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So, this is mostly stuff I've gleaned from Stuarts posts, and I want to make sure I have it right. It's commonly understood that when you go to boot camp, you become a cog in a great machine; you get the same skill set as everyone else, and in general, one infantryman is much the same as the other.

However, and this is the new thing for me, apparently officers are as easily replaceable? With the right training (and to get to that rank you get that ranks training), any general can look at the terrain and come to the same conclusion on what units go where. As well, he can make expectations on what the enemy can do simply by looking at the avenues of approach.

My understanding of this is from the TSW thread, where Patreus is thinking Abigor could look at the roads and see exactly what was happening if he knew how. My confusion for this is from the individual doctrine and general involved. Apparently the Thai method is "weird" to American eyes, and it's strange to me that individual brilliance won't shine through; all that matters is the weapon systems. It seems similar to the way Stalin looked at things; men and material are interchangeable.

At a higher level, I remember reading that no matter what political theory (realism, liberalism) you run a situation through, you tend to get the same results. Does that mean that given the same numbers, Bush senior would have fired cruise missiles at bin Laden in the 90s, and Al Gore would have attacked Iraq? If the policy is largely interchangeable, why do we have elections? Peaceful transition of power, sure, I understand, but it seems like a case of meet the new boss same as the old boss.

Beyond that, if the policy is generally unified no matter the administration, does that mean all the dissension along party lines is theater just to score domestic points? From what Ive seen of the 90s and 00s, when one party controls congress and the other the WH, they will say the WH is doing a fraudulent use of war. Is that just for show, or is our policy that schizophrenic?

I remember reading a while back that China was doing a certain navy set up, so we knew that they weren't going to contest our supremacy just yet. I'm getting the feeling weapon systems are diplomacy and politics both, and once you can read them, everything else follows. What confuses me, though, is if everyone is doing the same playbook (we all can read the maps and look at the tech and draw the same conclusions), then why do we have wars at all? Why wouldn't the weaker party say, oh, hey, you would win. Here you go.

Its possible I'm not remembering this correctly, but I remember reading that nations don't build their systems based on what other countries, they build them for their own interests. The example used in the thread were the missile defense shields being built up. Its not because you are being influenced by your neighbor, you would want them regardless. If that's the case, it completely throws my first year of polisci out the window; we are raised on the security dilemma; does this mean it doesn't have an impact on procuring weapon systems? And what if your neighbor is deciding to do an arms build up? Doesn't the arms race follow?

And, if some or all of these presuppositons are true, why was I taught the complete bloody opposite? If the U.S. acts in a maximal realist manner, why am I taught the liberal school? It causes me to draw completely erroneous conclusions on what we are up to.

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For the TL:DR crowd:

Are military officers interchangeable the way the lower ranks are?
Is foreign policy indifferent to what party is in the WH? If so, why do we change parties?
If all nations are aware of the balance of power as seen by the weapon systems deployed, why do we have wars, as opposed to an established pecking order?
Does a security dilemma exist in modern policy, arms race et al?
If all the presuppositions of polisci 101 are wrong (as above), then why are we taught them?

It seems that you're coming from a perspective which assumes that certain people in the army are completely replaceable when they are not. If you look at it closely, there is a whole lot of diversity within armies. Your basic infantryman might be very similar to each other, but even at that level, there are differences. An infantryman has different equipment, training and doctrine from an armored infantryman, who are different from guardsmen (who specialise in airborne and coastal ops in my country), and your footsoldiers aren't the whole story. You have logisticians, signalmen, medics. Each formation has their own set of roles and they all require specialised knowledge, and therefore are not exchangeable. This applies to officers as well. While an infantry officer might be able to replace another infantry officer, he wouldn't know what to do in a Signals company or a logistics formation.

Even if they were given proper training befitting their role, experience is a vital factor. Any person will require some time to gain experience before they can truly shine in their role. A general who spent the bulk of his career in the infantry formation will probably have a different mentality and attitude compared to one who was from armor. In addition to that, personal differences remain to be accounted for. Every army has it's set of doctrines, which provide a common frame of reference and a guide. However, everyone is free to act in their own way as the situation demands. Article: An illustration on how army doctrine and processes work

Take for example the situation in the Salvation War. Patreus' opinion was valid because Abigor was completely ignorant about the abilities of a modern day human army. With the intelligence assets at Patreus' disposal (such as real time UAV coverage), it was painfully easy to set up a kill zone with pre-prepared obstacles, artillery and an armored flanking force. If you substituted Abigor's demon army for a human one, the same opinion may not be applicable. Every combat formation will conduct a terrain analysis of it's Area of operations and draw it's own conclusions. How each side deploys will depend on it's purpose, capabilities, and doctrine. It is by no means a forgone conclusion. That is why the winner of a war is by no means certain, and that means no pecking order. There are too many variables.

-One thing to remember is that the techniques that are used in, say, coordinating a major land battle with modern technology are skills. Some people are better at them than others: they think faster, react more effectively, and make the right decisions without having to sit down and thumb through the manual. Stuart portrays Petraeus as this kind of general: everything he does is pretty much as per doctrine, but what makes him good is that he's good at it. Doctrine says to build up the loyalty of your subordinates, for example; that doesn't mean every commander can do it.

-Historically, individual brilliance in war always shows up as the genius doing things that any normal person would want to do, but that not every person could do. It's obvious that you want to surround an enemy army, but it takes a Hannibal to pull it off, because the enemy won't blunder into obvious traps. You have to get clever. It's obvious that you want to pursue a beaten enemy, but rallying your troops and actually making it happen takes a Patton. And so on.

-Likewise in domestic policy. Different administrations can and do have different objectives that they pursue in different ways. You can argue about which objectives are best, but there's still a lot of room for differences. Here, you may get a narrow view of that because most of our knowledgeable foreign policy commentators are "Stuart and friends:" they don't all agree on everything, but they probably share more broad objectives and ideas about how to pursue them than a random sample of the US policy establishment would.

-As for why people fight wars when they can look at what each other's weapons are capable of:

Sometimes, people get things wrong. Saddam Hussein counted his tanks and jets, thought about how many tanks and jets the coalition could send against him in 1991, and said "Bring it!" Because he thought he was going to win, or at least put up a hell of a fight. He was wrong, because he was outclassed. His weapons were mostly older crappy stuff, his troops were not as well trained, and his command structure was inferior to what his enemies had, which made the troops he had less effective than they could have been. He thought he was the stronger party, or at least strong enough to put up a fight. He wasn't.

And sometimes, the two sides have different definitions of victory. North Vietnam knew the US could and would bomb the crap out of them in the Vietnam War. They accepted that as the price of doing business, because their war was not going to be won or lost in terms of economic damage suffered due to air raids. Their war was going to be decided by infiltration and political maneuver in South Vietnam, and on that battlefield they felt confident of facing us and winning. They were right. In theory that gamble might have gone against them if we'd gone all out and destroyed North Vietnam as a country, but we weren't willing to do that at the time, and arguably shouldn't have been. So they won.

We were hoping to win by bombing North Vietnam until they gave up; North Vietnam was hoping to undermine the South Vietnamese government until we gave up. They didn't need to be able to defeat our bomber offensive to do that, and we didn't need to be able to defeat their infiltration to bomb them into the Stone Age (in theory, if we'd been willing to do that, which we weren't). Asymmetric warfare on both sides. Hence, who had the "best" weapons wasn't really as important.

-Then the question of the security dilemna and the arms race. Arms races happen- look at the naval building race between Germany and Britain in the runup to World War One. But they're often complicated by the fact that the two sides have asymmetric goals: say, Britain wants to build carriers and battleships to sink enemy navies and hammer their land based installations, but Germany would rather build submarines to sink freighters headed to Britain. So Britain has to scrap plans to build carriers and battleships in favor of building lots of tiny sub-hunters.

Likewise, today the US Navy's main objective is to patrol the world ocean. We have ships ten thousand miles or more from the US homeland, and we could call on them to do almost anything at any time. So we need long-range ships, big aircraft carriers to act as the central base for the fleet's firepower, and so on. Whereas the Chinese Navy is only interested in controlling the ocean right next to China, within range (more or less) of bases on land. They don't need huge nuclear carriers that can sail around the world without needing to refuel, but they do need lots of little ships to launch antiship missiles, submarines to prowl off their coast, and land-based aircraft to cover the fleet.

Insofar as there is an "arms race" between the US and China, it's asymmetric: we build up our long-range, carrier-centered forces and they build up their short-range forces to counter any carriers we bring into striking range of them. And in a real sense it's not an arms race at all, because we have so many objectives that have nothing to do with China, and they have so many that have little to do with us...

-Why are we taught simple things in POLI 100? Because they are simple, why else? Even with the best will in the world, students must walk before they can run. Being able to recognize concepts like the arms race is an important first step to understanding the more complicated stuff that's really happening, just as in science we teach Newton before Einstein.

Of course, that can backfire if the teaching establishment tries to pretend that the simple picture is the whole truth... That's never good, whether the teaching establishment in question is political science professors or Sunday school teachers.

Individual brilliance in a strategic scale quickly loses all importance whatsoever. Could another general, not Zhukov, take Berlin? Quite clearly. What if Zhukov was dead? Perhaps another general would've failed to defend Leningrad or Moscow. Sure, that's a major event. But in the scope of the overall war? The processes that have started would have went the way they did anyhow. Experience gathering, new methods of fighting, everything that comes from the bottom to the top of an armed force.

It's not a matter of a single badly trained officer when a war goes wrong. The whole army is at fault.

So yes, that might strike you as counter-intuitive when we're all told stories about badass men, heroes and commanders and all that, but when the talk is about a conflict so vast and massive that it operates in millions of men on a routine basis acting everywhere at the same time, the "sum" comes into play.

Not a single characteristic or any single individual, but the summary (average) level of all individuals involved, their equipment, their skills, their experience and, of course, their morale. A sum is always a more complex thing than the state of some single person. A single good commander can't save an entire war on the scale of modern operations (even such small conflicts like Iraq and Yugoslavia already conform to the effects of "large numbers").

That's my opinion on the issue.

This is all well and good, but would say that since modern generals are managers more than warriors, they can mess up an army with poor personnel and organizational choices, if only when made on a high enough level?

While a company getting smeared into red paste means little to nothing, an entire division falling apart because its commanding general is a corrupt drunk who can't enforce discipline is a little more significant - especially since in modern warfare, situations change really quickly and large units possess unprecedented mobility, making exploitation of such catastrophes easier than ever.

Stas Bush wrote:Individual brilliance in a strategic scale quickly loses all importance whatsoever. Could another general, not Zhukov, take Berlin? Quite clearly. What if Zhukov was dead? Perhaps another general would've failed to defend Leningrad or Moscow. Sure, that's a major event. But in the scope of the overall war? The processes that have started would have went the way they did anyhow. Experience gathering, new methods of fighting, everything that comes from the bottom to the top of an armed force.

It's not a matter of a single badly trained officer when a war goes wrong. The whole army is at fault.

So yes, that might strike you as counter-intuitive when we're all told stories about badass men, heroes and commanders and all that, but when the talk is about a conflict so vast and massive that it operates in millions of men on a routine basis acting everywhere at the same time, the "sum" comes into play.

Not a single characteristic or any single individual, but the summary (average) level of all individuals involved, their equipment, their skills, their experience and, of course, their morale. A sum is always a more complex thing than the state of some single person. A single good commander can't save an entire war on the scale of modern operations (even such small conflicts like Iraq and Yugoslavia already conform to the effects of "large numbers").

That's my opinion on the issue.

On the other hand, the difference between a good commander and a bad commander in a huge war may be "ten thousand dead soldiers learning the lesson we should have learned a month ago." It's small compared to the overall scope of the war, but it's still very large on the scale of an individual human's perception of events.

So you can say "Yes, killing Zhukov wouldn't change anything critical," and in the sense that the history books would record pretty much the same outcome, with the Soviets taking a beating in the early years, then recovering and taking Berlin... that's true.

But statistically speaking, I'd bet that there are a lot of Russian families that are a good deal better off for Zhukov having been alive and doing his job well.

This situation is of course rather different in modern warfare than in earlier times. At earlier times no whole societies went to war against each other, rather it was more or less one leader with his following. In that context, the leader is much more important. Remove, say, Caesar and you have no romanized Gaul, or at least the conquest would have taken far longer.

In ancient times the lethality of weapons was much smaller.

As result troops were much more concentrated, this meant that battles that lasted a single day fought by well defined armies could decide the outcome of a war. Hence, the individual characteristics of the leader in that decisive battle became more important.

Today weapons are very lethal. Personnel needs to disperse to survive in this environment, any massed block of men is easily cut down by the machine gun. As result armies don't clash in a single day. They fight over fronts, in constant warfare distributed for hundreds or thousands of kilometers. In this different type of situation there isn't a "leader", there are thousands of officers, each commanding a little part of the battle. As result, the individual qualities of a single leader, even a field Marshall, play a smaller role than in ancient battles.

This difference between these two types of warfare is quite clear cut: 200 years ago, Napoleon was a single leader that could win wars by himself. 100 years, in WW1, things changed.

This is an example of the effects of technology on the nature of warfare.

Thanas wrote:This situation is of course rather different in modern warfare than in earlier times. At earlier times no whole societies went to war against each other, rather it was more or less one leader with his following. In that context, the leader is much more important. Remove, say, Caesar and you have no romanized Gaul, or at least the conquest would have taken far longer.

I don't think that the degree of mobilization for war has significance in this aspect of warfare.

Ancient societies knew total war, when states run the risk of total destruction there is total mobilization for war. That happened in China of the Warring States period. Their situation was the same as for the Ancient Westerners: Single men lost and won wars. Also, the First and Second Punic wars were total wars, Rome and Carthage really battered each other apart. It ended with the destruction of Carthage and the massacre of it's inhabitants.

The Roman invasion of Gaul represented a probable case of total war for the Gauls. They gave everything that they had to try to stop Caesar. For Rome it clearly wasn't total war, by the mid 1st century BCE they were so powerful that they could destroy anything in their sphere of influence without a great effort.

What changed between Rome and WW2 was technology.

Ancient societies knew total war, when states run the risk of total destruction there is total mobilization for war.

It is uncommon. You had Athens and Sparta fighting with each other that ended with a Spartan victory... and Athens still independent for example. Most wars did not result in the complete and other destruction of the opposition's society. Alot of the older wars were simply raids for tribute.

It ended with the destruction of Carthage and the massacre of it's inhabitants.

That is the 3rd Punic War. 1st and 2nd ended with endemnities and colonial possessions being taken from Carthage.

The Roman invasion of Gaul represented a probable case of total war for the Gauls. They gave everything that they had to try to stop Caesar.

The Romans did not destroy Gaulish society. They left local administration intact.

Iosef Cross wrote:I don't think that the degree of mobilization for war has significance in this aspect of warfare.

How so?

Ancient societies knew total war, when states run the risk of total destruction there is total mobilization for war.

Hardly does this extend to the mobilization of women for the workforce and the front lines. So we have this complete difference from total war in that large sections of society remain at peace. The situation is different if a city is besieged, but this is hardly the same as total war.

That happened in China of the Warring States period. Their situation was the same as for the Ancient Westerners: Single men lost and won wars. Also, the First and Second Punic wars were total wars, Rome and Carthage really battered each other apart. It ended with the destruction of Carthage and the massacre of it's inhabitants.

Yeah...if you ascribe to the theory of the war lasting 100 years. The wars between Rome and Carthage were total wars only in the sense that Rome did heavily mobilze. Carthage, on the contrary, did not really mobilize its citizenry.

The Roman invasion of Gaul represented a probable case of total war for the Gauls. They gave everything that they had to try to stop Caesar.

No, it does not.

Why don't you show the criteria for total war and then attempt to show how this applies to carthage and gaul?

Iosef Cross wrote: This difference between these two types of warfare is quite clear cut: 200 years ago, Napoleon was a single leader that could win wars by himself. 100 years, in WW1, things changed.

You seem to be overstating things a lot. Logistics and command and control systems were always important, ever since the first city-state attempted to control an area larger than you could cover in a single day's march. The fact ancient wars tended to be decided by one or two pitches battles had more to do with these two problems than weapons technology.

Napoleon wasn't immune to that, either: see his massive blunder in the Russian campaign, which was decided entirely by logistics. Modern wars are simply fought by industrialized nation states for which fielding 10 000 men is nothing. If Rome could field an army 10 million men strong like the USSR, do you think individual leaders would have as much an impact as they did historically?

How about the effects of inertia? Sure if Zhukov died in 1940-something, the outcome of WW2 would still result in the Nazis getting their ass kicked. But the Nazis got their ass kicked in the Eastern Front NOT because of an action of an individual in the present. The Nazis got their ass kicked because of "prep time", because the Soviet Union was ALREADY a huge nation with a huge military that was already well developed in the years PRECEDING 1940-something. So, Zhukov or no Zhukov, the Nazis would've lost and the Soviets would've won not because of the immediate effects of the individual - but because of things that have preceded that over a period of years, developing and coalescing into huge factors that determine the outcome of war and other events in the "here and now"? So it's not exactly what the individual does "now" which is important, but what the individual did years ago - and not just that particular individual, but many individuals throughout the nation?

The inglorious facts tend to be the important ones during history of all kinds. Not even just history of the war. People just don't want to hear that though. No one wants to hear their Grandpa was fighting a war who's outcome was more or less predetermined by economics more than 20 years before. No soldier wants to hear that the number of kills he got during the war were probably waaaay less than what he was told at the time. No one wants to look back on their history and realize that they were not as important as they thought they were. It's just good old fashioned insecurity.

So people like to believe the drama and the exaggerations. I mean, I still hear people talk about the Luftwaffe's tiny cadre of 500+ kill aces like they could have won the war all by themselves. Do they know WHY the Luftwaffe even had those guys? (Hint: They weren't allowed to quit.) Do they understand how little their overall impact was on the war? Nope. Don't care. They want to hear the stories of glorious warriors, not the total output of a production line or the amount of man-hours going into guns XYZ.

Puts new light in that saying of Sun Tzu's, where you only fight a war after you've already won it.