StarDestroyer.Net BBS

Found at the NHHC Aviation Branch Archives:

---------------------------------------------------------------

THE NAVY OF THE 1970 ERA

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
January 1958

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO
Op93G/ac
Ser 04P93

13 JAN 1958

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Distribution List

Subj: The Navy of the 1970 Era

Ref: (a) Statement of U. S. Navy Long Range Objectives, 1967-72 (LRO-57)

Encl: (1) Copy of subject statement

1. Enclosure (1) is a statement in condensed form of present views regarding the desirable long range posture of the Navy, in relation to the nation's needs. Conceptually it is in full accord with reference (a), which remains in effect as the basic and more detailed statement of Navy long range objectives. The enclosure adds to reference (a) a more comprehensive statement of future numerical objectives, for ships and aircraft; in a few instances these numbers are revisions of those in the reference, reflecting recent developments. To this extent the enclosure modifies and supplements reference (a).

2. The enclosure is approved for wide distribution to meet two objectives:

a. To provide a source, of lower classification than reference (a), which will be used freely to provide all officers with a broad perspective of where the Navy is heading, and why.

b. To provide material useful in interpreting the Navy of the future, and its value to the nation, to persons outside the service.

/S/
Arleigh Burke

DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR OPNAV SERIAL 04P93

(Snipped for your sanity)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

THE NAVY OF THE 1970 ERA

For over two years the Navy has had an approved ten-year shipbuilding program. In August 1957, as the culmination of a three-year study, the Chief of Naval Operations approved long-range objectives for Navy weapons and forces, for the period through 1972. The ten-year shipbuilding program has been brought into accord with these objectives. This ship program to a large extent defines our ten-year programs for aircraft and missiles, but further refinement of the latter progams is in process.

Our long-range objectives and programs are not rigid. We recognize that technology, and changes in enemy posture and threat, will later require revisions which are now unforeseeable. We keep the objectives and programs under continuing review. But these objectives are founded on principles and basic situations which change slowly. We therefore believe that in their broad elements our long-range objectives present a picture of the future Navy which will remain valid, and toward which we can safely build. I will describe that Navy in broad terms.

I will start by describing in two capsules the broad national military problems of the 1970 era, to which the posture of this future Navy must be adapted:

First, the United States must have a guaranteed ability to deter all-out war. This means above all that we must have nuclear retaliatory forces which cannot be knocked out by surprise attack.

Second, the more certainly we can deter all-out war, the more certain the threat of limited aggression will become. We must be able to defeat limited aggression on whatever scale the Soviet bloc is able to wage it, and that is now a very large scale. We must be able to do this without provoking all-out war. I say this because I am now talking about 1970, and with the weapons of 1970 all-out retaliation will be unthinkable as an answer to anything but an all-out attack.

Against this background I will describe the Navy of the 1970 period, which we are aiming at. It will be a Navy of over 900 ships, and about 7000 aircraft.

About 50 of these ships will be missile launching submarines, with nuclear power. About 90 of these ships will be in our surface striking forces. Over a third of these will have nuclear power.

About 400 ships will be in our anti-submarine forces, which will also defend our sea commerce against air attack. About 75 of these will be submarines, almost all with nuclear power.

About 90 ships will be required to provide amphibious lift for two Marine divisions.

Another hundred ships, mostly of small size, will be required for mine warfare and coastal patrol tasks.

Finally,- there will be about 200 supply ships, tenders, tugs, and other auxiliaries, to keep the fighting ships in top fighting trim.

Of our 7000 aircraft about 1600 will belong to the striking forces. These will be fighter, attack and reconnaissance types.

About 1300 aircraft will be assigned to anti-submarine warfare. These will include large patrol planes, carrier planes, and helicopters.

Another 1100 will be fighters, attack planes, and assault transports assigned to the Marine Corps. As many of these as possible will be able to take off and land vertically.

The remaining 3000 or so will be aircraft required for support of the combat forces, for training, and for research, development, test and administrative activities.

This is the shape of our planned Navy in broad outline. Now let me go back and relate the pieces to the national needs I described earlier.

Of our 900-odd ships we relate only the 50 missile submarines, and a few of their tenders, directly to the all-out nuclear deterrence problem of 1970. We are not at all embarrassed about the smallness of this proportion. In the first place, we are not planning that the Navy will accomplish the whole national deterrent mission by itself — even though at the moment ve know of no land-based weapon program which promises the same security against surprise attack that the submarine does. And in the second place, it does not take unlimited strength to deter. This is particularly true if the retaliatory force is secure — if it doesn't lose most of. its strength to an initial attack.

In 1970 the 50-submarine program we are talking about could put some 800 thermo-nuclear missiles at sea — over 300 of them would always be at sea, submerged, their location unknown to the potential aggressor. These 300 missiles alone — capable of destroying a hundred or more cities — would give pause to any rational aggressor.

But we do not believe the United States should put all its retaliatory eggs in one basket. I assume that other invulnerable systems will eventually be developed by the other services. And so, while we could make ourselves look ultra-progressive by padding our objective with more missile submarines, I believe our approximate number of 50 is adequate. This includes about 40 submarines to use the POLARIS ballistic missile, and a round dozen smaller boats which by 1970 should have small, very precise missiles which we can also use for tactical purposes.

One reason why we resist inflating our retaliatory forces is the urgency and magnitude of the limited war problem. Wars of limited objectives can be waged on land, at sea, or in the air. The Soviet capability for waging them is massive. It has not diminished with Sputnik — it may still be increasing. To the vast Soviet armies and tactical air forces must be added the satellite forces, steadily being re-equipped and trained with modern arms. The Soviet Navy continues to grow larger and more modern — and so do the satellite navies. Our future military posture must face and meet the threat which these forces hold over us.

However the limited war of 1970 may be fought — and I have already said that all-out response is no safe answer to this threat — the Navy must be prepared to be in the thick of it.

A war of limited objectives, by definition, will not be fought in the U.S., or in the U.S.S.R. It will be fought over a third country. To help that third country we must exert our power — limited and discriminating power — on the other side of some ocean. We must get it there quickly and get it ashore quickly. We may have to supply it there for protracted periods. We cannot do these things without three capabilities:

First, a capability to control the sea routes to and surrounding the area of aggression — and any other sea routes along which we are threatened or harassed.

Second, a capability to strike within the area of aggression — to strike precisely and with discrimination, using weapons appropriate to the scale of the war, and inflicting minimum harm on our friends ashore.

Third, a capability to put forces promptly ashore in the area against whatever resistance there may be.

The great bulk of the planned Navy of 1970 is designed to meet these needs — to provide the spearhead and the shield for the free world's ability to defeat limited aggression without incurring unlimited catastrophe.

The forces for these purposes must be large, because:

First, the enemy's forces will be large.

Second, the extent of the oceans — and their shorelines — itself requires large forces to assure their control.

Third, we cannot throw megaton weapons around to cover our quantitative weakness in this type of war.

Our largest group of forces will be those required for anti-submarine warfare — offensive and defensive — and for the air defense of shipping. These forces — some 400 ships and 1300 aircraft — will include:

9 anti-submarine carriers and their aircraft

About 30 long-range patrol aircraft squadrons, plus those in the Naval Reserve

About 75 anti-submarine submarines

About 75 destroyers, most of them with guided missiles

About 240 escort and picket vessels, nearly half of them with guided missiles for air defense, and all equipped either with anti-submarine helicopters or anti-submarine missiles. Most will be built around advanced types of sonar, and some may be of radically new design.

These forces will be flexible. They will protect sea routes. They will convoy military transports or naval supply ships or merchant shipping. They will support landing forces, form protective lines off beachheads, or seek out and hunt down submarines in the open ocean.

They will also, and I emphasize this, be equally useful to defend the United States against missile launching submarines. While our main defense against such attack must be our own invulnerable deterrent forces, and while a total defense against any form of nuclear attack is impossible, we cannot, and do not intend, to leave any enemy a free shot at us. The antisubmarine forces I have listed can give us excellent warning of submarine attack and can impose a high level of loss on attacking submarines, and they meet our minimum requirements for limited war. It would be unreasonable, in view of other national needs, to ask for more.

These forces are the shield behind which we can project and maintain a limited war capability overseas. The point of the spear will be our surface striking forces. For the 1970 era we will require six such forces, composed on the average of 14 ships each: 2 carriers, 3 guided missile cruisers, and 9 guided missile frigates. At least two of these six forces will be fully nuclear powered.

For these forces we will need by 1970 twelve modern, postwar attack carriers. In addition, we will still need our three latest converted carriers, but only in a training and emergency role. We allocate to these surface striking forces in 1970 only 87 ships in all, less than one tenth of our planned total ships, but their mission will be important.

We see no substitute in 1970 for the long-range missile as the deterrent to all-out war. We likewise see no substitute for the manned aircraft, for the discriminating delivery of small weapons, which we must still be able to do in limited war. We see in the aircraft carrier the essential answer to the latter problem — precision striking forces which can get quickly to the scene before the war has been lost.

But we see also in the attack carrier force a continuing, flexible, alternate capability to contribute to all-out war if it should break out. For we intend to provide our attack aircraft with thermonuclear missiles, of several-hundred-mile range, which in emergency they can use against any target up to 1200 or 1500 miles from their carrier base.

These striking forces — while no less destructible than anything else On the face of this earth — will have a defensive capacity adequate for the most extreme degree of limited war. Each force will have something like 30 surface-to-air missile launchers — more probably than any land target outside of a few large cities. Its fighters also, in 1970, will probably be in the form of advanced airborne launching platforms for air-to-air missiles of 50-mile range. It will be possible to get through these defenses. But we should ask ourselves what limited war objective will be worth the costs to the enemy that such an effort would entail. I want to make it very clear, so I repeat — that for 1970 we are optimizing the carrier force for limited war, to be the nation's primary cutting tool for this purpose. The deterrence of all-out war will not then be the carriers' number one job. The carrier force need not measure up to the defensive requirements of that role in 1970, however useful it may be in that context in the next few years.

I have covered the shield, and the point of the spear. The rest of our limited war spearhead is the amphibious force. For 1970 we plan ships to land two Marine divisions. These will be modern, 20-knot ships. They will be designed to permit maximum utilization of the vertical assault technique, as well as to facilitate over-the-beach support when required. There is no single element of the national limited war capability more essential than the ability to put modern Marine forces ashore within a week or so after a limited aggression starts.

I previously mentioned a requirement for about a hundred small ships for mine warfare and coastal patrol. These are largely in support of our ability to project our amphibious forces into remote areas, and to operate our anti-submarine forces from bases overseas.

I mentioned the objective of 200 auxiliary ships. These serve, and make effective overseas, the entire range of combatant forces I have discussed. There will be fast replenishment ships for the striking forces; tenders for submarines, seaplanes, and other anti-submarine forces; repair ships, tugs, rescue ships and supply ships to support all forces. We contemplate that World War II ships, although tired and near their end, may meet up to half of these requirements as late as 1970.

There is one further aspect of the 1970 Navy that I cannot say too much about, because it is too early to predict. We do know that the seaplane is an optimum vehicle for nuclear propulsion, for a number of reasons. We know that large nuclear-powered seaplanes have a potential for wide dispersal in remote sea areas, relatively secure against surprise attack. Perhaps as carriers of long-range missiles such aircraft could help fill the nation's all-out deterrent needs in 1970. While we cannot predict such a force in our 1970 Navy, we do intend to develop large seaplanes — and nuclear power in seaplanes — toward whatever uses will be profitable to the nation, as the technology unfolds.

In addition, I should mention Naval Reserve forces. For future all-out war, the requirements for Reserve forces are limited to moderate numbers of a relatively few types. These would largely be anti-submarine units, pre-designated and kept in a high state of readiness for specific assignments. In all-out war there is little likelihood that one will be able to assemble large reserve forces of many types, train and equip them, and get them into action in time to be useful. However for limited war, strong Reserve forces of a number of types, in some strength, are essential. In our 1970 Navy we would rely on the Reserve primarily for four kinds of limited war jobs:

First, to bring our regular forces up to full wartime manning levels.

Second, to expand our anti-submarine and mine warfare forces.

Third, to provide a follow-up capability behind the amphibious assault spearhead we maintain in our regular forces.

Fourth, to expand our peacetime logistic support forces, in order to meet the higher wartime consumption rates as quickly as possible.

This of necessity has been the briefest summary of our projected Navy posture for the 1970 era, toward which we plan and build — and will seek appropriations. Many details and explanations of items which may interest you more deeply have been omitted for brevity, for reasons of security — and because we do not have all the details yet. This is a broad brush, but we feel it is on the right track.

In my description of the 1970 era Navy, I have thus far excluded mention of satellites. Our view is that satellites, which orbit indiscriminately over land and sea, are the proper subject of a national program, not of separate service programs. The Navy views the development of such a national program as of urgent importance. The Navy of the 1970 era will rely heavily on earth satellites for reconnaissance, for the support of long-range communications between widely dispersed naval units, for assistance in precise navigation at sea, and for other purposes.

Our Navy objectives for the 1970 era have been developed on the assumption that the Soviets will also use satellites for similar purposes. We thus can no longer assume that major surface units of the future will operate in complete security from enemy observation. This development will have varying effects. It will increase the importance of the submarine in the all-out deterrent role, and also for anti-submarine warfare near the enemy's shores. It will prevent us from placing full reliance on carrier forces in the all-out deterrent role. It will make close convoy escort more difficult, and other means of protecting shipping more attractive. It will reinforce the requirements for dispersal and faster movement which nuclear weapons have already established. These considerations are already incorporated in our objectives.

However, there are some conclusions to which contemplation of the satellite, in conjunction with future weapons, does not lead us. In this connection, I would dispel one illusion which has of late carried away some very sincere and able men, quite competent in their special fields. This is the notion that the whole Navy of the future should submerge. There are several answers to this.

My first and broadest answer gets down to basic philosophy. Do we accept the inevitability of all-out war? Or are we determined to prevent it?

Our future Navy is designed to prevent all-out war — to control and limit war to magnitudes we can tolerate. I am afraid the idea of an all-submerged Navy is keyed to the spirit that future war can only be all-out — that nothing on the surface can survive — that everything must go underneath. But if this is true at sea, it is true on land also. We are all vulnerable here on top.

I categorically deny that we must accept this hopeless outlook. We have to learn to live with our vulnerability. If human life is to be human, we have to stay on top, rather than become cave dwellers.

The best way to do this is to resolve that we can and will overcome the threats that surround us — by means other than all-out war. This means we must have a secure deterrent to all-out war — which we can and should put below the surface of the sea. But it also means accepting the burdens and restraints associated with limited war. This kind of war can be fought efficiently on the surface — in fact it must be fought largely on the surface and in the air. The principal burdens of limited war are these: One must identify one's target with certainty, hit it precisely, and refrain from excessive force. This is a bit difficult against most targets when one fires blind from under the sea or from under the ground. But if we do have these abilities in our armed forces the whole free world can safely stay up in the fresh air.

We have planned to put our all-out deterrent forces under the surface. They do not require high degrees of precision and discrimination.

We have also planned to put a goodly part of our anti-submarine force underneath. As technology advances, we may increase the latter element. But as we see it today, even in undersea warfare the nuclear submarine will have no permanent magic that foreseeable surface destruction systems, and advanced aircraft and missile systems, cannot puncture. Submarines are relatively easy to sink once you find them. The technology of finding them is progressing fast. The tools are not all here yet, but they are coming. When they arrive we will be back to the hard, close decisions as to which anti-submarine tools we buy — instead of the easy choice we have when we are buying miracles.

I will say one more word about the submarine in anti-submarine warfare. The mixed bag of tricks we plan, — surface, air, and undersea — will give the enemy submarine skipper a much harder time than any single weapon.

We have a very large job to do. It takes very large numbers of ships to do it. And except for a few rather specialized jobs, the submarine is about the most expensive way to fight a war on and from the sea. If we got all the way under the surface there would be many jobs we couldn't do at all. To do the rest it would cost us many times as much as it costs on the surface. We trust the nation wants us to do the whole job well, at the least cost.

We therefore — despite our considerable enthusiasm for submarines in their proper place, and with all due respect for those who feel otherwise — we feel it our duty to stay largely on top. You may count this also as a Navy affirmation that, if we plan intelligently and are willing to sacrifice enough, there is still a future on top for the human race.

Our Navy of the future, then, expresses our conviction that we can remain human, and not become moles. And this Navy will play a very major part in bringing about this result.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

APPENDIX

THE NAVY OF THE 1970 ERA

A. TENTATIVE ACTIVE FLEET OBJECTIVES

52 MISSILE-LAUNCHING SUBMARINES, ALL NUCLEAR POWERED

    40 with POLARIS or a successor, 1500-mile or greater range
    12 with smaller missiles, 1000-mile or greater range

87 SHIPS IN SURFACE STRIKING FORCES

    12 Modern Attack Carriers (6 with Nuclear Power)
    3 Large Training Carriers
    18 Guided Missile Cruisers (12 with Nuclear Power)
    54 Guided Missile Frigates (18 with Nuclear Power)

398 SHIPS IN ANTI-SUBMARINE FORCES

    9 Anti-submarine Aircraft Carriers
    75 Submarines (65 with Nuclear Power)
    72 Destroyers
    60 Ocean Picket Ships
    182 Ocean Escorts

90 SHIPS IN AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

    18 Helicopter Assault Ships
    58 Assault Transports and Landing Ships
    14 Command and Support Ships

110 MINE WARFARE AND SMALL PATROL SHIPS

190 AUXILIARIES

    50 Fast Underway Replenishment Ships
    140 Tenders, Tugs, Repair and Supply Ships

927 [Total Ships]

SHIPS WITH NUCLEAR POWER............................................150-Plus
SHIPS WITH LONG RANGE SURFACE MISSILES................52-Plus
SHIPS WITH AIR DEFENSE MISSILES...................................200-Plus
SHIPS WITH ANTI-SUBMARINE MISSILES...........................450-Plus
SHIPS WITH ANTI-SUBMARINE AIRCRAFT.........................150-Plus

B. TENTATIVE OBJECTIVES FOR OPERATING AIRCRAFT
(Approximations: Air Reserve Aircraft Included)

600 FIGHTERS WITH LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES

    400 for Attack Carriers
    200 for Marines

1250 LIGHT ATTACK AIRCRAFT

    1000 for Attack Carriers
    250 for Marines

400 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT (Navy and Marine)

    70 Long Range Seaplane, Mining and Recco
    180 Early Warning and Air Control
    150 Photographic, Electronic, Tactical Recco

1300 ANTI-SUBMARINE

    500 Long Range, Land and Seaplane
    400 Short Range, for Carriers
    400 Helicopter

500 ASSAULT TRANSPORTS (MARINE)

1250 AIRCRAFT FOR SUPPORT OF FLEETS (Target, Logistic, Development and Test, Rescue, Fleet Training)

1700 AIRCRAFT FOR TRAINING COMMAND 7000

7000 [Total Aircraft]

Even without Vietnam we'd be hard pressed to field a fleet this lavish in just 12 years, that's so many nuclear hulls while holding nothing else back except raw number of attack carrier decks.

One thing I like is the mention of 300 SLBMs at sea being able to take out over 100 cities. That jives pretty well the other stuff you found on the high unreliability of Polaris and its warhead.

CLEARED
FOR OPEN PUBLICATION
8 APR 1966
DIRECTORATE FOR SECURITY REVIEW (OASD-PA)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

January 1966

ADVANTAGES OF NUCLEAR POWER AND ITS
UTILIZATION IN A COMBAT ENVIRONMENT

by Rear Admiral. Henry L. Miller,
U.S. Navy, Commander Carrier Division Three

Since the advent of mechanical propulsion, ships have been freed from the uncertainty of dependence on the wind for motive power, but this advantage has been significantly reduced by the constant requirement for fuel whether it be coal or oil. Today, this inhibiting characteristic has been eliminated by the development of nuclear power.

The advantages of nuclear propulsion for surface ships do not appear dramatic nor spectacular when compared to nuclear powered submarines, for nuclear power gave us the true submersible for the first time in history — a truly dramatic breakthrough in the state of the art. However, once the lines are cast off from dockside and the nuclear powered ship starts to move, the commander realizes immediately that the unlimited, sustained power in the hull of that ship can give us or any other power that develops it, a dynamic revolution in Naval Warfare. It allows a commander to devote his attention and plans, toward effectively executing whatever task he has been assigned, without having to worry every step of the way about his logistic support of black oil.

As you recall, during World War II, we developed replenishment and refueling at sea to a high art. Such achievements greatly reduced our dependence on shore bases, allowed us to keep our combat ships at sea longer, and thus increased our combat effectiveness. Still, the times that fuel oil or the lack of it played a vital role in the success or failure of battles of World War II is astounding. Historians credit the inability to provide adequate fuel oil as being one of the most significant items leading to the downfall of Japan.

Today, nuclear powered task groups, without the constant periodic black oil replenishment, can add to cur combat effective- ness by totally eliminating the black oil need. Nuclear power has and will continue to have a tremendous impact on the effectiveness and capability of the Fleet as a whole.

The ultimate product of nuclear power when equated to a surface warship could probably best be summed up as "a vastly increased response." Whether it be providing greater versatility, flexibility, mobility, reliability or any of the dozens of highly desirable features of a man-of-war, the nuclear propelled man-of-war responds the best. In short, it can do just about everything better, easier, and faster than her conventional brethren. As such, nuclear power becomes of vital significance in the execution of national policy and the application of naval power.

During the past several months, we have had occasion to observe, in combat, the first nuclear task group, including the aircraft carrier USS ENTERPRISE, CVAN-65, and the frigate USS BAINBRIDGE, DLGN-25, A broad reference has just been made to the influence nuclear power could have on the waging of war. I would now like to draw attention to several advantages of the superiority of the all nuclear powered task group. Then I want to give several specific examples that have been experienced during these past several months of combat and that point up and support the advantages I will now enumerate:

1. Increased tactical flexibility as a result of unlimited endurance at high speed. This permits:

a. Greater use of evasive tracks when approaching the objective area thereby reducing the probability of detection.

b. Longer routes to avoid storms.

c. Capability to operate in bad weather is improved by the elimination of the hazardous and, sometimes, infeasible refueling requirement under these circumstances.

d. The high speed endurance extends the ability to attack along a greater perimeter of coastline.

e. The ability to maintain high sustained speed reduces the vulnerability to submarine and guided-missile attack. High speed is one of the most important measures to employ against submarines and guided-missiles.

2. Reduction of replenishment frequency with a greatly reduced dependence upon all forms of mobile logistic support (not only fuel) — as a result of increased storage space formerly required for fuel oil. ENTERPRISE took on aviation fuel and ammunition about once every few days.

3. Air intakes for boiler operations are eliminated thereby greatly improving the capability to seal the ship against atomic, biological and chemical attack — a quantum jump in ability to survive.

4. Elimination of the undesirable stack gases and smoke which not only make it difficult for the pilots sitting in their planes prior to take-off or during approaches to a landing but also adds considerably to the Navy's maintenance bill due to the corrosive effects of the stack gases on communication and radar antennas and on aircraft.

5. The concern for loss of fuel oil facilities is eliminated. This includes the loss of facilities at the source (in any foreign country) by political action. It also includes the loss of prepositioned fuel depots to the enemy or the loss of the replenishment oilers enroute to refueling rendezvous as a result of enemy action.

6. There is the ability, under severe threat situations, to operate from distant bases completely free from mobile logistic dependency, with the capability of high speed return to such bases for replenishment of aviation fuel and. ammunition.

7. Increased maneuverability resulting from much more rapid acceleration and deceleration.

8. High standards of technical training set in the nuclear propulsion program.

9. A cleaner ship internally and externally saving hundreds of thousands of hours a year in cleaning ship and aircraft.

10. And finally — ships in the 1967 and 68 programs will be with us until the turn of the century. We are buying time if we build nuclear powered ships. We are buying reduced effectiveness if we purchase oil burning warships.

Most of the above comments apply to any nuclear combat ship;, be it carrier, destroyer, or cruiser. I would like to emphasize a few pertinent points, however, with respect to the DLGN BAINBRIDGE.

Several specific examples of her performance on this deployment will be mentioned later. She, of course, derives all the same benefits from nuclear power that the carriers do with the exception of those affecting air operations. But some are particularly applicable to her specialities air defense and anti-submarine warfare.

A. With a nuclear ship, the screen commander has one always ready as a submarine search and attack unit. There is no need to worry about which ship is ready or how long the unit may be away from the screen. Nor is there a need to relieve her with a freshly refueled ship.

B. Independence from an external fuel source enables her to provide uninterrupted screening of aircraft carriers or ether large ships. This is especially applicable during replenishment operations while the force is at a vulnerable slow speed and steady course.

C. There is no need for the carrier to interrupt air operations to refuel her nuclear powered escort because the escort is freed from worries over fuel.

D. She can more readily follow speed changes of the carrier, e.g., faster acceleration and deceleration.

E. And finally, as a picket she can remain on station without oiler need, or destroyer relief in order to retire to refuel. Now, for some examples of how some of these advantages of nuclear propulsion have affected our operations on the current deployment.

First, let me speak of the transit of ENTERPRISE and BAINBRIDGE from Norfolk, Virginia to Subic Bay in the Philippine Islands, a concrete example of not only flexibility but conservation of resources as well.

We were directed to maintain a speed of advance (SOA) of some- thing in excess of 20 knots the entire 16,000 mile trip. This was accomplished with ease; with absolutely no strain. While doing this, flight operations were conducted for a total of nine days and three nights. In addition, a 13 hour search was made in an area of the South Atlantic Ocean as a result of a man falling overboard. Regardless of this high SOA and resultant delays, the entire transit proved to be a routine event with arrival in. WestPac exactly as scheduled and yet with sufficient jet fuel remaining to conduct days of heavy combat operations. The most obvious and immediate gain was the fact that ENTERPRISE commenced combat operations shortly after arrival with an Air Wing in a comparatively high state of readiness. This was demonstrated by the fact that on only her second day of operations, she set a new daily record for combat sorties by any CVA performing in-country support.

In contrast to the ENTERPRISE transit, had any other oil burning CVA such as Forrestal Class attempted to accomplish the same transit in the same time span and conduct similar operations, it would have consumed some several million gallons of fuel enroute. This would have necessitated propositioning oilers along the track in order to prevent the oil burning CVA from running out of fuel. The inconvenience and added expense of maintaining the oilers are, of course, obvious. A conventional frigate the size of BAINBRIDGE would have had to refuel several times along the track at the high sustained speed made by ENTERPRISE and BAINBRIDGE.

This same situation would exist in a tactical environment as well. If for example, FORRESTAL and ENTERPRISE were ordered from the South China Sea to another area at flank speed, to forestall or counter another outbreak of Communist aggression, FORRESTAL, in order to carry out the speed required, would possibly (depending on how far) require refueling before departure and perhaps require it soon after arrival. This would generate a requirement for an oiler to be scheduled to fuel FORRESTAL soon after arrival. If an oiler were not available for this purpose, FORRESTAL would proceed to station at a much slower speed than desired in order to conserve fuel, and upon arrival limit her operations — also to conserve fuel — until an oiler could be positioned.

ENTERPRISE, however, and with BAINBRIDGE as an escort ship, could respond instantly, arriving ready to meet the task without need for fuel and remain on station within the limits of her expenditure of aviation fuel and ordnance. This is much greater than FORRESTAL, as a result of the increased storage space for these items usually required for fuel oil storage, air intakes for boilers, and the huge smoke stacks.

Thus, in comparing the responsiveness and staying power of these two mighty ships, ENTERPRISE would be able to arrive sooner, stay longer, and deliver many more combat sorties than FORRESTAL — this increased effective- ness stemming primarily from the fact that she has nuclear rather than conventional propulsion.

To document this in even more detail, I would like to mention the following:

First is the fact that ENTERPRISE carries one more squadron—an A4C [A-4C] squadron at the present—than any of the other big CVAs. Although ENTERPRISE is slightly larger than FORRESTAL, for example, one of the primary space savers comes as a result of elimination of smoke stacks, air intakes and the many other items normally running up through the ship to provide for the proper functioning of conventional boilers. A quick glance at a side view diagram of ENTERPRISE and any other CVA points up the smaller island structure of ENTERPRISE with a resultant increase in available aircraft parking space. This same condition exists down through the lower decks as well. The end product is more shop space, living space, storerooms, etc., and on the hangar deck, again more aircraft parking and maintenance space.

Commenting further on the storage space, we have now found, even with the high intensity of flight ops, that a longer refueling cycle is completely acceptable with respect to aviation fuel. The only factor affecting this cycle is the pumping rate of the tanker ENTERPRISE refuels from. The advantages to be gained from this longer period between replenishments vs the shorter period include such important items as:

A. Lesser period of higher vulnerability from air, surface, or submarine attacks.

B. Greater periods of time to be performing combat operations.

C. Greater periods of time can be spent at remote distances from the UNREP "lifeline."

D. More crew rest in what is already a greatly overworked environment.

These, and many others have often been enumerated before in discussion of nuclear power but they have been particularly notable during the operating period since 2 December 1965 when ENTERPRISE went on the firing line in the South China Seas.

(Paragraph deleted by the Department of Defense)

A similar situation exists with regard to conventional ordnance stowage, the second item of primary significance in evaluating ENTERPRISE's combat staying power. If, under normal circumstances, a reasonable on-board reserve is maintained, this, with the previously mentioned greater jet fuel, provides a potent and previously unattainable sustained operational capability. And going still further, ENTERPRISE could be sent with full jet fuel and ammunition loads to any ocean area of the world and fight for many days before running out of fuel and ammunition.

We had several specific examples of rapid reaction during the first few days of our combat operations. The first occurred as we were proceeding from Subic Bay to our station off the southeast coast of South Vietnam. We received word of a submarine sighting by an underway replenishment (UNREP) ship some 145 miles from our position. The UNREP ship was without ASW protection so we were directed to detach a ship to provide assistance. BAINBRIDGE was without question, the obvious and, in fact only choice. Within less than 5 hours she had transited the 145 mile distance and was actively performing ASW search in the suspect area. Most probably our earliest concern with BAINBRIDGE would have been several days later when we may have had to send an ammunition ship to replenish ordnance if she had had any extensive ASW engagements. If the ordnance usage were relatively light, our next concern may have been weeks hence when we decided to send along some fresh vegetables.

In contrast, the two conventionally powered destroyers also accompanying us required nearly five hours time to close ENTERPRISE, top off with black oil and then depart to the submarine contact area. By the time they arrived, some 10 to 20 hours had elapsed. Then, of course, the immediate and necessary problem of keeping them in fuel oil began. Regardless of the amount of combat operations they engaged in, an oiler UNREP ship would have been a twice a week necessity. Again, the inconvenience and added expense is obvious.

Some five days later this situation repeated itself when an additional destroyer was required to be moved rapidly from our Task Group north to the Tonkin Gulf area, a distance of about 500 miles. Again, BAINBRIDGE was the logical choice. Twenty hours after she was directed to detach, she arrived on station fully prepared to execute all missions assigned. Not so a conventional destroyer. The average oil burner would probably have required refueling soon after arrival in the Gulf area. Continued frequent refueling would, of course, then have continued as the norm.

ENTERPRISE too was involved in a similar incident shortly after arriving on the line, late one evening, while operating southeast of Saigon, a message was received to the effect that the Cam Ranh Bay airfield was generally unserviceable because of heavy rains. ENTERPRISE's bird farm of about 100 planes was required early the following morning in the Second Corps Northerly area of South Vietnam. Response was instantaneous and because of her capability for sustained high speed, ENTERPRISE was launching support, opera- tions in this northern area in less than 9 hours after the initial alerting message. Conventional ships can, of course, take similar actions. However, they would require redisposition of replenishment ships to supply fuel. The nuclear ships can immediately respond to a request of this type, operate for some days, and then return to their normal stations without affecting replenishment force schedules and positions.

Increased maneuverability was mentioned earlier as a much desired advantage of nuclear power. The examples of this are a daily, in fact more properly, an hourly occurrence. The maneuver- ability, combined with tremendous acceleration and deceleration characteristics, provide the carrier skipper with a truly amazing response — it is an instantaneous response. Getting underway, turning into the wind for launch and recovery, approaches to replenishment ships and general ease of shiphandling are constantly recurring examples of this. And of course, in the ever-present environment of possible enemy offensive surface craft and surface- to-surface missiles, this rapid response could very easily mean the difference between survival and disaster. In routine evolutions, ENTERPRISE has consistently left the destroyers — commonly referred to as the Greyhounds of the seas — in her wake. One conventionally powered DD skipper said he drops behind station some 1,500 yards in, for what is to the Big "E", a routine acceleration from 15 to 25 knots. In a man overboard maneuver if "E" is 12 knots or lower, she stops immediately and goes to full speed astern. This cannot be done in a conventionally powered ship.

This capability for sustained speed and outstanding maneuver- ability provides another especially attractive feature in the South China Sea. Because of underwater geographical conditions, the submarine in this area is essentially required to remain near the ocean surface. ENTERPRISE considerably enhances her own safety by avoiding the submarines with the use of her speed.

An advantage also mentioned earlier was elimination of stack gases and smoke. The point was made of the reduction or elimination of these corrosive effects on the aircraft and the ship, and on ship's components so that many thousands of manhours were saved each year in the process by a vast reduction in cleaning require- ments. Today under our present tempo of operations, this saving in manpower is probably one of the most important items that can be realized. When 16 to 20 hour days are the routine, the ability to make available, additional manpower, even if only to permit the crew to get an additional hour or so of much needed sleep, is of special significance in the ship's overall performance.

An excellent example of corrosion control is available in one of the F4B [F-4B] squadrons presently on board. A year ago, this squadron with essentially the same aircraft were deployed on the USS RANGER, a conventionally powered ship. Any man who was a plane captain on that cruise will attest to the long hours he devoted to sweeping stack gas residue from his airplane in an attempt to maintain seme semblance of cleanliness. The problem of corrosion control became so acute that corrosion-control teams on the F4B had to be increased from four to six men working 12 hours a day plus augmentation with an additional four to six men on non-operating days just to curtail the spread of corrosion. And still within three months after deployment the airplane out of commission time because of the necessity to repair and replace access covers, stabilators and all open seams on the F4B approached the point of being unacceptable. A post deployment inspection revealed that some of the aircraft had reached such an advanced stage of corrosion damage that a major effort had to be expended in this area of repair.

Conversely, in the first three months aboard ENTERPRISE, the F4B [F-4B] corrosion control teams have been maintained at a level of five men. They have noted a marked difference in the corrosion control effort required aboard ENTERPRISE as compared with other carriers. To date none of the covers or doors mentioned previously have had to be replaced. The aircraft are immeasurably easier to keep clean, freeing the plane captain for other important duties, Records indicate that a 15% to 20% reduction in manhours required for corrosion control has been realised during this deployment on ENTERPRISE.

Similarly the Commanding Officer of BAINBRIDGE has completed a survey of his ship which indicates a savings of 440 manhours per week as a result of having no oil burning residue to contend with. This time is, of course, well spent in preventive maintenance and training rather than in cleaning the ship.

One minor but interesting side note that helo pilots have brought to the attention of the Commanding Officer of BAINBRIDGE was the lack of stack gases when inflight refueling. Any aviator who has ever operated off a conventionally powered carrier can attest to the discomfort of random stack gases blowing over the flight deck. To a helo pilot, required to sit directly in the gas for upwards of 10 minutes when refueling, the advantages from BAINBRIDGE's unique situation could be quite helpful.

Another advantage gained directly from the nuclear plant is increased electrical power. The demands for this power are many and varied and increasing almost daily with the introduction of better radars, sonars and missile systems. This electrical power is of course generated by steam power, and is made available through the ship's propulsion plant. It follows that the greater the requirement for electrical power, the greater the fuel consumption and thus a consequent reduction in fuel available for propulsion. For nuclear powered ships this is not a consideration.

One additional word on catapults. As you know, all our carriers now use steam pressure for the firing of catapults. And, of course, as just mentioned, this steam must come from the ship's engineering plant. We found last year in the South China Sea in RANGER during conditions of low wind and high temperatures requiring the ship,to steam at very high speeds during launchings that the rate of buildup of steam in the catapults could become critical. Delays of ten to twenty seconds between launches on the heavy aircraft was not uncommon while waiting for adequate steam pressure to build up. Although this seems minor, when the requirement exists for large launches or for rapid response to a threat to the force, this time can be significant. This slow buildup has not been the case with ENTERPRISE. Regardless of the conditions, steam is available now and in the quantities desired.

These last several paragraphs have cited just a few examples of the many advantages we have already experienced during this "combat cruise." They are realistic and typical. They are the type of items that will continue to occur in increasing frequency as the full operational capability of nuclear power is investigated, exploited and documented.

And now let us examine another facet of nuclear power that takes on considerable importance when the topic of providing for additional nuclear propelled warships is discussed. This facet is cost effectiveness.

By 1963, nuclear propulsion technology had progressed to the point where we were technically capable of constructing a carrier of the same size and operating characteristics as ENTERPRISE but with only four reactors producing the same shaft power as ENTERPRISE'S eight. These reactor cores had about a 7 year life as opposed to the approximately 3 year life of ENTERPRISE'S cores. Since that time, the state of the art has taken another quantum jump and we can now produce a two reactor plant that can drive a ship the size of ENTERPRISE and will require refueling only once in the life of the ship.

A study was made on the total cost of constructing and operating a two reactor nuclear carrier over its lifetime, with its aircraft. The nuclear carrier was compared to the conventional carrier's total cost under the same conditions. The total cost for the nuclear powered carrier came to 2% more than the conventional. With nuclear powered escorts, the all-nuclear task group was calculated to be about 6% more expensive than the conventional carrier group, depending on the specific assumptions for force composition and costs.

(Three paragraphs deleted by the Department of Defense)

The successful operations of ENTERPRISE, BAINBRIDGE, and LONG BEACH have demonstrated the military advantages of nuclear powered surface ships, and have confirmed our ability to build effective and reliable ships of this type. Reactor core improvements in the past 10 to 11 years, as validated by the nuclear submarine program, have increased the life of nuclear cores by a factor of over 3 and at the same time have decreased the cost by a factor of 3 or more, so that today the actual cost per unit of energy is only one tenth what it was 10 years ago, and there is every possibility that we will be able to make further improvements in the unit cost of nuclear energy in the future.

Two final points that have implications far beyond the immediate situation with ENTERPRISE and BAINBRIDGE. First, we have seen an almost complete revolution in undersea warfare with the advent of the nuclear submarine. And all within the last decade. The concept of what arc virtually self-sustained boats in our submarine fleet, combined with the deadly Polaris missile is one of the greatest single military advantages that the United States possesses over any other nation in the world today. We know, however, that the USSR has succeeded in producing nuclear powered submarines and I assume they are progressing rapidly with a submarine compatible missile similar to Polaris. In other words the power advantage in this one vital area is lessening. We have, however, the most powerful surface Navy in the world today. We can retain our current overall naval superiority — and in fact increase it — by a conversion to nuclear powered warships. Nuclear power is such, a significant advance in the state of the art in Naval Warfare that the nation with the first nuclear navy will become the world's leading naval power.

My second point is the significance that the nuclear power program can have on our national industrial potential. Nuclear plants for civilian use are a natural follow-on to nuclear power in naval ships. This advancement in technology, and in fact, creation of a new industry will be a requirement for our future domestic needs. The Atomic Energy Commission has stated as early as 1962 that in 10 years 20% of our new power plants will be nuclear powered. This will continue to spread well beyond the borders of the United States. Every nation will be looking for a nuclear power plant and other products of nuclear power, and will naturally turn to the nation with the best product. A nuclear power industry with a sound base in research, development and production will provide vast benefits to that nation, far beyond all expectations. We have competition. Great Britain, France, Russia, and Germany at this very moment, all are engaged in building nuclear power industries of some kind. France is concentrating her nuclear power in building submarines. Germany on the other hand is pointing her R&D in nuclear power to merchant ships. Great Britain and Russia are interested primarily in putting nuclear power into their navies. The United States, however, has one dramatic and successful advantage — a full decade of experience with at least a partial nuclear Navy and one Merchant Marine ship. This is an advantage we cannot — we must not lose. The freedom and economic well being of our Nation is at stake.

In summary, the evolution of the Navy to a progressive program of nuclear power can revolutionize our naval establishment and naval warfare in a more dramatic manner than that realized by the change from sail to steam or from coal burning to oil burning propulsion plants. The future of the United States Navy is nuclear power. We must not ignore it.

These are great reads, Shep.

Though one question: What is an ocean picket ship and how does it differentiate from an Ocean Escort? Is it a Radar Picket ship or what?

In the thinking of that time ocean picket ships were intended to be pickets against enemy bombers and submarines at the same time. An ocean escort would have had less endurance and been a pure ASW ship.

The ocean picket ships would have been for patrolling off the US coastline, as well as supporting carrier task forces. The US had a fair number of Liberty ships operating as long range coastal pickets in the 1950s and early 60s, but they were clearly vulnerable to preemptive attack by communist nuclear submarines. So a duel role picket was needed with a decent turn of speed and some defensive weapons against subs. An earlier solution was to build submarine radar pickets... this did not work well for the obvious reason that the radar doesn't work if the sub has to dive.

In the end deemphasis on bomber defense, the somewhat decent success of the EC-121 Warning Star as an airborne radar, and across the board improvements on the radars and plotting gear on all ships killed off the dedicated picket.

There is one further aspect of the 1970 Navy that I cannot say too much about, because it is too early to predict. We do know that the seaplane is an optimum vehicle for nuclear propulsion, for a number of reasons. We know that large nuclear-powered seaplanes have a potential for wide dispersal in remote sea areas, relatively secure against surprise attack. Perhaps as carriers of long-range missiles such aircraft could help fill the nation's all-out deterrent needs in 1970. While we cannot predict such a force in our 1970 Navy, we do intend to develop large seaplanes — and nuclear power in seaplanes — toward whatever uses will be profitable to the nation, as the technology unfolds.

That's...news to me! How would these nuclear seaplanes work? Use steam from a reactor to drive turboprops?

though I do remember reading about a soviet plan in the 80's to develop a massive seaplane - not nuclear - with a takeoff weight of 2500 tonnes and a 1000 tonne payload.



Is that the sort of thing they had in mind? Again, how would you make it run off of nuclear power?

Sea Skimmer wrote:In the thinking of that time ocean picket ships were intended to be pickets against enemy bombers and submarines at the same time. An ocean escort would have had less endurance and been a pure ASW ship.

The ocean picket ships would have been for patrolling off the US coastline, as well as supporting carrier task forces. The US had a fair number of Liberty ships operating as long range coastal pickets in the 1950s and early 60s, but they were clearly vulnerable to preemptive attack by communist nuclear submarines. So a duel role picket was needed with a decent turn of speed and some defensive weapons against subs. An earlier solution was to build submarine radar pickets... this did not work well for the obvious reason that the radar doesn't work if the sub has to dive.

In the end deemphasis on bomber defense, the somewhat decent success of the EC-121 Warning Star as an airborne radar, and across the board improvements on the radars and plotting gear on all ships killed off the dedicated picket.

Thank you.

So I found the Tactical Air Warfare Study Vol. I-IV (Sent to SecDef McNamara – 10 September 1964)

And the Bullshit level in it is high, and proves Elder Slade's comment:

"When someone cites something; ask who wrote it, and why."

For example...the U.S. Navy claimed in the TEWS study that land-based runways (with revetments) were vunerable to 250 lb bombs...despite these bombs not doing very well in World War II; hence everyone going up to 500 lb or even 1,000 lb bombs.

From what I remember, they claimed a pretty large danger radius with the 250 lb bomb; which I assume they were counting for the purposes of very light fragmentation rendering an aircraft unable to fly until the holes in the side were patched.

Later, they also claimed that in order to neutralize a 7,000 foot runway with Badgers carrying iron bombs...you only needed nine sorties....and this was with a 35% attrition rate.

Meanwhile, they claimed that with the same equipment and attrition rate; it would take 60 sorties by Badgers to neutralize a CVA operating with four decoys.

In another paper I found in the same folder as TAWS:
Can you see a glaring problem with this?

The Navy overlooks the fact that with a nuclear strike -- it doesn't matter if 90% of all BADGER BADGER BADGER BADGER BADGERs (I love doing that) are shot down; if only one or two make it past the fighter screen and the escort screen -- they can then nuke the carrier.
Even if a nuke misses by a decent distance...unless the carrier is a modern post-war Supercarrier; the shock and airblast damage will render it incapable of operations for a decent amount of time. (Fun fact, the USN considered a super carrier to be three times as resistant to shock as a war-built carrier).

Also, even if the carrier survives; a lot of her aircraft in the air will have blinded pilots; and her deck will be closed down long enough from airblast causing a mess on the deck farm that a non trivial fraction of airborne aircraft will go into the drink from fuel exhaustion, unless they can divert to another carrier or land based airfield.

I also have a lot of scans from another folder that dealt with the immediate post-WWII fight over Unification -- where the USN claimed that Naval Aviation was more cost efficient than land-based heavy strategic bombers; because carrier aviation, while it delivered less tonnage; delivered it more accurately via low level fighter-bomber attack.

Of course, the unwritten part of that statement was:

"As long as we face Japanese-level light flak."

The Navy never really had to deal with the intense proliferation of efficient or useful light flak that occured in the European theater, where every German unit seemed to have a quadruple 20mm Flakvierling, or at least a 37mm cannon. Meanwhile, the the Japanese in the PTO had a quite inefficient antiaircraft gun as their main light flak weapon that had a amazingly low practical ROF.

However; by the 1980s; the USN had become a bit more sane -- in the "Handbook of US Aircraft Carrier Programs"; which was the Navy's primary go to document for any Flag Officer who needed to brief Kongress or the Media on why big deck CVs were needed -- they basically said: "if the situation goes nuclear; then it really doesn't matter if a carrier task force is lost...since the war will be over in a few hours." in the 'vunerability' briefing section.

Well, it looked like that the US Navy in 1958 was in this mood:

Sea Skimmer wrote:Even without Vietnam we'd be hard pressed to field a fleet this lavish in just 12 years, that's so many nuclear hulls while holding nothing else back except raw number of attack carrier decks.

Cancel the space program (with consumed enormous amounts of money between 1958 and 1972) and pour the money in the Navy.

Modax wrote:
That's...news to me! How would these nuclear seaplanes work? Use steam from a reactor to drive turboprops?

Is that the sort of thing they had in mind? Again, how would you make it run off of nuclear power?

I'm pretty sure all nuclear aircraft boil down to the same concept as the Tory nuclear ramjet of Project Pluto which has to be one of my favourite mad science projects of all time.

They're not so much aircraft as low-altitude, air breathing, nuclear thermal rockets. Using the worrying direct method of an open core fission reactor, they heat the bejezus out of the air they intake so it can be blasted out the back as thrust. Delicious fisson fragment laden thrust.
There were closed cycle versions, but they never got off the ground, so to speak.

Being a ramjet, it needed other engines to get it up to speed so enough air is coming in the front end for it to work.

Weight, as always, is at a premium in aircraft, so rad shielding had to be minimal (ie, enough to keep the crew alive, sorry if you're under the aircraft as it passes over) As far as nuclear sea planes being better, at a guess, I'd say they expected to use sea water as a coolant/shielding medium while the plane was parked on the ocean. Pump an internal compartment full of water or dangle the damn reactor in the ocean instead of carrying tons of lead around with you for the time you're not in the air.

Spectre_nz wrote:I'm pretty sure all nuclear aircraft boil down to the same concept as the Tory nuclear ramjet... they're not so much aircraft as low-altitude, air breathing, nuclear thermal rockets.

Incorrect. That propulsion system is totally impractical for a manned, reusable aircraft. It requires massive solid boosters to launch and is essentially impossible to land.

There were closed cycle versions, but they never got off the ground, so to speak.

The actual US nuclear-powered bomber program used turbojets rather than ramjets; the initial prototypes piped a fraction of the core air through the reactor for direct heating, but the operational version would have used a liquid metal loop with heat exchangers (similar to Soviet high-performance sub reactors). A seaplane version would probably have used a similar system with turboprops rather than turbojets.

Iosef Cross wrote: Cancel the space program (with consumed enormous amounts of money between 1958 and 1972) and pour the money in the Navy.

Yeah, that would not be a good idea. All that money spent by NASA on R&D cycled directly back into military fields. If for not example NASAs invention of the digital camera for Apollo the US military would have still be stuck with film return satellites as the USSR was for the entire cold war. Killing the NASA budget would be all bad for the military.

Starglider wrote: The actual US nuclear-powered bomber program used turbojets rather than ramjets; the initial prototypes piped a fraction of the core air through the reactor for direct heating, but the operational version would have used a liquid metal loop with heat exchangers (similar to Soviet high-performance sub reactors). A seaplane version would probably have used a similar system with turboprops rather than turbojets.

After a point they started using turbofan concepts. That would have worked a lot better then a turbojet, because they placed cooling loops into the fan air, as well as the core. That way the core could run at a steady thrust, while the fan air radiator is adjusted to control reactor temp.

The actual US nuclear-powered bomber program used turbojets rather than ramjets; the initial prototypes piped a fraction of the core air through the reactor for direct heating, but the operational version would have used a liquid metal loop with heat exchangers (similar to Soviet high-performance sub reactors). A seaplane version would probably have used a similar system with turboprops rather than turbojets.

Was power from the reactor turning the blades? Or was a conventional engine being used to feed air to the reactor loop to heat it up for added thrust? I'd assumed the latter and just didn't consider the difference on the front end of how you got air to your reactor core or heat exchanger to really change the concept of "use the heat of a nuclear reaction to heat air for thrust"

I understand all the heat exchanger concepts proved too heavy to make a practical aircraft in the end?

Spectre_nz wrote:Was power from the reactor turning the blades?

Yes, via the jet turbine.

I'd assumed the latter and just didn't consider the difference on the front end of how you got air to your reactor core or heat exchanger to really change the concept of "use the heat of a nuclear reaction to heat air for thrust"

Ramjets produce zero thrust at takeoff and basically do not work at subsonic speeds. The Tory/Pluto concept lacks fans or turbines; it relies on extremely high exhaust temperature for thermodynamic efficiency. It is simple and robust, but unusable for conventional aircraft.

Ramjets of course are fueled by fuel-air combustion, whose sustainment requires a certain thermodynamic state within the combustion chamber. This is not so with a nuclear-powered heat exchanger replacing the combustion section. I'd have to think, but a nuclear-powered "ramjet" (that is a diffusor, a low-speed heat exchanger section, and a nozzle) should not have a minimum critical speed as a combusting ramjet does. It will instead limit to zero thrust at zero speed. I don't know the lowest speed at which it will produce useful thrust, but I suspect a pulsejet would be a better model of this behavior than a combusting ramjet.

Starglider wrote: but the operational version would have used a liquid metal loop with heat exchangers (similar to Soviet high-performance sub reactors). A seaplane version would probably have used a similar system with turboprops rather than turbojets.

so if I'm reading this correctly, the reactor is really a torus of liquid, critical uranium or plutonium inside the jet nacelle?

Sea Skimmer wrote:

Iosef Cross wrote: Cancel the space program (with consumed enormous amounts of money between 1958 and 1972) and pour the money in the Navy.

Yeah, that would not be a good idea. All that money spent by NASA on R&D cycled directly back into military fields. If for not example NASAs invention of the digital camera for Apollo the US military would have still be stuck with film return satellites as the USSR was for the entire cold war. Killing the NASA budget would be all bad for the military.

Broken window fallacy: Just because NASA brings benefits, that doesn't mean that the resources used by them couldn't be used better by other organizations. From the point of view of the military, NASA was a hole where the US threw money into.

-Fixed your grammar to be less shitty - Shep

Modax wrote:

Starglider wrote: but the operational version would have used a liquid metal loop with heat exchangers (similar to Soviet high-performance sub reactors). A seaplane version would probably have used a similar system with turboprops rather than turbojets.

so if I'm reading this correctly, the reactor is really a torus of liquid, critical uranium or plutonium inside the jet nacelle?

The liquid metal is probably sodium that is run through the reactor as coolant. The reactor would probably be in the fuselage of the plane and the liquid sodium would be ducted to the turbofans. I'm not clear on how they get power from the reactor to the fans/jets but it probably wouldn't be that hard. They might even pipe the sodium into another medium that does not contact the reactor core and use that for running a generator. This second medium is cooled by running it through the fans/jets.

IIRC, there has been insufficient radiation shielding available considering the weight limits.

I'll defer to anyone who has proof otherwise, as I have a very amateur knowledge of the field.

Jeremy wrote:The liquid metal is probably sodium that is run through the reactor as coolant. The reactor would probably be in the fuselage of the plane and the liquid sodium would be ducted to the turbofans.

Thanks for clarifying that! I wonder if it that sort of arrangement would be better or worse than the conventional type in terms the aircraft's thrust:weight ratio. Intuition says worse, but on the other hand, doesn't fuel constitute up to 50% of the takeoff weight of some modern fighter aircraft?

IIRC, there has been insufficient radiation shielding available considering the weight limits. I'll defer to anyone who has proof otherwise, as I have a very amateur knowledge of the field.

What about backing the cockpit with a foot or two of DemronTM?

Whether or not that would turn out to be sufficient/practical, this only poses an insurmountable problem in the olden days when all the aircraft were manned. I imagine that a nuclear UAV with surveillance equipment or an automated AWACS capable of loitering above an area for months (years?) at a time would be pretty valuable.

Modax wrote:Whether or not that would turn out to be sufficient/practical, this only poses an insurmountable problem in the olden days when all the aircraft were manned. I imagine that a nuclear UAV with surveillance equipment or an automated AWACS capable of loitering above an area for months (years?) at a time would be pretty valuable.

What happens when it falls out of the sky?

If a carrier or submarine sink, they may damage a fishery but won't harm the land. Land Based reactors are fairly robust because they are static.

Iosef Cross wrote:Broken window fallacy: Just because NASA brings benefits, that doesn't mean that the resources used by them couldn't be used better by other organizations. From the point of view of the military, NASA was a hole where the US threw money into.

And yet the military cheerfully supplied test pilots to the astronaut program, consulted with them on issues like g-tolerance, and shared missile hardware- ever seen a picture of a Titan II with "US Air Force" on the side?

They weren't blind or stupid, you see. They knew that the militarization of space was a serious potential issue, and that the space program was therefore important. Because civilian space exploration taught us a lot about how we could theoretically fight in space, above and beyond any improvments in technology that happened to fall out of the program.

Happily, it never turned out to be necessary to militarize space... but if it had, the military today would owe a tremendous debt to the manned space program for opening the way.

What benefits would a militarized NASA bring? A bunch of AN/XB-70 Dyna-Shroomkyries that can skim the edge of the atmosphere and carry space nukes for propulsion? Is that really beneficial? What benefits do we get if the funding for NASA gets thrown at the US Navy? From the point of view of other people, the US Navy was a hole where the US threw money into to feed nuclear submarines whose benefits may or may not be as beneficial as the benefits of NASA we've benefited from.

Shroom Man 777 wrote:What benefits would a militarized NASA bring? A bunch of AN/XB-70 Dyna-Shroomkyries that can skim the edge of the atmosphere and carry space nukes for propulsion? Is that really beneficial? What benefits do we get if the funding for NASA gets thrown at the US Navy? From the point of view of other people, the US Navy was a hole where the US threw money into to feed nuclear submarines whose benefits may or may not be as beneficial as the benefits of NASA we've benefited from.

...OK, trying to parse that for content.

From a military perspective, NASA was useful because it put a lot of funding into space hardware that might have to be militarized in the future. In the '50s and '60s, we still knew almost nothing about conditions in space, so we had to do basic research of the "toss guys up there and see if their heads explode or not" kind before we could make any serious plans. Thus, a civilian research program was perfectly reasonable as a solution to the problem.

Yeah, my point was that more militarization in either space or by cutting NASA funding and using the monies for the USN to buy some more carriers or nuclear-missile-laden underwater dicks wouldn't really be more beneficial (to the layman) than the benefits of NASA itself.

It was actually more directed at Iosef Cross. "From the point of view of the military, NASA was a hole where the US threw money into." he says, rite? But from the point of view of other people, the military was also a hole where the US threw money into. A lot of people like to point at NASA and go "look at all that money they're wasting for useless space exploration that we'll never benefit, all that cash could be spent feeding Africans/curing cancer/whatever", but the same can equally be said about the military since defense spending is easily way more than the budget allocation of NASA.