Averting the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War

[Sidewinder]

If Iraq did not invade Kuwait in 1990 (ideally, not ever), one obvious and positive consequence would be the US leaves Iraq alone instead of enforcing an embargo that results in mass starvation, or invading Iraq in 2003 (ideally, POTUS will never be motivated to invade). The question is, what can convince Saddam Hussein that attacking his Sunni and Arab neighbor is a bad idea?

Some possibilities I thought of:

1) The Shia Islamists epic fail and the Shah remains firmly in power. Saddam sees no political turmoil severe enough to give him an opportunity to sieze Iran's oil fields, and the Iran-Iraq War doesn't occur. Iraq is free of the financial drain of fighting that war, and its government leaders less motivated to sieze other nations' oil fields to refill their own coffers.

2) The Soviet War in Afghanistan or the Iran-Iraq War makes the Saudi government extremely worried about a Soviet or Iranian invasion, and the Saudi military undergoes a Reagan-era US-style expansion. Saddam sees the Saudi military rapidly becoming a match for his own military (he allegedly planned to sieze Saudi oil fields after the conquest of Kuwait), assumes the Saudi government will not sit on their hands if he attacks Kuwait, and cancels whatever plans he has to invade.

3) The CIA learns about Iraqi plans, and POTUS orders the US Ambassador to Iraq to tell Saddam, "We know you're planning to invade Kuwait. Don't. That is a very bad idea." USN warships and amphibious assault ships make port calls to Kuwait in the spring or summer of 1990, convincing Saddam the US military will intervene if Iraq invades.

4) The Soviet government becomes suspicious when Saddam goes shopping for a humongous amount of military hardware after the ceasefire is declared with Iran. The KGB investigates, learns about the planned invasion, and the General Secretary orders the Soviet Ambassador to Iraq to tell Saddam, "We know you're planning to invade Kuwait. Don't. Chances are, the Americans know too, and if the US military intervenes on Kuwait's behalf, there is nothing we can do to help you." The Soviets threaten to withdraw all the advisors and aid they provided Iraq, and Saddam gives in to their demands.

Another bonus of averting the Persian Gulf War: US troops never find reason to set foot on Saudi Arabia. Mecca remains free of "infidels," and Osama bin Laden's only reason to hate Americans is because of US support of Israel.

[CmdrWilkens]

Honestly the Persian Gulf War, in terms of positive results for the US in the region, was actually probably the best outcome for abotu 3 years following the conflict. Having US troops come, kick the Iraqis out and then leave would have been the perfect policy point for dealing with the Middle East. It would have given weight to moderates in Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, and Egypt who may have been able to continue to exert some additional influence over the craziness of the region. That being said all of this would require that we actually leave the region once everything was done. Sure a small base in Kuwait and continuing to base naval vessels in Bahrain would be fine but the diplomatic failure in the post GW1 era was in not removing troops from Saudi Arabia.

Had we not been over the top in trying to disarm Iraq, as in blow up known stores and declare victory. I think most Americans would have long ago forgotten the region as anything more than a super sized Panama. There would be no vilifying of Saddam and company for the years afterwards which would plant the seeds into the American subconcious that he is the next Hitler. Iraq would probably maintain most of its army but wouldn't be able to find hyper-cheap financing for Soviet equipment with the collapse of the USSR still due to take place and so he would spend the next decade attempting to rebuild his forces while Kuwait and the Saudis would now match him and the Iranians would still be a primary threat to his rule. Repression woul remain high but the state would remain secular as a counterpoint to everyone else in the region and we would proceed that way for the next 30 odd years until Saddam eventually pulls a Castro, invades Iran again, or dies prematurely.

So anyway I don't see him not invading Kuwait. He had an Army too large to integrate back into the civilian workforce, had wrecked half of his economy, AND had managed to destroy the one functional port he did own. The only way he doesn't invade is if he can somehow solve the chronic issue of middle eastern nations related to massive under and un-employment.

[Stuart]

I'm very tempted to say Me-Too to what Commander Wilkens said and leave it there. From a Western political point of view, I think he's encapsulated the subject almost perfectly. We should have gone in, smashed the Iraqi Army to fragments and left. It was the decision to stay on in the area that has caused all the problems although I disagree with the comment that it was a driving factor behind Osama bin laden. His decision to wage war on the west long predates the US arrival in Saudi Arabia. The "Infidels near the Holy Places Arrrgghhhhh" line is an excuse, that's all.

As to preventing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the problem is that Iraq was utterly bankrupt in 1990. They had massive loans to repay with Kuwait being the primary creditor. Those loans were due and there was no way to repay them. Basically, Kuwait had been Iraq's bank during the First Gulf War. The only way I can see of stopping the invasion would be

A - Russia and America go jointly to Saddam and tell him. "We know what you are planning. Don't even think it. if you do, we'll invade, occupy and partition Iraq.

B - Then, a financial package is arranged that reschedules Iraq's debts so that they can be repayed without bankrupting the country, making it very clear that any aggressive action by Iraq will negate those arrangements and result in the aforesaid invasion, occupation and partition.

I suspect even that might not work. It might hold off the invasion fo Kuwait for a year or two until Iraq does its first nuclear test-shot but after that, we're back to square one and probably in a worse position. As long as Kuwait holds huge amounts of Iraqi debt and will not forgive those debts, the situation remains critical. Ironically, from this perspective, its possible to argue that Iraq actually won in 1990 - after all, its primary objective was to eliminate payment of the Kuwaiti loans and AFAIK that's exactly what they got - the loans were never repaid.

[CmdrWilkens]

Going on from the part of the current reason why Iran has gained such prominence is that they are left as the one major power broker in the region iwth a populaiton large enough to support a stnading army of decent size. None of the gulf states has a population base that is broad enough (even if they have/had an economic base) from which to support a large number of troops. Essentially from the fall of the shah onwards Iraq was the regional counterbalance to Iran, they were Arab and secular while Iran was (and is) Aryan and fundamentalist. Both served as counterpoints to one another and any action which woudl preclude an invasion of Kuwait almsot certianly neccessitates a resumption of the Iran-Iraq war.

Moreover any such action would, as Stuart pointed out, require a good deal of the US and the USSR working in concert yet that cannot realistically be maintained much past the end of 1991. The US had, and has, little credibility with Iran and not all that much with Iraq. After the fall of the Soviet Union there will be no major player with influence inside either circle to prevent a confrontation. While the US might get kudos points with the Arab League from actions up to the start of PG1 (certainly we could have handled the UAE AWACS deal much better) the Iraqis were already distancing themselves from the "brother arab" role so our influence woudl remain minimal. Without belaboring it any further Saddam HAS to attack somebody: either Kuwait to secure additional access to oil and the Gulf OR Iran to secure additional access to oil and the Gulf.

Possibly a bridge loan from the IMF and help cleaning up the Shatt al-Arab could work but in a state as militaristic as Iraq in the 80s and early 90s I think it would be hard for someone to foresee a scenario in which they don't go on the offensive again.

[Sea Skimmer]

One major bone that could have been thrown to Iraq would have been a lease on part of Warbah and Bubiyan islands. Saddam wanted a decent port, which after the Iraqi economy did need, but without rights to at least the coast of those island it was impossible to dredge a deep channel to Umm Qasr. A big enough channel would have intruded into Kuwait territory. Building a new port on Bubiyan would have been far better in turn. Kuwait used those islands for literally nothing at all, but didn’t want to give them up least it compromise its security and other territory. But Kuwait could never be secure as long as Saddam had his full army so in hindsight that was a bad reason to reject Saddams proposals for a sale or lease. My understanding is Saddam didn’t want to build his new port on Al-Faw because it would be within mortar range of Iran.

[Rogue 9]

I suspect even that might not work. It might hold off the invasion fo Kuwait for a year or two until Iraq does its first nuclear test-shot but after that, we're back to square one and probably in a worse position. As long as Kuwait holds huge amounts of Iraqi debt and will not forgive those debts, the situation remains critical. Ironically, from this perspective, its possible to argue that Iraq actually won in 1990 - after all, its primary objective was to eliminate payment of the Kuwaiti loans and AFAIK that's exactly what they got - the loans were never repaid.

Whoa, back up. Osiraq was crippled by the IAF in 1981; if they had a nuclear program far enough along to have the bomb within a year of the Persian Gulf War, I've certainly never heard of it. I don't discount the possibility that I could have missed it; after all, I was six years old at the time, but it seems the sort of thing that George W. Bush would have included in his WMD estimate, rather than harping on chemical weapons.

[Stuart]

Whoa, back up. Osiraq was crippled by the IAF in 1981; if they had a nuclear program far enough along to have the bomb within a year of the Persian Gulf War, I've certainly never heard of it. I don't discount the possibility that I could have missed it; after all, I was six years old at the time, but it seems the sort of thing that George W. Bush would have included in his WMD estimate, rather than harping on chemical weapons.

Clutch down, shift into forward again.

In 1990 estimates for the time before Iraq did its first test shot was six months to three years. THIS is a very good source on the Iraqi nuclear program. That's why the late 1990s/early 2000s evidence was taken so seriously.

[Sidewinder]

So basically, the one and only way to prevent Iraq from acting aggressive towards Kuwait is to avert the entire Iran-Iraq War?

We should've demonized Khomeini before 1979. The Islamic Revolution propably killed as many people as WWII, if we count unanticipated consequences and indirect results (the Lebanon Civil War, Iran-Iraq War, Persian Gulf War, OIF).

I disagree with the comment that it was a driving factor behind Osama bin laden. His decision to wage war on the west long predates the US arrival in Saudi Arabia. The "Infidels near the Holy Places Arrrgghhhhh" line is an excuse, that's all.

What sparked this decision, anyways? "America supports Zionist pigs who're butchering brother Muslims"? "America supports/supported the infidel Shah of Iran"? "America is not a Muslim nation. 'Nuff said"?

[Straha]

As to preventing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the problem is that Iraq was utterly bankrupt in 1990. They had massive loans to repay with Kuwait being the primary creditor. Those loans were due and there was no way to repay them. Basically, Kuwait had been Iraq's bank during the First Gulf War. The only way I can see of stopping the invasion would be

A minor quibble here, the "Bank" of Iraq during the war was the Gulf Co-operation Council, a grouping of six nations in the Gulf designed to guarantee their own neutrality while trying to ensure Iraqi Victory. Altogether they gave roughly $40 Billion, with over $20 Billion of non-oil aid coming from Saudi Arabia. Kuwait, the second most generous member, gave about $6 Billion. However Kuwait was A. an easy punching bag, and B. already had long standing grievances with Iraq, especially regarding Bubiyan Island. The analysis I've seen on the issue, and I'd personally agree with it, is that Saddam wanted to renegotiate his agreements with the GCC members, who were being rather obstinate on the subject (understandably, considering they had cut the price of Oil to $10 a barrel to save Saddam's rear end, destroying their national incomes in the process), and by invading Kuwait he neatly annuls over 10% of his wartime debt and is then able to credibly threaten the rest of the GCC with "I did it to Kuwait, and I'll do it to you too, if you don't restructure."

As for how it could be stopped, America could have done it if our Ambassador had shown a bit more backbone when she was grilled on the subject by Saddam and Tariq Aziz. Personally, I don't think Russia could have done anything, it had much larger and bigger fish to fry and couldn't organize itself at the time, much less put concerted diplomatic pressure on a Middle Eastern country. Especially with Afghanistan still sitting in their mouths.

As for renegotiating the financial schedule... I'm not sure it could be done. The Saudis needed money, as did Kuwait, and they for all intents and purposes had Iraq by the balls. Unless a first world country steps in and offers to help subsidize payments Saddam has the unenviable choice between letting his country collapse into bankruptcy or invading his next door neighbour.

So basically, the one and only way to prevent Iraq from acting aggressive towards Kuwait is to avert the entire Iran-Iraq War?

Yes.

We should've demonized Khomeini before 1979. The Islamic Revolution propably killed as many people as WWII, if we count unanticipated consequences and indirect results (the Lebanon Civil War, Iran-Iraq War, Persian Gulf War, OIF).

No we shouldn't have, and no it didn't. I do think, because of what happened, that the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war are the two seminal moments of the second half of the 20th century, and the shapers of the modern world. BUT, the revolution does not mean that the Iran-Iraq war has to take place. If Saddam had not invaded it is quite possible that religious revolutionaries would have lost the populace, lost power and been replaced by moderate revolutionaries dedicated towards a semi-secular state in a western model.

Further, even if Iraq invades it doesn't, necessarily, mean that it goes as it did. If concerted international pressure had been placed on Iraq and Iran to accept a peace treaty in 1982/1983 it could have ended with much less bloodshed, and without Iraq having half the debt it ended up with. Further the price of Oil would have remained high enough that it could pay off its debts without having to invade Kuwait. Another possibility would be concerted economic sanctions on Iraq in 1984 for using Chemical Weapons, something that was vetoed in the U.N. Security Council by the United States. If we'd done that, the west would have its moral spine intact, and could have forced a happier conclusion to the war well before it claimed as many lives as it did (if Khomeini could be forced to the table. Something I think could have been done earlier in the war, but that window closes ~1985.)

I'm not Khomeini's biggest fan by any means. But don't blame him for having his country invaded, for Saddam's refusal to give indemnities for his act of blatant aggression, for the Arab Gulf States' terrified fear of having a populist uprising in their own backyard, or for the west's utter cowardice when confronted with an actual moral choice.

[K. A. Pital]

The Islamic Revolution propably killed as many people as WWII

That's why people should think before posting in History. Side, stop hurting history with casual statements which contain gross error. History is in pain.

His decision to wage war on the west long predates the US arrival in Saudi Arabia. The "Infidels near the Holy Places Arrrgghhhhh" line is an excuse, that's all.

Osama Bin Laden was among the allies of yours when you sponsored the Muj, however. So when exactly did he turn from "kill Soviet infidels!" to "kill United States infidels!"? It's interesting. It was certainly somewhere between the end of 1980s and the mid 1990s.

[CmdrWilkens]

As for how it could be stopped, America could have done it if our Ambassador had shown a bit more backbone when she was grilled on the subject by Saddam and Tariq Aziz. Personally, I don't think Russia could have done anything, it had much larger and bigger fish to fry and couldn't organize itself at the time, much less put concerted diplomatic pressure on a Middle Eastern country. Especially with Afghanistan still sitting in their mouths.

All joking aside but Saddam and Aziz were not going to listen to a woman tell them not to do what they wanted to do. I'm not syaing we shoudl have had a different ambassador but rathr I'm saying her ability to level a threat from the United States without some sort of material backup is negligible. We would have had to mvoe ground combat assets into the region in orde to lend her words enough weight. That, in turn, is likely never going to happen until AFTER Kuwait is invaded. The government of Kuwait, for that matter, told the military to stand down just prior to the invasion and were working with the assumption (along with most other memebrs of the GCC) that Saddam could be placated with a bit of small time negotiation and that 'Brother Arab' would not attack another.

So what I'm trying to point out is that the US's diplomatic threats (and hell even if they were delivered by someone other than Glaspie) are going to roll of Iraq like water unless there is a tangible component to them and the gulf states at that time are not going to allow such a tangible demonstration of US combat power.

[Stuart]

Osama Bin Laden was among the allies of yours when you sponsored the Muj, however. So when exactly did he turn from "kill Soviet infidels!" to "kill United States infidels!"? It's interesting. It was certainly somewhere between the end of 1980s and the mid 1990s.

It's a common myth that Osama bin Laden fought Soviet troops in Afghanistan; one promulgated by ObL himself and repeated all over the place. In fact, he didn't; his involvement came later along with that of the Taliban. Boiling down a lot of very confused history, teh fighting in Afghanistan was conducted by several groups of warlords who then fought each other into exhaustion. It was at that point that ObL and the Taliban entered the scene and scooped up the goodies. Also, ObL was never directly funded by the US; what we did was to direct financial aid through the Pakistan government who then distributed it to the various groups. ObL was started basically as a clerk doing the bookwork on these financial transactions. Unfortunately, the organization responsible for handing out the cash (the ISI) had its own agenda that included supporting various extreme groups so they could be used against India. Add in the fact that what became the Taliban had already infiltrated the ISI and the witches brew gets interesting. One of the problems was that the ISI was trying to expand rapidly in this era so people were going up the authority chain fast. As a result, the ISI quickly became infiltrated at a very high level and we have the situation that exists now, the ISI being a rogue agency that is working against the government it is supposed to serve

What sparked this decision, anyways? "America supports Zionist pigs who're butchering brother Muslims"? "America supports/supported the infidel Shah of Iran"? "America is not a Muslim nation. 'Nuff said"?

ObLs belief system appears to go back to his time in Abdul Aziz University (1976 - 1979). Those who knew him back then described him as being a fanatical wahhabist, only interested in religion and completely disinterested in his alleged university studies. Again contrary to the self-promotional mythology ObL never got a university degree; he was kicked out due to his poor academic performance. ***** Personal Guess ***** My personal opinion is that it was the disgrace of being thrown out of University that turned him from a loud-mouthed firebrand into a terrorist. In a society that values book learning as one of the highest and most honored skills available, being thrown out of University is a very real disgrace. I think a lot of his 'ideology' comes from that including his promotion of attacks on schools, his general contem,pt for education and his fanatical resistance to women being educated (women went to Abdul Aziz University and its easy to see his hatred at seeing women getting the degrees he'd been denied. It's notable that ObLs wives were mostly university graduates who were made to live in demaining and degrading dircumstances. One even divorced him on those grounds. ***** End of Personal Guess *****

What appears to have been the pivotal event in his development was the the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque by terrorists and the inability of the Saudi Government to restore the situation (the Saudis had to call in French special forces troops to do the job). This seems to have led ObL to believe that the Moslem world was hoplessly corrupt and only a return to the purest form of Wahhabi-dominated Islam would save it. That's the key to ObL; his target is the existing Moslem regimes, his objective is to sweep them away and replace them with Taliban-style governments. He's quite explicit about that; the way the Taliban ruled in Afghanistan is the way he wants to see the whole Moslem world ruled (by the way, he includes Spain in that area). How such a state would work is an interesting question (I've tried to address just that question in some of my books). But, a Taliban-style trans-national government is what ObL wants. In fact, ObL described Afghanistan under teh taliban as "the only true Islamic state". Everything else, the feud with the United States, his death to Israel propaganda etc are all subsidiary to and justifications for that primary aim.

[Straha]

As for how it could be stopped, America could have done it if our Ambassador had shown a bit more backbone when she was grilled on the subject by Saddam and Tariq Aziz. Personally, I don't think Russia could have done anything, it had much larger and bigger fish to fry and couldn't organize itself at the time, much less put concerted diplomatic pressure on a Middle Eastern country. Especially with Afghanistan still sitting in their mouths.

All joking aside but Saddam and Aziz were not going to listen to a woman tell them not to do what they wanted to do. I'm not saying we should have had a different ambassador but rather I'm saying her ability to level a threat from the United States without some sort of material backup is negligible. We would have had to move ground combat assets into the region in order to lend her words enough weight. That, in turn, is likely never going to happen until AFTER Kuwait is invaded. The government of Kuwait, for that matter, told the military to stand down just prior to the invasion and were working with the assumption (along with most other members of the GCC) that Saddam could be placated with a bit of small time negotiation and that 'Brother Arab' would not attack another.

If Glaspie had said, point blank, "The United States will oppose any drastic shift of the current balance of powers in the Region, and will back this with Military Force." (A simple restatement of the Guam/Nixon doctrine) I think Saddam could have been forced into rethinking the invasion. Honestly, like I said before, I don't think Saddam really thought he had a choice (actually, he probably didn't.) Iraq was, for all intents and purposes, up shit creek without a paddle. But a definitive statement that the United States would interfere and intervene in case of invasion would have given the best chance of forcing Saddam and Iraq into backing down, forces in the region or not.

[Stuart]

If Glaspie had said, point blank, "The United States will oppose any drastic shift of the current balance of powers in the Region, and will back this with Military Force." (A simple restatement of the Guam/Nixon doctrine) I think Saddam could have been forced into rethinking the invasion. Honestly, like I said before, I don't think Saddam really thought he had a choice (actually, he probably didn't.) Iraq was, for all intents and purposes, up shit creek without a paddle. But a definitive statement that the United States would interfere and intervene in case of invasion would have given the best chance of forcing Saddam and Iraq into backing down, forces in the region or not.

The problem is that a threat has to have credibility and in the absence of credibility, threats are just empty words. Everybody in the Middle East remembered (and still remembers) that in a previous crisis, Carter sent unarmed F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia - that's right, he deployed the aircraft but insisted that they go without any weapons. That didn't quite destroy US credibility but it left it very severely dented. Frankly had Glaspie made the statement you suggest, I don't think Saddam would have believed it. At best he'd have ignored it, at worst he'd have taken it as an opportunity to demonstrate his power by defying the United States.

[CmdrWilkens]

To Stuart's point a bit more most of the Gulf states were quite literally shocked that during the Tanker War we sent armed naval vessels and actual kept them there even after they were attacked and damaged (all through the Vincennes incident as well). So most of the gulf states were heavily suprised even at such minimal committment of force as, essentially, a surface action group tied solely to maintenance of free navigation. Add on things like the debacle of getting AWACS birds for the UAE during the build up towards hostilities and you have further proof that Saddam wouldn't view such threats as credible. What happened was during the run up to the invasion of Kuwait the UAE requested tankers and AWACS support to keep its planes in the air to act as a BARCAP against an Iraqi strike. The State Department actually recommended denying them this aid up until about a week before the actual invasion. So anyway Saddam was unlikely to believe any attempt at military bluster by the US without actual placement of forces. Moreover any move to actively oppose him woudl require noticeable committment of troops as in several divisions for which the US had no standing treaty obligations to provide so again its not hard to surmise that few expected we would intervene and certainly not that we would intervene so decisively.

[Sidewinder]

We should've demonized Khomeini before 1979. The Islamic Revolution propably killed as many people as WWII, if we count unanticipated consequences and indirect results (the Lebanon Civil War, Iran-Iraq War, Persian Gulf War, OIF).

No we shouldn't have, and no it didn't.

Not yet. Just give the religious fundamentalist nutcases some time. WWII lasted six years. The war between Islamists and secular states is nicknamed the "Long War" because the Pentagon's analysts predict it'll rage until 2026 or 2056; considering religious firebrands have a cockroach's resilience and propagation power, we might even say they underestimated how long it'll last.

[Straha]

The problem is that a threat has to have credibility and in the absence of credibility, threats are just empty words. Everybody in the Middle East remembered (and still remembers) that in a previous crisis, Carter sent unarmed F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia - that's right, he deployed the aircraft but insisted that they go without any weapons. That didn't quite destroy US credibility but it left it very severely dented. Frankly had Glaspie made the statement you suggest, I don't think Saddam would have believed it. At best he'd have ignored it, at worst he'd have taken it as an opportunity to demonstrate his power by defying the United States.

A. A niggling point: nice dig at Carter, but if you want the stuff that they would really remember, as opposed to the toothless F-15s, you easily cite America pulling out last second from the joint U.S.-French bombing of the Sheikh Abdullah Barracks which theFrench carried out nonetheless even though the U.S. left them utterly in the lurch, all because Caspar Weinberger was a chickenshit blowhard with an ego the size of the moon, and because Ronald Reagan couldn't keep his cabinet in line. Or the fact that America let Syria shoot down two of its planes in December 1983, and get away with it without any real repercussions. Or Lebanon, enough said right?

but

B. 1990 America was very different from 1979 and early 80s America. Starting contemporaneously in '83 with Grenada and continuing with the direct intervention in the Achille Lauro hijackings of 1985, the Naval operations in the Gulf of Sidra against Libya (and El Dorado Canyon), the strengthening of CENTCOM with the Saudis, the direct intervention in the Tanker War (where we showed we would take casualties as well as dish them out in live fire exercises, and even gave a campaign medal to the captain of the Vincennes,) and the Invasion of Panama, America showed it was no longer a paper tiger. The U.S. had gone to bat, repeatedly, when it said its interests were at stake, and was willing to risk lives and hardware for it.

I'm not saying that Iraq would have taken Glaspie at her word. But if Glaspie had said "No." point blank, and then maybe arranged for some minor sabre-rattling through CENTCOM with Saudi Arabia, Iraq might have backed down. In all honesty, maybe nothing could have forced Saddam out of his Hobson's choice for the future (either he invades Kuwait and reneges on his GCC debt, or he loses his country), but that would have had the best shot of working. (I hope that covered you too, Wilkins.)

Not yet. Just give the religious fundamentalist nutcases some time. WWII lasted six years. The war between Islamists and secular states is nicknamed the "Long War" because the Pentagon's analysts predict it'll rage until 2026 or 2056; considering religious firebrands have a cockroach's resilience and propagation power, we might even say they underestimated how long it'll last.

Sidewinder, go read Stas' post again.

But lets play your game for a second.

Circuitous method: If we give you that Khomeini's participation and spearheading of the Iranian revolution directly lead to 9/11 and Operation Iraqi Freedom and its aftermath (something I don't necessarily disagree with you on) then we can quite easily agree that World War II helped put Mao Zedong in power. Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward is directly responsible for a famine that killed somewhere between 20 and 40 Million people.

Short story: Go read a history book on Germany's approach towards civilians. (In fact, I think Surlethe recommended one in Venting just a day or two ago.) In Russia alone it killed over ten million people.

Either way: You lose. Good day, sir.

[CmdrWilkens]

Not yet. Just give the religious fundamentalist nutcases some time. WWII lasted six years. The war between Islamists and secular states is nicknamed the "Long War" because the Pentagon's analysts predict it'll rage until 2026 or 2056; considering religious firebrands have a cockroach's resilience and propagation power, we might even say they underestimated how long it'll last.

<snip>
Circuitous method: If we give you that Khomeini's participation and spearheading of the Iranian revolution directly lead to 9/11 and Operation Iraqi Freedom and its aftermath (something I don't necessarily disagree with you on) then we can quite easily agree that World War II helped put Mao Zedong in power. Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward is directly responsible for a famine that killed somewhere between 20 and 40 Million people.

Short story: Go read a history book on Germany's approach towards civilians. (In fact, I think Surlethe recommended one in Venting just a day or two ago.) In Russia alone it killed over ten million people.

Either way: You lose. Good day, sir.

Actually I was going to say that blame for either of those events always has to fall back to WWI and the decline of Empires that it kicked off. Above anything else the Khomeni line would never get going without the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the war. Had the young turks maanged to engage in a few more years of reforms, played the great game with the Brits and Russias across the desert for another decade and suppresed an Arab uprising or two then the entire character of conflict in the middle east would remain highly colonial for another several decades at least, modern fundamentalist Islam would never find quite the same purchase in the increasingly secular Ottoman Empire. That is all even before one considers the decline in British and French authority over their colonies in the wake of the War.

So anyway your point is dead on, we can assign blame in a host of ways but looking back we can usually find the cause that started the cause and realize that movements are much larger, usually, than the individuals which embody them. In other words stopping Khomeni would not neccesarily have stopped the broader conflict.

[Stuart]

A. A niggling point: nice dig at Carter,

Thank you; I do my best but jabbing at Carter is really rather like shooting fish in a barrel with Atomic Annie; he makes it too easy to be real fun.

but if you want the stuff that they would really remember, as opposed to the toothless F-15s, you easily cite America pulling out last second from the joint U.S.-French bombing of the Sheikh Abdullah Barracks which theFrench carried out nonetheless even though the U.S. left them utterly in the lurch, all because Caspar Weinberger was a chickenshit blowhard with an ego the size of the moon, and because Ronald Reagan couldn't keep his cabinet in line. Or the fact that America let Syria shoot down two of its planes in December 1983, and get away with it without any real repercussions. Or Lebanon, enough said right?

Oddly the toothless F-15s are the one that seems to stick in the mind out there. ***My personal guess*** is that not doing anything can be explained away as real-politik but sending unarmed F-15s wasn't just risible, it was insulting to everybody. *** End of personal guess *** Certainly, in dealing with "the Americans won't respond" meme, the F-15s are teh most common example, in my experience at least.

1990 America was very different from 1979 and early 80s America. Starting contemporaneously in '83 with Grenada and continuing with the direct intervention in the Achille Lauro hijackings of 1985, the Naval operations in the Gulf of Sidra against Libya (and El Dorado Canyon), the strengthening of CENTCOM with the Saudis, the direct intervention in the Tanker War (where we showed we would take casualties as well as dish them out in live fire exercises, and even gave a campaign medal to the captain of the Vincennes,) and the Invasion of Panama, America showed it was no longer a paper tiger. The U.S. had gone to bat, repeatedly, when it said its interests were at stake, and was willing to risk lives and hardware for it.

And yet, in 1990, despite all that you list (and more besides) the comment about the United States that had widest currency out there was that it couldn't be relied upon as an ally and couldn't be counted on to stay once the going got tough. Even after ODS, that was still the most frequent meme. It had evolved to "if Saddam had just managed to kill a few hundred Americans, they would have gone away". Then, of course, we had Mogadishu to back that line up. What you're really saying is that a nation's credibility as an ally and as a participant is rather like financial credit, it takes a long time to build up, is very easy to destroy and once destroyed is even harder to rebuild than it was to create.

I'm not saying that Iraq would have taken Glaspie at her word. But if Glaspie had said "No." point blank, and then maybe arranged for some minor sabre-rattling through CENTCOM with Saudi Arabia, Iraq might have backed down. In all honesty, maybe nothing could have forced Saddam out of his Hobson's choice for the future (either he invades Kuwait and reneges on his GCC debt, or he loses his country), but that would have had the best shot of working. (I hope that covered you too, Wilkins.)

Minor sabre-rattling won't do it; that's what the toothless F-15s were. The sabre has to be clearly heard and seen and it has to be a sword adequate to do the job. Moving USAREUR to Saudi would have done the job but I doubt if anything less would have. Remember we know now that Saddam's Army was a house of cards but it wasn't understood so widely then. Re-read coverage from the time and there's lots of discussions over whether the U.S. Army was capable of beating the "battle-hardened, experienced Iraqi Army that includes the world's largest special forces contingent" withou a lot of bloody fighting and a long stalemate. That sounds absurd now but it was plausible then and it appears even Saddam believed it. So limited sabre rattling won't do anything,

[CmdrWilkens]

I'm not saying that Iraq would have taken Glaspie at her word. But if Glaspie had said "No." point blank, and then maybe arranged for some minor sabre-rattling through CENTCOM with Saudi Arabia, Iraq might have backed down. In all honesty, maybe nothing could have forced Saddam out of his Hobson's choice for the future (either he invades Kuwait and reneges on his GCC debt, or he loses his country), but that would have had the best shot of working. (I hope that covered you too, Wilkins.)

I know Stuart got most of this and if it seems like piling on let me know but I figured I woudl add my two cents back in that there are two sides to this coin about "sabre-rattling"

1) Side one is the capabilites of Saddam's troops. While, and Stuart metnioend this, we now know they were battle weary and not prepared for a stiff fight their equipment was plentiful, their number were huge (Iraq was the world's 4th alrgest standing army at the time), they were known to be willing users of chemical weapons, and the Republican Guard was generally regarded as one of the premier fighting forces of the middle east. So from Saddam's perspective given the synchophantic natureof his regieme and the international military press generally regarding his units as very capable I think, think, he would feel he holds the biggest sabre even just squaring off between Iraq and the US (since we would be notably outnumbered by several divisions at least).

2) Side two is perception of US armed forces. Since the end of the Vietnam War we had fought in a series of smaller conflicts none of which would tend to imply the coming massive vicotry we won. Grenada was a succesful boondoggle, despite complete air and naval superiority we managed to turn a one day coup de main into a protracted almost week long battle for a small Caribbean Island. The Beirut intervention was a notable disaster from all points of view not the least of which was our response to the death of the Marines. The invasion of Panama was a better demonstrator of the use of force (and certainly very recent in most folks minds) but at the same time we showed the startling inability to run Norriega to the ground for days afterwards despite having that as a primary mission. Add in the Vincennes incident and the reputation of the US Armed Forces in the late 80s was decidedly mixed in terms of its actual combat abilities against opponents who didn't fight massive tank battles across the Fulda Gap.

Putting all that together Saddam would have easily been justified in believing he had the sharper sabre and any sabre rattling the US did do would have to be VERY big and VERY noticeable to even make a dent on the perceptions surrounding the time. Is it doable? Absolutely, had the US moved the XVIII Airborne Corps and at least 1 MEF into Kuwait or Saudi Arabia then Saddam may have been convinced we were serious BUT, and here is side three to the equation, would Kuwait or Saudi Arabia actually let those troops in absent an invasion? The Emir of Kuwait told his forces to stand down just prior to the attack and the Suadis almost to a man (King Fahd and the Crown Prince being obviously a tad more important in the process) were hesitant to ask for US troops even after the invasion of Kuwait. So yes I think the US could have rattled a sabre large enough but I don't think Kuwait or the Saudis would let them prior to the invasion.

[Straha]

Let me start this by saying I've started this post twice. The first time I got to almost the end, and the second time I got to about 3/4s through. Both times my browser closed. So, sorry about the delayed reply and if I seem a little irritated in the post, it's because I am. But not at the discussion

Actually I was going to say that blame for either of those events always has to fall back to WWI and the decline of Empires that it kicked off. Above anything else the Khomeni line would never get going without the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the war.

...

So anyway your point is dead on, we can assign blame in a host of ways but looking back we can usually find the cause that started the cause and realize that movements are much larger, usually, than the individuals which embody them. In other words stopping Khomeni would not neccesarily have stopped the broader conflict.

To the first part, I agree 100%, there are a huge number of influencing factors in the region that go back hundreds, even thousands, of years. But, and I'm addressing your second part here as well, I really really despise the practice of trying to blame large historical events solely on one individual or one event. There are times, very rarely, where it can be accurate, however the rest of the time it's a much more complicated situation (this lack of understanding is what really annoyed me about Sidewinder's post.) To make a ridiculous case in post: Operation Iraqi Freedom. It's not hard to draw a direct line from the Iranian Revolution to Iran-Iraq to Desert Storm to OIF. However in each case dozens of other factors effected the outcome. With OIF, you had to have George W. Bush in office, and in order for that to happen you have a few hundred disgruntled retirees in Florida become disgusted with Democrats after the Lewinski scandal. Does this mean that we should blame Little Billy Jr. coming out for air in the Oval Office for OIF? Of course not. But if he hadn't OIF would never have happened.


Anyway, I'm getting sidetracked. Onwards!

Thank you; I do my best but jabbing at Carter is really rather like shooting fish in a barrel with Atomic Annie; he makes it too easy to be real fun.

Hehe. I've joked with my friends a number of times that "I think Carter could have been a decent president. His only real problem was that he couldn't manage a crisis."

Oddly the toothless F-15s are the one that seems to stick in the mind out there. ***My personal guess*** is that not doing anything can be explained away as real-politik but sending unarmed F-15s wasn't just risible, it was insulting to everybody. *** End of personal guess *** Certainly, in dealing with "the Americans won't respond" meme, the F-15s are teh most common example, in my experience at least.

See, this is really surprising to me because the incident is so rarely mentioned in American books on the subject, and when it is it's almost always in passing. Heck, I leafed through Gary Sick's All Fall Down to see if it was in there, and he cuts away from his narrative right before the F-15s were sent down, and restarts it a few months later. (I can't imagine why he wouldn't want to mention it in his book... ) I think, in most books, the incident gets about a paragraph and then the author moves on to other subjects.

Also, in most of my discussions with people from the region (admittedly mainly Iranian ex-pats) they tend to focus much more on other incidents/issues (like the Shah being tear gassed on the White House lawn) and put massive weight behind those, and very little behind this.

Minor sabre-rattling won't do it; that's what the toothless F-15s were. The sabre has to be clearly heard and seen and it has to be a sword adequate to do the job. Moving USAREUR to Saudi would have done the job but I doubt if anything less would have. Remember we know now that Saddam's Army was a house of cards but it wasn't understood so widely then. Re-read coverage from the time and there's lots of discussions over whether the U.S. Army was capable of beating the "battle-hardened, experienced Iraqi Army that includes the world's largest special forces contingent" withou a lot of bloody fighting and a long stalemate. That sounds absurd now but it was plausible then and it appears even Saddam believed it. So limited sabre rattling won't do anything,

Wilkens, I hope to address your points here as well, if I don't feel free to bring it up (and no, it doesn't feel like piling on.)

I don't think the Sabre "has to be adequate to do the job." The point to get across isn't "The United States will commit enough troops to kick you out of Kuwait." Because nobody would have believed what was going to happen would happen, rather the point should be to make it clear that "If you invade Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, etc. will make you pay for it, with full backing from the United States and the participation of their military." Saddam Hussein is stuck between the rock of invading Kuwait, and the Hard Place of potentially letting his country go bankrupt. The point of the sabre rattling should be to make it clear that the latter is preferable to the former.

As for facing the Iraqi Army, the point could easily be mooted through diplomatic channels. "Sure you have a nifty army. But who's going to sign their paychecks? You have no money on hand, and any money you do make you make through exports, and we can surround you and cut you off from the rest of the world so you make no money. The best you can hope for is a long protracted stalemate that bloodies an Arab coalition, but will your Army really be willing to fight for you under those circumstances if you're not able to pay them?"

I should add, I'm not arguing that "this would have worked!" rather I'm arguing if there was a way to avert the First Persian Gulf War, this was the way to do it, and that I think it would have had a chance of working. Maybe not a huge one, but a chance.

[CmdrWilkens]

Wilkens, I hope to address your points here as well, if I don't feel free to bring it up (and no, it doesn't feel like piling on.)

I don't think the Sabre "has to be adequate to do the job." The point to get across isn't "The United States will commit enough troops to kick you out of Kuwait." Because nobody would have believed what was going to happen would happen, rather the point should be to make it clear that "If you invade Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, etc. will make you pay for it, with full backing from the United States and the participation of their military." Saddam Hussein is stuck between the rock of invading Kuwait, and the Hard Place of potentially letting his country go bankrupt. The point of the sabre rattling should be to make it clear that the latter is preferable to the former.

Oddly enough I think this is where WWI comes in great hand: solid diplomacy facing a nation with the threat of military intervention will likely result in Saddam still going forward with the invasion...why? Because to most folks who have steeped themselves in the military without also absorbing the ethos of not wanting to actually shed blood the prospect of not going to war is always mroe frightening than the prospect of going to war and its a matter of control. Saddam (much as any politician of the early 20th century) felt they held a great deal of control over the corelation of forces and thus while victory was hardly certain they felt that they had control over it, if they don't go to war then they don't have that control. Now obviously that's a simplificaiton of a much more complex diplomatic and military situation but it captures the essence of why I don't think it could work. Either Saddam will see the threat of intervention as less than the threat of internal dissent OR the US will not be able to actually bring a believable threat of intervention to the table.

From an unencumbered stance yes a threat of a massive US intervention is probably the only thing that COULD have stopped the invasion in its tracks but at the same time I don't think there is any realistic scenario in which it WOULD.

[Stuart]

But if he hadn't OIF would never have happened.

I'd argue that. Things were boiling up anyway and I Think OIF would have happened no matter who was in power. It might not have happened the same way or in exactly the same timescale but I think it would have gone down sooner or later.


Anyway, I'm getting sidetracked. Onwards!

His only real problem was that he couldn't manage a crisis.

His main problem was that he couldn't recognize a crisis; he had no idea of consequences. He simply didn't know when something was serious and when it wasn't. That's why the Fewocious Wabbit was so hysterically funny.

See, this is really surprising to me because the incident is so rarely mentioned in American books on the subject, and when it is it's almost always in passing. Heck, I leafed through Gary Sick's All Fall Down to see if it was in there, and he cuts away from his narrative right before the F-15s were sent down, and restarts it a few months later. (I can't imagine why he wouldn't want to mention it in his book... ) I think, in most books, the incident gets about a paragraph and then the author moves on to other subjects. Also, in most of my discussions with people from the region (admittedly mainly Iranian ex-pats) they tend to focus much more on other incidents/issues (like the Shah being tear gassed on the White House lawn) and put massive weight behind those, and very little behind this.

And yet, when I was working on Peace Shield it got thrown around all the time. This is another case of international perceptions I think; to Americans it was of minor importance but to the Saudis in particular it struck very deep. They considered it an explicit declaration that American support was worthless.

I don't think the Sabre "has to be adequate to do the job." The point to get across isn't "The United States will commit enough troops to kick you out of Kuwait." Because nobody would have believed what was going to happen would happen, rather the point should be to make it clear that "If you invade Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, etc. will make you pay for it, with full backing from the United States and the participation of their military." Saddam Hussein is stuck between the rock of invading Kuwait, and the Hard Place of potentially letting his country go bankrupt. The point of the sabre rattling should be to make it clear that the latter is preferable to the former. As for facing the Iraqi Army, the point could easily be mooted through diplomatic channels. "Sure you have a nifty army. But who's going to sign their paychecks? You have no money on hand, and any money you do make you make through exports, and we can surround you and cut you off from the rest of the world so you make no money. The best you can hope for is a long protracted stalemate that bloodies an Arab coalition, but will your Army really be willing to fight for you under those circumstances if you're not able to pay them?" I should add, I'm not arguing that "this would have worked!" rather I'm arguing if there was a way to avert the First Persian Gulf War, this was the way to do it, and that I think it would have had a chance of working. Maybe not a huge one, but a chance.

But that's what the other Arabs were saying and the result was to push Saddam into the invasion. The course you're suggesting would have done the same whether the Americans backed it or not. It's important to remember the kind of man Saddam was and the background he came from. All he knew was brute force; that's all he understood. He was hard-wired to force as a solution. Tell him you're going to cut him off and he instinctively thought of striking first. His response to "you can't pay your army" was "I'll take the cash". And his response to the idea that an Arab coalition might form against him was to pre-empt it. To be honest, I think the message you propose sending would have started the war, not deterred it.

[Setzer]

That might lead to an even greater inflammation of anti-American sentiment. Would we have been seen as provoking an Arab-on-Arab war? No doubt some would claim it was done at the behest of Israel.

[Straha]

Wilkens, I hope to address your points here as well, if I don't feel free to bring it up (and no, it doesn't feel like piling on.)

I don't think the Sabre "has to be adequate to do the job." The point to get across isn't "The United States will commit enough troops to kick you out of Kuwait." Because nobody would have believed what was going to happen would happen, rather the point should be to make it clear that "If you invade Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, etc. will make you pay for it, with full backing from the United States and the participation of their military." Saddam Hussein is stuck between the rock of invading Kuwait, and the Hard Place of potentially letting his country go bankrupt. The point of the sabre rattling should be to make it clear that the latter is preferable to the former.

From an unencumbered stance yes a threat of a massive US intervention is probably the only thing that COULD have stopped the invasion in its tracks but at the same time I don't think there is any realistic scenario in which it WOULD.

I can see where you're coming from and I agree with you, mostly. I don't think that a threat of U.S. intervention would have definitely worked to scare Saddam off, but at the same time I think if anything could have worked that was it and that it had a semi-decent chance of working if done right.

I'd argue that. Things were boiling up anyway and I Think OIF would have happened no matter who was in power. It might not have happened the same way or in exactly the same timescale but I think it would have gone down sooner or later.

It certainly wouldn't have happened at the same scale or with the same diplomatic approach that the Bush administration used, and that could have made miles of difference in how things ended up. (Either for better or for worse.)

His main problem was that he couldn't recognize a crisis; he had no idea of consequences. He simply didn't know when something was serious and when it wasn't. That's why the Fewocious Wabbit was so hysterically funny.

The man wasn't fit to be President. When you're President sometimes you have to say "This is how it's going to be. That's that. I'm the leader of this god damned country and if you have a problem with this, tough shit." Carter never got that down. I think from there all his other faults follow, because when you think everything can be negotiated and compromised down then you don't understand that inaction and indecisiveness will hurt you and then you never get around to actually resolving any pressing issues or concerns.

And yet, when I was working on Peace Shield it got thrown around all the time. This is another case of international perceptions I think; to Americans it was of minor importance but to the Saudis in particular it struck very deep. They considered it an explicit declaration that American support was worthless.

Of course that incident would stick in the mind of the Saudis. The Twin Pillars doctrine of the time said we'd do anything to shore them and the Iranians up, and we'd just let the Iranian government collapse like a pile of twigs and our support for our other staunch ally was... a bunch of training planes. But for Saddam I don't think this incident would rate that highly. The Lebanon fiasco, including the unanswered shoot down of American planes by the Syrians, would rate far higher as would just about anything else from the laundry list of incidents before as "Why the Americans wont bother supporting Kuwait." But by the time of Desert Storm we'd proven that American support wasn't "worthless" and that we were willing to go all out, and more, to defend allies if we wanted to.

(Out of curiosity, on a related note, what's your opinion of the Vincennes incident?)

But that's what the other Arabs were saying and the result was to push Saddam into the invasion. The course you're suggesting would have done the same whether the Americans backed it or not. It's important to remember the kind of man Saddam was and the background he came from. All he knew was brute force; that's all he understood. He was hard-wired to force as a solution. Tell him you're going to cut him off and he instinctively thought of striking first. His response to "you can't pay your army" was "I'll take the cash". And his response to the idea that an Arab coalition might form against him was to pre-empt it. To be honest, I think the message you propose sending would have started the war, not deterred it.

That's fair. I understand where you're coming from, and part of me agrees with it. The thing is I don't give Saddam that same degree of brute force ruthlessness as some others do. Saddam, when he needed to be, could be a sly crafty SOB, and I think that if that man was reminded that "If you do this, you die." he might have backed down for a while.