WWII Aerial Combat Kill Numbers (was: Fucking Hans Rudel)

[CaptHawkeye]

This may not be anything new to a lot of people, but does anyone want to tell me where the fuck people get off thinking that the Nazi published kill figures for Rudel are anything remotely fucking close to realistic? No matter where you go Wehrmachtophiles love to boast about the magical tank killing capacity of the Luftwaffe and how "just a few more Stukas would have won the war" and shit like that.

But I always, ALWAYS, see people try to throw up Rudel's kill statistics as proof that airplanes could and frequently did attack heavy armour. Even though they totally ignore that even if Rudel's wild 500+ figure was true, how many more 500+ tank aces does the Luftwaffe have?

That's moot though, based on the fact that, for fuck's sake, the NAZIS published his kill records. And i'll be damned if any statistic they ever published had an ounce of reality in its claim.

So does anyone have some handy arguments, websites, or other resources with which to handily shoot down the wild kill claims of guys like Rudel?

Renamed thread to something a bit more informative --Shep

[thejester]

I haven't got the figures handy 'cause I'm in the middle of moving and the location of my copy of The Most Dangerous Enemy is thus unknown, but point out as a starter the sheer disparity between Luftwaffe kill claims and actual RAF losses during the Battle of Britain. This works both ways, of course, but it's an obvious starting point. Overclaiming in aerial combat is simply a fact of life; German kill counts seem more inflated but when reconciled with the number of sorties they flew IIRC it isn't that overblown.

That discounts the idea of reliable kill counts, anyway. Closing With The Enemy discusses the ineffectiveness of airpower against heavy armour (as opposed to psychological factors) but again, haven't got it handy.

[Sea Skimmer]

Rudel flew around with about half of his squadron flying flak suppression missions with bombs in support, and was still shot down I forgot how absurdly many times. Having dozens of lives and a character shield is really useful sometimes. So that’s a major factor in his personal success. The ability of certain Nazi pilots to rake up huge air to air kill claims is directly related, they’d fly around with the rest of the squadron covering the rear. No doubt his kill claims are inflated but he still easily did knock out several hundred tanks. Of course this does not mean the overall squadron-wing averages are very good which is what counted. The Nazis were really good at missing this vital point in warfare. In any case gunfire lent itself to accurate hit (if not kill) talleys because the pilot could very clearly see the sparks of an impact on steel. Rockets and bombs threw up smoke clouds which instantly obscured the target. If a German pilot saw smoke it was because his target was burning and thus dead or at least disabled.

In all the major air forces it was constantly found during the war that about 90% of kills went to about 5% of the pilots. Everyone else would just get mixed up in the furball, keeping his opposite number busy but not really accomplishing that much. This would have logically been true for a task like precision air to ground gunnery as well.

Also keep in mind that a typical Soviet division during WW2 had just one battery of heavy automatic anti aircraft guns and no heavy guns. The hoards of independent mechanized and armored regiments typically had nothing heavier then 7.62mm machine guns for this purpose. The Russians had very little air to ground coordination to allow ground units to call in friendly fighter cover and also limited radar coverage. They also simply did not assign many aircraft to this role, preferring to hoard air power under central control for use in overwhelming offensive action. Defensive sorties concentrated on defending rear areas, not front line forces. So most of the time the limited stock of escorted Nazi anti tank planes had little opposition over the front. But they couldn't be nearly enough places to matter.

Meanwhile Nazi divisions always had at least one complete anti aircraft battalion until 1945 when they formed divisions out of odds and ends, and sometimes it was closer to being two battalions in actual strength. The Luftwaffe also had hoards of independent flak units it did not hesitate to push up close to the front lines. Western allied divisions also had pretty lavish scales of anti aircraft protection from mid 1942 onward, but the only really serious test came in Tunisia, and no one ever fucking remembers Tunisia.

That discounts the idea of reliable kill counts, anyway. Closing With The Enemy discusses the ineffectiveness of airpower against heavy armour (as opposed to psychological factors) but again, haven't got it handy.

The USAAF and RAF used bombs and rockets for anti armor missions which were both highly inaccurate and thus nearly worthless in that role. This is not relevant to the Germans and Russians experience which involved heavy use of dedicated armor piercing automatic guns. The Germans and Russians also both fielded anti armor cluster bombs, which were erratic in dispersal patterns, but still far more effective then iron bombs. They also had anti personal cluster bombs which made great flak suppression weapons. The western allies really only used incendiary cluster bombs and only then for burning cities. Large numbers of smallish fragmentation bombs were used by the USAAF, but mainly only in the Pacific. Not nearly so good as a real cluster bomb, and I’m not aware of any anti tank models.

This is why the USAF was perfectly happy to design the A-10 around a massive 30mm cannon at a latter date, while the Russians have armed just about every tactical aircraft they have built since WW2 with at least one high power 30mm cannon. Iron bombs would not become viable anti tank weapons until they got laser guidance. Rockets now work, but mainly because we found ways to make them far more accurate, and they can be equipped with cluster bomblet warheads.

[CaptHawkeye]

You can usually count on two kinds of responces once you say "Rudel's claims and the claims of many tank busting pilots are likely exaggerated".

A. "R U CALLIN SOLDURS LIARS?" Which i've actually gotten. At that point I usually just cut off the conversation, since you know who you're dealing with at that point.

B. "Yeah but the kills were verified by other pilots and the enemy stated X losses in vehicles". Somewhat better, but it disregards the fact that to a pilot, EVERY enemy vehicle was a tank. Things like APCs or Armoured Cars were frequently misidentified as full size tanks and such.

It's totally pointless for airplanes to attack tanks anyway. Why waste so much ammo to MAYBE hit one target every now and then when you could use those bombs on a fuel depot or an HQ and bring the whole armoured division to a halt by the end of the day. It's just penis waving vs. logistics as usual.

EDIT: I don't deny that Rudel was probably a particularly skilled pilot who earned many (certainly not all) of his claimed kills. In fact the Nazis had the "top list" aces in pretty much every area of the war. But like Sea Skimmer said, squadron level performance was shit. And in the end, heroes don't win battles, logistics do. One super awesome pilot in a squadron of shitty pilots isn't going to be as effective as a whole squadron of mediocre or average pilots.

A lot of this also had to do with the fact that the Nazis would rarely retire their experienced seniors. So what choice did many of have except fight for a very long time or die?

[Sea Skimmer]

B. "Yeah but the kills were verified by other pilots and the enemy stated X losses in vehicles". Somewhat better, but it disregards the fact that to a pilot, EVERY enemy vehicle was a tank. Things like APCs or Armoured Cars were frequently misidentified as full size tanks and such.

Except that Rudel had a kill tally for soft skins too. Course those are easy since you could nail a couple on one pass. His tank tally is well acknowledged to be for all AFV types put together. Many of the Soviet assault guns were actually tougher targets too as they had more armor and had fewer vulnerable chinks in that armor.

It's totally pointless for airplanes to attack tanks anyway. Why waste so much ammo to MAYBE hit one target every now and then when you could use those bombs on a fuel depot or an HQ and bring the whole armoured division to a halt by the end of the day. It's just penis waving vs. logistics as usual.

God you really have no clue what you are talking about at all do you? Certainly no conception of close air support whatsoever.

[CaptHawkeye]

Alright, it could be incorrect to say that Close Air Support serves no purpose, i'm just pretty tired of hearing the claims that it was single handedly decisive or led to a substantial number of losses of in armour. Early in the war the concept of CAS was pretty dismal despite all the claims it got. Later in the war with aircraft like the A-26, Il-2M, and Stuka G-3 things certainly started to change.

But I may not have an entirely clear picture of how CAS worked during the war, especially throughout the entire war. People seem to have a tendency to believe the technology and capabilities of armies in 1945 was representative of everyone's capabilities in 1939 too.

[Sea Skimmer]

Alright, it could be incorrect to say that Close Air Support serves no purpose, i'm just pretty tired of hearing the claims that it was single handedly decisive

It certainly was in many individual battles, and was capable of completely paralyzing enemy forces and rendering them incapable of offensive action even when it inflicted little physical damage. For the infantry on the ground, an air attack scattering an enemy armored regiment and buying them hours more to dig in and bring up support can be more meaningful support then if the a few tanks were destroyed in passing but the attack was not broken up. This is a serious concern in the modern day when more and more air support takes the form of quick stand off bombing attacks, rather then a persistent presence.

or led to a substantial number of losses of in armour.

Sure as shit did at Kursk. The Soviets actually completely disregarded deep battlefield air interdiction missions, because anti tank missions and CAS in support of Soviet attacks was easier to conduct and had more verifiable results. Once the all important breakthrough was made, the T-34 tank swarm would take care of the Nazi rear areas as they tried to flee by horse and foot.

Early in the war the concept of CAS was pretty dismal despite all the claims it got.

You base this conclusion on what? Somehow I don’t think you did a serious analysis of the effectiveness of close air support, and what it would have taken in horse drawn heavy artillery and ammunition wagons to accomplish the same result.

In fact only the Germans had an effectively implemented air to ground doctrine beyond mere artillery spotting roles upon the outbreak of war, and used it with massive success, causing all other powers to begin serious work on the matter. The fact that other powers were too stupid to try has zero bearing on the effectiveness of the concept. Of course the Germans also didn’t fight anyone with a proper scale of anti aircraft guns in the first two years of the war.

Later in the war with aircraft like the A-26, Il-2M, and Stuka G-3 things certainly started to change.

No such thing as a Stuka G3 last I checked and the A-26 was not really a CAS plane. Too big for that role. Its prize role was interdiction. Meanwhile the Hs 123 biplane was the only plane the Nazis routinely assigned to the CAS role in the first two years of the war, and was extreamly popular to the point that the Lufwaffer considered putting it back into production. This didn’t happen but it was used until 1944 when literally the last ones got shot down. Its low speed, high agility and open cockpit were all ideal for the role. It was also simple, cheap and rugged to operate allowing it to fly a high number of sorties per day which easily made up for its limited firepower. High performance is NOT what you want because you will not be able to identify the target before you fly past it.

But I may not have an entirely clear picture of how CAS worked during the war, especially throughout the entire war. People seem to have a tendency to believe the technology and capabilities of armies in 1945 was representative of everyone's capabilities in 1939 too.

Capabilities in 1939 favored aircraft much more so then they did in 1945. The planes may not have been so great but air defenses were far weaker, and armies had less motorization and inferior camouflage doctrine. Air attacks also had a large degree of novelty which greatly increased the moral effect they had on troops who often had zero combat experience prior to the first air raid appearing.

[K. A. Pital]

Taking the obscene count of one ace pilot or something and applying it to the entire force is nothing but faulty logic (Skimmer explained above that there were a special subset of pilots who got most kills while others did almost nothing - the average per plane/man/flight figure is far more important).

Moreover, Rudel's count is really hugely off compared to the average of other following aces (who have counts between 30 and 100 kills) - he was likely supported as a propaganda figure, etc. He claims like 10% of all tank losses from aerial action by the USSR. That's not just far above average, it seems hardly feasible - unless like I said, he was heavily supported as a prop. figure and thus in his operations he was always allowed to make kills that would otherwise go to other pilots.

Quite often Rudel's data just isn't corroborated by the losses of the opposing side. Also, the Soviet Union often salvaged hit tanks and they were not put in "losses" if they were restored to operational capacity quickly enough. Meanwhile, Rudel wrote everything that took fire from his hits as "destroyed". In some cases his account is more believable, in some (like the 1943 fighting) it's hardly believable - 64 claimed tank kills versus the 7 tanks lost from aviation by the Soviet account.

[Serafine666]

No such thing as a Stuka G3 last I checked...

He must have missed a number; a Stuka G2 was captured by the British at the end of the war. The G2 variant added two 37mm underwing cannons to the Ju87 and borrowed and extended wing design from the D5 variant.

...and the A-26 was not really a CAS plane. Too big for that role. Its prize role was interdiction. Meanwhile the Hs 123 biplane was the only plane the Nazis routinely assigned to the CAS role in the first two years of the war, and was extreamly popular to the point that the Lufwaffer considered putting it back into production. This didn’t happen but it was used until 1944 when literally the last ones got shot down. Its low speed, high agility and open cockpit were all ideal for the role. It was also simple, cheap and rugged to operate allowing it to fly a high number of sorties per day which easily made up for its limited firepower.

Henschel also built the HS-129 "tank cracker" (Panzerknacker) which saw some success towards the end of the war as well. I think it's the only plane that was eventually fitted with a 75mm rapid-fire cannon (the Bordkanone BK 7.5, essentially a copy of the Pak-40 anti-tank gun) which was added to the B3 variants. Looking back those German aircraft engineers don't seem to have been quite sane.

[Sea Skimmer]

Only a bare handful, about twenty five, of the 7.5cm armed version were ever produced, the massive weight and drag crippled the planes agility and the recoil was so heavy it would progressively bent the propellers out of shape. Most had the bomb racks removed to slightly make up for the extra mass which was a major limitation. It was great when it could hit the target though. The Mk101/103 series 30mm cannon were generally more successful then either the 5cm or 7.5cm guns in the anti tank role.

Much more insane was the installation of that 7.5cm gun on five He 177 A-3/R5 aircraft…. clearly the perfect armament and combat role for a 65,000lb four engine bomber! Even after structural stiffening it physically broke the plane and never did see combat, though the Ju-88 proved strong enough to handle it. Both planes were also armed in larger numbers with 5cm guns for tank, train and bomber box formation busting.

[Marcus Aurelius]

The Mk101/103 series 30mm cannon were generally more successful then either the 5cm or 7.5cm guns in the anti tank role.

Yes, but nevertheless their success was limited. The Soviet tanks in general had thicker top armor than German panzers, which made the 30 mm cannons only marginally effective. Their barely adequate performance was in fact the primary reason why the Germans started to look for heavier alternatives.

Even after structural stiffening it physically broke the plane and never did see combat, though the Ju-88 proved strong enough to handle it. Both planes were also armed in larger numbers with 5cm guns for tank, train and bomber box formation busting.

Anti-bomber work seems to have been the primary reason for the 50 mm BK5 installations on Ju 88 and Me 410. They even proved to be reasonably effective as long as the bombers were not escorted, but of course the heavy fighters were toast once the P-51 appeared in sufficient numbers.

[LaCroix]

One point leading to his success was that he actually 'made' the G2 conversion with two 37 mm flak underwing, giving him 12 shot of 37mm armor piercing rounds.

It was officially fielded December 1943, but he used it already in between February and April 1943.

It was his nearly exclusive use of that weapon that gave him that huge kill numbers, since no one expected a stuka in low level flight at long range to be a threat for armor, netting him easy kills when attacking from behind, igniting the fuel or damaging engines. I believe most of those were salvaged and back on the field within days or weeks.

Before Battle of Kursk, his tank tally was at about 100 tanks. This shows clearly that he was the "ace in the sleeve" with a secret weapon that earned him the kills. Once the G2 was fielded officially '( after a year of him having advantage), there already were tactics available to counter them.

[Marcus Aurelius]

One point leading to his success was that he actually 'made' the G2 conversion with two 37 mm flak underwing, giving him 12 shot of 37mm armor piercing rounds.

It was his nearly exclusive use of that weapon that gave him that huge kill numbers, since no one expected a stuka in low level flight at long range to be a threat for armor, netting him easy kills when attacking from behind, igniting the fuel or damaging engines.

Well, that may be partially true in some limited sense, but it's not like AA guns were not going to shoot at an approaching aircraft if it was a Stuka. In fact most AA doctrines stress that it's precisely the time you should be shooting at an attacking aircraft, since it's waste of ammo to shoot at it once it has dropped its bombs. Also, by that time frame the Germans were already switching for shallower dive attacks with regular D model Stukas as well. The change in tactics was one of the reasons for the 20 mm cannons of the D-5; unlike during the first two years of the war the Stukas were now doing strafing runs on a fairly regular basis. However, in 1943 the Soviets were still somewhat lacking in real AA guns and the 7.62 mm Quad Maxim AAMG was still common sight, as useless as it was.

Before Battle of Kursk, his tank tally was at about 100 tanks. This shows clearly that he was the "ace in the sleeve" with a secret weapon that earned him the kills. Once the G2 was fielded officially '( after a year of him having advantage), there already were tactics available to counter them.

Not so much tactics than simply increased numbers of AA guns. The Ju 87G was always a specialist aircraft, which required great skill to be used in any effective way, and it could not replace the D-5 as a general CAS platform1, nor was it useful for interdiction missions. Consequently the D-5 continued alongside the G-2 until the end of Ju 87 production. Both were already slated to be replaced by the Fw 190 as early as autumn 1943, but the Fw 190 was needed more for fighter duties and could never fully replace the Ju 87 in practice, despite the general obsolescence of the latter by 1944.

1Neither could the Hs 129B, since there were not enough engines for them, and the Gnome-Rhône 14M did not have enough power to begin with. As usual aircraft production was limited by engine availability.

[MKSheppard]

When you fly 2,530 combat missions (!!!), you get that kind of score. That averages out to a tank destroyed every five sorties.

[Stark]

And it's likely much lower, since his numbers are very probably inflated as discussed.

Sea Skimmer, I was under the understanding that despite using cannons, the Luftwaffe (Stukas specifically) were not really as effective as often claimed against heavy armour, especially post-France.

[Sea Skimmer]

And it's likely much lower, since his numbers are very probably inflated as discussed.

Sea Skimmer, I was under the understanding that despite using cannons, the Luftwaffe (Stukas specifically) were not really as effective as often claimed against heavy armour, especially post-France.

That statement makes no sense as the Luftwaffe did not introduce any kind of dedicated cannon armed anti tank planes until well into 1942, more then slightly post France! The cannon armed Stuka only appeared in 1943. Prior to that only limited efforts were made to bomb tanks, as it was quite clear such tactics would not ever be very effective. So it was only done when it was vital to break up an enemy tank attack against which no other weapon would be very effective either, usually when either Char B1 or KV-1 tanks appeared.

The most common target for Luftwaffe close air support was enemy artillery positions and in this role they proved very effective. This was a vital mission since throughout WW2 the German army was quite weak in corps and army level artillery that would normally handle counter battery missions. Ammunition supplies were never that great either and counter battery can easily guzzle 300-500 rounds to knock out one enemy gun.

A perfect example would be Sedan, when the Germans had deliberately left behind corps artillery and most ammunition reserves for divisional guns to get through the Ardennes quickly (the French belief that this area was impassable to a modern army was not totally without merit) but made up for it with over 1,000 close air sorties which succeeded in suppressing the artillery strength of several French divisions. The actual level of damage inflicted wasn’t even that great, but the bombing raids totally disrupted French wire based communications and made it impossible for batteries to shift position.

[Stark]

HA! Sorry, I'm at work and was thinking about Allied cannon armed planes (as you mentioned earlier). I was intending to ask about the real and commonly accepted effectiveness of the Stuka as an anti-armour dive-bomber, in which role it's often considered very effective, whereas as you say the approach was usually tactical disruption rather than what we'd call 'tank busting' today.

As with the Rudel numbers, people seem to move from the highest successes instead of considering battlefield averages; throwing around early-Barbarossa numbers of tank park raids isn't really meaningful.

[Sea Skimmer]

In the early-Barbarossa operations Rudel merely accounted for a Soviet battleship (also hit by another guys bomb at almost the exact same time though) and a destroyer, he was too busy to be busting tanks with his officers pistol and a Storch. The guy did a whole lot more then just kill tanks, IIRC its seven men he saved by landing his own plane beside wrecks, in one case bogging down and being saved by another Stuka landing in turn. Not to mention the whole losing both legs on separate occasions thing among the 32 times he was shot down.

And one should also never forget that he was a highly devout Nazi who offered to fly into Berlin after it was encircled to save Hitler’s brain. Maybe his body too, I forgot which. Either was he could have nursed his last five gallons of fuel to reach Argentina.

[K. A. Pital]

Boris Semyonovich Okrestin, one of the top Soviet assault plane pilots, made 406 sorties (died during the 406th) and destroyed over 40 tanks and 2 armored cars. That's one tank per ten sorties.

2500 sorties really is a lot; offhand however I know two Soviet pilots with ~1000 sorties - that's Mikhalenko Konstantin Fomich (1000 night sorties, if I'm not mistaken, that's hell of a man), HSU and another a woman Natalia Fyodorvna Kravtsova (Merklin), likewise HSU.

Considering though that the pressure and load on top German aces was higher than that of their Soviet counterparts, in sortie numbers, perhaps Rudel did fly all his 2500 sorties. 1 tank per 5 sorties seems a bit too high for such a large sortie number.

[thejester]

Quite by chance, stumbled on this. Makes for interesting reading about the veracity of German claims.

[Andras]

The Command and General Staff College has a ton of papers online that can be browsed as HTML or downloaded as PDFs. One of them is CSI Report No. 2: A Comparative Look at Air-Ground Support Doctrine and Practice in World War II, LTC Kenneth A. Steadman. which may be of interest due to the thread subject matter.

[Marcus Aurelius]

Considering though that the pressure and load on top German aces was higher than that of their Soviet counterparts, in sortie numbers, perhaps Rudel did fly all his 2500 sorties. 1 tank per 5 sorties seems a bit too high for such a large sortie number.

As Sea Skimmer already noted, Rudel did not try to differentiate between halftracks, armored cars, assault guns and "real" tanks. He started his tank busting business actually with the 20 mm cannon of the Ju 87D-5 (or was it a field modified D-3, can't remember) and destroyed a number of tanks with that already. Now, considering the weapon it seems likely that most of the kills were armored cars and light tanks. At that time the Red Army still had a significant number of leftover T-26 and BT-7, more importantly newer T-60 and T-70 light tanks, as well as assorted armored cars in service, so finding suitable targets was probably not a problem. It also is possible that a lucky hit by a 20 mm AP shot could occasionally destroy a medium tank. Such stories are told by many British Typhoon pilots, although they are anecdotal evidence at best.

[K. A. Pital]

Well, if he didn't differentiate between armored cars, assault guns and tanks, that is more believable. Destroying 500 of various armored vehicles is certainly not easy too.

[Big Phil]

In all the major air forces it was constantly found during the war that about 90% of kills went to about 5% of the pilots. Everyone else would just get mixed up in the furball, keeping his opposite number busy but not really accomplishing that much. This would have logically been true for a task like precision air to ground gunnery as well.

Why is that? I understand why that would be the case for infantry, but for pilots (and presumably other types of units - tanks for example), why are 95% of them so ineffective? Is it a lack of aggression, or are they unwilling to pull the trigger, or are they just not very good pilots?

[Sea Skimmer]

Why is that? I understand why that would be the case for infantry, but for pilots (and presumably other types of units - tanks for example), why are 95% of them so ineffective? Is it a lack of aggression, or are they unwilling to pull the trigger, or are they just not very good pilots?

A infantrymen will be forced to kill to save his own ass, and has many simple to learn ways of doing it. But that’s not even very relevant because the field artillery will inflict around 50% of enemy ground combat losses out of hand. The main job of riflemen is to defend crew served weapons (been proven that machine gun teams are more willing to deliberately kill, you can’t let the other guys beside you down ect..), artillery observers and tanks. It was still true that a minority did most of the killing, but not to the same degree as in the air. Also it was much harder to determine who killed what on the ground.

Shooting a plane down in a dogfight with gunfire meanwhile is just not something the average person can pull off no matter how hard they try, particularly with the relatively basic training methods available in WW2 which rarely included dissimilar air combat practice. Not to mention all gun sights in WW2 sucked. At best they had a means of setting the range based on an estimation of target wingspan, and no one could reliably estimate wingspan unless they identified the specific type of enemy aircraft which was not easy. So most of the time pilots just ended up in endless turning fights (good enough way of saving your own ass) in which neither side could gain an advantage or even a firing position, and when they could fire they’d just miss. But that kept the enemy busy, and provided the openings the handfuls of good pilots needed to score actual kills.

The typical WW2 fighter pilot never made ace, and usually had one kill or less to his name, and sometimes only then because kills of uncertain origin would end up awarded to guys with no kill who said they’d fired around that time, regardless of how much anyone really believed they could have done it. This helped keep up moral.

The Nazis meanwhile would most often award the uncertain kills to the top aces, further inflating scores. The moral of the underlings would be kept up by the mere presence of the super ace! Also it was also pretty typical in the RAF and USAAF to award those uncertain kills to two or three people each getting a fraction of a kill. I don’t know if the Soviets awarded fractions of kills or not. The Nazis did allow fractions of kills, but in practice always awarded a full kill, and for a period they actually awarded TWO kills to anyone who shot down a Mosquito at night as it was seen as so difficult. Plus the constant harassment raids they made on Berlin personally annoyed Hitler.

All powers also had habits, which changed with the fortunes of war, of denying a certain number of kills to the fighter pilots, and awarding them to anti aircraft units. This British did this the most since during the early part of the Blitz their AA fire was nearly worthless for various reasons. The Germans probably did it the least since while it took mountains of ammo, they did bring down very substantial numbers of aircraft, sometimes beating out the fighter defenses.