Recommendations on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
Moderator: K. A. Pital
Recommendations on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
Hi, I'd like to know if anybody can recommend good books on the Soviet invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan. I'm particularly interested in accounts written by the Soviets and Afghans themselves.
I'm also looking for a good account of the days prior to the invasion when the King was overthrown and an analysis of the military tactics used by both sides.
I've seen quite a few for sale on-line but I'd like to know which ones are worth actually buying.
I'm also looking for a good account of the days prior to the invasion when the King was overthrown and an analysis of the military tactics used by both sides.
I've seen quite a few for sale on-line but I'd like to know which ones are worth actually buying.
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Re: Recommendations on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
Gregory Feifer interviewed many people from both sides in The Great Gamble, which has a chapter summarizing Afghan history up to their Communist revolution.
Please do not make Americans fight giant monsters.
Those gun nuts do not understand the meaning of "overkill," and will simply use weapon after weapon of mass destruction (WMD) until the monster is dead, or until they run out of weapons.
They have more WMD than there are monsters for us to fight. (More insanity here.)
Those gun nuts do not understand the meaning of "overkill," and will simply use weapon after weapon of mass destruction (WMD) until the monster is dead, or until they run out of weapons.
They have more WMD than there are monsters for us to fight. (More insanity here.)
Re: Recommendations on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
This is just a column by an ex-Soviet soldier who served in Afghanistan, but it's an interesting read on the subject.
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Re: Recommendations on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
A nice condensed version of all the important stuff from The Lessons of Modern War: Volume III by AH Cordesman and AR Wagner.
Just what was Afghanistan worth at the beginning of all this?
When the war began, the nation [Afghanistan] had only 31,200 telephones, five AM stations, one TV station, and one earth satellite station. The nation relied on subsistence agriculture and small manufacturing. The GNP was only $3.52 billion in 1985. Per capita income was $250. Exports totalled about $780 million and civil imports $900 million. The only major export was natural gas through a 180-kilometer pipeline to the USSR.
A nice timeline of the early stages of the conflict
1955: Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud turns to the Soviets for military assistance after the U.S. refuses. Khrushchev and Bulganin visit Afghanistan. Aid package includes construction of Bagram airport and Salang Tunnel. Afghan officers begin training in Warsaw Pact countries.
1973: Prince Mohammed Daoud overthrows King Zahir Shah while the king is abroad and introduces a pro-Soviet, quasi-Marxist regime, supported by both major factions of the Afghan Communist Party.
1975-1978: Daoud slowly removes key pro-Soviet officers and political figures from his government, seeks closer ties to Pakistan, and increases support for nonalignment.
Mid-1977: Soviets force the two pro-Soviet Marxist factions, the Khalq led by Nur Mohammed Taraki and Parcham led by Babrak Karmal, to reunite as the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).
April 1978: The army, air force, and PDPA stage a coup and kill Daoud, who has been weakened by economic problems and his failure to provide the army with modern weapons and financial aid. The USSR recognizes the new government. Nur Mohammed Taraki becomes President
May 1978: The new government starts radical reforms that soon alienate a growing number of the people in rural areas.
August 1978: Several senior conservative Moslem leaders declare a Jihad (religious war) against the PDPA because of atheism, "land reform," and imprisonment of political opposition. The Mujahideen start a low-level war against the government using Lee Enfields, Martini Henrys, FN-FALs, and AK-47s
December 1978: Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation is signed. Revolts occur in twenty-three of Afghanistan's twenty-eight provinces.
February 1979: U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs is kidnapped and killed during a rescue attempt by Soviet-advised Afghan security police.
March 1979: Afghan soldiers join revolt in Herat, killing Soviet advisors and Afghan officials. A forced literacy campaign, combined with the impact of earlier attempts to abolish bride prices, sharply increases Mujahideen activity in the Kunar Valley as well as rural unrest and major riots in Herat. The 17th Infantry Division, ordered to put down riots, deserts to the Mujahideen.
May 1979: A brigade of the 7th Division deserts with all its equipment to the Mujahideen.
July 1979: Afghan army nearly disintegrates, torn apart by low morale and desertion; the countryside is largely under guerrilla control. The Afghan army becomes increasingly reliant on Soviet-built armor and helicopters; Soviet advisers number about 1,500.
August 1979: The government's new land reform efforts trigger major new problems with rural unrest. Soviet military and economic advisors have risen from 1,000 to 5,000.
September 1979: President Taraki is quietly murdered by Hafizullah Amin's guards during a coup, just days after meeting Brezhnev in Moscow. His death is announced in October. The Soviets responded to Taraki's murder and Amin's coup with a major military build-up.
October 1979: The USSR mobilizes five Category II and III divisions in Central Asia to allow it to concentrate Category I divisions for invasion.
November 1979: The Soviets create the command structure for the invasion.
Late November 1979: Spetsnaz infiltration of key points inside Kabul begins.
7-9 December 1979: Soviet airborne troops from 103 Guards Airborne Division arrive at Bagram air base north of Kabul.
24-26 December 1979: In a round-the-clock airlift of 75 to 125 flights of AN-22 and AN-12 aircraft per day, with 350 sorties to Kabul and Bagram, 15,000 Soviet troops enter Afghanistan in 24 hours.
26-27 December 1979: Motorized rifle divisions cross the border. Spetsnaz forces, sometimes using civilian clothing and DRA uniforms, seize key check points and work with much larger airborne forces to seize chokepoints and C3 facilities. Soviet military advisors immobilize key equipment and neutralize key DRA personnel.
27 December 1979: "President" Amin is killed by KGB Spetsnaz and Soviet airborne forces. His palace is defended by eight T-54 tanks and troops, and an initial Spetsnaz raid fails. The Duralamin Palace is overwhelmed by two battalions of Soviet paratroops. Babrak Karmal is made president. The four Soviet motorized rifle divisions already pouring into Afghanistan are "invited" by Karmal to help secure the country.
6 January 1980: Soviet military units have secured most key cities and important military airfields. These airfields are being fortified with SAM batteries and equipped with modern command and control facilities.
9 January 1980: Soviet Antonov aircraft make 4,000 separate flights into the capital during the first week of January. Soviet central Asian troops start to be replaced by more politically reliable and combat-ready troops from the western and eastern USSR.
Large-scale defections take place from the Afghan civil service. It becomes increasingly apparent that Karmal's government is viewed by many Afghans who formerly supported the PDPA as a Soviet puppet regime.
How much did it cost the USSR?
The USSR admitted in late 1988 in the foreign policy magazine Mozhdunaradnaya Zbizn that they had sent at least five billion rubles, or $3 billion, annually on the war.33 However, the troop presence and equipment strengths described earlier probably involved average annual costs of at least $7 to $12 billion over a nine year period, and the USSR also had to bear the cost of deploying an average of 2,000 Soviet military advisors.
Who were the Mujihadeen?
There were about twenty-seven groups of Mujahideen and seven other major active groups.
The most powerful groups were:
Hezb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) Gulbuddin Hekmatyar faction: This group had a cadre strength of roughly 2,500-3,500 and a total strength of 16,000-20,000 supporters. It was a conservative Sunni group which favored an Islamic republic. It was largely Pushtun and heavily supported by Pakistan and the U.S. It operated in Nangrahar and Lagham provinces, the Paghman hills, Kabul, Balkh, Fariab, Paktia, and Farah. This group often clashed with other elements of the Mujahideen.
Hezb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) Yunis Khalis faction: This group had a cadre strength of roughly 2,900-3,700 and a total strength of 10,000-20,000 supporters. It was a Sunni fundamentalist group which favored rule by the Islamic clergy. It was Pushtun, with elements from a number of tribes in eastern Afghanistan. It was supported by Britain, Pakistan, the PRC, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the U.S. It operated in Paktia (Jalaladin Haqqani), Kabul (Abdul Haq), Nangrahar province, Logar province, the Pagham hills, Kabul, Balkh, Fariab, Paktia, and Farah.
Harakat-e Ingelab-e-Islami (Islamic Revolution Movement): A conservative-to-moderate Sunni group with roots back to Afghanistan's power structure before the revolution. It was led by Mohammed Nabi Mohammed, and had a hard-core strength of 2,500-3,000 and a total strength of 20,000. It was largely Ahmadzi Pushtun and operated in the tribal areas of southern and western Afghanistan.
Mahaz-e-Meilli-e-Islami Afghanistan (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan): A Sunni monarchist movement, led by Pri Said Gailani. It had a hard-core strength of 2,500-4,000 and over 15,000 supporters. It was largely Pushtun and had a number of leaders who were ex-Afghan army officers. It received backing from the U.S. It operated in the Maidan Valley and Logar (Amin Wardak), Kandahar (Haji Latif) and Paktia (Rahmatullah Safi), and Pakita and Nimroz (Mohammed Nassim).
Jamiat-i-Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Society): A Sunni fundamentalist movement favoring a government of Mullahs and led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. It had a hard-core strength of 6,000-8,000 and 24,000-30,000 supporters. It was largely Turkic, but had strong Pushtun elements. It received backing from Kuwait, Pakistan, the PRC, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. It operated in the Panjshir Valley (Ahmad Shah Massoud); Herat, Farah, and Badghis provinces (Ismail Khan); and Balkh and Samagan provinces. It conducted small operations in Kabul, Badakshan, Fariab, Jowzjan, and Baghlan provinces.
Jabha-e-Nejat-e-Melli (National Liberation Front): A conservative Sunni monarchist group led by Sibghatullah Mujadidi. It was traditional Pushtun. It had a hard-core strength of about 2,000 and a total strength of some 4,500-6,000. It operated in Kunar and Kandahar.
Islamic Alliance of the Afghan Mujahideen (Islamic Unity for the Liberation of Afghanistan): A conservative Sunni group favoring an Islamic Republic and led by Abdul Rabbur Rasul Saif. It had hard-core strength of about 1,000 and a total support of around 6,000. It was Pushtun and operated largely in Paktia and around Kabul. It had U.S. support and favored the unification of Afghan liberation movements.
Sepha-e-Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards): This movement was a conservative Shi'ite group which was strongly pro-Iranian and pro-Khomeini and was led by Mohsen Rezai. It had a cadre strength of some 5,000 and a total strength of around 9,000. It operated in the west in Ghowr, Helmand, Bamiyan, Jowzhjan, and Herat. It received substantial Iranian aid—more than any other Shi'ite fundamentalist movement.
Hezbollah (Party of God): This movement was a conservative Shi'ite group which was strongly pro-Iranian and pro-Khomeini. It had a cadre strength of some 2,000 and a total strength of some 5,000. It operated in the west in Herat, Ghowr, and Helmand provinces and was affiliated with the Hezbollah in Iran and other countries.
Nasr: This movement was a conservative Shi'ite group which broke with Iranian and pro-Khomeini groups. It had a cadre strength of some 1,700 and a total strength of some 5,000. It operated in the west in Ghowr, Helmand, and Bamiyan.
Shura: A conservative Shi'ite group, led by Said Ali Beheshti, which favored an autonomous region in Hazara. It had a cadre strength of some 5,000 and a total strength of some 10,000. It operated in the west in Bamiyan, Baghlan, Balkh, and Ghazni provinces.
Harakat Islami (Islamic Movement): A conservative Shi'ite group, led by Sheikh Mushini, which favored an Islamic republic. It had a hard-core strength of some 3,000 and a total strength of some 16,000. It was largely Hazara and Dari. It operated in the west in Fariab, Jowzjan, Balkh, and Badakshan.35
How much aid did they get from the West?
Figures are not available for non-U.S. aid, but it seems to have roughly equalled U.S. aid. U.S. military aid was $30 million in 1980, $50 million in 1981, $50 million in 1982, $60 million in 1983, $140 million in 1984, $250 million in 1985, $470 million in 1986, $660 million in 1987, and $700 million in 1988.
Much of the military aid to the Mujahideen was lost due to sabotage and thefts in the "pipeline." Actual transfer of the aid to refugees may have totalled as little as 30 percent of the total funding. These figures may seem exceptionally low, but they are typical of such operations in support of Third World conflicts.
Soviet Mine Warfare
Both sides utilized mine warfare extensively.
The Soviets laid somewhere between 30 and 50 million mines, depending on which estimate you believe in; and they offically admitted to laying 2,131 minefields by 1988.
The Soviets used the following types of mines:
MON-50: Basically a M-18A1 Claymoreski with a 60 degree arc kill zone out to 50m.
MON-100: A cylinder with a concave face that can be set on a tripod or mounted on a tree or rock wall. It has 450 steel fragments set in five kilograms of plastic explosive. It can spray these fragments as far as 100 meters.
MON-200/MON-500: Large 52~ cm diameter mines with 12 kg or more of plastic explosives.
PMN-2: Size of a small fruitcake tin, buried.
UMK: Remote Control mines (or wave mines). First used in '85, they explode by either vibration or remote electrical triggering. A central sensor system is tied to a simple battery-powered discrete transistor circuit and is triggered by up to four wires and possibly an acoustic trigger. Linking to other mines is allowed; allowing traps to be set with one mine triggering simultaneous explosions from other devices.
PFM-1 "Butterfly/Green Parrot": Widely dropped from helicopters. Basically BLU-43B ski. Plastic case, 12 grams. Exists in Green and tan versions; camouflaged to look like stone or sand. It self-defuses after several hours or days, but this often fails. Is virtually impossible to detect with conventional gear. Up to 1 million of these may have been dropped in the first 7 years on Mujihadeen Lines of Communications.
Mujihadeen Mine Warfare
The Mujihadeen got most of the DRA's stock of Soviet TM-46 AT Mines early on. Mines were also recovered from Soviet laid fields, while others were imported. Unexploded Soviet aerial bombs were used to make mines as well.
By 1982, the Mujihadeen began to get significant amounts of non-metallic mines. After 1982, their efforts became relatively sophisticated. The scale of this effort can be drawn from two examples:
A.) One sapper battalion of the 201st Motor Rifle Division claimed to have cleared 30,000 mines over a five-year period, covering some 1,000 kilometers of roads.
B.) When the Soviets took on the Mujihadeen fortress of Zhawar on the Pakistani border, they found 6,000 AT Mines, and 12,000 AP Mines.
Soviet Counter-Mine Warfare
Right from the start, the Soviets had to use combat engineers and sappers to clear mines. At first, UAZ-469 Jeeps with mine detectors were used; but this rapidly shifted to tanks when snipers began killing the crews of the mine-detecting jeeps. Columns often didn't move without mine detection units and sappers. Handheld detection devices became very common.
By 1984, Soviet publications were warning about mines that were undetectable by conventional means, but they weren't as concerned as the US was about the lack of a field deployable technology for detecting plastic mines.
The Soviets achieved some success with using trained dogs to detect mines by smell. The sapper units involved in this used BTR-70s. The Dogs didn't work with buried mines, but seem to have worked with surface mounted booby traps and mines.
After 1983, the Soviets began placing mine rollers on their tanks; and converted T-55 and IT-1 tank destroyers into mineclearing tanks by removing their turrets and mounting the roller systems.
To counter this, the Mujihadeen used Chinese and Italian made pneumatic fuzes which came closer to setting off the mine with each vehile that rolled over them. Remotely triggered mines were also used, as were different mine laying methods.
Mujihadeen Counter-Mine Warfare
As opposed to the Soviets, the Mujihadeen had serious and never-ending problems with dealing with mines. Due to the lack of any advanced detection devices, they were forced to use old-fashioned methods:
A.) Using poles to probe the ground ahead.
B.) Driving animals into minefields to clear them
C.) Threw rocks into minefields
D.) Used professional mine hunters
E.) Simply walked single file into minefields, accepting the inevitable losses of the leading men.
F.) Used slingshots to set off the mines.
G.) Used mortars and rockets to set off the mines.
Later in the war, they recieved several Lightfoot mine breaching systems; which consisted of a 120mm mortar round which dragged a 1/2" cable about 1,000 feet through the air. The cord exploded on contact with the ground, clearing a 6 foot wide path through 80% of the types of mines used in the war. They usually fired them in groups of 3-4 to clear a secure path. These were effective in breaching the minefields around DRA and Soviet strongpoints.
As the war dragged on, the Mujihadeen's tactics became better and more sophisticated.
A.) They used Forward observers to map the minefields as they were laid.
B.) Over time, a trained cadre of people who could locate mines by sight or touch was created.
C.) Night-time scouting of minefields before attacks was also done.
To counter all this, the Soviets deployed concentric rings of mines, increased the density of mines per square klick, added flare mines, put in advanced mines with acoustic and sesmic triggers, and increased surveillance of mined areas.
Mujihadeen Anti-Aircraft Warfare
The Mujihadeen found that the Mi-24 HIND's survivability continually improved and that the Soviets used groups of attack helicopters to reduce individual exposure to enemy weapons fire. This made rifle-calibre machine guns useless as they became nothing more than a tracer line pointing to where Mujihadeen were.
To counter this, the US bought 12.7mm and 14.5mm HMGs. In 1985, about 40~ Oerlikon 20mm GAI-BOI cannons were bought and shipped via Iran and Pakistan to the Mujihadeen. They produced both MiG and helicopter kills, but proved to be too difficult to move, despite being capble of being broken into 50 kg loads. Both the HMGs and 20mm Oerlikons ended up being used more often against ground targets anyway.
In the period of 1984-87, these small calibre weapons became pretty much ineffective due to improved armor plating on helicopters. It's believed that the undercarriage plating on the HIND D/E is titanitium and completely resistant to 7.62mm fire.
By late 1987, the AA guns became much more effective after Stingers were provided in large numbers; forcing the Soviets to fly low. The US also began to supply a 12.7mm round with a tungsten penetrator which could penetrate the cockpit armor and contained a small phosphorous charge to start fires on-board.
Early on the CIA was against providing Stinger because:
A.) The Mujihadeen were too unsophisticated to operate it
B.) Security Reasons
C.) Fear of it falling into terror groups
D.) Supplying it could provoke USSR into attacking Pakistan.
So instead, SA-7s were sought; but when no sufficient supplies could be found, the CIA ordered 300 British Blowpipes in 1985; and 225 of them ended up in Mujihadeen hands. Blowpipe ended up being too difficult to operate and maintain in Afghanistan.
Finally by late '85, State Department and Pakistani pressure forced the decision to deploy Stinger. The first shipment of 150 didn't arrive until the summer of 1986. The first stinger kills scored seem to have been on 26 September 1986, when three HINDS were downed.
The US Army required 136 hours for Stinger Qualification, but in the hands of the Mujihadeen, it was simple to operate, due to them not caring about technical training or complicated IFF procedures, and the fact that it was fired under clear weather conditions.
Stingers forced the Soviets to increase their fighter bomber attack heights from 2,000 to 4,000 feet to around 10,000~ feet. Soviet aircraft losses went from 1.2 aircraft a day to 1.4 per day during late '86 and early '87 and dropped only after a severe curtailment of air operations by the Soviets.
150 more Stingers were shipped in 1986, 600~ more by '87, and by the time of the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, at least 1,000~ had been shipped. We also supplied a highly sensitive sound dector allowing the Mujihadeen to detect helicopters miles away.
According to US Army estimates, out of 340 Firings, 269 hits (79%) were scored by the Stinger system.
Soviet Anti-Aircraft Warfare
The Soviets widely deployed ZU-23s on BMDs, truck mounted guns, 37mm AA guns, and large numbers of 14.5mm HMGs as long range direct fire weapons which were capable of high elevation to hit mujihadeen positions. Convoys ended up being frequently protected by ZIL-135 trucks with armored mounts holding twin 23mm guns.
Soviet Fixed Wing Aircraft
Early on the Soviets dropped conventional bombs, many of which failed to arm and which had little lethality in the rough ground. By 1983, the fuses on most of the bombs had been changed, and more retarded cluster bombs were used, as well as 57mm rockets.
The basic aircraft used were:
MiG-21s; highly reliable, had a relatively low airspeed, and could turn well. However, it had very low loiter time. Used for CAS.
MiG-23/Su-17s: Carried out close air support missions where general accuracy was required, like reactions to ambushes.
Su-24 Fencer: Used primarily in attacks on villages and interdiction.
Tu-22 Blinder: Used primarily in attacks on villages and interdiction.
Tu-16 Badger: Used primarily in attacks on villages and interdiction.
Tu-26 Backfire: Used primarily in attacks on villages and interdiction in late 1988.
Su-25: First entered combat in '82. Was the most effective Soviet fixed wing aircraft.
Soviet airstrikes became less and less effective after 1985, due to more MANPADs, and the Mujihadeen began digging ever deeper, and conducted more of their movement by night.
Soviet Rotary Wing Aircraft
The HIND D/E's 12.7mm Gatling proved to be inaccurate and had low lethality, which was why various types of cannons replaced it in the HIND F models.
Mi-8 and Mi-17 HIPS performed badly at high and low altitudes, and had exposed non-crashworthy fuel lines. Rotor and engine life was limited. Trim controls were sloppy as well.
Soviet Logistics
The Soviets relied heavily on airlift until 1987-88, and even then, most supplies were delivered by truck convoys consisting of 100-300 vehicles, of which 30% were convoy defense vehicles. The remainder of the convoy was divided between POL and other supplies.
These convoys formed at the main Soviet Kairaton Transhipment Complex at Termez or at Kushka on the border to the east. They moved south along routes to Herat or to the Pol-e-Khomri Logistic Facility. The convoys using the latter route from Termez to Kabul had to travel 450 kilometers, including the 2,700-meter long Salang Tunnel. Further, the difficult mountain conditions required 70-90 percent more gasoline than routes in Europe and 30 to 40 percent more diesel fuel.
It took two weeks to complete the round trip from Termez to Kabul, and the maximum number of trips any driver could normally make in a two-year enlistment was eighty. The trips were so dangerous that pennants for "courage and valor" were awarded for twenty, forty, sixty, and eighty trips.
Soviet Infantry Units and other Miscellaneous Stuff
* Soviet body armor throughout the conflict was always continually being improved and replaced with more advanced armor as the war dragged on.
* ATGMs were used in long range fire against Mujihadeen positions like fortified stone forts, as tank guns and other weapons could not be elevated to the angles needed.
* Parachute equipped ATGMs were used to lay commo wires over rough terrain.
* The Soviets exerted tight control over ATGM allocations, due to the fact that if a DRA unit with them was defeated or routed, the weapons would fall into Mujihadeen hands, or when such troops defected. Eventually the USSR demanded that a number of ATGM systems be turned over to them. By 1980, the USSR had removed the SA-7 MANPAD from DRA inventory.
* A very high proportion of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan (25% or more) consisted of the VDV.
* Many of the Soviet units in the initial invasion of Afghanistan had no reason for their deployment other than the fact that they had been mobilized with their parent units. These units were withdrawn by 1980.
* The Soviets found that Mujihadeen equipped with european rifles could outshoot AK-74 equipped infantry at distances exceeding the effective ranges of the infantry's weapons. This led to special sniper suppression squads which dismounted first from vehicles, and were eqipped with scoped long range rifles and RPG-18s to deal with such nusiances.
Soviet Armored Vehicles, etc
* T-55 and T-62 tanks had frequent clutch problems in hilly terrain and lost tracks frequently on rocky ground. Strains on the engines in traversing rough terrain and slopes caused tank engines to overheat unless coolant supply was doubled or tripled. Fuel expenditure was 30 to 50 percent more than on flat ground.
* The T-55 lacked the gun elevation and depression to be effective in mountain fighting.
* The BMP ended up being largely replaced because they were too large for many mountain trails, broke down a lot, and were difficult to service in the field. The BMP's replacement ended up being the BMD and BMD-2; which were lighter and more reliable, although they could not ford streams as fast, due to them being smaller. Another factor was the BMP's highly visible exhaust trail. This was caused partly by an over-enrichment of the fuel mixture which occurs for the BMP at high altitudes.
* Many routes were impassable to the BMPs, BTR-60s, BTR-70s, and BTR-80s, and these vehicles were used instead in the cities, for protecting lines of communications, armored ambulances, and protecting strategic crossroads.
* The low-pressure 73mm gun found on the BMD-1 and BMP-1 could only elevate to 33 degrees; a critical problem in mountain fighting and lacked the rapidity of fire to deal with large amounts of infantry. It's replacement, the 30mm cannon of the -2 variants, could elevate to 50 degrees. SAGGER missiles were still useful because of their higher elevation.
* Virtually all of the BTR-60s that appeared in theatre were the -60PB version with armored roofs.
* The BTR-60 proved easy for Afghan forces to handle and maintain.
* As delivered, the turreted machine guns of the BTR-60 and -70 could only elevate to 30 degrees, but modifications in the field expanded that to 50-60~ degrees.
* The Soviets liked the 2S5 152mm SP Gun, because it could fire to longer ranges than the older guns (27 km normal range, and 37 km range with Rocket Assist); and could rapidly displace to keep pace with convoys, etc. The towed version was also widely deployed.
Just what was Afghanistan worth at the beginning of all this?
When the war began, the nation [Afghanistan] had only 31,200 telephones, five AM stations, one TV station, and one earth satellite station. The nation relied on subsistence agriculture and small manufacturing. The GNP was only $3.52 billion in 1985. Per capita income was $250. Exports totalled about $780 million and civil imports $900 million. The only major export was natural gas through a 180-kilometer pipeline to the USSR.
A nice timeline of the early stages of the conflict
1955: Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud turns to the Soviets for military assistance after the U.S. refuses. Khrushchev and Bulganin visit Afghanistan. Aid package includes construction of Bagram airport and Salang Tunnel. Afghan officers begin training in Warsaw Pact countries.
1973: Prince Mohammed Daoud overthrows King Zahir Shah while the king is abroad and introduces a pro-Soviet, quasi-Marxist regime, supported by both major factions of the Afghan Communist Party.
1975-1978: Daoud slowly removes key pro-Soviet officers and political figures from his government, seeks closer ties to Pakistan, and increases support for nonalignment.
Mid-1977: Soviets force the two pro-Soviet Marxist factions, the Khalq led by Nur Mohammed Taraki and Parcham led by Babrak Karmal, to reunite as the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).
April 1978: The army, air force, and PDPA stage a coup and kill Daoud, who has been weakened by economic problems and his failure to provide the army with modern weapons and financial aid. The USSR recognizes the new government. Nur Mohammed Taraki becomes President
May 1978: The new government starts radical reforms that soon alienate a growing number of the people in rural areas.
August 1978: Several senior conservative Moslem leaders declare a Jihad (religious war) against the PDPA because of atheism, "land reform," and imprisonment of political opposition. The Mujahideen start a low-level war against the government using Lee Enfields, Martini Henrys, FN-FALs, and AK-47s
December 1978: Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation is signed. Revolts occur in twenty-three of Afghanistan's twenty-eight provinces.
February 1979: U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs is kidnapped and killed during a rescue attempt by Soviet-advised Afghan security police.
March 1979: Afghan soldiers join revolt in Herat, killing Soviet advisors and Afghan officials. A forced literacy campaign, combined with the impact of earlier attempts to abolish bride prices, sharply increases Mujahideen activity in the Kunar Valley as well as rural unrest and major riots in Herat. The 17th Infantry Division, ordered to put down riots, deserts to the Mujahideen.
May 1979: A brigade of the 7th Division deserts with all its equipment to the Mujahideen.
July 1979: Afghan army nearly disintegrates, torn apart by low morale and desertion; the countryside is largely under guerrilla control. The Afghan army becomes increasingly reliant on Soviet-built armor and helicopters; Soviet advisers number about 1,500.
August 1979: The government's new land reform efforts trigger major new problems with rural unrest. Soviet military and economic advisors have risen from 1,000 to 5,000.
September 1979: President Taraki is quietly murdered by Hafizullah Amin's guards during a coup, just days after meeting Brezhnev in Moscow. His death is announced in October. The Soviets responded to Taraki's murder and Amin's coup with a major military build-up.
October 1979: The USSR mobilizes five Category II and III divisions in Central Asia to allow it to concentrate Category I divisions for invasion.
November 1979: The Soviets create the command structure for the invasion.
Late November 1979: Spetsnaz infiltration of key points inside Kabul begins.
7-9 December 1979: Soviet airborne troops from 103 Guards Airborne Division arrive at Bagram air base north of Kabul.
24-26 December 1979: In a round-the-clock airlift of 75 to 125 flights of AN-22 and AN-12 aircraft per day, with 350 sorties to Kabul and Bagram, 15,000 Soviet troops enter Afghanistan in 24 hours.
26-27 December 1979: Motorized rifle divisions cross the border. Spetsnaz forces, sometimes using civilian clothing and DRA uniforms, seize key check points and work with much larger airborne forces to seize chokepoints and C3 facilities. Soviet military advisors immobilize key equipment and neutralize key DRA personnel.
27 December 1979: "President" Amin is killed by KGB Spetsnaz and Soviet airborne forces. His palace is defended by eight T-54 tanks and troops, and an initial Spetsnaz raid fails. The Duralamin Palace is overwhelmed by two battalions of Soviet paratroops. Babrak Karmal is made president. The four Soviet motorized rifle divisions already pouring into Afghanistan are "invited" by Karmal to help secure the country.
6 January 1980: Soviet military units have secured most key cities and important military airfields. These airfields are being fortified with SAM batteries and equipped with modern command and control facilities.
9 January 1980: Soviet Antonov aircraft make 4,000 separate flights into the capital during the first week of January. Soviet central Asian troops start to be replaced by more politically reliable and combat-ready troops from the western and eastern USSR.
Large-scale defections take place from the Afghan civil service. It becomes increasingly apparent that Karmal's government is viewed by many Afghans who formerly supported the PDPA as a Soviet puppet regime.
How much did it cost the USSR?
The USSR admitted in late 1988 in the foreign policy magazine Mozhdunaradnaya Zbizn that they had sent at least five billion rubles, or $3 billion, annually on the war.33 However, the troop presence and equipment strengths described earlier probably involved average annual costs of at least $7 to $12 billion over a nine year period, and the USSR also had to bear the cost of deploying an average of 2,000 Soviet military advisors.
Who were the Mujihadeen?
There were about twenty-seven groups of Mujahideen and seven other major active groups.
The most powerful groups were:
Hezb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) Gulbuddin Hekmatyar faction: This group had a cadre strength of roughly 2,500-3,500 and a total strength of 16,000-20,000 supporters. It was a conservative Sunni group which favored an Islamic republic. It was largely Pushtun and heavily supported by Pakistan and the U.S. It operated in Nangrahar and Lagham provinces, the Paghman hills, Kabul, Balkh, Fariab, Paktia, and Farah. This group often clashed with other elements of the Mujahideen.
Hezb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) Yunis Khalis faction: This group had a cadre strength of roughly 2,900-3,700 and a total strength of 10,000-20,000 supporters. It was a Sunni fundamentalist group which favored rule by the Islamic clergy. It was Pushtun, with elements from a number of tribes in eastern Afghanistan. It was supported by Britain, Pakistan, the PRC, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the U.S. It operated in Paktia (Jalaladin Haqqani), Kabul (Abdul Haq), Nangrahar province, Logar province, the Pagham hills, Kabul, Balkh, Fariab, Paktia, and Farah.
Harakat-e Ingelab-e-Islami (Islamic Revolution Movement): A conservative-to-moderate Sunni group with roots back to Afghanistan's power structure before the revolution. It was led by Mohammed Nabi Mohammed, and had a hard-core strength of 2,500-3,000 and a total strength of 20,000. It was largely Ahmadzi Pushtun and operated in the tribal areas of southern and western Afghanistan.
Mahaz-e-Meilli-e-Islami Afghanistan (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan): A Sunni monarchist movement, led by Pri Said Gailani. It had a hard-core strength of 2,500-4,000 and over 15,000 supporters. It was largely Pushtun and had a number of leaders who were ex-Afghan army officers. It received backing from the U.S. It operated in the Maidan Valley and Logar (Amin Wardak), Kandahar (Haji Latif) and Paktia (Rahmatullah Safi), and Pakita and Nimroz (Mohammed Nassim).
Jamiat-i-Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Society): A Sunni fundamentalist movement favoring a government of Mullahs and led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. It had a hard-core strength of 6,000-8,000 and 24,000-30,000 supporters. It was largely Turkic, but had strong Pushtun elements. It received backing from Kuwait, Pakistan, the PRC, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. It operated in the Panjshir Valley (Ahmad Shah Massoud); Herat, Farah, and Badghis provinces (Ismail Khan); and Balkh and Samagan provinces. It conducted small operations in Kabul, Badakshan, Fariab, Jowzjan, and Baghlan provinces.
Jabha-e-Nejat-e-Melli (National Liberation Front): A conservative Sunni monarchist group led by Sibghatullah Mujadidi. It was traditional Pushtun. It had a hard-core strength of about 2,000 and a total strength of some 4,500-6,000. It operated in Kunar and Kandahar.
Islamic Alliance of the Afghan Mujahideen (Islamic Unity for the Liberation of Afghanistan): A conservative Sunni group favoring an Islamic Republic and led by Abdul Rabbur Rasul Saif. It had hard-core strength of about 1,000 and a total support of around 6,000. It was Pushtun and operated largely in Paktia and around Kabul. It had U.S. support and favored the unification of Afghan liberation movements.
Sepha-e-Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards): This movement was a conservative Shi'ite group which was strongly pro-Iranian and pro-Khomeini and was led by Mohsen Rezai. It had a cadre strength of some 5,000 and a total strength of around 9,000. It operated in the west in Ghowr, Helmand, Bamiyan, Jowzhjan, and Herat. It received substantial Iranian aid—more than any other Shi'ite fundamentalist movement.
Hezbollah (Party of God): This movement was a conservative Shi'ite group which was strongly pro-Iranian and pro-Khomeini. It had a cadre strength of some 2,000 and a total strength of some 5,000. It operated in the west in Herat, Ghowr, and Helmand provinces and was affiliated with the Hezbollah in Iran and other countries.
Nasr: This movement was a conservative Shi'ite group which broke with Iranian and pro-Khomeini groups. It had a cadre strength of some 1,700 and a total strength of some 5,000. It operated in the west in Ghowr, Helmand, and Bamiyan.
Shura: A conservative Shi'ite group, led by Said Ali Beheshti, which favored an autonomous region in Hazara. It had a cadre strength of some 5,000 and a total strength of some 10,000. It operated in the west in Bamiyan, Baghlan, Balkh, and Ghazni provinces.
Harakat Islami (Islamic Movement): A conservative Shi'ite group, led by Sheikh Mushini, which favored an Islamic republic. It had a hard-core strength of some 3,000 and a total strength of some 16,000. It was largely Hazara and Dari. It operated in the west in Fariab, Jowzjan, Balkh, and Badakshan.35
How much aid did they get from the West?
Figures are not available for non-U.S. aid, but it seems to have roughly equalled U.S. aid. U.S. military aid was $30 million in 1980, $50 million in 1981, $50 million in 1982, $60 million in 1983, $140 million in 1984, $250 million in 1985, $470 million in 1986, $660 million in 1987, and $700 million in 1988.
Much of the military aid to the Mujahideen was lost due to sabotage and thefts in the "pipeline." Actual transfer of the aid to refugees may have totalled as little as 30 percent of the total funding. These figures may seem exceptionally low, but they are typical of such operations in support of Third World conflicts.
Soviet Mine Warfare
Both sides utilized mine warfare extensively.
The Soviets laid somewhere between 30 and 50 million mines, depending on which estimate you believe in; and they offically admitted to laying 2,131 minefields by 1988.
The Soviets used the following types of mines:
MON-50: Basically a M-18A1 Claymoreski with a 60 degree arc kill zone out to 50m.
MON-100: A cylinder with a concave face that can be set on a tripod or mounted on a tree or rock wall. It has 450 steel fragments set in five kilograms of plastic explosive. It can spray these fragments as far as 100 meters.
MON-200/MON-500: Large 52~ cm diameter mines with 12 kg or more of plastic explosives.
PMN-2: Size of a small fruitcake tin, buried.
UMK: Remote Control mines (or wave mines). First used in '85, they explode by either vibration or remote electrical triggering. A central sensor system is tied to a simple battery-powered discrete transistor circuit and is triggered by up to four wires and possibly an acoustic trigger. Linking to other mines is allowed; allowing traps to be set with one mine triggering simultaneous explosions from other devices.
PFM-1 "Butterfly/Green Parrot": Widely dropped from helicopters. Basically BLU-43B ski. Plastic case, 12 grams. Exists in Green and tan versions; camouflaged to look like stone or sand. It self-defuses after several hours or days, but this often fails. Is virtually impossible to detect with conventional gear. Up to 1 million of these may have been dropped in the first 7 years on Mujihadeen Lines of Communications.
Mujihadeen Mine Warfare
The Mujihadeen got most of the DRA's stock of Soviet TM-46 AT Mines early on. Mines were also recovered from Soviet laid fields, while others were imported. Unexploded Soviet aerial bombs were used to make mines as well.
By 1982, the Mujihadeen began to get significant amounts of non-metallic mines. After 1982, their efforts became relatively sophisticated. The scale of this effort can be drawn from two examples:
A.) One sapper battalion of the 201st Motor Rifle Division claimed to have cleared 30,000 mines over a five-year period, covering some 1,000 kilometers of roads.
B.) When the Soviets took on the Mujihadeen fortress of Zhawar on the Pakistani border, they found 6,000 AT Mines, and 12,000 AP Mines.
Soviet Counter-Mine Warfare
Right from the start, the Soviets had to use combat engineers and sappers to clear mines. At first, UAZ-469 Jeeps with mine detectors were used; but this rapidly shifted to tanks when snipers began killing the crews of the mine-detecting jeeps. Columns often didn't move without mine detection units and sappers. Handheld detection devices became very common.
By 1984, Soviet publications were warning about mines that were undetectable by conventional means, but they weren't as concerned as the US was about the lack of a field deployable technology for detecting plastic mines.
The Soviets achieved some success with using trained dogs to detect mines by smell. The sapper units involved in this used BTR-70s. The Dogs didn't work with buried mines, but seem to have worked with surface mounted booby traps and mines.
After 1983, the Soviets began placing mine rollers on their tanks; and converted T-55 and IT-1 tank destroyers into mineclearing tanks by removing their turrets and mounting the roller systems.
To counter this, the Mujihadeen used Chinese and Italian made pneumatic fuzes which came closer to setting off the mine with each vehile that rolled over them. Remotely triggered mines were also used, as were different mine laying methods.
Mujihadeen Counter-Mine Warfare
As opposed to the Soviets, the Mujihadeen had serious and never-ending problems with dealing with mines. Due to the lack of any advanced detection devices, they were forced to use old-fashioned methods:
A.) Using poles to probe the ground ahead.
B.) Driving animals into minefields to clear them
C.) Threw rocks into minefields
D.) Used professional mine hunters
E.) Simply walked single file into minefields, accepting the inevitable losses of the leading men.
F.) Used slingshots to set off the mines.
G.) Used mortars and rockets to set off the mines.
Later in the war, they recieved several Lightfoot mine breaching systems; which consisted of a 120mm mortar round which dragged a 1/2" cable about 1,000 feet through the air. The cord exploded on contact with the ground, clearing a 6 foot wide path through 80% of the types of mines used in the war. They usually fired them in groups of 3-4 to clear a secure path. These were effective in breaching the minefields around DRA and Soviet strongpoints.
As the war dragged on, the Mujihadeen's tactics became better and more sophisticated.
A.) They used Forward observers to map the minefields as they were laid.
B.) Over time, a trained cadre of people who could locate mines by sight or touch was created.
C.) Night-time scouting of minefields before attacks was also done.
To counter all this, the Soviets deployed concentric rings of mines, increased the density of mines per square klick, added flare mines, put in advanced mines with acoustic and sesmic triggers, and increased surveillance of mined areas.
Mujihadeen Anti-Aircraft Warfare
The Mujihadeen found that the Mi-24 HIND's survivability continually improved and that the Soviets used groups of attack helicopters to reduce individual exposure to enemy weapons fire. This made rifle-calibre machine guns useless as they became nothing more than a tracer line pointing to where Mujihadeen were.
To counter this, the US bought 12.7mm and 14.5mm HMGs. In 1985, about 40~ Oerlikon 20mm GAI-BOI cannons were bought and shipped via Iran and Pakistan to the Mujihadeen. They produced both MiG and helicopter kills, but proved to be too difficult to move, despite being capble of being broken into 50 kg loads. Both the HMGs and 20mm Oerlikons ended up being used more often against ground targets anyway.
In the period of 1984-87, these small calibre weapons became pretty much ineffective due to improved armor plating on helicopters. It's believed that the undercarriage plating on the HIND D/E is titanitium and completely resistant to 7.62mm fire.
By late 1987, the AA guns became much more effective after Stingers were provided in large numbers; forcing the Soviets to fly low. The US also began to supply a 12.7mm round with a tungsten penetrator which could penetrate the cockpit armor and contained a small phosphorous charge to start fires on-board.
Early on the CIA was against providing Stinger because:
A.) The Mujihadeen were too unsophisticated to operate it
B.) Security Reasons
C.) Fear of it falling into terror groups
D.) Supplying it could provoke USSR into attacking Pakistan.
So instead, SA-7s were sought; but when no sufficient supplies could be found, the CIA ordered 300 British Blowpipes in 1985; and 225 of them ended up in Mujihadeen hands. Blowpipe ended up being too difficult to operate and maintain in Afghanistan.
Finally by late '85, State Department and Pakistani pressure forced the decision to deploy Stinger. The first shipment of 150 didn't arrive until the summer of 1986. The first stinger kills scored seem to have been on 26 September 1986, when three HINDS were downed.
The US Army required 136 hours for Stinger Qualification, but in the hands of the Mujihadeen, it was simple to operate, due to them not caring about technical training or complicated IFF procedures, and the fact that it was fired under clear weather conditions.
Stingers forced the Soviets to increase their fighter bomber attack heights from 2,000 to 4,000 feet to around 10,000~ feet. Soviet aircraft losses went from 1.2 aircraft a day to 1.4 per day during late '86 and early '87 and dropped only after a severe curtailment of air operations by the Soviets.
150 more Stingers were shipped in 1986, 600~ more by '87, and by the time of the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, at least 1,000~ had been shipped. We also supplied a highly sensitive sound dector allowing the Mujihadeen to detect helicopters miles away.
According to US Army estimates, out of 340 Firings, 269 hits (79%) were scored by the Stinger system.
Soviet Anti-Aircraft Warfare
The Soviets widely deployed ZU-23s on BMDs, truck mounted guns, 37mm AA guns, and large numbers of 14.5mm HMGs as long range direct fire weapons which were capable of high elevation to hit mujihadeen positions. Convoys ended up being frequently protected by ZIL-135 trucks with armored mounts holding twin 23mm guns.
Soviet Fixed Wing Aircraft
Early on the Soviets dropped conventional bombs, many of which failed to arm and which had little lethality in the rough ground. By 1983, the fuses on most of the bombs had been changed, and more retarded cluster bombs were used, as well as 57mm rockets.
The basic aircraft used were:
MiG-21s; highly reliable, had a relatively low airspeed, and could turn well. However, it had very low loiter time. Used for CAS.
MiG-23/Su-17s: Carried out close air support missions where general accuracy was required, like reactions to ambushes.
Su-24 Fencer: Used primarily in attacks on villages and interdiction.
Tu-22 Blinder: Used primarily in attacks on villages and interdiction.
Tu-16 Badger: Used primarily in attacks on villages and interdiction.
Tu-26 Backfire: Used primarily in attacks on villages and interdiction in late 1988.
Su-25: First entered combat in '82. Was the most effective Soviet fixed wing aircraft.
Soviet airstrikes became less and less effective after 1985, due to more MANPADs, and the Mujihadeen began digging ever deeper, and conducted more of their movement by night.
Soviet Rotary Wing Aircraft
The HIND D/E's 12.7mm Gatling proved to be inaccurate and had low lethality, which was why various types of cannons replaced it in the HIND F models.
Mi-8 and Mi-17 HIPS performed badly at high and low altitudes, and had exposed non-crashworthy fuel lines. Rotor and engine life was limited. Trim controls were sloppy as well.
Soviet Logistics
The Soviets relied heavily on airlift until 1987-88, and even then, most supplies were delivered by truck convoys consisting of 100-300 vehicles, of which 30% were convoy defense vehicles. The remainder of the convoy was divided between POL and other supplies.
These convoys formed at the main Soviet Kairaton Transhipment Complex at Termez or at Kushka on the border to the east. They moved south along routes to Herat or to the Pol-e-Khomri Logistic Facility. The convoys using the latter route from Termez to Kabul had to travel 450 kilometers, including the 2,700-meter long Salang Tunnel. Further, the difficult mountain conditions required 70-90 percent more gasoline than routes in Europe and 30 to 40 percent more diesel fuel.
It took two weeks to complete the round trip from Termez to Kabul, and the maximum number of trips any driver could normally make in a two-year enlistment was eighty. The trips were so dangerous that pennants for "courage and valor" were awarded for twenty, forty, sixty, and eighty trips.
Soviet Infantry Units and other Miscellaneous Stuff
* Soviet body armor throughout the conflict was always continually being improved and replaced with more advanced armor as the war dragged on.
* ATGMs were used in long range fire against Mujihadeen positions like fortified stone forts, as tank guns and other weapons could not be elevated to the angles needed.
* Parachute equipped ATGMs were used to lay commo wires over rough terrain.
* The Soviets exerted tight control over ATGM allocations, due to the fact that if a DRA unit with them was defeated or routed, the weapons would fall into Mujihadeen hands, or when such troops defected. Eventually the USSR demanded that a number of ATGM systems be turned over to them. By 1980, the USSR had removed the SA-7 MANPAD from DRA inventory.
* A very high proportion of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan (25% or more) consisted of the VDV.
* Many of the Soviet units in the initial invasion of Afghanistan had no reason for their deployment other than the fact that they had been mobilized with their parent units. These units were withdrawn by 1980.
* The Soviets found that Mujihadeen equipped with european rifles could outshoot AK-74 equipped infantry at distances exceeding the effective ranges of the infantry's weapons. This led to special sniper suppression squads which dismounted first from vehicles, and were eqipped with scoped long range rifles and RPG-18s to deal with such nusiances.
Soviet Armored Vehicles, etc
* T-55 and T-62 tanks had frequent clutch problems in hilly terrain and lost tracks frequently on rocky ground. Strains on the engines in traversing rough terrain and slopes caused tank engines to overheat unless coolant supply was doubled or tripled. Fuel expenditure was 30 to 50 percent more than on flat ground.
* The T-55 lacked the gun elevation and depression to be effective in mountain fighting.
* The BMP ended up being largely replaced because they were too large for many mountain trails, broke down a lot, and were difficult to service in the field. The BMP's replacement ended up being the BMD and BMD-2; which were lighter and more reliable, although they could not ford streams as fast, due to them being smaller. Another factor was the BMP's highly visible exhaust trail. This was caused partly by an over-enrichment of the fuel mixture which occurs for the BMP at high altitudes.
* Many routes were impassable to the BMPs, BTR-60s, BTR-70s, and BTR-80s, and these vehicles were used instead in the cities, for protecting lines of communications, armored ambulances, and protecting strategic crossroads.
* The low-pressure 73mm gun found on the BMD-1 and BMP-1 could only elevate to 33 degrees; a critical problem in mountain fighting and lacked the rapidity of fire to deal with large amounts of infantry. It's replacement, the 30mm cannon of the -2 variants, could elevate to 50 degrees. SAGGER missiles were still useful because of their higher elevation.
* Virtually all of the BTR-60s that appeared in theatre were the -60PB version with armored roofs.
* The BTR-60 proved easy for Afghan forces to handle and maintain.
* As delivered, the turreted machine guns of the BTR-60 and -70 could only elevate to 30 degrees, but modifications in the field expanded that to 50-60~ degrees.
* The Soviets liked the 2S5 152mm SP Gun, because it could fire to longer ranges than the older guns (27 km normal range, and 37 km range with Rocket Assist); and could rapidly displace to keep pace with convoys, etc. The towed version was also widely deployed.
"If scientists and inventors who develop disease cures and useful technologies don't get lifetime royalties, I'd like to know what fucking rationale you have for some guy getting lifetime royalties for writing an episode of Full House." - Mike Wong
"The present air situation in the Pacific is entirely the result of fighting a fifth rate air power." - U.S. Navy Memo - 24 July 1944
"The present air situation in the Pacific is entirely the result of fighting a fifth rate air power." - U.S. Navy Memo - 24 July 1944
- MKSheppard
- Ruthless Genocidal Warmonger
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Re: Recommendations on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
Squadron Signal SU-25 in action:
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Some very interesting facts; the SU-25 was the most feared aircraft by the mujihaddeen, even though by 1984, only 25 of them with 80 pilots were actually flying in Afghanistan
In april of '86, Frogfoots first used Laser guided, retarded, and cluster bombs against rebel positions, including caves.
One of the most notable strikes was a precision air strike against the secret HQ of Ahmad Shah Massoud, one of the most prominent muhjihadeen leaders...
From 1980 to 1989, a grand total of 23 FROGFOOTS were lost in combat, with several more being destroyed on the ground, including 8 at once during a rocket attack on a airbase.
During a three-day period shortly after Stingers were introduced by the CIA to Afghanistan, four frogfoots were shot down, killing 2 pilots.
Following this, additional chaff/flare dispensers were installed and armor plate positioned between the engines, after these modifications were completed to all frogfoots in Afghanistan, no more Su-25s were lost to Afghan Stingers, although several were damaged.
There was even cases where a Su-25 survived a direct hit by an AIM-9L Sidewinder
The 23 SU-25s lost over A-Stan were 10~ percent of all USSR fixed wing losses over Afghanistan, and the average was one loss for every 2,800 flight hours, and it was estimated it took some 80~ hits to down a FROGFOOT, as opposed to 15-20 hits for the MiG-21 and Su-17.
There were a number of Su-25 pilots that flew several hundred combat missions, COL Alexamir Rutskoy flew over 400 missions and was shot down twice, while CAPT Vladislav Gontcharienko flew 415 combat missions, was never shot down and was one of the youngest Grach pilots to win the Hero of the Soviet Union award.
One of the greatest Grach pilots of the Afghan war was Senior LT Konstantin G. Pavlyukov, who.at the time, was only twenty-three. During a mission in December of 1986, Pavlyukov managed to destroy two Stingers launched against his formation. He shot down the first with a burst from his AO-17A cannon, while the second was shot down by a salvo of unguided rockets. His quick action saved the life of the flight leader. LT A. Potchktn.
His luck finally run out during a mission against a Mujahideen position on 21 January 1987. His Grach was hit by a Stinger missile and although he managed to safely eject, he was wounded by Mujahideen ground fire on the way down. On the ground, he was unable to radio his position to rescue forces and was soon encircled by the Mujahideen.
After about an hour of attempting to evade, he killed himself and the approaching Mujahideen with a grenade. Senior LT Pavlyukov was posthumously awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union award.
-------------
Some very interesting facts; the SU-25 was the most feared aircraft by the mujihaddeen, even though by 1984, only 25 of them with 80 pilots were actually flying in Afghanistan
In april of '86, Frogfoots first used Laser guided, retarded, and cluster bombs against rebel positions, including caves.
One of the most notable strikes was a precision air strike against the secret HQ of Ahmad Shah Massoud, one of the most prominent muhjihadeen leaders...
From 1980 to 1989, a grand total of 23 FROGFOOTS were lost in combat, with several more being destroyed on the ground, including 8 at once during a rocket attack on a airbase.
During a three-day period shortly after Stingers were introduced by the CIA to Afghanistan, four frogfoots were shot down, killing 2 pilots.
Following this, additional chaff/flare dispensers were installed and armor plate positioned between the engines, after these modifications were completed to all frogfoots in Afghanistan, no more Su-25s were lost to Afghan Stingers, although several were damaged.
There was even cases where a Su-25 survived a direct hit by an AIM-9L Sidewinder
The 23 SU-25s lost over A-Stan were 10~ percent of all USSR fixed wing losses over Afghanistan, and the average was one loss for every 2,800 flight hours, and it was estimated it took some 80~ hits to down a FROGFOOT, as opposed to 15-20 hits for the MiG-21 and Su-17.
There were a number of Su-25 pilots that flew several hundred combat missions, COL Alexamir Rutskoy flew over 400 missions and was shot down twice, while CAPT Vladislav Gontcharienko flew 415 combat missions, was never shot down and was one of the youngest Grach pilots to win the Hero of the Soviet Union award.
One of the greatest Grach pilots of the Afghan war was Senior LT Konstantin G. Pavlyukov, who.at the time, was only twenty-three. During a mission in December of 1986, Pavlyukov managed to destroy two Stingers launched against his formation. He shot down the first with a burst from his AO-17A cannon, while the second was shot down by a salvo of unguided rockets. His quick action saved the life of the flight leader. LT A. Potchktn.
His luck finally run out during a mission against a Mujahideen position on 21 January 1987. His Grach was hit by a Stinger missile and although he managed to safely eject, he was wounded by Mujahideen ground fire on the way down. On the ground, he was unable to radio his position to rescue forces and was soon encircled by the Mujahideen.
After about an hour of attempting to evade, he killed himself and the approaching Mujahideen with a grenade. Senior LT Pavlyukov was posthumously awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union award.
"If scientists and inventors who develop disease cures and useful technologies don't get lifetime royalties, I'd like to know what fucking rationale you have for some guy getting lifetime royalties for writing an episode of Full House." - Mike Wong
"The present air situation in the Pacific is entirely the result of fighting a fifth rate air power." - U.S. Navy Memo - 24 July 1944
"The present air situation in the Pacific is entirely the result of fighting a fifth rate air power." - U.S. Navy Memo - 24 July 1944
- MKSheppard
- Ruthless Genocidal Warmonger
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- Joined: 2002-07-06 06:34pm
Re: Recommendations on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
Leave No Comrade Behind!
Page 180 of Fulcrum by Zuyev:
Boris must have known the situation when he rolled in on his own bomb run. The enemy was wide awake and had definitely gotten the range. They were so confident of shooting him down that they didn't even use one of their valuable missiles.
Boris's plane exploded even before he pulled out of his dive. The tumbling fireball smashed into the ridgeline across the valley from the enemy fort. Eduard saw the ejection seat fire from the tumbling mass of debris. But he couldn't be sure Boris's parachute deployed before impact. The surviving pilots definitely saw an orange and white parachute canopy crumpled on the rocks not far from the smoke of the crash site.
They called in an Mi-8 rescue helicopter and requested more fighters to suppress the ground fire. Two helicopters answered the call. After the surviving MiG-23 and the Su-17s made strafing runs on the enemy ridgeline, one of the Mi-8s flew across the valley to strike the enemy bunkers with its own rockets and machine guns while the second helicopter flew straight toward the parachute on the ground.
The helicopter pilots had a grim responsibility. According to Soviet military regulations, a man's family did not receive death benefits or a pension if his body was not recovered from the war zone. Soldiers' statements that they saw a comrade fall in battle were not considered sufficient evidence of his death. This cruel regulation stemmed from the desperate days early in the Great Patriotic War when some men had gone missing from their units hi the thick of battle, but had actually deserted to the Germans or been captured. A soldier was meant to fight to the death if surrounded. To surrender willingly was a serious offense, punishable by years in prison.
But few of us actually considered surrender as an option in battle. All our intelligence briefings had stressed the fact that the NATO forces would torture Soviet pilots savagely to extract as much military information as possible. Then the poor devil would be either executed or killed in one of their horrible medical or drug experiments. Apparently the Westerners had carried on this barbaric tradition with the assistance of their ex-Nazi allies. No one in his right mind would surrender to the Afghan Mujahedin. Their torture methods were less sophisticated than me Americans', but even bloodier.
By Soviet doctrine, pilots who are shot down are "transferred" to the infantry the moment their boots touch the ground and their parachute collapses. They are then bound by the same orders to fight on as the ground troops. Many of the fellows in Afghanistan carried hand grenades in their flight suits, and strapped a paratrooper's folding-stock AKM Kalashnikov to their ejection harness.
Whatever the origin of the body-retrieval regulation, the crewmen of rescue helicopters knew they had an obligation not just to the airman on the ground but also to his family.
The rescue helicopter was halfway across the valley when it took a direct hit from a Stinger. Luckily the aircraft did not explode, but it did smash onto the side of the ridge several hundred yards below the wreckage of Boris's aircraft. The sky above the ridges and valley was suddenly crisscrossed by streams of heavy-caliber tracers. At least one missile was fired, but exploded among the helicopter's decoy flares. The pilot bore in to try to rescue the crew of the first Mi-8. But the valley was a death trap. The second helicopter went down on the lower slopes of the ridge. Now there were two helicopter crews on the ground and possibly an injured Soviet pilot.
By this time, rotating flights of strike aircraft were laying down an almost continuous bombardment on the enemy-held ridges. They dropped cluster bombs and napalm, fired rockets, and strafed with their cannons. The next morning a ground force of Spetsnaz commandos arrived in light-armored vehicles and rescued the helicopter crews. But the fire from the enemy positions intensified. Now the Air Force used powerful fuel-air explosives to neutralize the Mujahedin gun positions in the caves and bunkers. These were cruelly effective weapons. A mist of fuel droplets was dispersed from a canister by compressed gas and allowed to seep into the enemy positions before being ignited by a delayed fuse. The resulting explosion literally ripped the caves and bunkers apart, killing everyone inside. But the Mujahedin had devised means to counter even these bombs.
The fight dragged on for three days before the enemy fell back in good order. When the Spetsnaz finally reached Boris's airplane, they found his burnt and mangled remains near the ejection seat. He had been dead before the parachute deployed. But at least Sultanat, his widow, would receive the pitiful death benefit of 120 rubles a month. Maybe back in her home village, I thought, as the major ended his briefing, she would be able to live on that shamefully small pension.
Page 180 of Fulcrum by Zuyev:
Boris must have known the situation when he rolled in on his own bomb run. The enemy was wide awake and had definitely gotten the range. They were so confident of shooting him down that they didn't even use one of their valuable missiles.
Boris's plane exploded even before he pulled out of his dive. The tumbling fireball smashed into the ridgeline across the valley from the enemy fort. Eduard saw the ejection seat fire from the tumbling mass of debris. But he couldn't be sure Boris's parachute deployed before impact. The surviving pilots definitely saw an orange and white parachute canopy crumpled on the rocks not far from the smoke of the crash site.
They called in an Mi-8 rescue helicopter and requested more fighters to suppress the ground fire. Two helicopters answered the call. After the surviving MiG-23 and the Su-17s made strafing runs on the enemy ridgeline, one of the Mi-8s flew across the valley to strike the enemy bunkers with its own rockets and machine guns while the second helicopter flew straight toward the parachute on the ground.
The helicopter pilots had a grim responsibility. According to Soviet military regulations, a man's family did not receive death benefits or a pension if his body was not recovered from the war zone. Soldiers' statements that they saw a comrade fall in battle were not considered sufficient evidence of his death. This cruel regulation stemmed from the desperate days early in the Great Patriotic War when some men had gone missing from their units hi the thick of battle, but had actually deserted to the Germans or been captured. A soldier was meant to fight to the death if surrounded. To surrender willingly was a serious offense, punishable by years in prison.
But few of us actually considered surrender as an option in battle. All our intelligence briefings had stressed the fact that the NATO forces would torture Soviet pilots savagely to extract as much military information as possible. Then the poor devil would be either executed or killed in one of their horrible medical or drug experiments. Apparently the Westerners had carried on this barbaric tradition with the assistance of their ex-Nazi allies. No one in his right mind would surrender to the Afghan Mujahedin. Their torture methods were less sophisticated than me Americans', but even bloodier.
By Soviet doctrine, pilots who are shot down are "transferred" to the infantry the moment their boots touch the ground and their parachute collapses. They are then bound by the same orders to fight on as the ground troops. Many of the fellows in Afghanistan carried hand grenades in their flight suits, and strapped a paratrooper's folding-stock AKM Kalashnikov to their ejection harness.
Whatever the origin of the body-retrieval regulation, the crewmen of rescue helicopters knew they had an obligation not just to the airman on the ground but also to his family.
The rescue helicopter was halfway across the valley when it took a direct hit from a Stinger. Luckily the aircraft did not explode, but it did smash onto the side of the ridge several hundred yards below the wreckage of Boris's aircraft. The sky above the ridges and valley was suddenly crisscrossed by streams of heavy-caliber tracers. At least one missile was fired, but exploded among the helicopter's decoy flares. The pilot bore in to try to rescue the crew of the first Mi-8. But the valley was a death trap. The second helicopter went down on the lower slopes of the ridge. Now there were two helicopter crews on the ground and possibly an injured Soviet pilot.
By this time, rotating flights of strike aircraft were laying down an almost continuous bombardment on the enemy-held ridges. They dropped cluster bombs and napalm, fired rockets, and strafed with their cannons. The next morning a ground force of Spetsnaz commandos arrived in light-armored vehicles and rescued the helicopter crews. But the fire from the enemy positions intensified. Now the Air Force used powerful fuel-air explosives to neutralize the Mujahedin gun positions in the caves and bunkers. These were cruelly effective weapons. A mist of fuel droplets was dispersed from a canister by compressed gas and allowed to seep into the enemy positions before being ignited by a delayed fuse. The resulting explosion literally ripped the caves and bunkers apart, killing everyone inside. But the Mujahedin had devised means to counter even these bombs.
The fight dragged on for three days before the enemy fell back in good order. When the Spetsnaz finally reached Boris's airplane, they found his burnt and mangled remains near the ejection seat. He had been dead before the parachute deployed. But at least Sultanat, his widow, would receive the pitiful death benefit of 120 rubles a month. Maybe back in her home village, I thought, as the major ended his briefing, she would be able to live on that shamefully small pension.
"If scientists and inventors who develop disease cures and useful technologies don't get lifetime royalties, I'd like to know what fucking rationale you have for some guy getting lifetime royalties for writing an episode of Full House." - Mike Wong
"The present air situation in the Pacific is entirely the result of fighting a fifth rate air power." - U.S. Navy Memo - 24 July 1944
"The present air situation in the Pacific is entirely the result of fighting a fifth rate air power." - U.S. Navy Memo - 24 July 1944
Re: Recommendations on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
Very interesting Mark. Thanks for that.
Jonathan
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Re: Recommendations on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan was written by junior officers with war experience and was put together by the Frunze Combined Arms Staff College as a collection of essays. It was translated by Lestar Grau and published by the National Defense University in 1996. It is downloadable from the NDU site via the publicaly accessible library catalog here (PDF).
Grau followed up with The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, written with Ali A. Jalali. Also from 1996, the book uses interviews with surviving Afghan fighters as source material. The Defense Training and Information Center hosts the book, as linked by the NDU library here (PDF).
I have both in my ebook collection, but have not yet read them. However, since they are a.) primary source material, and b.) legitimately free, I suspect they are worth investigating.
Grau followed up with The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, written with Ali A. Jalali. Also from 1996, the book uses interviews with surviving Afghan fighters as source material. The Defense Training and Information Center hosts the book, as linked by the NDU library here (PDF).
I have both in my ebook collection, but have not yet read them. However, since they are a.) primary source material, and b.) legitimately free, I suspect they are worth investigating.
Re: Recommendations on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
wow looks like this is a topic near and dear to Shep's heart.
thanks for all the reccs especially the excerpts and the pdf links.
thanks for all the reccs especially the excerpts and the pdf links.
Go back far enough and you'll end up blaming some germ for splitting in two - Col Tigh
Re: Recommendations on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
I've been looking for the Other Side of the Mountain for a while, thanks simplicius!
On the bear went over the mountain, a lot of the 'vignettes' deal with platoon or company-level engagements. Interesting stuff if you're into that sort of thing.
But I would recommend at least the foreword, introduction, and afterword. It goes over the war in a general manner, but also includes some very interesting statistics. Like 600,000 soldiers having served, some 490,000+ casualties, of which 410,000+ were due to disease.
Interesting stuff.
On the bear went over the mountain, a lot of the 'vignettes' deal with platoon or company-level engagements. Interesting stuff if you're into that sort of thing.
But I would recommend at least the foreword, introduction, and afterword. It goes over the war in a general manner, but also includes some very interesting statistics. Like 600,000 soldiers having served, some 490,000+ casualties, of which 410,000+ were due to disease.
Interesting stuff.
Shrooms: It's interesting that the taste of blood is kind of irony.
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Re: Recommendations on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
Grau went on to translate the Soviet General Staff Study of the war in The Soviet-Afghan War : How a Superpower Fought and LostSimplicius wrote:It was translated by Lestar Grau and published by the National Defense University in 1996.
Also there seems to be a newish book titled Afghan Guerrilla Warfare by Ali Ahmad Jalali, Lester W. Grau, Lester W. Grau, John E. Rhodes
"If scientists and inventors who develop disease cures and useful technologies don't get lifetime royalties, I'd like to know what fucking rationale you have for some guy getting lifetime royalties for writing an episode of Full House." - Mike Wong
"The present air situation in the Pacific is entirely the result of fighting a fifth rate air power." - U.S. Navy Memo - 24 July 1944
"The present air situation in the Pacific is entirely the result of fighting a fifth rate air power." - U.S. Navy Memo - 24 July 1944
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Re: Recommendations on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
We're lucky that the Soviet-Afghan War has had a bunch of decent books on it. The Iran-Iraq War for example has had a whole series of clunkers; there's really only one decent book; and it ends in 1987 or so; and leaves out the final Iraqi offensives which caused Iran to seek peace....xerex wrote:wow looks like this is a topic near and dear to Shep's heart.
"If scientists and inventors who develop disease cures and useful technologies don't get lifetime royalties, I'd like to know what fucking rationale you have for some guy getting lifetime royalties for writing an episode of Full House." - Mike Wong
"The present air situation in the Pacific is entirely the result of fighting a fifth rate air power." - U.S. Navy Memo - 24 July 1944
"The present air situation in the Pacific is entirely the result of fighting a fifth rate air power." - U.S. Navy Memo - 24 July 1944
Re: Recommendations on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
which one is that?
Go back far enough and you'll end up blaming some germ for splitting in two - Col Tigh
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Re: Recommendations on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
Oops, hit edit instead of QUOTE...
The Gulf War by Edgar O'Ballance. Published in 1988.
Unfortunatley, the author died in the last couple of years, so we'll never get a second edition covering the final phase of the war.
The Gulf War by Edgar O'Ballance. Published in 1988.
Unfortunatley, the author died in the last couple of years, so we'll never get a second edition covering the final phase of the war.
"If scientists and inventors who develop disease cures and useful technologies don't get lifetime royalties, I'd like to know what fucking rationale you have for some guy getting lifetime royalties for writing an episode of Full House." - Mike Wong
"The present air situation in the Pacific is entirely the result of fighting a fifth rate air power." - U.S. Navy Memo - 24 July 1944
"The present air situation in the Pacific is entirely the result of fighting a fifth rate air power." - U.S. Navy Memo - 24 July 1944
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Re: Recommendations on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
Try this hard-to-find one:
Schofield, Carey, The Russian Elite: Inside Spetsnaz and the Airborne Forces, Stackpole/Greenhill, 1993
It's actually about Russian/Soviet Airborne Forces, but the book was published in 1993 and all the work was done in the early '90's, so it de facto becomes a book about Afghanistan, since that was was just a few years past at the time.
I got it from the Military Book Club a long time ago, and cannot find it on Amazon.
Schofield, Carey, The Russian Elite: Inside Spetsnaz and the Airborne Forces, Stackpole/Greenhill, 1993
It's actually about Russian/Soviet Airborne Forces, but the book was published in 1993 and all the work was done in the early '90's, so it de facto becomes a book about Afghanistan, since that was was just a few years past at the time.
I got it from the Military Book Club a long time ago, and cannot find it on Amazon.
Something about Libertarianism always bothered me. Then one day, I realized what it was:
Libertarian philosophy can be boiled down to the phrase, "Work Will Make You Free."
In Libertarianism, there is no Government, so the Bosses are free to exploit the Workers.
In Communism, there is no Government, so the Workers are free to exploit the Bosses.
So in Libertarianism, man exploits man, but in Communism, its the other way around!
If all you want to do is have some harmless, mindless fun, go H3RE INST3ADZ0RZ!!
Grrr! Fight my Brute, you pansy!
Libertarian philosophy can be boiled down to the phrase, "Work Will Make You Free."
In Libertarianism, there is no Government, so the Bosses are free to exploit the Workers.
In Communism, there is no Government, so the Workers are free to exploit the Bosses.
So in Libertarianism, man exploits man, but in Communism, its the other way around!
If all you want to do is have some harmless, mindless fun, go H3RE INST3ADZ0RZ!!
Grrr! Fight my Brute, you pansy!