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So the thread in OT got me to thinking. I believe we've all heard the "US was lucky the Japanese didn't..." aspects of the attack, but I for one have never heard any real discussion on what would have happened if the Japanese had bombed the fuel depots, the carriers were in port at the time of the attack, and so on. So since we have this forum and it's on my mind, I thought I'd go ahead and ask here.

1) What if the US carriers were in port on December 7, 1941?

2) What if the Japanese had done those follow-up attacks? To hit the submarine pens, fuel storage, and so on?

3) Anything I missed?

Are we taking this all as one or what?

Even if the carriers are there and the Japanese commit to follow-up strikes which destroy the sizeable support infrastructure all without suffering immense casualties without doing so it merely delays the inevitable.

Japan is still going to be crushed by a wave of American ships and it will still suffer atomic attack, just maybe a year or two later.

That NOS Guy wrote:Are we taking this all as one or what?

Even if the carriers are there and the Japanese commit to follow-up strikes which destroy the sizeable support infrastructure all without suffering immense casualties without doing so it merely delays the inevitable.

Japan is still going to be crushed by a wave of American ships and it will still suffer atomic attack, just maybe a year or two later.

If America's nuclear ultimatum was delayed by a year or two, is it possible that the Soviet Union would have succeeded in occupying Japan? How would that have altered history?

RogueIce wrote:1) What if the US carriers were in port on December 7, 1941?

The Japanese can do some more carnage in the Pacific while we repair the carriers and build more.

2) What if the Japanese had done those follow-up attacks? To hit the submarine pens, fuel storage, and so on?

Carrier aviation of the time didn't really have the ordinance to do the job.

The task force was also running out of fuel. Can you imagine going back to Japan, "Yes, we had to abandon half of our destroyers." I will bet that would go over well. Even with a victory, I will bet there would be some sacking.

RogueIce wrote:
1) What if the US carriers were in port on December 7, 1941?

It wouldn't have made a lick of difference. The IJN could have sunk every ship in the Navy during 1941 and by 1945, they would still be facing an overwhelming opponent.

2) What if the Japanese had done those follow-up attacks? To hit the submarine pens, fuel storage, and so on?

Presuming they could even pull it off, again nothing. Most of the Navy's submarines were in the Philippines anyway. Eliminating the dry dock facilities and fuel storage yards would slow the Navy down, but it would hardly bring it to a stop.

3) Anything I missed?

Personally I think a more interesting what if scenario would be if the Japanese' worst nightmare came true, and their fleet was discovered or attacked long before it was within range of the harbor. Yamamoto and his staff were pretty doubtful of the operation, and were ready to call it off at the slightest hint of American reaction.

I refer you to this article, which, although it talks about midway, really hammers home the point that Japan could never have won the war.

CaptHawkeye wrote:Personally I think a more interesting what if scenario would be if the Japanese' worst nightmare came true, and their fleet was discovered or attacked long before it was within range of the harbor. Yamamoto and his staff were pretty doubtful of the operation, and were ready to call it off at the slightest hint of American reaction.

If they were obviously discovered beforehand and had lost the element of surprise, the staff would certainly have tried to abort the mission, but I think politically they'd be unable to do so.

Yeah, the Japanese Government probably wouldn't take "no" for an answer from the IJN. Their entire strategy revolved around crippling the Pacific Fleet so the Phillipines and Malaya couldn't count on the cavalry valiantly showing up to save the day. They'd probably just tell Yamamoto to steam off suicidally into death. Where he'd be subjected to relentless air attack from Hawaii's huge aircraft garrison and Halsey's carriers. God help him if the battleships and submarines sortie.

The war would end faster.

Let me put it this way: right before the war, in 1940, the US decided to go shopping.

They ordered eighteen fucking aircraft carriers. The entire (misguided) Japanese strategy revolved around causing enough casualties to the Americans to force them to the negotiating table: the problem with this strategy was, of course, that forcing a humilitating peace would only set the stage for a later conflict. One with a hugely up-armed US lusting for revenge.

In a way, Pearl Harbor was a huge mistake (if a brilliant operation), because it left Americans seriously lusting for blood. So even if the Japanese sunk all seven fleet carriers, decimated the US Navy and forced negotiation...ten years later, the US would come back with literally hundreds of brand new naval ships and atomic weapons. Boom.

Perhaps, but if a swift political defeat (before Hitler declares war on the USA) has happened, the US might not be so keen to get itself involved in other wars (including the European War), leaving Britain and the USSR to deal with the Axis. Of course, they will manage to do it and utterly crush Axis opponents somewhere along a similar, maybe more protracted timeline.

But what then? The US has not dived into the European war, Japan has achieved a relatively safe theater of operations for the interim. It's Asian holds may or may not be occupied in a putative Japanese-Soviet conflict, but what then?

The USA largely fell out of the political process which made it one of the superpowers after World War II; yes, it has enormous industrial capacity, but would it be willing to risk a war that might upset the fragile peace balance in the world? Would it just go apeshit against the Japanese, or would it look out for other powers, considering their potential rise while the USA bogs down in the post-war conflict with still-existing Japan?

That is assuming Japan can force the USA to any kind of peace. If hostilities carry on, Japan is doomed either way.

PeZook wrote:Let me put it this way: right before the war, in 1940, the US decided to go shopping.

They ordered eighteen fucking aircraft carriers. The entire (misguided) Japanese strategy revolved around causing enough casualties to the Americans to force them to the negotiating table: the problem with this strategy was, of course, that forcing a humilitating peace would only set the stage for a later conflict. One with a hugely up-armed US lusting for revenge.

In a way, Pearl Harbor was a huge mistake (if a brilliant operation), because it left Americans seriously lusting for blood. So even if the Japanese sunk all seven fleet carriers, decimated the US Navy and forced negotiation...ten years later, the US would come back with literally hundreds of brand new naval ships and atomic weapons. Boom.

The article I posted shows it in even more drastic terms - even if the americans had lost all carriers, within one year the USA would have gained numerical superiority. An excerpt, better analysis in the article.

So there would be no way the USA would stay out of it. And Hitler, the nutcase he was, immediately declared war after the attack, so there is no way the USA would stay out of the european theater.

Stas Bush wrote:Perhaps, but if a swift political defeat (before Hitler declares war on the USA) has happened, the US might not be so keen to get itself involved in other wars (including the European War), leaving Britain and the USSR to deal with the Axis. Of course, they will manage to do it and utterly crush Axis opponents somewhere along a similar, maybe more protracted timeline.

Winning a political victory would be pretty much impossible in the four days between Pearl and Hitler's declaration of war, though

Even in case of victory at Midway (not that much of a long shot, BTW - all that was needed for it was a slightly reworked plan) it's still unlikely they could force a peace on anything like the terms they wanted. They'd pretty much have to destroy all West Coast shipyards for that to happen...

PeZook wrote:Let me put it this way: right before the war, in 1940, the US decided to go shopping.

They ordered eighteen fucking aircraft carriers. The entire (misguided) Japanese strategy revolved around causing enough casualties to the Americans to force them to the negotiating table: the problem with this strategy was, of course, that forcing a humilitating peace would only set the stage for a later conflict. One with a hugely up-armed US lusting for revenge.

Technically it was more than 18. Unless you count the Essex class only of which there were 24, but there's also the smaller Independence class which was far more numerous.

Unless you count the Essex class only of which there were 24, but there's also the smaller Independence class which was far more numerous.

The Independence class only amounted to 9 ships; you're probably thinking of the ~120-odd hulls that comprise the USN's three classes of merchantman-based escort carriers.

The 1940 Plan did call for 18 aircraft carriers, 13 Essex class and 5 CVEs. On the outbreak of war 11 Essex’s had been ordered, two more followed very shortly after. The Essex class was then expanded to be…. 32 ships! Of these 30 were ordered, 26 laid down and 24 completed. The US also added in plans for six Midways, of which only two would be completed just after the war, in early 1942, and in January 1942 acted on an existing proposal by ordering the conversion of the 9 Cleveland’s to light carriers. The two ship Saipan class was added in sometime in 1943 for no particularly good reason, and completed postwar as well.

The only way I can see for Japan to win the war would have been to entice an intact US fleet to a fleet action very early in the war, ideally in December. This would come only after a declaration of war giving at least two DAYS of warning.

Historically US carrier pilot and plane quality was quite poor in December 1941 and our automatic AA batteries were very weak, all of this improved immensely by the Coral Sea and Midway thanks to months of hard work. Kido Butai meanwhile quite clearly had aviators who could sink anything they could attack. It would not be unreasonable to expect it to sink the American carriers, and then sink a couple American battleships in conjunction with land based bombers. If the Japanese surface forces could then force an action with a weakened American force, Japan might just win its decisive battle. If the moon was just right… America might even agree to peace terms which leave the Philippines Independent while Japan is assured access to oil.

Problem is, such a plan is nothing but risk, and if it fails, it would mean Japan has delayed its attack on South Asia by at least a month, if not two while it redeploys its fleet.

I remember that was one documentary, where historians and naval officers did a simulation if the US pacific fleet decides to leave port and engage the IJN.

The result is the loss of more warships, and several warships can't be repaired easily because of the deeper waters when you are engaging the enemy in the open sea.

Oh, you mean when they fucking rolled dice and did a table top wargame as a "simulation"?


Yes, that was brillant!

I remember the ONE Naval Officer that was there was pissed off at how the wargamers came to their conclusion.

Lonestar wrote:Oh, you mean when they fucking rolled dice and did a table top wargame as a "simulation"?


Yes, that was brillant!

I remember the ONE Naval Officer that was there was pissed off at how the wargamers came to their conclusion.

Don't think that the one. If I remember correctly, they used computers to calculate the damage of a bomb or torpedo and etc.

ray245 wrote:I remember that was one documentary, where historians and naval officers did a simulation if the US pacific fleet decides to leave port and engage the IJN.

The result is the loss of more warships, and several warships can't be repaired easily because of the deeper waters when you are engaging the enemy in the open sea.

That ignores the fact that if the Pacific Fleet had enough warning to sortie, then the fighters at Wheeler Field would also have had enough warning to scramble and provide the fleet with continuous air cover. On the other hand, the old battleships are simply not fast enough to catch the Japanese force if they decide to flee; the smaller ships based at Pearl are, but given those other ships consisted of just 6 light and 2 heavy cruisers (one of which was in overhaul), plus about 2 dozen destroyers, I would not feel confident sending them against the surface escorts of the Kido Butai, which included two Kongo-class battlecruisers. Then again, the Japanese force was operating at the extreme envelope of their maximum range, so forcing them to flee might cause them to burn through too much fuel to make it home safely.

That is an interesting idea...US Battleships chasing at 20 knots with their huge bunkerage in many cases and forcing the Japanese ships to run away at 20 knots and running themselves out of fuel.

Also perhaps chasing them into a trap formed by Enterprise and Lexington

Much as I love the Standards I doubt they'd get the dream job of broadsiding Japanese carriers. Just too damn slow. Hawaii's aircraft garrison would probably end up having most of the fun.

The Japanese had a whole hoard of submarines deployed around Oahu precisely to counter a sortie by the American fleet. Japanese subs did poorly in the war overall, but they certainly proved they could torpedo American carriers and battleships in 1941-1942.

Now the first air fleet withdrew the same way it came, from the west north. Without significant forewarning neither America carrier could think about an ambush, but Enterprise was in a position to mount a head on attack. But to do that she had to not only know about the attack, she had to know the Japanese location promptly, as it was she flew off a number of searches in support of those launched from Oahu and found nothing. In fact she actually flew off a couple different strikes on December 7th and 8th in response to erroneous reports of Japanese forces. Trying to run the Japanese down over time wasn’t going to happen, they had the fuel budget for a quick withdrawal and the north pacific is awful big.

Also note that on December 7th between the two of them the American carriers had just 31 embarked fighters, 17 x F2A-3 Buffalos on Lexington, and 14 x F4F Wildcats on Enterprise. A handful more of each ships fighters had been left behind on Oahu, about 10 total as I recall. I don’t recall specifics on the dive bombers and torpedo planes, but it wasn’t a good situation either. Enterprise in fact flew off her dive bomber squadron to land on Oahu in the morning, and had it fly right into the Japanese attack, losing several aircraft to Zero’s and friendly AA fire.

How things would work out would depend a very great deal on just how much warning the American forces got. I mean… if it was really significant warning the Japanese might have outright aborted the attack after detecting the surge in US radio traffic and seeing the fleet sortie. Most likely though we'd have inflicted major damage on the Japanese strikes, and sunk or damaged 1-2 carriers. American air power land and sea based is greater then that at Midway, but Midway was hardly typical results for an attack.

Yeah, everything i've seen indicates that even if they had a day of warning before the attack, Halsey was in no position to do anything about it much to his disbelief. I figure Hawaii's aircraft garrison will do most of the defensive work.

I'm not sure how much damage the subs could be counted on to cause. If an attack was coming the Pacific Fleet's DDs would probably start combing the entrance of the harbor and surrounding area for precaution, especially if Ward or another DD trips over a sub. If the battleships leave the harbor and operate at full speed that leaves the submarines with a very small window to attack them. Poor old Oklahoma could bring the line down to 19 kts on most days, but that's still way faster than a sub's underwater max. No matter how you cut it, the Pacific Fleet will be directly affected by how much warning time they have.

CaptHawkeye wrote:Much as I love the Standards I doubt they'd get the dream job of broadsiding Japanese carriers. Just too damn slow. Hawaii's aircraft garrison would probably end up having most of the fun.

It is mostly just random exploration. I have a source which indicates that Lexington and Enterprise were deployed in the Pacific but not exact positions.

One item I am not sure is the weather of that exact time. Given bad enough weather, the Standards might be able to at least outrun the destroyers.