Wages of Destruction Review

[Setzer]

This is a review I wrote while I was preparing to enter college. It's my first attempt at a professional scholarly review, and I'd greatly appreciate any constructive criticism the board might be able to provide.

Book Review: The Wages of Destruction



Despite the relatively recent end of the Second World War, a number of persistent myths have
managed to emerge. One of the most prominent myths is the myth of the German economy. The average person, and indeed, the average history book, will claim that the ruthless efficiency of the Nazi party ended unemployment and restored Germany to economic prosperity. The common archetype is of a merciless army of Fascism, ruthlessly crushing Europe under its oft-mentioned jackboots, creating great and terrible wonder weapons produced by a cabal of technocratic evil masterminds with no concern for human life. Countless books and TV shows have trumpeted the genius of Nazi industrialists and scientists, claiming that if they'd had more Me-262 jets or produced more Tiger 2 tanks, or fielded the Sanger Amerikabomber, they would have won the war. The idea that war is won by hardware, by weapons and technology, was a popular one in World War 2. It was a notion heavily relied upon by Nazi propaganda after 1942. Though the smashing triumphs of the first three years of war were behind them, they fostered the idea that with their awesome weaponry, victory would still be theirs.

This is more a credit to Nazi propaganda then to Nazi industrial and science. Adam Tooze cuts through over half a century of World War 2 mythos to obtain cold hard facts, and his discoveries are thought provoking to say the least. The opening chapters of the book deal with the ubiquitous myth that the Nazis restored Germany's economy. By looking closely at the budget figures for both the Weimar Republic and Hitler's regime, he reveals that the only funding the Nazis ever devoted to creating work was that which was already budgeted under the previous administration. While it is true that the economy recovered under the Nazi government, Tooze argues that this is mainly due to natural economic cycles. The worst of the depression had ended, and the world was slowly moving towards recovery. Nazi Germany was not exempt from the ebb and flow of the world economy. Germany was a prominent industrial power before the First World War, and there was no reason why it would not be so again, despite the heavy reparations exacted by the victors in 1919.

It's true that the Nazis invested heavily in the economy, but this was only a means to an end for them. Their investments were all in some way devoted to their plans for warfare. They built up industries responsible for producing weaponry or areas that provided the means for supplying the military. The Nazis accurately predicted that the superior economies of Britain, France, and the USA, would overwhelm them unless they took advantage of their early lead. They devoted everything they could to building up their military, often reducing their reserves of foreign exchange to dangerously low levels. The German government also subsidized exports to keep them competitive in the world market. The aging rail network in Germany was left with aging rolling stock for most of the 1930s.
It would not get any modern locomotives or rail cars until they were taken from France in 1940.
Their only goal was to maintain the pace of rearmament, and all other considerations were secondary.

By 1939, their investment in the military had grown to such an amount that war was a necessity. And even then, their lead over the Allies was not so great as their battlefield successes would seem to indicate. A full third of the Luftwaffe was out of service after the conquest of Poland. In Winter of 1939, ammunition had fallen to such a critical low that it might have doomed the planned November invasion. And during the invasion of France itself, the Germans had only a few dozen mechanized units, out of a force numbering more then a hundred divisions. Early propaganda focussed less on their war machines and more on the mystical element. Emphasis was on the inherent superiority of the German man and the National Socialist leadership. The message was that courage and strength had laid France low and driven Britain from the continent. Technological factors were not something they chose to dwell on.

After the fall of France, the Nazis had most of Europe under their control. France had an indigenous aircraft industry, large shipyard facilities, and tank designs that were actually superior to what the Germans fielded. And yet, the Germans failed to make proper use of industry in the occupied territories, running counter to the popular perception of brutal efficiency that is usually associated with the Nazi regime. To finance their efforts, the Nazis engaged in some economic slight of hand.
Whenever something was ordered in an occupied territory, local industries were paid by their own central banks, in their own currency. The payment was then charged to the Reichsbank. Therefore, the Nazis were able to acquire goods without actually paying for them. By war's end, they had accrued
billions of Reichsmarks in debts they had no intention of paying. In essence, Germany was making a net profit off anything they imported.

Whenever possible, German businesses took over local ones. IG Farben acquired most of the French chemical industry via the Francolor die trust. Kontinental Oel was created to exploit the petroleum reserves in the Caucasus. It goes without saying that Jewish businesses were “Aryanized”. Yet despite these measures, contributions from industries in the occupied territories were minimal. The Germans produced tens of thousands of aircraft over the course of the war, but only a thousand of them were built outside of Germany.

The Nazis were haunted by the spectre of German's defeat in World War 1. They feared the collapse of the German economy at home, and had no compunction about looting anything they could to prevent such a collapse. This meant that from 1940 to 1945, no occupied country in Europe experienced any economic growth. Local agriculture relied heavily on imported nitrates for fertilizer. The British blockade mean imports were no longer an option. The other major consumer of nitrates was in the manufacture of explosives. The Germans would not allow any reduction in this output, so farming across Europe suffered. Steel production in the occupied territories fell dramatically as well. Coal and iron ore were diverted to German factories, and other nations were forced to do without. Lack of steel was a major concern for the entire war, ironic in light of the resources under German control.

Food was a concern above all else. When Hitler spoke of Lebensraum, in practical terms he meant farmland. The wheat fields in the Ukraine were one of Operation Barbarossa's primary strategic objectives, and Nazi leaders drew up detailed plans on the ideal farming communities they would create in the conquered east. They even went so far as to determine the optimal percentages for who should be employed in which business, be it in agriculture or in support of agriculture. But food factored in to present plans as well as future ones. In the early years of the war, the Germans not only took hundreds of thousands of prisoners, they occupied territories that had tens of millions of peoples that Nazi racial ideology regarded as inferior. The brutality of Nazi forced labor had an ulterior motive here. By working the “Untermenschen” to death, they not only got all the usefullness they could out of them, they eliminated another group of mouths to feed. Far from being senseless murder, the Holocaust was something far worse; murder with a goal in mind, carefully calculated and judged genocide. Those who have not read this book may never truly realize the deliberate nature of the Nazi's crimes.

The emphasis on superweapons was something that came about much later in the war. With Nazi armies in retreat on all fronts, it was difficult to argue that the strength and fighting will of the German soldier would be they key to victory. Hence the shift to emphasis on weapons and technology. The idea was that the ever increasing number of marvels produced by German industry were sure to make victory an inevitability. This was largely due to Albert Speer's influence during his time as Minister of Armaments.

The part of the book that made the largest impact on me were the sections pertaining to Albert Speer. I had read Inside the Third Reich many years ago, and Speer portrayed himself as a disinterested artist who was roped into the war effort. The tone he takes is one of penitence, admitting he had gotten in over his head and was horrified by what he learned after the war. Tooze looks at Speer's official correspondence, and that of the Gaulieters, the Nazi regional governors. By 1942, when Speer took up his office, the use of POW and foreign slave labor had grown to such a point that no one could truly plead ignorance.

Albert Speer's rise to prominence had given him a reputation as a miracle worker, one who could take existing factory output and cause tremendous increases for no new investment of resources. Tooze argues that he had the good fortune to come into office when much of the early war construction was coming online, but he does agree that Speer was responsible for major increases in war production. While Speer claims this was due to his unique managerial talents, Tooze focusses on the importing of slave labor and resources plundered from occupied territories. At Nuremburg, Speer escaped the death penalty, being sentenced to twenty years in Spandau prison. In light of Tooze's research, I came to believe that Speer was given too light a punishment. His death may make it a moot point, but other Nazi leaders involved in the acquisition and exploitation of slave labor were executed, and Speer was no less guilty then they were. Speer portrayed himself as primarily an artist (he was an architect by profession) but he was also heavily involved in the internal politics of the Nazi regime. Having made his reputation thanks to the increasing production of weaponry, Speer was willing to do anything necessary to ensure a supply of resources and labor. Rather then being ignorant of the Holocaust, Speer made a close alliance with Himmler and the SS. His relationship with Himmler was never a secret. Soon Speer was numbered among individuals such as Himmler, Goebbels, Goering, and Bormann

Most of what the average person knows about World War 2 is acquired from portrayals in popular culture. For those that are looking for something more genuine, this book is a good place to start. Be it for serious study or simply as a hobby, the Wages of Destruction yields a wealth of information that one would never discover by word of mouth, internet rumor, or Hollywood movies.

[Norseman]

This is a very nice synopsis of the book, but that's what it is, a synopsis. A review may include a synopsis, but it needs more than that, it needs to answer questions such as: Was it well written from a technical point of view? Entertaining or a dry read? Who would find this book interesting (e.g. beginners, academics, etc)? How well did it support its arguments? How does it compare to other books covering the same subject matter?

Remember as a reviewer you are passing judgement on the book.

[spaceviking]

Food was a concern above all else. When Hitler spoke of Lebensraum, in practical terms he meant farmland. The wheat fields in the Ukraine were one of Operation Barbarossa's primary strategic objectives, and Nazi leaders drew up detailed plans on the ideal farming communities they would create in the conquered east. They even went so far as to determine the optimal percentages for who should be employed in which business, be it in agriculture or in support of agriculture. But food factored in to present plans as well as future ones. In the early years of the war, the Germans not only took hundreds of thousands of prisoners, they occupied territories that had tens of millions of peoples that Nazi racial ideology regarded as inferior. The brutality of Nazi forced labor had an ulterior motive here. By working the “Untermenschen” to death, they not only got all the usefullness they could out of them, they eliminated another group of mouths to feed. Far from being senseless murder, the Holocaust was something far worse; murder with a goal in mind, carefully calculated and judged genocide. Those who have not read this book may never truly realize the deliberate nature of the Nazi's crimes

Now I have not read the entire book but I think it is probably worth mentioning how the book explains the difficulties in removing native populations and settling Germans in their place, for reasons such as massive costs and apathy of the German population toward becoming settlers, and of course the native populations hostility towards such plans.
Also an interesting part of the book I believe you may be overlooking in terms of the food question is how some populations of lesser peoples were given adequate food. It is explained in the book how the Nazi’s as you mentioned worked people to death to use their labour as well as remove them from the food equation, however it is also shown in the book how some population of believed lesser peoples received adequate food as the Nazis realized it was more economically efficient to have a work force of well fed worker then keep a larger force barely alive and extract negligible worker productivity.

[PeZook]

It reads much like a high school "review", which often are only a synopsis with a short paragraph for judgement. A serious academic review will try to ascertain its factual accuracy, use of language, usefulness for research, etc.

But for a fresh high school graduate, it's fine.

[Zixinus]

Like what others said: synopsis and very little actual critique. How does the author come to his conclusions? How well are they presented? How reliant is he on math? How extensive is the bibliography? How is the author's use of language, is it a more scholarly textbook focusing on high precision of meaning or does it use more simplistic elements, so it may be read by all? How is the book edited, how well does each paragraph illustrate a point it is trying to make? How well-drawn are the conclusions it makes? Are there noticeable biases or even outright stated opinions of the author? How well does the author dispel certain myths or does the author even focus on dispelling these myths?

[Setzer]

Pezook, thanks for your opinion. I had the rotten suspicion my review wasn't really up to college level, but now I know that it isn't nearly as bad as I had feared. And Zixinus, thank you too. These are really good questions with regards to the book, and I can see I was looking in the wrong places as far as content goes.

[Zixinus]

And Zixinus, thank you too. These are really good questions with regards to the book, and I can see I was looking in the wrong places as far as content goes.

I am glad to be of service.

Though, the book does sound interesting. My father and I are planning to get a big bunch of books off Amazon anyway. Could you please tell me how well can be this book be read casually with little foreknowledge of the details of WW2?

[Setzer]

You don't really need a lot of in depth knowledge. So long as you know the basic high school level details, you should be able to understand everything fine. You may want to read Inside the Third Reich by Albert Speer first, simply because it deals with the same subject matter.

[JGregory32]

You might want to include a couple of passages where you compare the text to others published at the same time. Is this book a responce to another work? Is it part of a larger body of work the author is doing?
Go through the introduction to the book, that should lay out what the author is trying to get across and give your opinion on wither or not he achieves it.

It's not a bad synopsis but needs more analysis. Try to figure out what the weaknesses of the argument are. Is the author relying on secondary sources for information or does he have access to primary sources? Is the information presented in a manner that is easy to follow?

For a bit of context, you need to understand that the Germans have always had a smaller population than other countries, and consequently a smaller military in absolute terms. To offset this the German military has always relied on technology to give them an edge against larger opponents. The Japanese in WWII tried to do the same thing, they believed that having a technological edge against their opponents would make up for their smaller numbers. The problem comes when your technological edge isn't that great and your opponent has much greater numbers.