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In 1933, Walther Wever became the Chief of Staff of Nazi Germany's new Luftwaffe, and was convinced of the importance of strategic bombing in any future war. He soon requested designs for a heavy bomber (secretly) from Dornier and Junkers, the prototypes being the Do 19 and the Ju 89 respectively, so that in the event of a war with the Soviet Union, these bombers would flatten any Soviet industry that evacuated to the Urals (yes, I'm talking about the Ural bomber program). Unfortunately for the Nazis, Wever was killed in an air crash in April 1936, and his heavy bomber proyect was canceled by Goering due to the influence of Udet, Kesserling and Milch.

In this scenario, the air crash does not happen. How will Wever, alive and well, affect subsequent bomber development in the Luftwaffe? Can Germany aquire a good heavy bomber (I refuse to see the He 177 as one) or will the Luftwaffe remain stuck with tactical bombers? What other effects will a living Wever have on the Luftwaffe?

Force Lord wrote: Unfortunately for the Nazis, Wever was killed in an air crash in April 1936, and his heavy bomber proyect was canceled by Goering due to the influence of Udet, Kesserling and Milch.

In this scenario, the air crash does not happen. How will Wever, alive and well, affect subsequent bomber development in the Luftwaffe? Can Germany aquire a good heavy bomber (I refuse to see the He 177 as one) or will the Luftwaffe remain stuck with tactical bombers? What other effects will a living Wever have on the Luftwaffe?

The thing is, Udet, Kesselring and Milch were right. Their position was that Germany could not afford to have both a meaningful heavy bomber force and an effective tactical air force. Heavy bombers would have meant less tactical bombers and less fighters in Poland, France, the BoB and Barbarossa, since aircraft production was primarily limited by engine availability. Germany was a continental power and concentrating on tactical air power was the logical choice.

Futhermore, just a good heavy bomber would not have made much difference. One of the lessons of the first half of the war was that bombers had to be escorted or they would be slaughtered by interceptors. The Bf 110 was not up to the task against anything more modern than an M.S. 410 or I-16 and the Bf 109 and Fw 190 did not have the range. Night bombing could be done without escorts, but it was very inaccurate with the technology available before 1944.

As for the He 177; it had a very troubled and prolonged development. Even the first two major production models were quite flawed, but the A-5 finally managed to fix all major problems and had a pretty decent performance as well. By that time it was too late though.

Plus, lots of German war planning assumed that the US would provide industrial aid to Great Britain. I don't think any long range bombers on Germany's drawing board at the time could reach the USA, so the U-boat arm seemed a better way of isolating and defeating the Brits.

^Which, like the rest of the armed forces, were rushed into battle because Hitler decided to start the war 6 years earlier.

To be fair, the rest of the world was starting to catch on and rearm in proportion to Germany's efforts, and the german ecconomy was starting to show signs of strain under mobilization efforts. Waiting until 1945 to begin the war would have allowed another generation of fighters and tanks to cycle into service and increase available resources, but would also allow his potential enemies to do the same.

Furthermore, certain powers such as Japan would have gone ahead with their plans anyways, complicating the issue. What if 1945 rolls around and the US has like in real life, reduced Japans fighting forces to tatters and won't need to wait a few years to build new hardware and train pilots, sailors and soldiers to increase the size of its forces? Germany can't fight that. Hell, France might have reorganized, and give more of a fight this time around. To say nothing of what Stalin will have brewing, although just what Russia would look like in 1945 without the Great Patriotic War is a mystery to me.

I am not saying that it would have necessarily been a better end results - and the speed of rearmament was not sustainable anyway, but merely pointing out the fact that the Kriegsmarine was rushed into action.

Vehrec wrote:To be fair, the rest of the world was starting to catch on and rearm in proportion to Germany's efforts, and the german ecconomy was starting to show signs of strain under mobilization efforts. Waiting until 1945 to begin the war would have allowed another generation of fighters and tanks to cycle into service and increase available resources, but would also allow his potential enemies to do the same.

Furthermore, certain powers such as Japan would have gone ahead with their plans anyways, complicating the issue. What if 1945 rolls around and the US has like in real life, reduced Japans fighting forces to tatters and won't need to wait a few years to build new hardware and train pilots, sailors and soldiers to increase the size of its forces? Germany can't fight that. Hell, France might have reorganized, and give more of a fight this time around. To say nothing of what Stalin will have brewing, although just what Russia would look like in 1945 without the Great Patriotic War is a mystery to me.

Couple thoughts the foremost of which is that if Germany waits 6 years it won't neccessarily be fighting the US. While Japan may go ahead with their plans in '41 the only way for Germany to sit out until '45 is to not declare war on the US when Japan attacks. In turn the pacific war will end up being between Japan and the US/British with possibly a little bit of French thrown in the mix though unlikely as neither of those two powers woudl be stretched by a European War at the same time. The Japanese command while unrealistic in long term planning could not fail to see the strategic dilemna they were in with regards to the forces arrayed against them, this means that the mini cold war between Japan and the US over strategic resources woudl continue, the US would run its peacetime economy and work its slow recovery out of the Great Depression but likely would continue to split development time between battleships and carriers.

In other words war between Japan and the US in '41 is not inevitable as they may be more than willing to wait for Germany to kick start her war. If they don't then the US will declare on Japan but Germany will not declare on the US. Without a direct provocation the US then would never enter the war against Germany. Now that alone may not be enough to tip the scales as the Soviet Union will have had time to make it through another 5 year program wth pluses and minuses on both sides of the equation. On the plus side is the increased industrial capacity which may give them a chance to sustain the eventual war without US aid the flip side is that the further concentration of economic resources in the vulnerable territories may present too great a challenge to moving them eastward and a greater portion may be captured by the advancing Germans.

Again all hypothetical but 6 years of waiting would certainly make things a bit more tense when they do break.

CmdrWilkens wrote:
Again all hypothetical but 6 years of waiting would certainly make things a bit more tense when they do break.

Remember, though, that these six years will include the fist example of nuclear warfare - which changes the whole situation drastically.

As for the Kriegsmarine, I don't think even a fully constructed Z plan fleet would last long against the USN once it gets up to speed.

Serafina wrote:

CmdrWilkens wrote:
Again all hypothetical but 6 years of waiting would certainly make things a bit more tense when they do break.

Remember, though, that these six years will include the fist example of nuclear warfare - which changes the whole situation drastically.

Not certainly, the Nazi effort kept running in to hurdles and the US effort whiel still loaded with available talent might not get off to the start that it did. We might have to push nuclear weapons back another half decade or so. The German effort was already stalling by the time '41-'42 rolled around and its unlikely that the available resources needed to create a functional weapon woudl continue to be poured in to the project. Likewise without a meancing German race towards nukes it is unlikely that the US or the British would give the degree of money and material support that the Manhattan project required. Given those conditions its entirely likely that a WW2 which doesn't start until 1945 wouldn't produce a nuclear bomb until '49 or later.