Defending Malaya

[PainRack]

Its 1st Jan 1939 and you are GOC Malaya, responsible for defending Malaya against the enemy.
Circumstances are the same as it was historically, Hitler is perceived as the greater threat in Germany, the local political situation remains the same with the local police more concerned about KMT and Communist political activity, with warnings of Japanese infiltration ignored and the British officials generally more concerned about profits and colonial rule/stability than Imperial defence.

Your objectives are the same historically. Defend Malaya against the Japanese. The Imperial Chief of Staffs has confided to you his real plans, that you are to delay an Japanese victory for as long as possible until the American come in to save the day and buy time for the rest of the British Empire to mobilise against th Japanese threat. God help us if there's a two front war.

The difference is that your military authority is absolute within the confines of Malaya. There would be no "differing opinions", no conflicts between the RAF and the Army and the Navy. Similarly, the Indian Army and Australian Army would be equipped and train/fight the way you dictate it to be.

What would you do?

[Sea Skimmer]

1) Convert most of the airfields in northern Malay into a grid of drainage ditches and wooden poles. Malay never had even the RAFs calculated minimal number of squadrons for defense, and yet the RAF built as many airfields as its ‘ideal’ number of squadrons would have required for support. It also built them with absolutely no thought to ground defense. The ditches can be filled in and the poles pulled out latter if the aircraft ever show up. Until then they provide defense against airborne landings as well as denying easily used airfields to the Jap.

2) Construct a line of pillboxes along the north shore of Singapore, supported by a second line about 250 meters inland. Clear fields of fire and keep them cleared. All of this was historically proposed, denied funding pretwar and then absurdly not implemented even after the Japs attacked and despite large stocks of material being on hand. As it was Singapore did have pillboxes along its southern shore. Additionally a large number of basic but effective roadblock positions would be established in depth across the length and width of Malay. As many main lines of resistance as my engineers can scout out would also be planned, even if most will never be used.

3) Request that a large order for 6in and 9.2in high explosive ammunition be placed in the United States. This ammo can be justified as useful not only to defend Singapore, but also for numerous batteries in the British Isles. It will become all the more relevant after the fall of France. The batteries historically had little but APC ammo. 15in HE would be nice too, but I won’t push my luck since historically only Singapore had 15in shore batteries until 1942 when two guns were installed at Dover (they had been intended for Singapore too).

4) Train the damn troops for jungle warfare. Historically many units in Malay trained quite hard and had a budget to do so, but the training often emphasized tactics useful for projected deployments in the Western Desert of Egypt. This worked out really badly. Leaders will be promoted on merit, and the men will be subject to as much anti Japanese propaganda as I can muster. A special intelligence section will be placed in charge of generating it.

5) Request the political authority to invade Thailand should a Japanese attack become imminent. This was historically the entire basis of the British defensive plan, but London had to sign off on making the first move. That obviously took too long to be approved. I would also ask that the US be requested to extend military aid to Thailand as a bulwark against Japan. This initiate will gain strength after Japan invades Indochina in 1940. The US was fond of arming Thailand anyway, and historically refused to accept Thailand’s declaration of war in 1941.

6) Request motor torpedo boat units for the defense of Singapore, with orders to be placed in the US if they cannot be met. This shouldn’t be too hard to pull off, MTBs would require scant resources in 1939, and after the fall of France Lend Lease will work fine. Historically Japan captured not just airfields and fuel, but large numbers of sampans and junks which it then used to make a number of small outflanking landing. Destroying those small craft, and opposing Japanese landing craft with MTBs could make a huge difference. It certainly helped the US hold Bataan, a battle which saw several similar outflanking landings annihilated.

7) I would require that comprehensive demolition and denial plans be drawn up encompassing all military and transportation resources in Malay. The British historically did much on this end, but many bridges, sampans, junks, airfields and stores fell into Japanese hands none the less. A comprehensive plan backed by propositioned demolition supplies would be much more effective.

Ask for more planes, troops, tanks, artillery (especially heavy artillery which ironically the UK had plenty to spare) and warships. I’m not likely to get much but I’d be crazy not to ask. All and all the British should have been able to hold at least six months with the forces they had and even slightly better planning anyway. I may not save Malay even with hindsight, but I could easily hold long enough to let Burma be saved. If Burma is saved then Thailand and Malay might fall in 1943 (meaning Japans oil supply is cut off), and the war in the Far East could be shortened by six months to a year or even more.

[Thanas]

Thread title edited to cut out the idiocy.

[Sidewinder]

Its 1st Jan 1939 and you are GOC Malaya, responsible for defending Malaya against the enemy.
<snip>

Your objectives are the same historically. Defend Malaya against the Japanese. The Imperial Chief of Staffs has confided to you his real plans, that you are to delay an Japanese victory for as long as possible until the American come in to save the day and buy time for the rest of the British Empire to mobilise against th Japanese threat. God help us if there's a two front war.

Considering the US does NOT declare war until AFTER Pearl Harbor is attacked- in December of 1941, almost THREE YEARS after the date you give- the defenders have a snowball's chance in hell, unless the Japanese decide to attack Pearl Harbor three years ahead of schedule.

The difference is that your military authority is absolute within the confines of Malaya. There would be no "differing opinions", no conflicts between the RAF and the Army and the Navy.

Unless I have technology A DECADE ahead of its time, the only way I can hold off the Japanese is with numbers- MILLIONS of additional infantrymen, THOUSANDS of additional field guns and light armored vehicles (I doubt tanks are ideal in a fucking jungle), and HUNDREDS of additional fighters- numbers the UK is unable to provide, and which the US is unwilling to provide until Japan attacks them.

[Captain Seafort]

Considering the US does NOT declare war until AFTER Pearl Harbor is attacked- in December of 1941, almost THREE YEARS after the date you give- the defenders have a snowball's chance in hell, unless the Japanese decide to attack Pearl Harbor three years ahead of schedule.

The Japanese attacked Malaya a few hours before they hit Pearl Harbour, however it would be impossible to defend the peninsular much better than historically if you were left with only the equipment and fixed defences in place historically. Hence three years prep time.

Unless I have technology A DECADE ahead of its time, the only way I can hold off the Japanese is with numbers- MILLIONS of additional infantrymen, THOUSANDS of additional field guns and light armored vehicles (I doubt tanks are ideal in a fucking jungle), and HUNDREDS of additional fighters- numbers the UK is unable to provide, and which the US is unwilling to provide until Japan attacks them.

Bullshit - against a Japanese force in the low tens of thousands, you don't need anything like those numbers. The problem is one of training and tactics, to either stop Japanese outflanking movements in the first place, and stop the tendency to panic if troops are outflanked. The key is to make the troops confident of their own ability to operate in the jungle, and not rely so heavily on major roads. The worst case scenario is if the Japanese take the whole of Malaya, in which case Singapore island, with decent stocks of HE ammo, should be able to hold out for a long time.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Unless I have technology A DECADE ahead of its time, the only way I can hold off the Japanese is with numbers- MILLIONS of additional infantrymen, THOUSANDS of additional field guns and light armored vehicles (I doubt tanks are ideal in a fucking jungle), and HUNDREDS of additional fighters- numbers the UK is unable to provide, and which the US is unwilling to provide until Japan attacks them.

Are you off your knockers or something? You don't need a swam of infantry just to tackle a few ten thousand strong army. The real trouble with the defenders was equipment, tactics, and training. Equipment they had a dearth of, because the Brits couldn't be half assed about doing a good job of doling out the right equipment. Then training and tactics because of many ineffectual commanders who didn't do a good job of training their troops.

[PainRack]

Considering the US does NOT declare war until AFTER Pearl Harbor is attacked- in December of 1941, almost THREE YEARS after the date you give- the defenders have a snowball's chance in hell, unless the Japanese decide to attack Pearl Harbor three years ahead of schedule.

Was there a mistake somewhere? The historical scenario is the same, the Japanese would invade in 1941. While in 1939, no real political or military strategy vis a vis the Americans did exist, it was clear back in 1938 that the British were hoping that a combined effort with the Americans will deter and hold back the Japanese. By 1940, Churchill explicit political and military strategy in the Far East is to rely on the Americans to fight Japan.
One of the reasons against authorising Operation Matador and the invasion of Thailand rested on this. The British ambasador was of the opinion that a pre-emptive invasion would alienate the Americans.

Unless I have technology A DECADE ahead of its time, the only way I can hold off the Japanese is with numbers- MILLIONS of additional infantrymen, THOUSANDS of additional field guns and light armored vehicles (I doubt tanks are ideal in a fucking jungle), and HUNDREDS of additional fighters- numbers the UK is unable to provide, and which the US is unwilling to provide until Japan attacks them.

You GOTTA be kidding me. While the actual force structure against the Japanese arrived relatively late, the British wasn't that significantly outnumbered, outclassed or under-equipped.

Are you off your knockers or something? You don't need a swam of infantry just to tackle a few ten thousand strong army. The real trouble with the defenders was equipment, tactics, and training. Equipment they had a dearth of, because the Brits couldn't be half assed about doing a good job of doling out the right equipment. Then training and tactics because of many ineffectual commanders who didn't do a good job of training their troops.

Equipment was a problem, especially as the Hurricanes had to be re-adapted for tropical work. And the less talked about comns, the better.

It would be interesting to examine the training of the Indian and Australian forces in Malaya though. Like Sea Skimmer said, the forces in Malaya did train hard. The stereotype of officers going to ballrooms and having afternoon tea ignores some issues such as newly arrive troops needing time to acclimatise to the environment. This was not aided as the Tropical medicine facillities were centred in Singapore and the Straits Settlement. 2nd Argyll, being stationed longer in Malaya than the other units did complete several jungle and riverine exercises and the two British battalions historically outperformed the colonial units.
Initial Australian forces were earmarked for the Middle East IIRC.

1) Convert most of the airfields in northern Malay into a grid of drainage ditches and wooden poles. Malay never had even the RAFs calculated minimal number of squadrons for defense, and yet the RAF built as many airfields as its ‘ideal’ number of squadrons would have required for support. It also built them with absolutely no thought to ground defense. The ditches can be filled in and the poles pulled out latter if the aircraft ever show up. Until then they provide defense against airborne landings as well as denying easily used airfields to the Jap.

2) Construct a line of pillboxes along the north shore of Singapore, supported by a second line about 250 meters inland. Clear fields of fire and keep them cleared. All of this was historically proposed, denied funding pretwar and then absurdly not implemented even after the Japs attacked and despite large stocks of material being on hand. As it was Singapore did have pillboxes along its southern shore. Additionally a large number of basic but effective roadblock positions would be established in depth across the length and width of Malay. As many main lines of resistance as my engineers can scout out would also be planned, even if most will never be used.

To be honest, I don't have any books or figures other than apologist arguments that the British couldn't hire labourers due to the authorised pay-rates being lower than normal prices. Could anyone elaborate and clarify on this issue with regards to labour?

[PainRack]

Bullshit - against a Japanese force in the low tens of thousands, you don't need anything like those numbers. The problem is one of training and tactics, to either stop Japanese outflanking movements in the first place, and stop the tendency to panic if troops are outflanked. The key is to make the troops confident of their own ability to operate in the jungle, and not rely so heavily on major roads. The worst case scenario is if the Japanese take the whole of Malaya, in which case Singapore island, with decent stocks of HE ammo, should be able to hold out for a long time.

Spencer book "The Jungle is Neutral" contrasted the Indian and British infantrymen gear with the Japanese. While the British and Indian forces wore thick uniforms with over 40kg worth of personal gear, the Japanese wore light cotton uniforms, abandoned personal gear and used bicycles to increase their mobility.

There were also several staff notes........ and as the war went on, exhortation by Percival himself to go off-road and flank the enemy and stuff. Interestingly, the units most capable of doing so was the 2nd Argylle.... a British formation. For all the exhortations of the Australians natural outdoorsman skill, they were mostly outclassed in Malaya by the Japanese.

[Marcus Aurelius]

Unless I have technology A DECADE ahead of its time, the only way I can hold off the Japanese is with numbers- MILLIONS of additional infantrymen, THOUSANDS of additional field guns and light armored vehicles (I doubt tanks are ideal in a fucking jungle)

Depends on what you mean by "tanks". WW2 light tanks were quite capable of operating in many jungle conditions. In fact the Japanese did operate light tanks and tankettes in Malay, which was somewhat of a surprise for the British. It is something to add to Sea Skimmer's list: more portable anti-tank weapons. Even the Boys AT rifle would suffice against the Japanese light tanks, but if you don't have any anti-tank weapons, you are in trouble. I don't know if the British used satchel charges as AT weapons in the Far East, but they are easy to make in field conditions and are effective against light and medium tanks. Or at the very least can be, if you know how to move in and exploit the forest for your advantage. The historical "sticky bomb" was a harebrained idea though: you don't need any superfluous adhesive to complicate matters in your anti-tank hand grenade.

[Sea Skimmer]

Unless I have technology A DECADE ahead of its time, the only way I can hold off the Japanese is with numbers- MILLIONS of additional infantrymen, THOUSANDS of additional field guns and light armored vehicles (I doubt tanks are ideal in a fucking jungle), and HUNDREDS of additional fighters- numbers the UK is unable to provide, and which the US is unwilling to provide until Japan attacks them.

Wow you are truly fucking retarded aren’t you? The British already had superior numbers, and the entire fucking Japanese invasion force that took over South East Asia wasn’t even 1 million men strong. You have no clue, at all. Its almost impressive.

Depends on what you mean by "tanks". WW2 light tanks were quite capable of operating in many jungle conditions. In fact the Japanese did operate light tanks and tankettes in Malay, which was somewhat of a surprise for the British. It is something to add to Sea Skimmer's list: more portable anti-tank weapons. Even the Boys AT rifle would suffice against the Japanese light tanks, but if you don't have any anti-tank weapons, you are in trouble. I don't know if the British used satchel charges as AT weapons in the Far East, but they are easy to make in field conditions and are effective against light and medium tanks. Or at the very least can be, if you know how to move in and exploit the forest for your advantage. The historical "sticky bomb" was a harebrained idea though: you don't need any superfluous adhesive to complicate matters in your anti-tank hand grenade.

The British had a number of 2pdr guns and Boys rifles in Malay, they also had field guns they could have used in the anti tank role. Anti tank mines and grenades were lacking, but many different kinds could have been produced locally had anyone thought to do so.

In fact historically the British knocked out a large portion of all Japanese tanks sent into the campaign, which only numbered about one brigade in strength. The trouble was what happened over and over again was the British troops (who are mostly poorly trained Indian units) would get pinned by frontal attacks backed by a few tanks, and then why they tired to figure out what to do the Japanese would outflank them through the jungle. They also outflanked them along the coastline using captured boats. In fact the Japanese really didn’t do much BUT outflank people when it came to successful jungle warfare. Once the allies learned to do this too, and learned to establish 360 degree defensive positions, the Japanese fortunes in the jungle very quickly dropped off. Then the Japanese lack of heavy weapons, ammo, logistics, and even the lack of any real battalion level staff became a huge liability, rather then a mobility facilitating advantage.

[Serafina]

Would it be overdone to say that anyone with modern jungle warfare tactics (not equipment, just tactics) could defeate the japanese under these conditions then?
Since the main reason for their victory seems to be an enemy who did not understand the terrain, someone with just that, the knowledge how to use it would win even without magical foreknowledge - as far as i can tell, at least.

[Captain Seafort]

Would it be overdone to say that anyone with modern jungle warfare tactics (not equipment, just tactics) could defeate the japanese under these conditions then?

Given the forces available to GOC Malaya, the Japanese would have got hammered if they'd been trained in 1941 jungle warfare tactics. The problems were that a) they were trained in desert tactics, since India and Malaya were treated as Middle East Command's rear area and b) they were commanded by a staff officer, with no experience whatsoever in commanding forces of that size.

[Marcus Aurelius]

Would it be overdone to say that anyone with modern jungle warfare tactics (not equipment, just tactics) could defeate the japanese under these conditions then?
Since the main reason for their victory seems to be an enemy who did not understand the terrain, someone with just that, the knowledge how to use it would win even without magical foreknowledge - as far as i can tell, at least.

Perhaps not completely defeat but at least significantly delay and cause much larger casualties than historically. The Japanese did not even do anything specific to jungle; the Finnish army exploited very similar tactics in cold temperate coniferous forests (minus the Japanese fixation on hand-to-hand combat plus as many submachine guns as could be procured). Forest warfare is the same everywhere. Jungle is special only that it is more demanding on the medical corps and soldiers need special training on how to deal with the interesting plant and animal life and stuff like fungal infections (crotch rot etc.). In cold temperate forests you only get mosquitos and they don't carry malaria...

[Serafina]

Would it be overdone to say that anyone with modern jungle warfare tactics (not equipment, just tactics) could defeate the japanese under these conditions then?

Given the forces available to GOC Malaya, the Japanese would have got hammered if they'd been trained in 1941 jungle warfare tactics. The problems were that a) they were trained in desert tactics, since India and Malaya were treated as Middle East Command's rear area and b) they were commanded by a staff officer, with no experience whatsoever in commanding forces of that size.

Well, the training of troops and officers is not going to change magically - how much could have been done by the central command there?
Or, to formulate it differently, how much was the fault of the top officers?

[Sea Skimmer]

Well, the training of troops and officers is not going to change magically - how much could have been done by the central command there?
Or, to formulate it differently, how much was the fault of the top officers?

Three years is enough to train an entire army from scratch. The US certainly did and under more urgent conditions in 1940-1943. You can pretty well do anything you like, and take a full year to study the issue before you even issue new training manuals and orders. It was all the fault of the top officers for doing nothing, but yeah, basically the place was treated as a rear area and not the frontline for defense against Japan. Very healthy dosages of racism are involved here too, which is why I specified a significant propaganda effort. The men and officers need to hate the Japanese and be motivated to prepare to fight them, but not assume them to be helpless racial inferiors who will be sent running by a good bayonet charge.

[Stuart]

1) Convert most of the airfields in northern Malay into a grid of drainage ditches and wooden poles. Malay never had even the RAFs calculated minimal number of squadrons for defense, and yet the RAF built as many airfields as its ‘ideal’ number of squadrons would have required for support. It also built them with absolutely no thought to ground defense. The ditches can be filled in and the poles pulled out latter if the aircraft ever show up. Until then they provide defense against airborne landings as well as denying easily used airfields to the Jap.

2) Construct a line of pillboxes along the north shore of Singapore, supported by a second line about 250 meters inland. Clear fields of fire and keep them cleared. All of this was historically proposed, denied funding pretwar and then absurdly not implemented even after the Japs attacked and despite large stocks of material being on hand. As it was Singapore did have pillboxes along its southern shore. Additionally a large number of basic but effective roadblock positions would be established in depth across the length and width of Malay. As many main lines of resistance as my engineers can scout out would also be planned, even if most will never be used.

3) Request that a large order for 6in and 9.2in high explosive ammunition be placed in the United States. This ammo can be justified as useful not only to defend Singapore, but also for numerous batteries in the British Isles. It will become all the more relevant after the fall of France. The batteries historically had little but APC ammo. 15in HE would be nice too, but I won’t push my luck since historically only Singapore had 15in shore batteries until 1942 when two guns were installed at Dover (they had been intended for Singapore too).

4) Train the damn troops for jungle warfare. Historically many units in Malay trained quite hard and had a budget to do so, but the training often emphasized tactics useful for projected deployments in the Western Desert of Egypt. This worked out really badly. Leaders will be promoted on merit, and the men will be subject to as much anti Japanese propaganda as I can muster. A special intelligence section will be placed in charge of generating it.

5) Request the political authority to invade Thailand should a Japanese attack become imminent. This was historically the entire basis of the British defensive plan, but London had to sign off on making the first move. That obviously took too long to be approved. I would also ask that the US be requested to extend military aid to Thailand as a bulwark against Japan. This initiate will gain strength after Japan invades Indochina in 1940. The US was fond of arming Thailand anyway, and historically refused to accept Thailand’s declaration of war in 1941.

6) Request motor torpedo boat units for the defense of Singapore, with orders to be placed in the US if they cannot be met. This shouldn’t be too hard to pull off, MTBs would require scant resources in 1939, and after the fall of France Lend Lease will work fine. Historically Japan captured not just airfields and fuel, but large numbers of sampans and junks which it then used to make a number of small outflanking landing. Destroying those small craft, and opposing Japanese landing craft with MTBs could make a huge difference. It certainly helped the US hold Bataan, a battle which saw several similar outflanking landings annihilated.

7) I would require that comprehensive demolition and denial plans be drawn up encompassing all military and transportation resources in Malay. The British historically did much on this end, but many bridges, sampans, junks, airfields and stores fell into Japanese hands none the less. A comprehensive plan backed by propositioned demolition supplies would be much more effective.

Ask for more planes, troops, tanks, artillery (especially heavy artillery which ironically the UK had plenty to spare) and warships. I’m not likely to get much but I’d be crazy not to ask. All and all the British should have been able to hold at least six months with the forces they had and even slightly better planning anyway. I may not save Malay even with hindsight, but I could easily hold long enough to let Burma be saved. If Burma is saved then Thailand and Malay might fall in 1943 (meaning Japans oil supply is cut off), and the war in the Far East could be shortened by six months to a year or even more.

I'd agree with most of that except I would add a major effort at air raid precautions in Singapore itself plus safeguarding Singaporean water supplies. Water is the key to holding Singapore, more than any other single factor.

I'd delete item five. Don't tangle with the Thai Army (look up the battle of Prachuab Kiri Khan). It's another enemy you don't need and doing so triples the number of troops available to the Japanese. Note that the Thai border police were the only force in WW2 to defeat the Axis and Allies on the same day.

Item 8. Make a big point of getting Fairey Battles (yes, thought prompted by the HPCA thread). They're not much use over Europe and are being pulled from front-line service by late 1940 BUT that makes sure that if you ask, you'll probably get. A good force of light bombers, individually superior to their Japanese equivalents, will inflict great nuisance on the Japanese who lack light AAA and have only a handful of fighters available.

If there's one basic thing to get over to the troops though, its teh necessity of forming hedgehogs when the Japanese try an outflanking move. Hedgehogs have two advantages, the firepower available allows them to stack up Japanese dead like cordwood and those inside the hedgehog can't retreat. As soon as they learn the Japanese die like anybody else when shot, they lose the desire to retreat.

[Sea Skimmer]

I'd agree with most of that except I would add a major effort at air raid precautions in Singapore itself plus safeguarding Singaporean water supplies. Water is the key to holding Singapore, more than any other single factor.

The trouble is even building a reduit which can only defend the city and the reservoirs while abandoning the naval base, heavy coastal batteries and most airfields, would still need to span a frontline of around 20 miles length not counting the seacoast portion. That’s so big I’d rather just make the shoreline defenses stronger unless an awful lot of money became available. I’ve read before that the British already did take steps to guard against sabotage.

A system of air raid wardens would be good, but with the official policy for physical protection in the British isles being ‘dispersion’ I see no hope for getting money to do more then this. Ideally all communications centers, pumping houses and a few smaller power plants would be made splinter proof.

I'd delete item five. Don't tangle with the Thai Army (look up the battle of Prachuab Kiri Khan). It's another enemy you don't need and doing so triples the number of troops available to the Japanese. Note that the Thai border police were the only force in WW2 to defeat the Axis and Allies on the same day.

If the Japanese are already coming ashore, and I’ve previously talked to the Thais and arranged for them to get more weapons as a show of good faith I don’t see why the Thai Army would do anymore then it did in real life. They might well ‘attack’ to push the British out of Thai territory after taking a period to redeploy forces, but by then I would have either defeated the main Japanese landing, or already been forced to retreat back into Malay anyway. I don’t see them doing more then that.

After all British bombers flying from Rangoon can burn down Bangkok just as well as Japanese bombers from Saigon could. The Thais certainly would not believe that Japanese fighters would waste time preventing this from occurring, and even the US isn’t in a position to have given them substantial numbers of anti aircraft weapons or greatly speed up delivery of the Hawk 75. If it was then Thailand might not fold to Japan at all, and I can hardly lose in Malay, so I would naturally change plans.

Item 8. Make a big point of getting Fairey Battles (yes, thought prompted by the HPCA thread). They're not much use over Europe and are being pulled from front-line service by late 1940 BUT that makes sure that if you ask, you'll probably get. A good force of light bombers, individually superior to their Japanese equivalents, will inflict great nuisance on the Japanese who lack light AAA and have only a handful of fighters available.

I was thinking I’d ask for all the torpedo biplanes I could get. Even the models built before the Swordfish will work. Attacking at night with flare droppers they should be able to sink a good portion of the Japanese invasion force. That not only helps defend Singapore, it could seriously undermine the Japanese capability to invade Sumatra and outflank my entire position. Such biplanes could also operate from very marginal, wet forward airfields and even roads which will not be useful as bases for Japanese bomber operations. At least not the twin engine types, I suspect a Ki-30 can fly off anything it wishes. Getting a plane as modern as the Battle might still be difficult because it was used heavily as an advanced trainer after being withdrawn from combat and the RAF was expanding rapidly.

[Sidewinder]

Wow you are truly fucking retarded aren’t you?

No, I'm poorly informed.

The British already had superior numbers, and the entire fucking Japanese invasion force that took over South East Asia wasn’t even 1 million men strong.

Details which were NOT included in the OP. (I admittedly should've looked up the Battle of Malaya, at least on Wikipedia, before posting.) As for your ideas, "the men will be subject to as much anti Japanese propaganda as I can muster," is probably counter-productive, as it can easily become anti-Asian propaganda. Considering these men are fighting IN an Asian nation WITH an Asian majority population, it's best not to push the natives into the Japanese camp- at the very least, not push their feelings from mere apathy towards British rule, to outright hatred.

[Samuel]

Than supply them with information about what the Japanese do in China. They aren't fighting the yellow peril- they are fighting a bunch of brutal zealots who butcher civilians and don't respect those who surrender.

[Simon_Jester]

Details which were NOT included in the OP. (I admittedly should've looked up the Battle of Malaya, at least on Wikipedia, before posting.)

Um, yes. Or at least had a rough knowledge of how many men were involved, and how many men could realistically be moved into the area given that the Japanese were sustaining the entire operation over a logistics chain thousands of miles long, with effectively nothing but sea transport, in rough terrain.

As for your ideas, "the men will be subject to as much anti Japanese propaganda as I can muster," is probably counter-productive, as it can easily become anti-Asian propaganda. Considering these men are fighting IN an Asian nation WITH an Asian majority population, it's best not to push the natives into the Japanese camp- at the very least, not push their feelings from mere apathy towards British rule, to outright hatred.

Propaganda against the Japanese need not be anti-Asian. There's a lot you can say about how cruel and oppressive the Japanese are without saying anything about how Asian they are.

The real focus is convincing them "you do NOT want to be conquered by these guys" and "they aren't ten feet tall and bulletproof." Both of which are true.

[PainRack]

Three years is enough to train an entire army from scratch. The US certainly did and under more urgent conditions in 1940-1943. You can pretty well do anything you like, and take a full year to study the issue before you even issue new training manuals and orders. It was all the fault of the top officers for doing nothing, but yeah, basically the place was treated as a rear area and not the frontline for defense against Japan. Very healthy dosages of racism are involved here too, which is why I specified a significant propaganda effort. The men and officers need to hate the Japanese and be motivated to prepare to fight them, but not assume them to be helpless racial inferiors who will be sent running by a good bayonet charge.

Wasn't one of the problems with regards to training the fact that most of Heath and Bennett units weren't in place until a few months before the war?

Similarly, the assumption that the British could had successfully invaded the corridor and held it against the Japanese is debatable at best. An advance along a single road, with ill-equipped and semi trained troops which could had been easily cut by Thai irregulars, not to mention comns that couldn't have worked?

[Sea Skimmer]

No, I'm poorly informed.

Hard to tell from such a series of insane sweeping statements which amounted to dismissing the entire thread premise. This is the history forum, know what you are talking about.

Details which were NOT included in the OP. (I admittedly should've looked up the Battle of Malaya, at least on Wikipedia, before posting.) As for your ideas, "the men will be subject to as much anti Japanese propaganda as I can muster," is probably counter-productive, as it can easily become anti-Asian propaganda.

Yeah, go back to wikipedia or something, I already know they have good orders of battle and you still don't know what you are talking about. The overwhelming majority of ‘British’ troops defending Malay came from India, followed by troops from gasp, the Federated States of Malay! I’m sure propaganda will make them hate themselves in no time! The only white division present upon the outbreak of war was the 8th Australian division which was highly under strength with no artillery and was only formed in the middle of 1940 in the first place. With any hope I’ll be able to keep its artillery from being sent to the desert, or at least obtain some unmodernized 18pdrs as replacement. If not then I will put a local workshop to work building mortars for them which ought to do better in the jungle anyway. No unit from the UK larger then a regiment was present. This was and will be a battle of Asian against Asian.

Racism and a generally inferior view of Asians and the Japanese was historically already incredible prevalent throughout British forces in any case. I could not make that worse if I tried. But in fact my propaganda effort would be aimed at playing up the Japanese as the capable but barbaric conquerors they are to motivate the men to take them as a serious threat to train against.

[thejester]

Wasn't one of the problems with regards to training the fact that most of Heath and Bennett units weren't in place until a few months before the war?

The 22nd Brigade arrived in February 1941, and at roughly the same time it was decided by the Australian Government that the 8th Division would be kept behind for 'home defence' (in practice Malaya, Ambon and Timor). As a result the division's 24th Brigade was re-assigned to the 9th Division in the Middle East and the 9th's 27th Brigade made its way to Malaya in July 41.

As such the time for training in Malaya, particularly for the 27th, was limited. Theoretically units could have trained in Australia but most of these battalions were only established in mid to late 1940 and AFAIK the specialist jungle warfare centre in Queensland had yet to open. That said, I don't think any AIF units had more than 12-18 months between being raised and entering combat, and they generally performed well. Jungle training is specialist but the basics of good infantry tactics remain the same and the Australians should know them.

That said, my understanding was that the single biggest problem with field units in Malaya was that the Indian Army units were continuously stripped of NCOs and junior officers to raise new units in India/service in the Middle East. I don't see that as an easily reversible problem. Perhaps a rotational policy could be adopted, or raw Indian brigades could replace Australian units in the ME which in turn would allow the 8th to be moved in its entirety to Malaya.

[Stuart]

The trouble is even building a reduit which can only defend the city and the reservoirs while abandoning the naval base, heavy coastal batteries and most airfields, would still need to span a frontline of around 20 miles length not counting the seacoast portion. That’s so big I’d rather just make the shoreline defenses stronger unless an awful lot of money became available. I’ve read before that the British already did take steps to guard against sabotage. A system of air raid wardens would be good, but with the official policy for physical protection in the British isles being ‘dispersion’ I see no hope for getting money to do more then this. Ideally all communications centers, pumping houses and a few smaller power plants would be made splinter proof.

There's a lot that can be done to shield vital installations using local labor and relatively little resources. building earth berms around things for example is surprisingly effective; they turn damaging near-misses into inconsequential near misses. Investing in such things as fire brigades is also useful; they prevent small fires turning into big ones. In air raid damage, the Japanese were running very close to the lower margin of effectiveness; it doesn't take much to push them below that margin. On the other hand, the water issue is absolutely critical. It's not just the reservoirs on the island, if supplies from the mainland are cut, Singapore falls. It's only a matter of time.The defenses need to be inland from Singapore; once the enemy reaches the shoreline defenses, the battle is lost anyway.

If the Japanese are already coming ashore, and I’ve previously talked to the Thais and arranged for them to get more weapons as a show of good faith I don’t see why the Thai Army would do anymore then it did in real life. They might well ‘attack’ to push the British out of Thai territory after taking a period to redeploy forces, but by then I would have either defeated the main Japanese landing, or already been forced to retreat back into Malay anyway. I don’t see them doing more then that.

This is the real key. Thailand was actually pro-western by choice and pro-British/pro-American by desire. Their alignment with Japan was forced on them primarily by incredibly inept American diplomacy (State in general and Cordell Hull in particular couldn't understand that a strongly nationalist leader wasn't pro-fascist). If Thailand can be properly armed with modern equipment and given guarantees of support, it'll be an ally rather than a hostile neutral. That throws the entire regional equation into a different balance. Suddenly the Allies acquire five pretty powerful and capable Army divisions that can defeat an equivalent Japanese force by themselves. Given enough fighters to ward of threatened Japanese air attacks, the Japanese position in Indochina becomes tenuous. They'll actually have to think about defending their positions there rather than expanding. Malaya can only really be defended on the Mekong.

After all British bombers flying from Rangoon can burn down Bangkok just as well as Japanese bombers from Saigon could. The Thais certainly would not believe that Japanese fighters would waste time preventing this from occurring, and even the US isn’t in a position to have given them substantial numbers of anti aircraft weapons or greatly speed up delivery of the Hawk 75. If it was then Thailand might not fold to Japan at all, and I can hardly lose in Malay, so I would naturally change plans.

The British were handing out Hurricanes in 1941 to allies. Getting a substantial number to Thailand would probably be the best single investment possible. The key will be pitching the message. "We'll invade if the Japanese appear" is a no-no; "If the Japanese invade, we will stand by you" is much better. in this issue, presentation is everything.

I was thinking I’d ask for all the torpedo biplanes I could get. Even the models built before the Swordfish will work. Attacking at night with flare droppers they should be able to sink a good portion of the Japanese invasion force. That not only helps defend Singapore, it could seriously undermine the Japanese capability to invade Sumatra and outflank my entire position. Such biplanes could also operate from very marginal, wet forward airfields and even roads which will not be useful as bases for Japanese bomber operations. At least not the twin engine types, I suspect a Ki-30 can fly off anything it wishes. Getting a plane as modern as the Battle might still be difficult because it was used heavily as an advanced trainer after being withdrawn from combat and the RAF was expanding rapidly.

That's a cogent argument as far as it goes, but the real problem isn't maritime, its the land defenses and trying to prevent the advance down the Malayan peninsula. Torpedo biplanes won't help with that. If the British could ship enough goodies to thailand to convince them that remaininga British ally is viable, then we can do that by shifting the battle for Malaya to the Mekong. With the very limited forces they have available, I don't think the Japanese have the moxie to do an assault crossing of the Mekong and then head across Thailand to Malaya and Burma. Not against the RTA. If their bases in Indochina are being battered as well (now there's a thought - Hampdens. They are both medium bombers and torpedo biombers. Getting some of them would be a useful double-edged sword) the Japanese might not be capable of moving and would give the Malaya move up as a bad job. Again, we run into Japanese capability here. Virtually every operation they carried out was at the lowest edge of viability (Wake Island being a good example of how close they shaved things). It won't take much to push them the other side of that level.

[Sidewinder]

The overwhelming majority of ‘British’ troops defending Malay came from India, followed by troops from gasp, the Federated States of Malay! I’m sure propaganda will make them hate themselves in no time!

You're a member of the majority race, in a nation with significant racial homogeny, right?

Let me tell you how it feels to be on the OTHER side of the coin. When people of a different race make fun of yours, you don't hate yourself, you hate THEM for making fun of yours. When people of a different race say yours should be hated and mistrusted, you don't hate and mistrust yourself, you hate and mistrust THEM for abusing you as an expression of THEIR hatred and mistrust of you.