StarDestroyer.Net BBS

Having committed to fighting Lee's army on Marye's Heights, is there any way that the Federal Army could have substantially changed the outcome of the day's action? Consequently, are there any mistakes that the Confederates could have made which would have hurt them?

Even if Franklin's troops were committed to supporting Meade's assault against Jackson's position on the Confederate right, success would still have been a long shot for the Federals, I think.

Obviously, from a Federal point of view the battle shouldn't have been fought at all. That being said, was General Burnside at all justified in his decision to wait for the pontoon bridges to cross the Rhappahannock?

irishmick79 wrote:Having committed to fighting Lee's army on Marye's Heights, is there any way that the Federal Army could have substantially changed the outcome of the day's action? Consequently, are there any mistakes that the Confederates could have made which would have hurt them?

Against the heights? No way. An uphill assault against heavily entrenched enemy positions backed by substantial artillery support? You can't commit a large enough force to dislodge the Confederates.

Even if Franklin's troops were committed to supporting Meade's assault against Jackson's position on the Confederate right, success would still have been a long shot for the Federals, I think.

Meade was able to hold his breakthrough in Jackson's lines unsupported for quite some time, certainly long enough for reserves to be brought up. But even then, Jackson could still afford to respond with a sizable force of his own and, having been to Jackson's line, it's not the kind of terrain that you can really exploit a breakthrough in any substantial way.

Obiously, from a Federal point of view the battle shouldn't have been fought at all. That being said, was General Burnside at all justified in his decision to wait for the pontoon bridges to cross the Rhappahannock?

How else would they have crossed? Boats? Confederate sharpshooters would have had a field day, and if Lee suddenly appeared before enough of the army got across, there'd be no way to quickly retreat or dispatch reinforcements.

Burnside had, in my view, a talent at making good plans. He got to Fredericksburg days before Lee did, nearly rolled up the Confederate right flank at Antietam, and almost ended the siege at Petersburg at the Crater months ahead of time. But his plans never work perfectly, and the man can't adapt to changing circumstances. His entire campaign strategy hinged on the pontoon bridges being there when he reached the river. So when they got held up by Halleck, he just went ahead as if nothing had changed (albiet retreating would have been tantamount to a humiliation), and the Battle of Fredericksburg is the result.

In Burnside's defence, the pressure he was under must be understood. For one thing, he was not entirely happy commanding the Army of the Potomac, since its previous commander had been McLellan, a family friend to whom he was personally loyal. To Burnside, taking his job must have felt like committing an act of treachery. More to the point, it would not merely be a humiliation to withdraw in the face of the entrenched Confederates. From a military perspective it was the sensible thing to do, but Burnside was under constant pressure from Washington to attack, by politicians who were under similar pressure from a Northern press and public thirsting for big victories. Failure to deliver would put careers on the line.

Overall, there was little Burnside could have done at Fredericksburg to improve matters. His plan, for Sumner and Hooker to attack head on while Franklin breaks through the less well-defended Confederate right (the sunken Telegraph Road did not extend that far) was quite logical and might very well have worked. The head-on attack, though apparently suicidal, was necessary to tie-up the Confederate left and centre. As for Franklin's attack, Meade and Gibbon's divisions succeeded in breaking through Hill's division, but were not supported (Birney was for some reason unwilling to take orders from a General of equal rank), thus being driven back once Pickett managed to reinforce Longstreet.

TC Pilot wrote:Burnside had, in my view, a talent at making good plans. He got to Fredericksburg days before Lee did, nearly rolled up the Confederate right flank at Antietam, and almost ended the siege at Petersburg at the Crater months ahead of time. But his plans never work perfectly, and the man can't adapt to changing circumstances. His entire campaign strategy hinged on the pontoon bridges being there when he reached the river. So when they got held up by Halleck, he just went ahead as if nothing had changed (albiet retreating would have been tantamount to a humiliation), and the Battle of Fredericksburg is the result.

Honestly that says everything right there. Burnside would likely have been a great G-3 in the modern understanding. Though I think the "Grand Division" structure was probably a foolish idea without sufficient rank structure to permit a higher ranking General in charge of each. While the modern idea is to have Armies composed of Corps all under an Army Group this is permitted by the additional ranks of LtGen and Gen. With the Corps commanders holding rank equal to hat of the "Grand Division" commanders there were bound to be issues.

Burnside just had a lot of bad luck too. He gets slammed by some historians for bottling up his entire corps trying to force a crossing at a bridge at Antietam, yet actually going to the site, it's obvious that there really wasn't any alternative (although trying to force a crossing at a bridge that can only fit 2 men across with a huge ridge facing you isn't exactly a great idea) crossings he could have taken without being mowed down, or is held responsible for the debacle at the Crater, even though the black troops that had been specifically drilled for the operation were suddenly swapped out for white soldiers who just bumbled in (Meade apparently didn't like having a corps commander who outranked him).

Hell, had the pontoon bridges gotten to Fredericksburg on time, Burnside would have been on top of Richmond before Lee even knew what hit him.

He was stubborn, but he was far and away a better commander than McClellan (whose stubbornness meant he refused to fight) or Hooker (who just completely sucked).

Plus he gave us sideburns, so he can't be all bad.

With the Corps commanders holding rank equal to hat of the "Grand Division" commanders there were bound to be issues.

I only know this in passing, but I seem to recall Franklin's orders to Birney were incredibly ambiguous, like that they ordered him to advance at his own discretion, rather than to advance to relieve Meade, although I could be misremembering some other battle.

TC Pilot wrote:Hell, had the pontoon bridges gotten to Fredericksburg on time, Burnside would have been on top of Richmond before Lee even knew what hit him.

He was stubborn, but he was far and away a better commander than McClellan (whose stubbornness meant he refused to fight) or Hooker (who just completely sucked).

If Hooker's order to Howard had been obeyed and he secured the Right Flank then the Confederate II corps would have shattered itself against the Federal right, Reynolds would have been able to reinforce and possibly turn their flank and the whole time Meade was in reserve. So in shorter form if Hooker's orders had been obeyed he would have crushed Lee in direct battle and won the war in '63. If Meade had assaulted Lee prior to crossing the Potomac or as he was crossing then he would have shattered the army and won the war in '63. Those are both some big ifs but no more iffy than Burnside's bridges. In all three cases the ifs didn't fall where they needed to and the commanders made poor follow on choices that compounded the error.

As to Hooker he did excelelnt during the Penninsular and Anteitam Campagins and was also notable during Lookout Mountain so I would hesitate to call him a failure. Rather both he and Burnside (and Meade though he got lucky being able to fight defensively in PA) had the same problme of being fine Divisional Commanders and rather strong Corps commanders who simply lacked the neccessarry skill set to move to the next level of command. They simply weren't suited to commanding that large of a body of men and it hurt them even though they were fine as subordinates to the Army commander. I would guess, as a broad generalizaiton, that they lacked the ability to both organize the Army level assets in terms of the artillery reserve, the supply train, the enginners, etc while also retaining solid oepraitonal control over their subordinate Corps Commanders. As Corps Commanders they were supplied with both direction (in terms of the campaign plan) and a fair deal of logistical supprot that they simply had to organize...they didn't have to plan for it.

Yeah, Lee had pretty much everything going against him at Chancellorsville: the winter had decimated his troops, Longstreet was off in the Western Theater, and Hooker was at least smart enough to divide his massively larger army in order to force Lee to do so as well, which funny enough led to the less well known Second Battle of Fredericksburg. Short of modern weaponry, the conditions under which the Union drove the Confederates off the heights at 2nd Fredericksburg were the only ones anyone could hope to carry that ground with.

If Franklin had come forward with his whole corps at the start like Burnside wanted him to, he probably would have been able to knock Jackson off of the heights. Meade's division did pretty solidly on its own, and an all out attack probably could have held the ground (after all, Meade did take the heights, he just couldn't hold it). It probably wouldn't have let Burnside beat Lee in a race to Richmond, but it would have forced Lee to give up Marye's Heights, at least. In all likelihood, though, the troubles that Burnside was having getting the army to obey his orders the way he wanted would have foiled him at some point down the line. Hooker was openly plotting against him from the get-go, and that wouldn't have ended well no matter how many battles Burnside managed to win.

He did get screwed at the Crater. I had always been under the impression, though, that Meade and Grant were hesitant to use the black troops because they didn't want to come off as callous if the attack failed. Then, of course, the black troops were sent into the crater to retrieve an impossible situation, and Meade and Grant came off as callous anyway. The white troops still might have been able to win the fight, though, if Robert Ledley, the division commander, was commanding his division instead of getting drunk in his tent.

CarsonPalmer wrote:If Franklin had come forward with his whole corps at the start like Burnside wanted him to, he probably would have been able to knock Jackson off of the heights. Meade's division did pretty solidly on its own, and an all out attack probably could have held the ground (after all, Meade did take the heights, he just couldn't hold it).

Thing is, if Franklin pushed an all-out attack, Lee could easily just commit part of Longstreet's corps on the "Left Grand Division's" right while Jackson sends up his reserves to hold him (rather than press a counter-attack) and simply outflank him, since Franklin was essentially unsupported at a bridgehead on the Rappahannock. Even if Burnside launched a concurrent attack on the heights, Lee could still reinforce Jackson, since no army could have hoped to storm that position. He couldn't even count on much artillery support, given the weather and terrain. Hell, Stuart's cavalry could have even tried to slip behind Franklin's left and wreck the bridge. Now that would be a disaster.

It probably wouldn't have let Burnside beat Lee in a race to Richmond, but it would have forced Lee to give up Marye's Heights, at least.

True. The Army of Northern Virginia almost always moved faster than the Army of the Potomac, even when someone like Grant took over. Plus Lee would still hold the main road to Richmond. So yeah, no way he could outrun Lee.

[quote="TC Pilot"][quote="CarsonPalmer"]If Franklin had come forward with his whole corps at the start like Burnside wanted him to, he probably would have been able to knock Jackson off of the heights. Meade's division did pretty solidly on its own, and an all out attack probably could have held the ground (after all, Meade did take the heights, he just couldn't hold it).[/quote]

Thing is, if Franklin pushed an all-out attack, Lee could easily just commit part of Longstreet's corps on the "Left Grand Division's" right while Jackson sends up his reserves to hold him (rather than press a counter-attack) and simply outflank him, since Franklin was essentially unsupported at a bridgehead on the Rappahannock. Even if Burnside launched a concurrent attack on the heights, Lee could [i]still[/i] reinforce Jackson, since [i]no[/i] army could have hoped to storm that position. He couldn't even count on much artillery support, given the weather and terrain. Hell, Stuart's cavalry could have even tried to slip behind Franklin's left and wreck the bridge. Now [i]that[/i] would be a disaster.[/quote]

Even an extra division would have done the trick, though. Meade got to the road network, he just couldn't hold it. If Franklin came forward then and there, Jackson would have been broken up before Longstreet's corps got there. In fact, if Meade had an extra half-hour before Jackson's counterattack, he might have held the heights anyway. His men weren't exhausted or dead, just badly disorganized. An extra division would have given him time to get his own men back in order.