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I thought it will be interesting to discuss about the Chinese civil war, and discussing which side would benefit China more, especially during the 1950s-1970s period. This is not a discussion thread about whether the KMT could have won the war, but a thread to discuss would China benefit from the KMT if they:

1) Score a decisive defeat over the CCP
2) Only managed to achieve an indecisive defeat over the CCP (Meaning they are still countless pockets of resistance in the 1940s-1970s)

China under Mao suffered heavily due to famine during the great leap forward and countless of other failed ideological push, including the backlash against intellectualism by the red guards. The CCP lack of drive towards industrialisation in their early years sure did not help things out as well.

On the other hand, China was unstable when the KMT was in power in the 1930s and 1940s, where there is rampant corruption and facing severe inflation problems. Even then, the KMT's rule in Taiwan left much to be desired when Chiang continues his military dictatorship in Taiwan. The KMT also faced numerous problems in regards to exerting its policies throughout the nation due to the weak central government.

Based on what we know, which party or side would be better for the overall progression of China, in terms of economic development and social progress alike?

Would China take a longer time to reach what it has achieved today if the KMT is in control, or will China be more progressive if the KMT is in control in your opinion?

There are no easy answers. But nonetheless I will try.

I cannot say with any confidence that KMT rule would have been any better than PRC rule. It's true that Taiwan managed to democratize after a while, but the experiences of Taiwan cannot realistically be applied to China as a whole. Whoever won would be faced with the task of dragging an enormous, heavily-populated, and rather backward country into the twentieth century. I have to wonder who in their right mind would want the job?

It is easy to say that Mao's regime caused many deaths due to famine, but this in turn raises a difficulty. We must ask ourselves whether the conscious planning and carrying-out of many deaths is morally equivalent to causing an equal number of deaths by the adoption of certain social or economic policies. Can we say for certain that Chiang could have handled it any better? Could anyone have done any better?

The simple fact is that we cannot be know for sure whether one or the other would be better. The usual method employed by governments is to embrace whoever wins. The British, for example, refused to talk to the French Revolutionary government until it stablised its position and driven off the armies of its neighbours. The British government could justify this policy by saying that the Revolutionaries had proven their ability to rule by surviving. In the same way, the British recognised the PRC because it won, and one can argue that Mao and co. proved their worth by winning the war and holding China together afterwards. The attitude of the US government was different, since Chiang represented the last hope of a long-standing US policy to democratize and christianize China, which in itself informed American hostility to Imperial Japan.

My answer, in short, is that we don't know and can never know for certain. The only factor I can really pick up on is that Chiang was discredited in the eyes of many Chinese for failing to resist the Japanese invasion, whereas Mao consistently fought back. This attitude may have made it difficult to Chiang to rule effectively afterwards, perhaps leading to the second scenario. That, incidentally, would more than likely lead to the collapse of China into multiple entities, a popular wet-dream among Western conservatives.

Personally, I think the best thing for China would be a communist victory that Mao didn't live to see. No Great Leap Foward or Cultural Revolution would help the country go ahead faster than OTL.

A tie betweem the Communists and the Nationalists leaving China a war zone which is the worst outcome as it prevents the country from industrializing at all.

It's difficult to say. Part of the KMT's problem is that Chiang is obsessed with destroying the communists, to the point where he needs his generals to force him at gunpoint to do anything about the Japanese, and even then it wasn't enough to stop him from backstabbing Mao from time to time.

That's not to say the KMT was neccesarily bad. Sure, Chiang had soldiers open fire on demonstrators on more than one occasion, and corruption was downright rampant during and after World War II, but it all revolved around his determination to wipe out the communists. Get rid of them and, well, we have a Chiang Kai-Shek and KMT operating in a completely unknown situation.

I feel that Stas's insights regarding Soviet development are also applicable wrt China too, especially as the CCP's organization efficiency compared to the KMT's internal structure was a major and ultimately necessary asset to improve conditions in China for the long term, not merely enabling the process of achieving a military victory over the KMT. If the KMT could have matched that, not only would have nipped the post-war inflation in the bud but would also have been the victors in the civil war in the first place.

The early CCP ideas not necessarily were correct regarding national economic development. A lack of large-factory industrialization and a reliance on "people's enthusiasm" in both theories of war and theories of industry (Great Leap Forward) is perhaps the biggest error the CCP made.

I guess the rigid organization of the CCP helped to keep China stable even through times of great turmoil, but frankly, I'd pick the CCP without Mao. Mao's unhealthy fascination with the importance of "people's war" and peasant "people's action" were barriers to development, not stimuli.

There might be truth about the long-term stability though - CCP stabilized China for a long term, whereas unstable nations in the same region did not do as well as China.

However, the key problem isn't the fact that the CCP has achieved long term stability in the present, but whether a KMT can focus on industralising China.

After all, it would seems to me that the KMT understood the principles and benefits of industrialisation during the development of Taiwan.

Really? The KMT actually won't be able to industrialize Chinaif the government is unstable and the nation becomes dismembered and torn apart by separatism in a few years after a KMT "victory", so stability matters a lot. If the KMT would be stable, I'm sure they would realize some form of industrialization; but it's questionable that the amount of aid from the US they received otherwise would be as beneficial to overall China, which is far larger than the meager Taiwan island. Just thoughts.

Stas Bush wrote:Really? The KMT actually won't be able to industrialize Chinaif the government is unstable and the nation becomes dismembered and torn apart by separatism in a few years after a KMT "victory", so stability matters a lot. If the KMT would be stable, I'm sure they would realize some form of industrialization; but it's questionable that the amount of aid from the US they received otherwise would be as beneficial to overall China, which is far larger than the meager Taiwan island. Just thoughts.

I'm basing this on the assumption that the KMT managed to score a decisive victory against the CCP. If we compare Chiang to Mao, it is far more likely that Chiang would not implement retarded policy like the great leap forward and the cultural revolution for one.

Chiang never adopted the idea of 'people's enthusiasm' that led to the stalling of China's economic growth in the 1960s to 1970s.

ray245 wrote:I'm basing this on the assumption that the KMT managed to score a decisive victory against the CCP.

Decisive victory /= post-war stability, I think we're talking about different things here. I already said that early CCP policies were not sound, I mentioned stability as being a feature of the CCP consolidation of power over China. The KMT may destroy the CCP as a fighting force and political opponent, but it doesn't automatically mean a stabilized government and nation-state.

Samuel wrote:Personally, I think the best thing for China would be a communist victory that Mao didn't live to see. No Great Leap Foward or Cultural Revolution would help the country go ahead faster than OTL.

A tie betweem the Communists and the Nationalists leaving China a war zone which is the worst outcome as it prevents the country from industrializing at all.

Stas Bush wrote:The early CCP ideas not necessarily were correct regarding national economic development. A lack of large-factory industrialization and a reliance on "people's enthusiasm" in both theories of war and theories of industry (Great Leap Forward) is perhaps the biggest error the CCP made.

There might be truth about the long-term stability though - CCP stabilized China for a long term, whereas unstable nations in the same region did not do as well as China.

There's a major assumption going on here. Mainly that Mao was the one who consciously planned for the Great Leap Forward and wasn't "forced" to commit to it due to the political, social and economic conditions of the time. We must not forget that the US politically and economically isolated China at this point in time, preventing the natural development of Shanghai, Guangzhou as the economic engines of China. The needs for People War and defence against either the Soviets or the Americans, especially in terms of a nuclear conflict drove Mao Zedong to adopt the Great Leap Forward and its industrialisation programme in the mountainous and desert areas of western china and once that was adopted. In particular, the need to decentralise industry so as to maintain guerilla forces in a nuclear conflict made small workshops more and more appealing. The belief on "spirit" and idealism overcoming such material difficulties is both neccesity as well as propangda, similar to how the British had to believe that the Americans will save Malaya and Singapore during WW2, because they had no other choice but to believe so.

In this sense, China could not possibly hope to win a nuclear conflict with the Americans or the Soviets without the adoption of People War. It HAD to organise its society and military around People War, a massive guerilla conflict, and that overriding neccesity filtered its way down to economic and social planning.

If despite wartime illusions America would still continue to prop up China, one might argue that under the nuclear umbrella of America, China might had been better off under the KMT. I leave it to others to argue whether Madam Song could had continued to mobilise pro KMT support in America after Chiang disappointing performance in WW2.

In this sense, China could not possibly hope to win a nuclear conflict with the Americans or the Soviets without the adoption of People War. It HAD to organise its society and military around People War, a massive guerilla conflict, and that overriding neccesity filtered its way down to economic and social planning.

Than they should have realized that it was impossible for them to win a nuclear conflict.

In particular, the need to decentralise industry so as to maintain guerilla forces in a nuclear conflict made small workshops more and more appealing.

How on Earth would that work? The workshops need mines to work, which are inherently centralized and China had little else they could scavange to make machinery.

The belief on "spirit" and idealism overcoming such material difficulties is both neccesity as well as propangda, similar to how the British had to believe that the Americans will save Malaya and Singapore during WW2, because they had no other choice but to believe so.

Except that they just say what happens when you try to match spirit against overwhelming industrial might- spirit doesn't work. Did they not learn from the defeat and occupation of Japan?

If despite wartime illusions America would still continue to prop up China, one might argue that under the nuclear umbrella of America, China might had been better off under the KMT. I leave it to others to argue whether Madam Song could had continued to mobilise pro KMT support in America after Chiang disappointing performance in WW2.

Of course. The have the South Eastern border of the USSR- they would be extremely important to the US even leaving aside the cultural ties and economic possibilities.

Samuel wrote:Than they should have realized that it was impossible for them to win a nuclear conflict.

Mao liked to at least pretend he didn't care about nuclear weapons. He called them "paper tigers" and on at least one occasion stated that the obliteration of China wouldn't really matter since the universe wouldn't even notice it.

Except that they just say what happens when you try to match spirit against overwhelming industrial might- spirit doesn't work. Did they not learn from the defeat and occupation of Japan?

Considering from the communist perspective it was the Japanese with the overwhelming industrial might, and that they regarded the Korean War as a Chinese victory, no, I doubt they did.

TC Pilot wrote: Considering from the communist perspective it was the Japanese with the overwhelming industrial might, and that they regarded the Korean War as a Chinese victory, no, I doubt they did.

From what I understand, the Chinese success in the Korean War was a triumph of consistent local (not overall) numerical superiority, experience, suprise, and tactical skill triumphing over overwhelming firepower. Similarly, the triumph in the Chinese Civil War was also against a foe with firepower superiority. So as far as the PLA's view of its own track record goes, spirit, motivation, and experience had triumphed over its foes multiple times. And Japanese victories against the Nationalists could be easily ignored. The motivation, training, and experience of Nationalist armies was absolutely pathetic outside the Central Army (which lost most of its best troops in Shanghai). The communists on the other hand, had a nice propaganda victory.

Samuel wrote: Than they should have realized that it was impossible for them to win a nuclear conflict.

That's a nonsensical defence policy for any country to take. Name me a single country in the world which would willingly bow down to foreign pressure on all counts and not insitute a defence policy.

How on Earth would that work? The workshops need mines to work, which are inherently centralized and China had little else they could scavange to make machinery.

Hence, the screws up of the Great Leap Forward. China adopted decentralised workshops and used a series of pig iron foundries so as to maintain her decentralised cottage industries.

Except that they just say what happens when you try to match spirit against overwhelming industrial might- spirit doesn't work. Did they not learn from the defeat and occupation of Japan?

I believe the word is saw? You also forgot that in that very same war, indeed, a much longer one once you consider the existing conflict between the KMT and the CCP/Warlords, they have seen how organisation, doctrine and this very belief in "spirit" saw victory over the better equipped and numerically larger KMT.

Furthermore, the adoption of guerilla warfare was DELIBERATELY adopted so as to offset the massive industrial and firepower advantage of Soviet/American forces.

Of course. The have the South Eastern border of the USSR- they would be extremely important to the US even leaving aside the cultural ties and economic possibilities.

Historically, the KMT government was never as anti Soviet as Chiang.

That's a nonsensical defence policy for any country to take. Name me a single country in the world which would willingly bow down to foreign pressure on all counts and not insitute a defence policy.

Denmark 1940?

Hence, the screws up of the Great Leap Forward. China adopted decentralised workshops and used a series of pig iron foundries so as to maintain her decentralised cottage industries.

Agreeing with me isn't a good way to argue

I believe the word is saw?

You also forgot that in that very same war, indeed, a much longer one once you consider the existing conflict between the KMT and the CCP/Warlords, they have seen how organisation, doctrine and this very belief in "spirit" saw victory over the better equipped and numerically larger KMT.

And they saw it fail against the Japanese. The KMT was handicapped by not being over the top evil and ruthless. The Japanese and presumably anyone else willing to invade the country and use nukes against them could devestate the country and obliterate any and all opposition.

Samuel wrote:Denmark 1940?

lol. Conceded.

Agreeing with me isn't a good way to argue

Err, say what? Nobody disagrees that decentralising industry was a dumb move. I'm pointing out that there were strategic reasons why such a policy was adopted other than ideology, namely, the need to decentralise industries and workshops to fit China defence policy against a nuclear conflict.

You also forgot that in that very same war, indeed, a much longer one once you consider the existing conflict between the KMT and the CCP/Warlords, they have seen how organisation, doctrine and this very belief in "spirit" saw victory over the better equipped and numerically larger KMT.

And they saw it fail against the Japanese. The KMT was handicapped by not being over the top evil and ruthless. The Japanese and presumably anyone else willing to invade the country and use nukes against them could devestate the country and obliterate any and all opposition.

Except for one teensy itsy bitsy thing. They didn't. The war happened over the water, against the Japanese navy and isolated Army divisions. Not in theatres where the Chinese were operating, much less the CCP. The Burmese theatre was the only arena where the Chinese did participate with Allied forces against the Japanese, and this was the KMT.
More importantly, the Japanese were not fighting a guerilla war and the CCP were. This isn't something as simple as spirit>>>>> firepower. The Chinese deliberately adopted a specific strategy and doctrine so as to miminise the advantages firepower had and to maximise the advantages chinese forces had. Witness the Korean war. While the Korean war was never a full People War(in theory, People War was a defensive strategy in which any invader, be it American or Soviet would be drawn into the Chinese homeland and stuck in a guerilla war), it did highlight the various tactics that the Chinese army had adopted to fight against overwhelming firepower. The innovative use of supply and logistics, camoflague against aerial and artillery attack, "hugging close" to the enemy and the use of night attack.


As for nukes, Mao philosophy, minus the propaganda is based around the basis that any invader would not wish to expend all available nuclear stockpiles on relatively low value targets. Hence, decentralisation. Decentralise available industry and shift it to other areas, further away from American or Soviet bombers. Use workships and cottage industries to support guerilla armies in the field. Emphasise the rural populace, since it would be “wasteful" for nuclear powers to expend nukes on villages.
It was a stragety meant to use Chinese strength, mainly, her landspace and the long supply lines Soviet or American forces would had invading China and her huge population which allowed her to absorb large losses. Its no different from how America and Europe planned to survive a nuclear conflict, and then pray that because they had planned to fight and survive a nuclear exchange, no nuclear war would ensue.

So essentially they had to believe that the method they choose would work, because otherwise they would have to admit they were defenseless... I'm not certain about policy makers, but isn't there always an alternative? The Soviet Union was incredibly vulnerable during and just after the Russian Civil War, but they dealt with it by industrializing, even though it was obvious it wouldn't help them for a while and until then they would be vulnerable to invasion.

Actually, there was a fair bit of opposition to professional "cluster" industrialization in the USSR. Many thought that adhering to the "people's war" doctrine and keeping in line with the "brotherly rebel Red Guards" idea would be superior in case of a conflict with any invader. They never got to realize their ideas, because it was clear by the late 1920s that industrialization was needed to boost the economy, but nonetheless such factions existed.

In China, they must have been so much stronger, because they relied on peasantry far more than they did on factory workers.

Samuel wrote:So essentially they had to believe that the method they choose would work, because otherwise they would have to admit they were defenseless... I'm not certain about policy makers, but isn't there always an alternative? The Soviet Union was incredibly vulnerable during and just after the Russian Civil War, but they dealt with it by industrializing, even though it was obvious it wouldn't help them for a while and until then they would be vulnerable to invasion.

Close. It was more of an idea fixation on People war, so EVERYTHING that People War demanded must be done, and it would be successful. If people war demanded decentralisation of industry to protect them from American or Soviet nuclear attacks and support guerilla armies, then by god, cottage industries and workshops would suffice to propel our economy into the future generation.

The British equivalent was on "The Fleet will save the day", to the extent that the Army and GHQ Malaya entire defence plan was on a delaying defence, so that reinforcements and the arrival of a fleet would "save the day". Neither Perceival, Wavell or Churchill was willing to scarifice the idea that the fleet would play a major role and that the linchpin of British colonial defence, hold while reinforcements from the Empire flood in to save the day(witness Boer War 1, Sepoy Mutiny and etc) would come about. As such, they scarificed the only plausible value Singapore could had given the British, that of time so that Rangoon and India could be defended and built up. Ditto to other areas such as Australia and the Chinese front. We seen how desperate such ventures were, with the formation and despatch of Task Force Z(over Task force R), Perceival using up his units by failing to withdraw them in time and in good order and so forth.

Stas Bush wrote: In China, they must have been so much stronger, because they relied on peasantry far more than they did on factory workers.

The role of the peasants, Mao background and many of the new elite in the CCP after the fall of Shaanxi(errr, I may have gotten my geography wrong here) discredited the Bolsheviks probably did play an important anti-intellectual and anti-urban role.

Still, there are certain differences between Russia of 1920 and China of 1950/60s. China were not just facing a border threat, but also encirclement and enroachment from the USA and had a history of being bullied on the international front. Nukes also changed the face of warfare, advocating the use of decentralised armies to face off against enemy firepower.

Spam split to HoS, thread unlocked.