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I'm currently reading The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors by James Hornfischer.

He mentions the Sho-1 plan, which involved sending Japan's remaining heavy battleships and other surface combatants against the US transports at Leyte. However, it said that there was a lot of opposition to this plan. Some opponents of the plan thought that the IJN's last battle shouldn't be wasted against lowly transports. The thinking was that they should be sent against the US carriers.

I agree with the original plan that it was smarter to attack the transports, but that's just me. If either attacking the transports or the carriers was successful, which would have hurt the US campaign the most?

Also, assuming the large surface ships (Yamato, Musashi, heavy cruisers, etc.) were able to successfelly get to the carriers, how effective would they be? Would the results still mainly be the same?

If we assume Oldendorf's battleship force was lured away, did the carriers have enough surface protection to fight off the IJN ships? Woud it mean basically sacrificing all the surface warships immediately with the carriers? Were USN submarines nearby, and if so were they able to come to a rapid defense of the carriers?

If the carrier's main force of planes were off attacking the IJN carriers (which were used as bait in real life, as well), how would the IJN battleships fare? Would the standing CAP be of any use? Perhaps the carriers could have simply turned and outran the battlewagons?

I'm also interested in some technical information. How effective would battleship shells be against the carriers? Did they have a realistic shot at disabling a majority of the carriers?

Sorry for the multitude of questions, but I just realized how much I'd like to know about this subject. I haven't finished the book yet so maybe some of these questions are answered, but I doubt it. Thanks to anyone who has any answers or insights!

IIRC, the fast carrier task forces also had fast battleships (Iowas, SoDaks, etc.), heavy cruisers, destroyers, in addition to the hordes of aircraft. To say nothing of the IJN actually catching the speedy US task forces.

Really in the end it wouldn't have even mattered if the Japanese had sunk the US Carriers, because the US would have been able to replace those losses very quickly.

The fire support/surface action element of Seventh Fleet (the invasion task force) consisted of 6 old battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, and about 30 destroyers. (There were some other cruisers and destroyers in the fleet, but they weren't attached to Oldendorf's group.) Third Fleet (the carrier task force) had six new, fast battleships, 6 heavy cruisers, 10 light cruisers, and about 60 destroyers.

Third Fleet is almost certainly going to spot the Japanese force well away from intercept and will pummel the Japanese fleet for a day or so. The only way they'll be able to force an interception is if Halsey wants one. Otherwise, he'll be fast enough to, if not escape, at least run away and pound the Japanese with air strikes for a few days while rendezvousing with Seventh Fleet. Historically, I believe 6 Japanese battleships survived the air strikes (2 in the Southern Force and 4 with Kurita, including Yamato). So, assuming the same result and Halsey engages with just Third Fleet, 6 somewhat damaged Japanese battleships, 13 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, and about 30 destroyers face a fresh, similar sized Third Fleet surface element. What ensues is a Jutland-esque battle royale with moderate losses on both sides. Given Kurita's historical performance during the battle, I imagine he'll retreat after a while.

Dark Flame wrote:
He mentions the Sho-1 plan, which involved sending Japan's remaining heavy battleships and other surface combatants against the US transports at Leyte. However, it said that there was a lot of opposition to this plan. Some opponents of the plan thought that the IJN's last battle shouldn't be wasted against lowly transports. The thinking was that they should be sent against the US carriers.

It wasn't like they were really ever going to get that opportunity though. The best they might get were slower escort carriers in an ambush. (Which they did.) As it was American Fleet Carriers were fast and extremely well protected. By 1944 the only way to get at an American Carrier was to swarm it with kamikazes. Even that failed to produce any serious results.

I agree with the original plan that it was smarter to attack the transports, but that's just me. If either attacking the transports or the carriers was successful, which would have hurt the US campaign the most?

The carriers would be downright impossible to attack without inviting inevitable destruction for his own forces. Attacking the transports would be even more useless, since by the time Kurita was in position to attack them the invasion was already complete, and he would be doing little more than shooting up empty hulls.

Also, assuming the large surface ships (Yamato, Musashi, heavy cruisers, etc.) were able to successfelly get to the carriers, how effective would they be? Would the results still mainly be the same?

The carriers aren't without escort you know. They have their own battleships. Of Kurita's forces only Yamato and Musashi any real threat. All of his other ships are either too old, too slow, or too small to safely pursue the waaaay faster fleet carriers. The carriers could simply retreat to a safe distance and then rule Kurita's entire force while it wastes time with Halsey's escorts. Instead of retreating with a token force, Kurita would likely end up dead and his force totally annihilated. Kurita had precisely zero intention of dieing at that point in the war. I expect he might give up the chase even if it's going well.

If we assume Oldendorf's battleship force was lured away, did the carriers have enough surface protection to fight off the IJN ships?

In all honesty, yes. Sprauge's piddly force of destroyers and some escort carriers was enough to make Kurita call it a day and turn for home. Halsey's fleet will undoubtedly have way better escort. Like I said, Kurita may very well turn for home the moment he spots Halsey. By 1944 his morale and the morale of his staff is effectively broken.

If the carrier's main force of planes were off attacking the IJN carriers (which were used as bait in real life, as well), how would the IJN battleships fare? Would the standing CAP be of any use? Perhaps the carriers could have simply turned and outran the battlewagons?

They can comfortably outrun every ship except Yamato and Musashi, and only those two can only keep up.

The problem with attacking the transports was… it could never work properly. It was not possible to base the Combined Fleet closely to the battle area for reasons of fuel availability and vulnerability to American attacks to quickly react. In addition the fleet could not stand out to sea in waiting for any length of time because it would be too exposed to submarine attacks, and lacked the tankers to refuel repeatedly at sea.

So this meant by the time the IJN could reach the invasion beaches, the transports would already be empty of troops. They might sink a number of empty transports and follow on supply ships, but this could not stop the landing, only improve the odds of a Japanese land counter attack succeeding. Historically only about 50 out of some 400 amphibious ships involved remained in Leyte Gulf by the end of October 24th.

Japanese plans included extensive amphibious forces to bring in reinforcements, and historically these efforts met with considerable success, at first. This issue, and the defeat of the Japanese air armada over Formosa, should not be overlooked when analyzing Japanese plans, Japan never expected to win with surface forces alone.
http://www.combinedfleet.com/taops1.htm

Many IJN leaders realized this inability to actually prevent a landing from becoming established, they’d seen how quickly the US was able to make landings in the Solomon’s and along New Guinea, but they didn’t have much other choice. Attacking US fleet carrier groups was hopeless. IJN destroyers and cruisers were universally faster then American ships, but the Japanese battleline was universally slower then US fleet carriers. Indeed half the available Japanese battleships would have been too slow to even begin to consider such an attack. Making contact was thus going to be almost impossible and any battle would consist of an extremely long range tail chase while hundreds of US planes swarmed overhead. Like Samar… but far worse for Japan.

Task Force 38 was actually in a weakened state at Leyte, several of its battleships were unavailable because of refits and collision damage, and one of the four task groups was at Ulithi replenishing. Still the remaining three groups had 12 fast carriers, one of which was sunk on the 24th, as well as 4 modern battleships and I think 12 cruisers. Even in a straight up battle the American carrier fleet is thus not that inferior to the Japanese fast ships in gun power. Of course we also had all the slow battleships and no small number of cruisers defending the invasion forces.

CaptHawkeye wrote: They can comfortably outrun every ship except Yamato and Musashi, and only those two can only keep up.

Yamato, Musashi and Nagato were all 27 knot ships. Kongo and Haruna could make about 30 knots, the Fuso’s and Ises are 23 knots at best. An Essex which could expect 31-32 knots in a combat loading condition. In paper an Essex CV was a 33 knot ship, but most were overloaded and by the time of Leyte few of them had been recently dry-docked. An Independence class CVL was rated at 31.5 knots, and would be subject to slow down from bottom fouling as well.

However warships just cruising didn't steam faster then about 20-25 knots for any length of time because fuel consumption skyrocketed, so it remains physically possible that the 27 knot Japanese battleships could make contact going all out…. Only to then have the Americans pull away as they build up full speed. This assumes American air recon totally fails, while Japanese air recon works. The Japanese of course cannot present full broadsides while steaming direct at the enemy, so practical speed of advance drops down even lower once they made contact. Of course in reality contact was just never going to happen. The most likely result of a Japanese attack on the fast carriers with surface ships would be the complete destruction of the Japanese force over two days or so.

Yeah. I actually doubt Kurita would carry out a long term pursuit even if he fell on Halsey's forces. He knows the farther he steams into the Pacific, the less likely he is to survive. In correction the Kongos are the only ships fast enough to marginally keep up with the carriers. Too bad Kongo and Haruna are both painfully obsolete. Any of the fast battleships could and probably would rule them. Especially if they're steaming at full, and thus seperating themselves from the protection the Yamatos would give them. No matter what happens, Halsey is essentially untouchable.

Japan's last real opportunity to inflict serious damage on US forces had come and gone a long time ago during the Solomons. It wasn't going to come again.

Were Kongo etc still capable of those speeds? They're old, and I thought their inter-war refits reduced speed?

acesand8s wrote:What ensues is a Jutland-esque battle royale with moderate losses on both sides. Given Kurita's historical performance during the battle, I imagine he'll retreat after a while.

I hate people who say shit like this. Let's state a simplistic description of a complex situation as fact!

Oh shit. I didn't even notice he said that. "Jutland-esque" engagement with "moderate losses both sides".

Yeah, Halsey soooo wanted to line battle with the Japanese.

Given Halsey's problem with concentrating forces to excess that left Sprague high and dry when he chased the IJN carriers, the IJN really, really wouldn't have wanted to actually come in contact with them while massed up. Sprague with ASW armed second line planes made them seriously think twice about it through sheer determination.

As Admiral Holloway put it in his book no modern fleet carrier meaning Essex-class and forward has been sunk despite over 60 years of extensive combat operations. And as is emphasized in the Tin Can Sailors the real thing could outrun the IJN, which Kurita and co thought "Halsey's Task Force" was doing.

CaptHawkeye wrote:Yeah, Halsey soooo wanted to line battle with the Japanese.

I wouldn't say that Halsey wanted a surface action; rather, he wanted the total victory that Spruance refused to pursue at the Battle of the Philippine Sea and only way for Halsey to achieve that complete victory is going to be with the battle line of TF34.

During the historical Leyte Gulf, Halsey had to make a choice between Ozawa's carriers and Kurita's battleships; he chose the carriers. However, in this scenario Kurita is coming after Third Fleet and Halsey doesn't have to make that choice. Assuming Ozawa's carriers are destroyed as quickly in this scenario as they were historically, the battle quickly comes down to just Kurita and Halsey.

Now, as I said, Halsey isn't going to just throw TF34 against the Japanese; he's going to launch a series of air strikes. But unless the carrier air crews do much better than they did historically at Leyte Gulf, the bombers aren't going to take out all seven Japanese battleships. Thus, if Halsey truly wants his total victory, it's very likely that he'll have to resort to a surface action. Looking at his historical actions during Leyte Gulf and Cape Engano, I believe that Halsey will go for the decisive battle and will eventually force the surface engagement. It's my opinion that the real question isn't whether Halsey will accept a confrontation but rather how long Kurita is willing to continue the chase.

And I'll concede the issue of the last two sentences of my first post in the thread.

I am concerned with Sea Skimmer's discussion top speeds of Japanese Vessels

For example, most discussions of the Nagato I read is that after her various refits could only reach around 25 knots, not really 27 knots. This fits with another line of discussion that the other older battleships were increased to around 25 knots, making a homogeneous battle line.

Also, many of the Japanese cruisers had to be extensively rebuild. Rebuilding generally makes a ship heavier (not sure if any have also been bulged) and likely reduces speed. I also believe I have read that Japanese cruisers have trouble in higher sea states. Still, you may have something as far as cruisers.

Finally, comparing Japanese destroyer classes to US destroyer classes. For later Japanese classes, listed speeds are 34 to 35 knots compared to 36 to 37 knots for US Destroyer classes around the time. Some of the older Japanese classes appear to be listed as 39 knots while the best consider class (Akizuki class) has only a 33 knot top speed. The whole destroyer situation seems to even itself out.

Kitsune wrote: For example, most discussions of the Nagato I read is that after her various refits could only reach around 25 knots, not really 27 knots. This fits with another line of discussion that the other older battleships were increased to around 25 knots, making a homogeneous battle line.

Nagatos speed was slightly over 25 knots on official 2/3rds trials, but she managed better in service, and of course, with less then 2/3rds fuel onboard or some ammo fired off speeds starts to rise. You are right on the older ships, they made around 24.75 knots (it varied ship to ship) on trials which has usually been rounded up to 25 knots, I always forget just how much extra shp they pushed into those old hulls.. The Japanese opinion on the matter is clear, the Nagatos operated Japans own carriers battles as did the Yamatos and Kongos, but never a Fuso or Yamashiro.

Also, many of the Japanese cruisers had to be extensively rebuild. Rebuilding generally makes a ship heavier (not sure if any have also been bulged) and likely reduces speed. I also believe I have read that Japanese cruisers have trouble in higher sea states. Still, you may have something as far as cruisers.

Japanese heavy cruisers typically lost 1-2 knots as a result of rebuilding. This still left them faster then American ships designed for lower speeds in general. A Cleveland was designed for 33 knots, a Baltimore for 33.5 knots, but both proved quite overloaded in service, a Cleveland dangerously so and they made about 32 and 33 on trials on average, though most American wartime built ships never ran standardized trials. Actual speeds will depend on loading condition and time out of dock, which for American ships in late 1944 was high owing to the almost unbroken high tempo of operations since Tarawa. Really the US fleet was becoming exhausted by this point, and we took a big break between securing Leyte and the attack on Okinawa. For a compairson a Mogami was designed for 37 knots, and indeed reached somthing close to that on the first trials, but once they'd been twice rebuilt they made around 35-35.5.

Finally, comparing Japanese destroyer classes to US destroyer classes. For later Japanese classes, listed speeds are 34 to 35 knots compared to 36 to 37 knots for US Destroyer classes around the time.

Only if you accept paper design speeds as reality. The USN set high design speeds for destroyers, and it did not get them, especially not by 1944 when every destroyer was heavily overloaded with more anti aircraft weapons, radar, fuel and 5 inch ammo. In fact our prewar trial conditions were unrealistic to start with in not requiring more then a token allotment of ammunition or water, this was a means of circumventing the London naval treaty. Japan didn’t need such self deception, they simply lied.

The Fletchers designed for 38 knots turned out to be 35 knots or slower, Sumners were 33 knot ships though could do a bit better with overload, and Gearings did around 33-34. It didn’t help that designers had assumed in essence a flat calm ocean. Postwar the USN found that in fact it needed ships a good thousand tons heavier to get the speeds it thought it had designed for… the same studies also showed that such ships where just too expensive to be justified and so the classic destroyer died off.

Some of the older Japanese classes appear to be listed as 39 knots while the best consider class (Akizuki class) has only a 33 knot top speed. The whole destroyer situation seems to even itself out.

Most Japanese destroyers made 35-36 knots. The 33 knots of Akizuki, which was considered a specialized type by the IJN, perfectly illustrates the weight and thus speed penalties suffered by American ships that came from making a proper multifold destroyer. Japan had inferior machinery technology, but they got high speeds by accepting lower endurances, less armor, less ammo, no duel purpose guns, no machinery dispersion and various other limitations compared to American ships. On the other hand Japanese ships generally were designed to take the weather better, especially in terms of destroyers. Most American units had flush decks and several turrets forward, while the Japanese often had only one turret forward allowing for a raised forecastle or at least a lot of shear. This made sense since conditions off Japan suck, while the USN thought in terms of fighting on a calm clear Central Pacific day.

acesand8s wrote:
I wouldn't say that Halsey wanted a surface action; rather, he wanted the total victory that Spruance refused to pursue at the Battle of the Philippine Sea and only way for Halsey to achieve that complete victory is going to be with the battle line of TF34.

Air attacks could do the job pretty darn well. The October 24th air attack on the Japanese Central Force one must realize sank one super battleship, forced a heavy cruiser forced to turn back and damaged numerous other ships while involving only 260 planes. These planes in turn came from only part of the strength of just two of the three, soon to be four US carrier task groups available, which had a total of about 1,200 aircraft. That’s not counting the planes on the CVEs. These aircraft could fly several missions per day if need be. I don’t remember the specifics, I think it was around 2,000 offensive sorties flown (and by carriers much weaker in numbers) but Operation Hailstone, the attack on Truk in February 1944, showed just what you could do with a sustained carrier air attacks.

If Center hadn’t duped Hasley by turning around, the American ships would have just kept sending out waves of planes all day long, and attrition would have made each wave more effective then the last. The Japanese fleet would never have been able to keep advancing under those circumstances and would have suffered massively. Even if it takes another 200 sorties per battleship sunk, the job can be done in a day.

Surface actions often seem like they offer more certainty, and to a point that’s true, but they also mean exposing the fleet to maximum risk, especially if one makes a vagarious pursuit. Historically you really don’t find that many annihilating victories in 20th century sea warfare between surface ships. Most likely TF34 would end up doing much what historically the heavy cruisers did to the Japanese carrier force, mopping up cripples.

Sea Skimmer wrote:That’s not counting the planes on the CVEs.

Would the CVEs have been dangerous to anything larger than a destroyer? I thought they didn't carry torpedoes or AP bombs.

acesand8s wrote:
Would the CVEs have been dangerous to anything larger than a destroyer? I thought they didn't carry torpedoes or AP bombs.

They had some torpedoes and some 1,000lb AP bombs, though not any 1,600lb AP bombs. They also had some SAP weapons which will go through the decks on cruisers and carriers. In reality American fleet carriers didn’t carry all that many heavy weapons either, typically about 40 torpedoes and 40 heavy AP bombs. However 1000lb and 2,000lb GP bombs can inflict serious damage on any ship. 500lb bombs tended not to work too well for sinking bigger warships, but they could play havoc with the upper works and the ships ability to defend itself and maneuver. Only the Yamatos and Nagato had really thick deck armor in any case, the Kongos weren’t too bad, but not that great either. Japanese heavy cruisers are quite tough as a bunch… but still only cruisers.

Historically CVE planes at Samar crippled heavy cruiser Chikuma, which had to be scuttled after an Avenger from Taffy 2 put a torpedo in her engine rooms. Heavy cruiser Suzuya meanwhile was exploded after a near miss bomb dropped by an Avenger from Taffy 3 sprayed her torpedo tubes with fragments, exploding a warhead which touched off a deveasting chain reaction of torpedoes and secondary gun ammo. Chokai was the third heavy cruiser lost, she took a single 500lb bomb that disabled her engine rooms, she was scuttled as well.

The CVE attacks would have been even more effective had the CVE’s been able to fly off coordinated strikes, instead of launching every plane as fast as they could when taken by surprise.

Also, when considering a general fleet action, the CVEs can do more then just attack Japanese ships. Since ground opposition was (initially) light on Leyte, they didn’t have to fly many close air support missions, and so they could take on more combat air patrol and counter air (bombing airfield) missions while the fleet carriers concentrate as heavily as possible on sinking the Japanese fleet.

Edit: I remembered, I made a list complied out of Japanese Cruisers Of the Pacific War on what sank every Japanese cruiser except the captured ones and the worthless 'training' cruisers. Gives a good idea of the variety of damage that could doom a ship; some day Ill have to compile all the examples of major damage which was survived.

Fatal Damage Inflicted On Japanese Cruisers

Heavy Cruisers

Kako – 3 Mk10 submarine torpedo hits
Furutaka – 24 x 6in and 8in shells
Kinugasa – 1 x 500lb bomb hit, 1 x 1000lb near miss bomb
Aoba – 1 x 500lb bomb hit, 1 x 2000lb near miss bomb

Myoko – scuttled postwar after being crippled by a single submarine torpedo
Nachi – the ship that wouldn’t die – 9 x aerial torpedoes, 20 x aerial bombs, 16 aerial rockets
Ashigara – 5 x submarine torpedoes
Haguro – 3 x destroyer torpedoes

Takao – scuttled postwar after being crippled by two submarine torpedoes
Atago – 4 x Mk14 submarine torpedoes
Maya – 4 x Mk14 submarine torpedoes
Chokai – crippled by a single 500lb bomb, scuttled during battle off Samar

Mogami – 15-25 8in shell hits + 2 x 500lb bomb hits
Mikuma – 5 x 500lb and 1000lb bomb hits explode ships Long Lance torpedoes, (companion at the time Mogami jettisons torpedoes and survived at least seven hits)
Suzuya – 1 x near miss disables a shaft, second near miss bomb explodes Long Lance torpedoes at Samar
Kumano – 8 x aerial torpedoes and 7 x 500lb bomb

Tone – 1 x 500lb bomb, 2 x 1000lb bomb plus near misses, ship beached with main deck above the waterline, raised and scrapped postwar.
Chikuma – crippled by 1 x Mk13 aerial torpedo, scuttled during battle off Samar

Light Cruisers

Kuma – 2 x submarine torpedo
Tama – damaged but amazingly still mobile after 1 x submarine torpedo hit, she was attacked days later by a second sub and broke in half and sank in minutes after three additional hits
Kitakami – survived war having been near missed to the point of engine damage, but never took a direct hit from anything, scrapped
Ooi – 2 x submarine torpedoes, one a dud, broke in half and sank after some hours
Kiso – 3 x 500lb bomb hit and 1 x 500lb near miss

Nagara – 1 x submarine torpedo
Isuzu - 1 x submarine torpedo reduced speed to 10knts, sank in minutes two hours later after a second sub scored two additional hits
Natori – crippled by 1 x Mk23 submarine torpedoe, fatally damaged by a second Mk18 torpedo an hour later
Yura – reduced to 14knts by two bomb hits from dive bombers, crippled several hours later by three more bomb hits from B-17s and dive bombers, scuttled with torpedoes
Kinu – one bomb hit and six near misses
Abukuma – damaged by one PT boat torpedo, hit by three bombs and numerous near misses the next day she remained underway until the fires spread to her torpedoes, four of them exploding, sank two hours later after abandonment

Sendai – sunk by several 6in shell hits
Naka – broken in half by one aerial torpedo and one bomb, the ends of the wreck remained afloat until being sunk by a follow up dive bombing attack!
Jintsu – crippled by at least 10 x 6in shells and sunk by one surface torpedo

Yubari – 1 x submarine torpedo

Oyodo – sunk by numerous near miss bombs, but had taken 5 x 500lb bomb hits in previous attacks.

Agano – 2 x Mk14 submarine torpedoes
Noshiro – 1 x 500lb near miss, 2 x aerial torpedoes
Yahagi – sunk by a literal rain of aerial torpedoes and bombs, at least seven and twelve respectively, when accompanying Yamato, she was however totally crippled and doomed by the first aerial torpedo hit
Sakawa – not proof against 21kt nuclear airburst at 500 meters, one of the few ships sunk by Test Able, abet only after a day of slow flooding.

Sea Skimmer:
I have only ever seen a couple of sources which credits the Nagato with 27 knots and they may very well come from the same source. If you wanted to state 25.5 or just a shade under 26 knots, I would not argue that. It could be that fully loaded, the older battleships were a bit slower than the 24.75 knots, maybe 23 or so knots. The US Standards after being bulged were often listed at 20 knots but 19 knots was a better number.

Remember that fouling effects both sides.....A 35 knot ship might be only 33 knots with heavy fouling as a 33 knot ship might be 31 knots. Also, since the power required is cubed, it might effect a faster ship even worse. All I am saying is that while the Japanese cruisers may have been faster, likely the margin is not really all that great. As well, since US Plants are generally regarded as more reliable, this becomes even closer for any kind of distance.

Some US Destroyers actually reached as fast as 40 knots in trials according to Friedman (You can look at at preview of his US Destroyers on Google Books.) Even in service that likely equated to 38 knots. They seemed to, just like the Japanese destroyers, bounce all over the place. Some extremely fast at 38 knots, some right around 33. One of the other Japanese Destroyer classes was restricted to 34 knots. You are most of the time restricted to your slowest destroyer. You don't want to break up you group. That means you usually will be fighting around 33 knots at best for both sides.

As far as I am to understand, the "Classic" destroyer and "Classic" Cruiser are due to construction standards. The US Cruisers were mostly DLs (Destroyer Leaders) before being reclassified. Several older cruiser classes such as the Omaha and Atlanta were also more of overgrown destroyers than anything else. I would say that the traditional destroyer is still alive but the tr additional cruiser is dead. Now, what did you mean that the US Navy stopped building the traditional destroyer?

Kitsune wrote:Sea Skimmer:
I have only ever seen a couple of sources which credits the Nagato with 27 knots and they may very well come from the same source.

The official trial speed in 1920 was 26.7 knots, but she was reported to do better in service. Close enough to 27 knots that the wind could make the difference up, or the depth of water.

Remember that fouling effects both sides.....A 35 knot ship might be only 33 knots with heavy fouling as a 33 knot ship might be 31 knots. Also, since the power required is cubed, it might effect a faster ship even worse. All I am saying is that while the Japanese cruisers may have been faster, likely the margin is not really all that great.

Did I not already say that fouling affects both sides? Did I not also point out that the US fleet had spent the last year rampaging across the Pacific, and in fact already had to detach major units for refits, leaving it weakened at Leyte, because of this? Meanwhile the Japanese fleet had done little, and mostly sat in the home islands or near Singapore, both areas well equipped with dry docks. You know something else that affects the US fleet is that speed trials are supposed run in normal condition, but often were run in a light condition, and yet even normal condition made no account of emergency fuel storage, which was built into all American ships and always used during the Pacific War. This storage could increase a ships capacity by 20-40%, which meant even with the same proportionally reduced fuel load the ship would be much heavier then trial condition.

Japanese ships had no comparable emergency storage, the some kinds of minor watertight compartments the USN used for this purpose the Japanese had to kept empty, because they used lots of longitudinal bulkheads (direct result of not using unit machinery) and needed the space for counter flooding. Capsizing would go on to sink a lot of IJN ships anyway.

As well, since US Plants are generally regarded as more reliable, this becomes even closer for any kind of distance.

I’ve never seen anything to indicate that American machinery was actually more reliable then Japanese, both navies were generally conservative but steady in pursuing increases in steam conditions. Near the Pacific War outbreak the Japanese became very conservative, as they sought to standardize machinery across all classes of ship. Meanwhile around the same time in a number of US destroyers steam conditions were actually reduced from 825 degrees back down to 700 degrees because of reliability trouble.

Some US Destroyers actually reached as fast as 40 knots in trials according to Friedman (You can look at at preview of his US Destroyers on Google Books.)

Since your don’t even bother to name a page, and I happen to have owned the book for years I use my powers of deduction to guess that this is a speed achieved by a Benham class on trial in an extremely light condition, which is used as a specific example of the total unreality of US trial conditions, and the need to revise design standards!

Even in service that likely equated to 38 knots.

No for some of them service speed proved to be as little as 32 knots.

They seemed to, just like the Japanese destroyers, bounce all over the place. Some extremely fast at 38 knots, some right around 33. One of the other Japanese Destroyer classes was restricted to 34 knots. You are most of the time restricted to your slowest destroyer. You don't want to break up you group. That means you usually will be fighting around 33 knots at best for both sides.

That’s why the Japanese normally grouped destroyers by class, and if they had to mix types within a squadron they arranged the classes by division. The slower ships stand by the slower battleships while the fast ones are free to race forward to gain torpedo attack position.

As far as I am to understand, the "Classic" destroyer and "Classic" Cruiser are due to construction standards.

They did have differing construction standards, but the ship type is defined by its role. The classic destroyer conducted torpedo attacks and screened the fleet in a gun action; it thus needed a significant speed advantage over the ships it protected and enemy capital ships. With the impossibility of obtaining sufficient speed on acceptable displacement realized, the USN ceased trying to gain higher speeds. This was before guided missiles took over. More emphasis was also placed in maintaining decently high speed in rougher sea conditions, which is more a matter of hull design the anything else. Once missiles arrived our speeds actually began retreating, and today the mighty Burke can barely make the 31 knots of its namesake.

The US Cruisers were mostly DLs (Destroyer Leaders) before being reclassified. Several older cruiser classes such as the Omaha and Atlanta were also more of overgrown destroyers than anything else. I would say that the traditional destroyer is still alive but the tr additional cruiser is dead. Now, what did you mean that the US Navy stopped building the traditional destroyer?

In World War 2 a destroyer leader was a destroyer with an enlarged superstructure to accommodate more personal and radio gear. The USN ceased building them just before the war as its destroyers grew so big and capable a dedicated leader was unnecessary. The IJN meanwhile always used light cruisers as leaders, and indeed stupidly kept building ships specifically for this role leading to the speedy but very weak Agano class.

Postwar the designator DL was revived in the USN, and later morphed to DLG but this referred to frigates or alternatively the ships were just known as task force escorts. Only Norfolk was ever really called a Destroyer Leader, which was sort of legitimate. She failed as the one and only CLK, hunter killer cruiser, so she was revamped as a leader for smaller ASW destroyers converted from wartime units. These changes in name and roles distinctly marked the shift in naval power being measured in inches of armor and guns and knots of speed to sensors, command and control capability and rates of engagement.

I don’t know how the hell you can think of an Omaha as an overgrown destroyer; it was one of the most powerful cruisers of its day at 7,000 tons and with a dozen 6 inch guns. In contrast most British cruisers were 1-2,000 tons lighter and with no more then about six 6 inch guns. Only a Hawkins was clearly superior. An Atlanta is also very firmly a cruiser in role, size and design standards. The USN made no distinction between cruiser types before the London Naval Treaty and considered both the Omaha’s and the 8 inch ships to be light cruisers. The designation CLAA meanwhile was only invented for the Worchester class, and latter applied in hindsight to the Atlantas, but both were numbered as CLs, light cruisers.

Sea Skimmer wrote:The official trial speed in 1920 was 26.7 knots, but she was reported to do better in service. Close enough to 27 knots that the wind could make the difference up, or the depth of water.

I am going to take these issues one at a time......

This one first though. Friedman in "Battleship Design and Development 1905-1945" credits the Nagato with 26.5 knots. I don't have a problem with 26.7 knots when first commissioned.

The problem is that she was refitted including being bulged to a width of 108 feet from 95 feet and an increase of displacement from around 33,800 tons normal and 38,500 tons full load to around 39,120 tons standard and 42,753 tons trial (Likely even greater in service) Her horsepower was virtually unchanged at the same time.

You appear to be arguing that she did not lose any top speed after this refit. In this case, you need to show some evidence / sources that this is the case.

I'm really new at this stuff, so I'm getting confused. What is the purpose of bulging a ship? It sounds like adding more width, but what goes in that extra space? What are the significant trade offs?

So far, it sounds like no matter what happens at this time period, the IJN is fucked. None of their plans even had a significant upside (realistically) except for trying to force the Decisive Engagement that they were looking for.

Also, I just read the chapter about the Johnston's lonely attack on the entire remaining Center Force. How did the IJN fuck up so badly that they never got a single hit on it? Was their gunnery that awful? I read a little bit about "chasing the splashes" or something like that, but is it really that easy to evade gunfire?

Also, are there any other examples of battles where USN advantages in gunnery were so pronounced and significant?

Thanks again for the info!

Dark Flame wrote:I'm really new at this stuff, so I'm getting confused. What is the purpose of bulging a ship? It sounds like adding more width, but what goes in that extra space? What are the significant trade offs?

ARe you refering to the bulges at the waterline? Those are torpedo bulges. Torpedoes are supposed to, or rather hopefully, hit that bulge and the bulge will absorb the explosive force of the torpedo. In general, they may be spaced armour, or even hollow spaces filled with oil or something liquids.

Bulging is also used if you ship is becoming overweight...It allows you to displace part of the additional weight.

Kitsune wrote: The problem is that she was refitted including being bulged to a width of 108 feet from 95 feet and an increase of displacement from around 33,800 tons normal and 38,500 tons full load to around 39,120 tons standard and 42,753 tons trial (Likely even greater in service) Her horsepower was virtually unchanged at the same time.

You appear to be arguing that she did not lose any top speed after this refit. In this case, you need to show some evidence / sources that this is the case.

You missed a part of your source less figures, the part in which the Japanese lengthened the ship at the same time they rebuilt the armor and machinery, to maintain length to beam ratio despite blistering, something which also had the effect of increasing natural hull speed.

Dark Flame wrote:I'm really new at this stuff, so I'm getting confused. What is the purpose of bulging a ship? It sounds like adding more width, but what goes in that extra space? What are the significant trade offs?

The extra space is either empty, or holds fuel oil. The trade off is if you don’t lengthen the ship, your length to beam ratio drops, and wetted area increases, slowing down the ship. However with a very well designed blister, resistance could actually be reduced by using the blister to improve the prismatic coefficient, which is basically how abruptly the shape of the hull changes.

Also, I just read the chapter about the Johnston's lonely attack on the entire remaining Center Force. How did the IJN fuck up so badly that they never got a single hit on it? Was their gunnery that awful? I read a little bit about "chasing the splashes" or something like that, but is it really that easy to evade gunfire?

Yeah it pretty much is. Once a gun fires, the shell is on a set course, if the target ship turns say 15-20 degrees, the gunfire is going to miss. Even at 10,000 yards time of flight for the shells may be 15 seconds or so, which is enough for a ship being fired upon to try to evade it. In addition Japanese gunnery was poor because they had exhausted crews; constant harassment by attacking aircraft, and in general Japanese salvos had very tight spreads. This was good for a very long range battle, but it actually decreased hit probabilities at shorter ranges. In addition the American ships made extensive use of smokescreen’s. At the time Japanese ships had radar, but it was not good enough to aim gunfire on its own if the ships gunners could not see the target optically.

The downside of chasing salvos is the maneuvers also throw off the evading ships own gunnery. However Johnston wasn’t going to stop the IJN with her 5 inch guns, she could only hope to buy time by staying alive and remaining a distraction. So she chased salvos. Several other battles in WW2 like the Bearing Sea and 2nd Sirda saw a destroyers employ the same tactic to survive against cruisers and battleships.

I meant to also note, that firing tactics do exist to counter chasing salvos, mainly involving firing several quick salvos that are all in the air at once to bracket the target, but employing these gunnery tactics is harder to pull off in combat then merely steering a ship erratically.

Sea Skimmer wrote:

Kitsune wrote: You appear to be arguing that she did not lose any top speed after this refit. In this case, you need to show some evidence / sources that this is the case.

You missed a part of your source less figures, the part in which the Japanese lengthened the ship at the same time they rebuilt the armor and machinery, to maintain length to beam ratio despite blistering, something which also had the effect of increasing natural hull speed.

Umm, actually no but I realized that the ratios did not work out between them

Length divided by width of the original (700 by 95) would give a ratio of 7.37 to 1
Length divided by width of the rebuilt (738 by 108) would give a ratio of 6.83 to 1

My Sources for the 25 knot top speed on the Rebuilt Nagato are "Battleships of the U.S. Navy in World War II" from Stefan Terzibaschisch (page 18), "Jane's Battleships of the Twentieth Century" by Bernard Ireland (Page 77), and "An Illustrated Guide to Battleships and Battlecruisers" by John Jordan (page 100)

The last book gives a full load displacement of 46,350 tons.

Basically, the ball is in your court where you need to show a source (or three) which states that she did not lose speed when rebuilt. You complained about me not offering a page number in a previous message, a source is not an unreasonable item to ask from your side.