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Did there exist a military force in the world in 1863 sufficiently motivated and advanced to take the up the center assault of Picket's Charge on the Union line, and turn it into a workable maneuver? Assume that this is a complete replacement of men and equipment but whoever replaces Longstreet and Pettigrew only replaces the artillery and troops involved in the charge itself, and the tactics are equally unchanged. Likewise, the miserable supply of ammunition remains identical, so breachloaders are less an advantage and many of the guns will not have shot in their targets.

Keep in mind, merely crossing the stone fence and reaching the Union line is not enough, the troops in question must stand a reasonable chance of deciding the battle in favor of the confederates.

The men of Longstreet's division were suffering casualties even before they began their charge. Then, they walk for up to a mile through rifle and cannon fire, suffering roughly 30-40% casualties... and that's before they can even begin shooting back at the Union forces arrayed against them. Once they reach the stone fence, they're being decimated by canister and musketry. The only way they stood a chance of winning at this point is if they could have made the Union soldiers run away... unlikely given that the Union was supported by cannon while the Rebels were not.

Realistically the Rebels did about as good a job as could be expected, and I doubt another force would be able to do better.

No force existed.

No amount of morale or training overturns the simple fact that cannons and bullets kill soldiers in large numbers when they advance in the open.

This was the harsh lesson learned by many armies when they actually had to fight enemies who used entrenched positions. Elan, gymnastics, booze - all of that simply does not stand up to the killing power of artillery and (relatively) accurate rifle fire.

If you want to take an entrenched position, either outflank it, avoid it, or crush it by immense amounts of high explosive - the last of which is not available to Civil War combatants due to technological limitations.

Given what happened to the Confederates- massive casualties as they were torn apart by fire on the approach, which rose to the point where many of their units broke and were finished as fighting units before reaching the stone fence...

I'd split this into two questions.

1) Did units exist which could have advanced through that volume of fire and remained effective enough to engage in a close quarters assault on the Union positions in front of them?

2) Even if such units made up the entirety of the attacking force, would it have mattered?

The answer to (1) is "yes," because some Confederate units did dislodge Union troops from their front line positions. Other units who accomplished similar feats, often from 'elite' regiments of various 19th century militaries, also exist. It is conceivable that more Confederate units could have done this, or that other troops from somewhere else in the world could have done this, on a larger scale than was historically done.

The answer to (2) is "no," because by the time they got through the attackers, the Confederates- unless I am much mistaken- simply did not have enough men left standing to break the Union line. Drive it back, yes, cut it up here and there, yes. Break it, I don't think so.

To the OP; I would say that yes, there were- the same men, twenty-four hours earlier. By the time they made it to the battlefield, the opportunity was long since gone and they had no chance of strategic success- but if two things had gone differently, if Longstreet had not gone the wrong way and had to countermarch wasting most of the afternoon of the second day, and if Pickett had managed to find another road to bring up his troops by and not been congested dead last in the Confederate order of march; then, just maybe, a lunge through the Union centre late on the afternoon of the second day would have been a battle, even war-winning move.

Against distracted, committed, counter- batteried artillery and an army already facing two directions at once, the possibilities would have been brighter than they were the day after; could not have been worse, really. Attack en echelon goes back to Frederick, after all, so it's not a tactic without precedent, or a record of success.

Neither of those things happened, even though one was possible; the logistics of getting Pickett's men to the field in time to play a useful part, instead of a forlorn hope after the Union army had had all night and most of a morning to reorganise, look like the sticking point. By the time Pickett's charge was launched, against a Union army that had nothing else to do but recieve it, and with the rest of the Confederate army not prepared or really able to exploit, it was pointless.

As to who if anyone in 1863 could have stood a reasonable chance of deciding the battle in favour of the confederates, no-one they would have accepted to fight for them, I expect; there may be a two word answer to this, and it is Ayo Gurkhali! The sheer improbability of finding fifteen thousand Nepalese mercenaries to fight for the Confederacy puts this well into the realm of alternate history...and I would love to see it done in a way that managed to make it make sense...but no, not politically possible, even if they may be the only troops around at the time able to better Pickett's men.

The Confederates needed better artillery observation, and a much better organized infantry accompanying gun force to have any hope of accomplishing anything. Given both of those they might have broken the Union line, and would be promptly crushed by a corps strength counter attack anyway. Lee underestimated Union strength, if he had not then it is unlikely he would have ordered such a foolish attack.

Sea Skimmer wrote:The Confederates needed better artillery observation, and a much better organized infantry accompanying gun force to have any hope of accomplishing anything. Given both of those they might have broken the Union line, and would be promptly crushed by a corps strength counter attack anyway. Lee underestimated Union strength, if he had not then it is unlikely he would have ordered such a foolish attack.

I'm not all that familiar with the battles of the civil war, so correct me if I'm wrong. I remember reading a book about Gettysburg and it claimed (or implied) that Lee gained wildly unrealistic expectations of his troops after trouncing the Union in a few battles. The author implied that Lee grew far too overconfident and it all culminated in Picket's charge.

I will dig out that book when I get the chance.

Vehrec wrote:Did there exist a military force in the world in 1863 sufficiently motivated and advanced to take the up the center assault of Picket's Charge on the Union line, and turn it into a workable maneuver? Assume that this is a complete replacement of men and equipment but whoever replaces Longstreet and Pettigrew only replaces the artillery and troops involved in the charge itself, and the tactics are equally unchanged. Likewise, the miserable supply of ammunition remains identical, so breachloaders are less an advantage and many of the guns will not have shot in their targets.

Keep in mind, merely crossing the stone fence and reaching the Union line is not enough, the troops in question must stand a reasonable chance of deciding the battle in favor of the confederates.

There are a lot of troops that might have tried and succeeded (the French Guard, the Prussian Guard, the Bavarian regiments during the 1871 campaign the list goes on and on)...basically, any elite European force that was employed in a shock troop role. However, none of them would have made such a difference had they been employed there, it is not as if there is a +10 bonus troops get for being French/Prussian etc. Maybe they would have more experience in those charges (having done them in several wars before) but that is almost very difficult to consider seeing as how European troops would most likely never have fought at Ghettysburg due to supply issues. The only other desperate attacks like that had AFAIK been done by the French Foreign legion in 1871, but they failed as well to break through the Prussian lines.

Thanas, when you say "would not have fought due to supply issues," I assume you mean that in a European army Lee's 1863 offensive would never have been made because his logistics were so bad?

Simon_Jester wrote:Thanas, when you say "would not have fought due to supply issues," I assume you mean that in a European army Lee's 1863 offensive would never have been made because his logistics were so bad?

In a sense, yes and no. I mean, if there was utter desperation and high espirit de corps, then the attack might have been made, as evidenced by the several French attempts to breach the Prussian lines at Sedan and at Paris. But in general, I doubt a European leader woulld have ordered an attack with an army that was lacking in even basic necessities like shoes. But of course, that is rather easy for me to say considering no European Army was ever in such a situation like that in the 19th century. Maybe the Crimean war does qualify, but that was largely a series of sieges, not an attempt at a deep strike into enemy territory.

I would assume that most European leaders would have tried to fight a defensive war when so desperately outnumbered (think for example of the Danish strategy in the war of schleswig) but Lee - as far as I know - did not have that option due to political concerns. Still, it puzzles me why he would attempt to march so deep into Union territory, especially if he hopes to make Northern morale plummet through casualties, something that is unlikely to be realized in an offensive war.

Though I freely admit I am far from an expert on the civil war besides general reading, so feel free to correct me if something is wrong here.

From what I know, I believe his aim was to sweep north, then strike south towards Washington and seize the capital in a broad encirclement. He'd tried a narrow encirclement the year before (got stopped at Antietam), and a direct assault was ruled out by the fortifications covering the capital from the south.

This was, as you say, a desperation tactic- he was trying to create a situation that would force the government to seriously consider sitting down and negotiating rather than simply crushing the Confederacy, at a time when the Confederate defenses were already failing on other fronts.

The entire war on the mid-Atlantic coast can be viewed as a contest of strength between the Union and the Confederacy to see who could take the other's capital- a consequence of Washington and Richmond lying so close together, and of Virginia being one of the greatest centers of Confederate military and industrial power. In the opening years, Lee enjoyed great tactical success at defeating Union invasions of Virginia, and was able to launch counterattacks aimed at taking Washington; in 1864-65, he was forced onto the defensive and gradually defeated.

At the same time, you have the Confederates losing control of the Mississippi river in 1863, and Sherman's offensive down through Georgia in 1864. This was part of an overall strategy to cut the Confederacy apart and break up its transport network and major field armies, to the point where further resistance became impossible. I'd argue it was these other theaters that decided the war, but the Virginia/Maryland theater gets a lot of the attention, probably because it contains the highest density of major battles fought between the two armies.

Simon_Jester wrote:From what I know, I believe his aim was to sweep north, then strike south towards Washington and seize the capital in a broad encirclement. He'd tried a narrow encirclement the year before (got stopped at Antietam), and a direct assault was ruled out by the fortifications covering the capital from the south.

By 1863 Washington was encircled by over 25 miles of fortifications and something like 40 specific forts, no direction was wide open by this point. His goal seems to have been to burn a path to Philly, burn that, then seize Baltimore which was only kept on the Union side by armed force the whole war, for a while in 1861 the rail line to Washington could not be used because of mobs burning the bridges. If he'd gotten those two cities and used captured arms to arm the population of Baltimore then its pretty likely Washington would have surrendered, but it was never going to happen. The Union army was simply too big to be defeated in one big battle without making really glaring mistakes, and supplying the Confederate advance completely from capture while possible, was unlikely. Lee didn't grasp this, neither did Union commanders before Grant. Everyone was still trying to fight like Napoleon when you could win in one action.

bobalot wrote: I'm not all that familiar with the battles of the civil war, so correct me if I'm wrong. I remember reading a book about Gettysburg and it claimed (or implied) that Lee gained wildly unrealistic expectations of his troops after trouncing the Union in a few battles. The author implied that Lee grew far too overconfident and it all culminated in Picket's charge.

I will dig out that book when I get the chance.

He was overconfident, but its not like he was going crazy about it and he simply did have men with very high moral, and he needed to use every weapon he had for the Confederates to win. That moral was a weapon. The bombardment which supported the attack is by number of tubes the largest artillery barrage in North American history for example; its just the firepower was wasted by bad observation letting the rounds mostly land over. He also had a major flanking attack made by his cavalry which is mostly ignored; that attack did not go well either. So its not like he was being totally unrealistic; and after all he had turned back a massive Union attack on Richmond the year prior which should have never failed, via making very aggressive attacks. He also thought the Union was a full army corps weaker in strength then it really was, blame Stuart's late arrival for that.

The alternative to making the charge was to retreat and return to fighting a battle of attrition, on Confederate soil/ That had not been working very well, and sparing Virginia, not only his home but also the only industrial center at all in the south from another campaign season was important and a major factor in why Lee ever invaded the North.

Sea Skimmer wrote:By 1863 Washington was encircled by over 25 miles of fortifications and something like 40 specific forts, no direction was wide open by this point. His goal seems to have been to burn a path to Philly, burn that, then seize Baltimore which was only kept on the Union side by armed force the whole war, for a while in 1861 the rail line to Washington could not be used because of mobs burning the bridges.

Ah. My mistake. Thank you.

Well before the Stone Wall where the Charge broke, the army had to cross several fields that each had their own WOODEN Fences. These fences are only now being replaced across the Gettysburg Battlegrounds as the Park Service continues its purchase and restoration of the area.

Each time the Confederates came to one of these fences, they would have to stop, climb over, reform their lines, and then march onwards. Each stop was a killing field, as well as a place soldiers could go AWOL to escape the murderous artillery fire.

Thanas wrote:But in general, I doubt a European leader woulld have ordered an attack with an army that was lacking in even basic necessities like shoes.

Ironically, that's why a battle the battle was fought at Gettysburg. A Confederate column heard there was a stockpile of shoes in town and ran into a Union column.

I would assume that most European leaders would have tried to fight a defensive war when so desperately outnumbered (think for example of the Danish strategy in the war of schleswig) but Lee - as far as I know - did not have that option due to political concerns. Still, it puzzles me why he would attempt to march so deep into Union territory, especially if he hopes to make Northern morale plummet through casualties, something that is unlikely to be realized in an offensive war.

Confederate strategy at the start of the war had been to fight defensively, simply repulsing Union invasions until Europe intervened for the sake of cotton imports. It worked early on in the east because of bad generals like McClellan, but failed miserably in the west. By halfway through '62, the Confederates had lost the entire Mississippi River except Vicksburg. Lee's invasion (simultaneous with Bragg's invasion of Kentucky in the west) was meant to score a victory in Northern soil and compel Europe to recognize the Confederacy. When it failed, and Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, chances of Europe intervening basically fell to zero.

From '63 onward, the hope turned instead of simply wearing out the North and get them to elect an anti-war president in '64. Inflicting casualties was only part of it. The U.S. regularly sustained more casualties in single battles than in all previous wars combined, and Antietam is still the bloodiest day in American history. It was the demoralization of the war dragging on, of no progress being made, that really impacted things. Lee had a number of reasons to invade: to spare northern Virginia more fighting (and let his army live off Maryland/Pennsylvania for awhile instead), to relieve pressure on Vicksburg (which was under siege and surrendered the day after the last day of Gettysburg), and to shock the North into peace.

Obviously its difficult to asses all the differing factors but Napoleon often used a massed central attack to break the enemy army after after a protracted battle of attrition- of course the 'French' army of this period was much better at using artillery and melee cavalry in close support of advancing infantry than armies of the the civil war and Napoleon usually kept at least a corps of fresh troops to hand to deliver this attack (sometimes his Guard).

A couple of technical factors mainly based on the idea that artillery had a much large kill zone than that of Napoleons era due to rifling and improved casting methods which allowed heaver shot means that Union artillery will be causing much more damage at long range - but its musketry and canister that will actually repulse the assault which was largely unchanged from the early 19th century (minie bullets and rifling did not lead to a significant increase in accuracy of range when it came to volley fire over smoothbores).

Even if you had substituted Pettigrews and Pickets men with the ANVs best (IMO) attacking divisions of Hood and Early and make them fresh on day 3 I think you still get the same result because as mentioned two divisions may have managed to make a lodgement in the Union lines in cementary hill but would have being ejected eventually by the substancial union reinformcents that Meade could have bought in (I have wargamed this scenrio a few times and even when I take the point of attack as the rebels the flanks of my 'bulge' get worn down by Union troops.)

Its easy to talk of missed rebel chances at Gettysburg but I think the real lesson of the battle was that Union troops had got better since 1862 and that a decisive victory was never really in Lee's grasp.

Napoleon won so many battles through the charge for two reasons 1) he was always where the enemy felt was impossible to get a large army to quickly and 2) he generally charged under favourable conditions, as an example he would pin the enemy while pushing units to the flanks and force the enemy reserve to commit at that point his reserve would reinforce or make a break through in the frontage. Lastly he generally fought a strategic defensive ie: he would out flank and out manoeuvre till he reached a choke point in the enemy rear then cut them from resupply and re-enforcement. Not being American I don't understand the details of the civil war but from what I read Gettysberg didn't in any way fit this, and from what I understand was a good general being put in an unenviable situation politically - similar to Hannibal being called home in a way. Should Gettysberg have happened? well the best answer is what if it had worked.. could the confederacy have in one last desperate action actually won?. From what I understand it probably would have failed to win the victory the confederates were looking for - that said Washington was a powerful symbol (this also neglects to account for desperate urban defence and so on that may have occurred even if the confederates got to the capitol). The reality was that the south had too few people, not enough factories and wasn't willing to emancipate the slaves to form further units. The only nation with any ability to influence the civil war was England and well they didn't seem to care enough to invade from Canada.

Napoleon also simply had greater forces to play with in most battles, his largest single army after all was similar in scale to all Union and Confederate armies put together. If Napoleon had been thinking about a charge like this, he would have been thinking in terms of 25-50,000 men to do it echeloned in depth. The Confederate attack lacked any real depth. Great depth could exploit not just limited weapons of the defender, but also the limited ammunition supply all armies of the era carried in the forward units. The Confederates might have had more success if they had attacked on a narrower front; not the strategy one might first think was wise but it can’t work worse then the historical disaster. I believe Lee also simply overestimated how many men Longstreet even had, thinking it was over 15,000 men in the corps when it was closer to 12,000.

Even if Pickett made his charge and struck contact with the Union line (and managed to sustain this contact) so what?

Like Sea Skimmer pointed out, the charge lacked depth. Even if Pickett did make contact, there would be no one around in a tactical position to support and exploit his maneuver. It would have been a different story if the Confederates had either artillery superiority or a rapid response force in place to roll up a flank, but as it stood, Pickett's Charge, whether it succeeded or failed, would have meant nothing if nothing else in the battle changed.

I'm surprised no one's brought up Anderson so far in this discussion.

If Anderson had held the momentum of his push and didn't get repulsed by Union reinforcements, Pickett's charge may have had a snowball's chance to turn the battle. There may have been a time window when Pickett could have coordinated his charge with Anderson's advance, but I'll leave that supposition to those better versed in CW history than I.

mithie your wrong in assuming that no one took andersons actions into account - I admit this isn't my forte as far as history goes but we went as far as assuming that napoleon was present. I am pretty sure we meant if there was any way picket could have been successful including everyone and everything else going right.... but since you feel we overlooked something what if anderson and picket succeeded then what?. Is there any real chance the battle would have been anything but the last gasp of the confederacy - I am not denigrating the men who died at Gettysburg and a Gettysburg was going to be fought somewhere simply because the south was proud and the north stronger. Even if Gettysburg succeeded in defeating the north it would have merely prolonged the war a little and added to the death toll. Unless you can come up with an intelligent reason why not?.

mithie your wrong in assuming that no one took andersons actions into account - I admit this isn't my forte as far as history goes but we went as far as assuming that napoleon was present. I am pretty sure we meant if there was any way picket could have been successful including everyone and everything else going right.... but since you feel we overlooked something what if anderson and picket succeeded then what?.

IF Anderson and Pickett succeeded, they would have pushed straight through the Union flank.

IF Anderson and Pickett forced the Union's left flank to route, they could have pushed all the way to Taneytown road.

IF Anderson and Pickett managed to hold the road, Hays would be forced to stagger his line to protect the Union batteries.

IF Hays staggered his line to deal with Pickett and Anderson, Pettigrew may have held his push, and the Confederates would have won Gettysburg.

Yeah, that's a lot of IFs, but it's not hard to see the chain reaction that could have happened if you manage to collapse an entire flank of the opponent and decapitate half of his leadership.

Is there any real chance the battle would have been anything but the last gasp of the confederacy - I am not denigrating the men who died at Gettysburg and a Gettysburg was going to be fought somewhere simply because the south was proud and the north stronger. Even if Gettysburg succeeded in defeating the north it would have merely prolonged the war a little and added to the death toll. Unless you can come up with an intelligent reason why not?.

Gettysburg meant very little when placed in the extended frame of the whole war. The Union simply had an insurmountable industrial capacity. I don't think I've ever made any argument regarding the outcome of the war. But Pickett's charge was a gamble that had a chance to succeed, if Anderson pulled a bloody miracle and held his momentum.

mithie wrote:If Anderson had held the momentum of his push and didn't get repulsed by Union reinforcements, Pickett's charge may have had a snowball's chance to turn the battle. There may have been a time window when Pickett could have coordinated his charge with Anderson's advance, but I'll leave that supposition to those better versed in CW history than I.

Against George Stannard and the 3rd Vermont? Anderson had no chance at all. He had available two brigades, 1,600 in total strength, and deployed in a single line, marching uphill over open ground and against the Vermonters who held a strong position on the ridge and deployed in an L-formation to make a perfect enveloping firezone on any approaching enemy formation. They'd just finished shooting Kemper to bits and did the same thing to Wilcox and Lang when they came up for it. Anderson didn't have the numbers and he didn't have the depth to achieve anything at all —especially not against prepared troops with competent fighting officers in command.

And I don't think anywhere on the line was weak enough for a frontal charge ... I think it was longstreet? who suggested a rear assault or blocking manoeuvre which again probably would have failed, so mithie apart from what Patrick said I don't see anything else you suggested being feasible especially as the union troops were fresher and able to be replaced or rotated.

And I don't think anywhere on the line was weak enough for a frontal charge ... I think it was longstreet? who suggested a rear assault or blocking manoeuvre which again probably would have failed, so mithie apart from what Patrick said I don't see anything else you suggested being feasible especially as the union troops were fresher and able to be replaced or rotated.

Right. I think we're on two completely different levels on the boundaries of this thread.

So the premise here is alternate history. You're talking about replacing Pickett with Napoleon for god's sakes. It's a what-if scenario about what could possibly cause Pickett's charge to succeed. And I proposed that if Anderson DID have the manpower available to sustain his push, if Anderson HAD tighter control of his men, he could have provided the support Pickett's charge needed to get something done. Say, if Anderson had an additional full strength brigade, and coordinated better with Pickett, it's entirely possible he could have sustained the momentum.

This is an ALTERNATE WHAT-IF SCENARIO. I am absolutely NOT attempting to argue any other outcome with the historical deployment.

Against George Stannard and the 3rd Vermont? Anderson had no chance at all. He had available two brigades, 1,600 in total strength, and deployed in a single line, marching uphill over open ground and against the Vermonters who held a strong position on the ridge and deployed in an L-formation to make a perfect enveloping firezone on any approaching enemy formation. They'd just finished shooting Kemper to bits and did the same thing to Wilcox and Lang when they came up for it. Anderson didn't have the numbers and he didn't have the depth to achieve anything at all —especially not against prepared troops with competent fighting officers in command.

Anderson's push wasn't rebuffed immediately. It got rebuffed when Union reinforcements showed up, and Anderson lost control of his men. The fact of the matter is, Anderson DID make progress, his men DID contest the push with some degree of success, and if he DID have another wave behind him to give him the momentum needed to overcome the Union reinforcements, he would have been in an extremely good position to cushion Pickett's charge.