snaps up Belgium and Holland, pounds on the Maginot line, give up, dig in, and turn east that much sooner. The Phoney War goes on that much longer, because the best way for either side to break the stalemate is for the other side to try to attack.
The lines shuffle back and forwards a bit, in an endless succession of technically ever more adept and operationally ever more empty bite-and-hold attacks, until the germans break themselves pushing too far, too fast in the east.

I think your dismissing airborne operations way too quickly. The French did not react to fluid situations nearly as fast as the Germans due to command structure and organization, and all it takes is a portion of the line being overwhelmed from behind by an airborne division to create the breakthrough the Germans need to completely shatter the French.

What state of organisation were the german parachute troops in in May 1940, and how much in the way of losses could they afford?

There were certainly individual occasions on which efforts like that succeeded- Eben Emael, for one- but the Maginot line was not a single line, not even a single fortress, it was an interlocking meshwork of mutually supporting fire points with a collective beaten zone kilometres deep.

Consider the evolution of the fortress line; surprisingly, it seems- in Robin Neillands quoting from the Official History- that by late 1917 in the previous war, it was an article of faith that a single fixed defence line could be breached by a properly coordinated attack.

So the trench line evolved into the trench zone, which grew progressively thicker- forward area, fighting area, rear area. The reason I bring this up is that the Maginot line was the penultimate stage of this process, fixed reinforced-concrete bunker lines behind lines, field artillery backing machine guns, itself backed by mutually supporting batteries of heavy artillery, sheltering air observers and counterattack troops.

(The ultimate stage was the defence lines at Kursk, which almost managed to achieve strategic surprise by presenting an unexpectedly deep defence line composed of mobile units moved to the area and fitted into a coherent, mutually supporting plan. That's another topic, though.)

Although it is possible that they would try, that would be a tough task for a regiment of 1940 paratroopers, without much of the antitank kit that evolved later in the war- especially being dropped on the wrong side of it. The very best they could have hoped for, I reckon, is a pyrrhic victory in the style of Crete, which would leave a narrow gap still under fire from the other untaken sections of the line on either side. Rather more likely to get an Arnhem style situation, a bunker too far.

Basically, the options reduce themselves to WW1- style bite and hold, with the heavy price in time and blood that would involve;
special operations- like the airborne effort, which would be like trying to whittle an elephant to death with a scalpel;
ridiculously heavy use of strategic bombers in the tactical role trying to demolish the bunkers- something which the war proves seldom worked, if ever;
bypass entirely and fight the war chiefly in the air.

An airborne division armed with nothing but what they could carry, dispersed, cut-off, and attacking a heavily-defended fortress? They would get massacred.

Eleventh Century Remnant wrote:What state of organisation were the german parachute troops in in May 1940, and how much in the way of losses could they afford?

Long story short, the Dutch Army destroyed the German Paratroopers as an effective unit for the rest of 1940.

Unlike everyone else, the Dutch paid attention to the Norway fighting and the moment they spotted a big mass of planes coming their way, they sent every plane they had against the Ju-52s and massacred them.

More Ju-52s and paratroopers were destroyed or killed in the this operation than were in Crete.

Only a lucky turn of events gave the Germans victory before the Dutch could activate Fortress Holland and then laugh and make fun of the Germans behind their backs.

I think the Germans would have broken the M-line just like they broke the Stalin line, and how the anglo-american forces broke the Atlantic Wall.

It's a matter of knowledge, and germans had the knowledge of non-positional war, which is what the lines were created for.

Breaking through would've probably been quite expensive, though, and might well have ensured no rapid victory over France but instead a much uglier war.

Stas Bush wrote:I think the Germans would have broken the M-line just like they broke the Stalin line, and how the anglo-american forces broke the Atlantic Wall.

It's a matter of knowledge, and germans had the knowledge of non-positional war, which is what the lines were created for.

The Germans DID attempt to break a part of the line in the southernmost segment of the advance and it took them several days, every one of the most experienced engineer battalions along with the heaviest guns they could mount and they still only managed to break the segment because gun smoke from the French guns didn't ventilate enough and started choking the defenders. Even then it still took most of a day of an actual assault in addition to the week or so of logistics neccesarry to bring the units up for the job. Had the garrison had mobile units supporting them, even some light infantry, the German attack would have been decimated. There were still units from the line actively fighting up until the Vichy government finally surrendered several weeks after Dunkirk.

Well, technically the Germans were adept enough at killing the forts, even if it would lead to heavier losses. They did not exactly "round" the Maginot line but instead, they went through it's weaker part. Still they destroyed several forts on the way, and it has also shown a problem with positional emplacements.

On 17th of May 1940, the Germans opened fire on the La Fer fortification. On 18th of May the garrison troops left two casemates with 75-mm guns, and the Germans started making way into the fort territory. The neighbor Le Shen fort tried to support the defenders of La Fer, but the casemates were placed too far and were thus out of range.

By 19th May La Fer was captured, opening a straight road into France. Between 20 and 23 may, germans obliterated all four Maubege fortifications. Operations "Tiger" and "Bear" used 420-mm atillery, bombers and assault units.

In Belgium, the Germans also fought againt forts. 305 and 355 mm guns were effective in destroying fort Battice.

Yes, it wasn't easy and certainly no cakewalk, but they managed to break the forts - an ability which they had shown later too. Yes, the war would get dragged, but not for a too long a term.

Are there any good books on the construction and design of the Maginot line?

The thing that irks me is that neither the French or the Belgians learned a lesson from the German invasion of France through "neutral" Belgium in WWI; the Belgians refused to let France and England station soldiers on their territory, and the French thought German concerns on escalating a war would STOP THEM from violating Belgian "neutrality" to get to France AGAIN.

But as Charles de Gaulle noted before the German invasion of Poland, the money spent on the Maginot Line would've been better used on a mobile force, i.e., ARMORED and MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISIONS, which can take the initiative instead of simply reacting to enemy movements, the only option available with static defenses.

Um...the French did learn from history, perhaps far too much. Their plan was to move the bulk of the French Army into Belgium and meet the German Army head on, ensuring that the positional battles that developed would occur outside of France - the same purpose the Maginot Line had been built to serve. The German plan was deliberately tailored to this - an initial invasion of Belgium and Holland to draw the Allies in and then the crushing blow to the flank.

thejester wrote:Um...the French did learn from history, perhaps far too much. Their plan was to move the bulk of the French Army into Belgium and meet the German Army head on, ensuring that the positional battles that developed would occur outside of France - the same purpose the Maginot Line had been built to serve.

Okay, let me rephrase that: the French learned the wrong lessons from WWI, i.e., trying to avoid the nastiness of trench warfare by digging better entrenchments (the Germans learned the right lessons, i.e., using blitzkrieg to avoid that nastiness). That doesn't excuse the Belgians' stupidity ("Let France station soldiers on Belgian soil? Perish the thought! Oh, they don't want the Germans to attack them through our country AGAIN? Too bad! Oh, the Germans would fuck up our country on their way to fuck up the French AGAIN? Gee, I was so indignant over the idea of letting the French violate Belgian neutrality, that I didn't think, 'What if the Germans violate our neutrality?'").

Maybe, maybe not. The battles the French planned to fight were not that dissimilar to the ones the Allies did end up fighting in 1944-45 along the German border; and ultimately the Maginot Line was a reflection of the need to keep the Germans out of France's most critical industrial areas and her demographic disadvantage.

Jason L. Miles wrote:Are there any good books on the construction and design of the Maginot line?

YES. Fortress Europe by J.E. Kaufmann is an incredible resource on the Maginot line and countless other fortifications spread across Europe in WW2. Its cheap too, if you have any interest in the subject of WW2 fortifications it’s a purchase you could not ever regret. Lots of photographs and diagrams to go with the text.

Stas Bush wrote: On 17th of May 1940, the Germans opened fire on the La Fer fortification. On 18th of May the garrison troops left two casemates with 75-mm guns, and the Germans started making way into the fort territory. The neighbor Le Shen fort tried to support the defenders of La Fer, but the casemates were placed too far and were thus out of range.

One must remember that entire sector was the extream western end of the Maginot line. In fact it wasn't even part of the formal line, it was an an extension designed and constructed latter. Its artillery positions did not mutually support each other so as to cover more ground cheaply and quickly. La Fer was literally the very last fort in this line extension; naturally this left it very exposed to any sort of attack. The forts at Maubeuge consisted of pre WW1 forts with concrete positions for ouvrages poured inside of them. These ouvrages fell far short of the standards of petits ouvrages in the line proper, let alone the gros ouvrages of the strongest sectors.

The Germans did have success against several of the higher quality petits ouvrages as well, but no gros ouvrages fell to enemy attack, and it wasn't for a lack of trying. In any case all those assaults took several days during which the Maginot line had little support. The line was NEVER meant to stop an invasion without the direct support of artillery and infantry from the field army, and for this reason few positions had weapons heavier then 75mm guns and 81mm mortars.


The allied left hook into Belgium historically deprived the line of most of this support. Place the main allied army behind the line and each fort would have an immense amount of artillery to call down in its own defence. Given this proper level of support I see no reason why an extended Maginot line could not have bogged down the Germans. Even knocking out several major forts would provide only a narrow gap for an armored invasion force, which would then face much larger allied counter attacks. Overall the allies had more firepower, more tanks, and more tactical and strategic mobility then the Germans, it was just used absurdly poorly. The Maginot line is more scapegoat then folly as I see it, on tanks and trucks bought in the 1920s would have been worn out and obsolete junk by 1940.

Course, France could never have afforded extending the line to the sea on any worthwhile scale so this whole discussion is a bit meaningless. Spend that much extra money on any sort of land weapon and the allies could win. keep the allied army in France and the allies could win. Have the Germans attack in a different sector and the allies could win... certainly the Battle For France was not a forgone conclusion even with the historical allied forces. Sufficiently bad leadership and command can let any army lose any battle.

The Maginot line is more scapegoat then folly as I see it

I would agree. Poor command and the lack of a decisive counterattack doomed France.

I've read accounts of foreign pilots who fought in France in 1940, who encountered things like French pilots refusing to engage German planes upon spotting them.

I wonder if this lack of agressiveness was endemic to the French armed forces in 1940? If it was, the problem seems to have ran deeper than simply bad leadership...

Well, they used to point posters "Lets' not shoot at each other" and share some wine with the enemy encampments during the phony war IIRC. Don't know if that's not a rumor however.

PeZook wrote:I've read accounts of foreign pilots who fought in France in 1940, who encountered things like French pilots refusing to engage German planes upon spotting them.

I wonder if this lack of agressiveness was endemic to the French armed forces in 1940? If it was, the problem seems to have ran deeper than simply bad leadership...

Source?
That would go quite against the traditional French doctrine of "Overwhelming attack"/"Atacck, attack, unstoppable attack", which was self evident from even before Napoleon turned it into an art form.

Sounds suspiciously like anti-French stuff (Not that I usually mind that), as I recall, the main problem was that the German squadrons were far better coordinated, and in many cases were far better technically/hardware (Unlike the case of the ground forces, where the French had better tanks, but no combined arms/control on the German level, hobbling them along with the infantry)

DEATH wrote: Source?
That would go quite against the traditional French doctrine of "Overwhelming attack"/"Atacck, attack, unstoppable attack", which was self evident from even before Napoleon turned it into an art form.

It does ; Hence why I'm suspicious of these accounts, especially since tis kind of thing is completely unreliable under the best of circumstances.

It was a book about Squadron 303 ; I don't remember the title offhand, so I'll post it once I get home.

DEATH wrote:Sounds suspiciously like anti-French stuff (Not that I usually mind that), as I recall, the main problem was that the German squadrons were far better coordinated, and in many cases were far better technically/hardware (Unlike the case of the ground forces, where the French had better tanks, but no combined arms/control on the German level, hobbling them along with the infantry)

It's not quite that ; The French did have full armored divisions in addition to tanks sprinkled around with infantry units, but they were used horribly inefficiently.

There were morale problems with the French.

"Ils ne sont pas mechants" (germans are not thugs) and "if we start shooting, we'd start shooting too!" were French slogans when the armies waited against each other deployed in the Phony War. Apparently the French were not so eager to get into a fullscale war with Germany over Poland.

A lot of the Phony War events which could be termed "cowardice" with the hindsight knowledge we have now were detailed in Fuller's "World War II" monography.

Sidewinder wrote:But as Charles de Gaulle noted before the German invasion of Poland, the money spent on the Maginot Line would've been better used on a mobile force, i.e., ARMORED and MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISIONS, which can take the initiative instead of simply reacting to enemy movements, the only option available with static defenses.

Bad idea. You'd have ended up with a whole bunch of little tanklets, and mass obsolescence; like what happened to Italy in WWII -- they armed too early, and ended up fighting with weapons that were good for 1936-37 or so; but horribul for 1940-43

MKSheppard wrote:

Sidewinder wrote:But as Charles de Gaulle noted before the German invasion of Poland, the money spent on the Maginot Line would've been better used on a mobile force, i.e., ARMORED and MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISIONS, which can take the initiative instead of simply reacting to enemy movements, the only option available with static defenses.

Bad idea. You'd have ended up with a whole bunch of little tanklets, and mass obsolescence; like what happened to Italy in WWII -- they armed too early, and ended up fighting with weapons that were good for 1936-37 or so; but horribul for 1940-43

Moreover France spent money on Armored units, they actually counted more and better tanks than the Germans did in 1940. The problem was how they were organized. The French used them as basically heavy machine gun units organizc to the infantry divisions instead of massing them into armored unit capable of rapid counter-attack. Solving that structural problem with the organization of the French would have helped a lot but the cost would be minimal aside from the time to train officers and men in the concept of mobile warfare.