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I've heard people argue that Finland should've just surrendered and become a part of the Soviet Union during WW2, because we'd have gotten our independence back along with the East European countries when USSR collapsed. The usual counter-argument has been that East Europe is in way worse shape and we'd be just the same now had we become a part of USSR. But what effect did Soviet rule actually have on the member states, compared to states "growing up" on their own?

Would East Europe be in similar shape now as Finland had they retained their independence after WW2? I don't think a comparison like that is entirely fair because Finland didn't get devastated playing host to the eastern front, but I can't come up with any other relevant differences between us and East Europe either*. After all, Finland was a fairly backwards agrarian nation back then too.

Any pair of nations structurally similar to each other where one became a part of USSR and one stayed independent that'd provide a case study here?

*I know there probably are differences besides that, I just don't know what?

Wasn't the Finnish population so dead against the USSR that it would have revolted the moment they joined the USSR? I don't think the USSR wanted to absorb a poison pill for that matter. Hungary was enough trouble really, for example.

Fingolfin_Noldor wrote:Wasn't the Finnish population so dead against the USSR that it would have revolted the moment they joined the USSR? I don't think the USSR wanted to absorb a poison pill for that matter. Hungary was enough trouble really, for example.

Yeah, but that's not the point here. I'm interested in comparing the results of Soviet rule vs. independence in general, I just used Finland as an example because the arguments mentioned in the OP are the reason I'm curious about the subject in the first place.

Karza wrote:I've heard people argue that Finland should've just surrendered and become a part of the Soviet Union during WW2, because we'd have gotten our independence back along with the East European countries when USSR collapsed. The usual counter-argument has been that East Europe is in way worse shape and we'd be just the same now had we become a part of USSR. But what effect did Soviet rule actually have on the member states, compared to states "growing up" on their own?

Depends. What kind of states do you want to look at? Soviet Central Asia? Soviet rule certainly helped them out, compared to their atrocious neighbors like Afghanistan, Iran, et cetera. Soviet Eastern Europe? Not exactly. Most European nations were, or have, already industrialized on their own, and had pretty solid code-laws. Basically, Finland would be probably something like East Germany or Belorus, and no technological exchange vs the First World. Not too bad, but not what it is now.

You see, Europe as a "battleground" in the Cold War had technological progress sped up by the constant investment and re-investment, and the First World here was an eager player. So for a European nation, being Soviet was definetely not the best choice.

Karza wrote:I don't think a comparison like that is entirely fair because Finland didn't get devastated playing host to the eastern front, but I can't come up with any other relevant differences between us and East Europe either*. After all, Finland was a fairly backwards agrarian nation back then too.

There are differences. One, you didn't get devastated. Two, you didn't get locked out of technological exchange of the First World by a trade embargo. That's pretty serious differences.

Karza wrote:Any pair of nations structurally similar to each other where one became a part of USSR and one stayed independent that'd provide a case study here?

Yes, but see above. For Central Asia and other shitholes of the world, being Sovietized was a way to progress. For Europe during the Cold War, staying open to the First World had greater benefits. It's just practical from an economic sense, and nothing political.

Well, in all fairness to the Shah of Iran, he managed to industrialize Iran to a fair extent but he simply didn't have the political acumen or staying power that the Soviets would have had once the going got rough.

Karza wrote:Would East Europe be in similar shape now as Finland had they retained their independence after WW2? I don't think a comparison like that is entirely fair because Finland didn't get devastated playing host to the eastern front, but I can't come up with any other relevant differences between us and East Europe either*. After all, Finland was a fairly backwards agrarian nation back then too.

Any pair of nations structurally similar to each other where one became a part of USSR and one stayed independent that'd provide a case study here?

*I know there probably are differences besides that, I just don't know what?

Finland did suffer rather heavy losses in the war: Petsamo, Karelia, Viborg (a major industrial city by Finnish standards), and suffered rather heavy casualties in manpower, even if it was not devastated by fighting the Red Army all over. There was also the smaller conflict with German troops stationed there when they turned on them. So it was certainly not pristine and untouched, even if it did escape comparably lighter than some.

Also, one should not look solely at material gains. If comparison to, say, the Baltic states is the least bit valid, a hypothetical post-Soviet independent Finland would have to contend with a large ethnic Russian minority, with everything that entails, as opposed to being a largely unitary nation-state.

Stas Bush wrote:Depends. What kind of states do you want to look at? Soviet Central Asia? Soviet rule certainly helped them out, compared to their atrocious neighbors like Afghanistan, Iran, et cetera. Soviet Eastern Europe? Not exactly. Most European nations were, or have, already industrialized on their own, and had pretty solid code-laws. Basically, Finland would be probably something like East Germany or Belorus, and no technological exchange vs the First World. Not too bad, but not what it is now.

You see, Europe as a "battleground" in the Cold War had technological progress sped up by the constant investment and re-investment, and the First World here was an eager player. So for a European nation, being Soviet was definetely not the best choice.

Central Asia might be the more interesting case then.

Stas Bush wrote:There are differences. One, you didn't get devastated. Two, you didn't get locked out of technological exchange of the First World by a trade embargo. That's pretty serious differences.

Trade embargo? I thought there was at least a modicum of trade between Soviet states and the west, at least Finland traded quite a lot with the USSR. Were the East European states actually completely forbidden from dealing with their non-Soviet neighbors?

Karza wrote:

Stas Bush wrote:There are differences. One, you didn't get devastated. Two, you didn't get locked out of technological exchange of the First World by a trade embargo. That's pretty serious differences.

Trade embargo? I thought there was at least a modicum of trade between Soviet states and the west, at least Finland traded quite a lot with the USSR.

Not a full embargo, only stuff that the US & Western Europe didn't want to see east of the Iron Courtain. It was managed by the COCOM organization(?). They kept a list of banned products which were known simply as the "COCOM list" here.
Listed products were either nonavailable or have to be smuggled in to became expensive rarities and/or have to be reverse-engineered and produced locally.

As I heard some of those Finnish exports to the SU contained different things than what was on the manifest

Were the East European states actually completely forbidden from dealing with their non-Soviet neighbors?

Not that I'm avare of, at least not after the Stalin era. Although the SU could have the final word in it's client's non-Comecon oriented trade especially in the Khrushchev and the early Brezhnev era, but I don't know much about it.

Darth Hoth wrote:So it was certainly not pristine and untouched, even if it did escape comparably lighter than some.

Undeniably however these losses were totally insignificant compared to say Poland, USSR and Yugoslavia. Or?

Karza wrote:Central Asia might be the more interesting case then.

Yes, but Finland is not Central Asia, it's Europe. As I said, the First World was eager to deal in Europe (not to mention quite a few First World nations are concentrated in Europe, clue number two). Central Asia, not so. Blessing on Europe, blight on Central Asia. And vice-versa - the USSR was willing to raise Central Asia to industrialism from tribalism, but it wasn't really comparable to the First World as an investor in Europe. Besides, Finland had plenty of trade with the USSR anyway, and we helped you build nuclear plants. We were pretty friendly in post-war times, and it didn't take Finland being a part of the USSR.

I'd say the way it played out for you was best. You're a First World nation, one of the most socially secure, and medically advanced socities, good protection for workers, good prospects. What's wrong with that so that you want to consider becoming Second World nation with all the problems this entails?

Karza wrote:Trade embargo? I thought there was at least a modicum of trade between Soviet states and the west, at least Finland traded quite a lot with the USSR. Were the East European states actually completely forbidden from dealing with their non-Soviet neighbors?

The stuff that Europe and the First World in general did not want us to have, had no way of moving into the Soviet bloc. That stuff tended to be the most modern means of production devised in the First World, which brings us back to the point I made: being locked out of the First World technological process is not good.

Aye, it was advanced computers and related computerized machine tools the west was largely successful at keeping out of Soviet hands. For everyday goods and simpler tools, the west was more then happy to trade with the Soviets, because they paid in commodities which tended to work out very favorably for western companies. Whoes going to turn down gold ingots in exchange for bags of wheat?

Stas Bush wrote:Yes, but Finland is not Central Asia, it's Europe. As I said, the First World was eager to deal in Europe (not to mention quite a few First World nations are concentrated in Europe, clue number two). Central Asia, not so. Blessing on Europe, blight on Central Asia. And vice-versa - the USSR was willing to raise Central Asia to industrialism from tribalism, but it wasn't really comparable to the First World as an investor in Europe. Besides, Finland had plenty of trade with the USSR anyway, and we helped you build nuclear plants. We were pretty friendly in post-war times, and it didn't take Finland being a part of the USSR.

I'd say the way it played out for you was best. You're a First World nation, one of the most socially secure, and medically advanced socities, good protection for workers, good prospects. What's wrong with that so that you want to consider becoming Second World nation with all the problems this entails?

I think you misunderstood me a bit. I'm certainly not longing to live in a Second World nation, I was just curious about the state we'd be in now had we been a part of USSR. Since that and the reasons for eastern Europe's current state were pretty much answered already, looking at Central Asia would be the interesting part now. As I said, Finland was just the specific case that got me interested in the general subject.

You're not Central Asia, hence why look at it? Central Asia was the worst place inside the USSR, but they were still Second World and the Soviet border was the limit at which Central Asian nations were divided between Second and Third World, and the life standard was quite different after 70 years of development of various Central Asian nations. The reason? Well, the USSR tried to equalize development level across the nation, so those Central Asian nations incorporated into the USSR also industrialized as part of the Soviet industrialization programme, had universal healthcare and education forcibly installed by the Soviet rule. This benefitted them as they were in a rather tribal and agrarian state prior to the installation of Soviet power. That's all.

Anything else?

Stas Bush wrote: The stuff that Europe and the First World in general did not want us to have, had no way of moving into the Soviet bloc. That stuff tended to be the most modern means of production devised in the First World, which brings us back to the point I made: being locked out of the First World technological process is not good.

I can confirm the Soviet Block was not forbidden from trading with the West: trade was simply centralized and tightly controlled by several state-run companies.

What's funny is the kind of indirect damage that technological embargo managed to cause: it implanted a belief into Soviet leadership that Western computer technology was better on all levels, thus when the Russians stole an IBM machine and reverse-engineered it, they forcibly implemented it across the nation, destroying domestic Soviet computer industry altogether.

It's funny how things sometimes turn out: a talented Polish computer engineer Jacek Karpiński built in 1973 an innovative 16-bit programmable microcomputer with multi-tasking and multi-processor capability, superior to the first IBM PCs. It was capable of adressing a whopping 8 megabytes of internal memory and was generally a pretty awesome piece of technology.

Production was never started, because directors of firm making the old Odra series computers had too much political clout, and killed the idea. Just like that, a second possibility for a Soviet computer revolution was murdered.

In a more liberal economic system, a private company would probably start making the K-202 and selling it, of course, as was the norm in the West.

PeZook wrote: <snip>
What's funny is the kind of indirect damage that technological embargo managed to cause: it implanted a belief into Soviet leadership that Western computer technology was better on all levels, thus when the Russians stole an IBM machine and reverse-engineered it, they forcibly implemented it across the nation, destroying domestic Soviet computer industry altogether.

It's funny how things sometimes turn out: a talented Polish computer engineer Jacek Karpiński built in 1973 an innovative 16-bit programmable microcomputer with multi-tasking and multi-processor capability, superior to the first IBM PCs. It was capable of adressing a whopping 8 megabytes of internal memory and was generally a pretty awesome piece of technology.

Production was never started, because directors of firm making the old Odra series computers had too much political clout, and killed the idea. Just like that, a second possibility for a Soviet computer revolution was murdered.

In a more liberal economic system, a private company would probably start making the K-202 and selling it, of course, as was the norm in the West.

Yep this pretty much describes the problem with the Central/East European soviet clients. The success of your innovation depended on whether you knew the right comrades in the party's higher echelon, than your rival...

Failing that your innovation either died out or you had to go with it below the party's radar like the old hungarian PDP "clones" the TPA series. AKA the "No comarade chairman, it's not a computer, it's a 'Stored-program Analyser'..."

EDIT: wording

folti78 wrote: Yep this pretty much describes the problem with the Central/East European soviet clients. The success of your innovation depended on whether you knew the right comrades in the party's higher echelon, than your rival...

Failing that your innovation either died out or you had to go with it below the party's radar like the old hungarian PDP "clones" the TPA series. AKA the "No comarade chairman, it's not a computer, it's a 'Stored-program Analyser'..."

EDIT: wording

This is also a problem with predicting the state of technology in another country if it turned into a Soviet republic ; A communist PC revolution was averted with only a few key decisions which didn't really have to go the way they did historically. Such is the nature of centralized systems, after all.

Stas Bush wrote:

Darth Hoth wrote:So it was certainly not pristine and untouched, even if it did escape comparably lighter than some.

Undeniably however these losses were totally insignificant compared to say Poland, USSR and Yugoslavia. Or?

They were not comparable; I believe total deaths were somewhere in the range of 90,000, out of a population of three million, and infrastructural damage was also much less, though still considerable. However, measuring against Allied/Soviet losses might not be appropriate, given that Finland fought on the side of the Axis in the Continuation War; it might be better to compare it to other German co-belligerents.

Darth Hoth wrote:

Stas Bush wrote:Undeniably however these losses were totally insignificant compared to say Poland, USSR and Yugoslavia. Or?

They were not comparable; I believe total deaths were somewhere in the range of 90,000, out of a population of three million, and infrastructural damage was also much less, though still considerable. However, measuring against Allied/Soviet losses might not be appropriate, given that Finland fought on the side of the Axis in the Continuation War; it might be better to compare it to other German co-belligerents.

Exactly which co-belligerents you have in mind?
* Italy proper made battleground from 1943 to April 1945.
* Rump Chechoslovakia had a bloody uprising in 1944 and later got stampeded by the soviet forces
* Bulgaria got invaded in 1944 by the Soviets and the new government turned on the Germans.
* Rumania changed sides successfuly in 1944 and expelled the German forces peacefully. They escaped the war relatively unscathed.
* Hungary made battlefield thanks to the Szálasi government and the occupying German troops.
* Yugoslavia had an ongoing partisan war between rival partisan groups, the croatian puppet state and the occupying axis forces.

Did i miss anyone?

Darth Hoth wrote:However, measuring against Allied/Soviet losses might not be appropriate, given that Finland fought on the side of the Axis in the Continuation War

Compared to Axis satellites (Finland was the only true co-belligerent - others were fascist sidekicks) Finland also fared much better. Only Romania, which switched sides early, could be considered a comparable example. Hence, the outcome of the war for Finland was rather favourable; not to mention that it's relation both with the USSR and the West stayed rather normal in the post-war period.

Well, I did not seek to dispute that; I only found the OP somewhat misleading, in that it appeared to imply that Finland got of the war more or less free of damage as it went. Sorry if this was unclear.

PeZook wrote:What's funny is the kind of indirect damage that technological embargo managed to cause: it implanted a belief into Soviet leadership that Western computer technology was better on all levels, thus when the Russians stole an IBM machine and reverse-engineered it, they forcibly implemented it across the nation, destroying domestic Soviet computer industry altogether.

Ah, the sordid tale of the ES EVM (a clone of the IBM S/360), though it'd be inaccurate to say that it was stolen (though certainly reverse-engineered).

It's funny how things sometimes turn out: a talented Polish computer engineer Jacek Karpiński built in 1973 an innovative 16-bit programmable microcomputer with multi-tasking and multi-processor capability, superior to the first IBM PCs. It was capable of adressing a whopping 8 megabytes of internal memory and was generally a pretty awesome piece of technology.

Well, I'd hope a full minicomputer would be more powerful than an early crippled PC

Production was never started, because directors of firm making the old Odra series computers had too much political clout, and killed the idea. Just like that, a second possibility for a Soviet computer revolution was murdered.

I think you're overstating things. A real computer revolution would require major consumer demand and trigger mass economies of scale. The K-202 is "just" a minicomputer.

phongn wrote:A real computer revolution would require major consumer demand and trigger mass economies of scale.

A computer revolution is the same as industrial revolution. If you want, you can mandate it from above.

Stas Bush wrote:

phongn wrote:A real computer revolution would require major consumer demand and trigger mass economies of scale.

A computer revolution is the same as industrial revolution. If you want, you can mandate it from above.

I'm not quite sure there - the US, too, (indirectly) invested a fortune into computer development from above. The air-defense system, the Minuteman program, the huge demands for computer power at the R&D (esp. nuclear weapons) establishments all gave the US industry a firm foundation, certainly, but it really didn't "take off" until mass demand came in. The situations don't seem to be quite analogous to the Industrial Revolution.

phongn wrote:The situations don't seem to be quite analogous to the Industrial Revolution.

You're using remarkably circular logic: "The US required market proliferation of computers => all require market demand". The US is not a command economy; hence of course it would be impossible to make an industry work without the mass demand. The USSR on the other hand was a command economy; it could forcibly install computers everywhere, like it forcibly installed telephones, et cetera.

Investment by the state into initial R&D is not the same as proliferation; the state might invest in a multitude of projects, but proliferation is the real question. In a market economy, unless there is demand, the technology simply won't proliferate no matter how advanced it is. In a command economy, unless a correct decision is taken to enforce this technology everywhere, it likewise won't proliferate.

So there's always a possibility, for both command and market systems, to have a technological revolution; but the centralized system is vulnerable to bad decisions at the top, while the decentralized is vulnerable to bad decisions "at the bottom".

Stas Bush wrote:

phongn wrote:The situations don't seem to be quite analogous to the Industrial Revolution.

You're using remarkably circular logic: "The US required market proliferation of computers => all require market demand". The US is not a command economy; hence of course it would be impossible to make an industry work without the mass demand. The USSR on the other hand was a command economy; it could forcibly install computers everywhere, like it forcibly installed telephones, et cetera.

It was more of a "the only known example of mass computerization has been the mass-demand model" so I apologize if I phrased it poorly (and I didn't mean to generalize it to all things). And certainly, the USSR could've given everyone a computer, but would that then "stoke the fire" for developing rapidly improving performance ending in "microprocessors everywhere?" The market system has its many flaws, but I'm not convinced that a command economy would succeed in the kind of necessary planning to go from "advanced minicomputers in labs" to "microcomputers on many desktops" to "my oven, my car and my antitank missile are controlled by embedded CPUs"

We may also have a difference in terminology here - when I think "computer revolution" I think of the endgame where computing power has become completely transparent. To crib the earlier example: my microwave has a computer in it that would make engineers from not very long ago weep for joy. When you refer to "computer revolution," did you mean that there would be a proliferation of "traditional computers"?

So there's always a possibility, for both command and market systems, to have a technological revolution; but the centralized system is vulnerable to bad decisions at the top, while the decentralized is vulnerable to bad decisions "at the bottom".

There's certainly no argument there.

You mean like water bottles in the US?