StarDestroyer.Net BBS

Well, I'm on leave and since I'm dateless, well.....

Unfortunately, I can't find the books that actually presented primary documents, so, I'm presenting stuff that's secondary/tertiary stuff.

Brian P. Farrell, The Defence and fall of Singapore 1940-1942.

Regarding fixed defences and training.
Major Ashmore: There is no doubt whatever that the Garrison of Malaya was not trained for the campaign and the responsibility for this fact must be accepted as the fault of the higher command. There are, however, in my humble opinion, a number of factors which mitigated against complete and proper training of the forces.

Defensive works was one of the reasons given(along with acclimatisation and etc). Perceival post mortem states
A balance, therefore had to be struck between the employment of troops on defence works and their field training. I decided that the proper course was to build up a foundation of good individual and sub-unit trainingm which could be done concurrently with the construction of defences. If hostilities did nto break out in the autumn I hoped that we might then expect a period of three months(Decemeber/February) during which we could concentrate on higher training... Towards the end of September, the defences having made good progress, I directed that an increased proportion of time should be alloted to training.

We could thus see that higher training ,(division level) was initially scheduled only after December. The relatively raw Indian Army had only a few months to conduct its training.This was complicated of course by the situation on the ground. The war diaries for the 22nd Indian Brigade defending kuantan records in the month in October and november, and two battalions, 2nd Argylls and 4/19 Hyderabadis didn't even schedule any training during the month of may miminal afterwards.
Despite all this work, the field defences were in no way complete. The Australians themselves took over the Mersing line and was so unahppy that they spent the remainding time prior to the war upgrading those defences.

11th Indian division records that only 1 monthly brigade exercise and a battalion exercise held weekly was conducted in the months prior to war, such that only one company per battalion was field training at any given time. This is significant of course. 5/11 Sikh war dirary noted that the Bn arrived in Malaya in August having been throughly milked, 450 recruits and 6 British officers unable to speak Urdu having joined a few weeks prior to embarkation.. Much work was needed to correct these defiencies but the British had to work on field defences. Most damaging would be the fact that miminal anti tank exercises was done.

YET, despite all the expenditure in labour, we know from Stimson and other sources that everybody involved was unhappy with the defences thus errected.
Perceival notes What was lacking was the ability to drop the construction of defences and take a formation, complete with all its arms, off into the country and carry out intensive training.

Perceival blamed Governer Shenton as the governer forbid massive works that would draw upon labourers, especially pay at wartime rates. This was due to his directive from London that the economy/supply of cash was not to be disrupted. Shenton counter-argument was that the military adminstration failed to push the importance and urgency of the mission on his staff, (never once prior to the Japanese invasion was any warning given of the great danger in which we were placed. )and all involved acknowledged the complexity of Britsh adminstration(Federated Malay States, Unfederated Malay States, Straits Settlement. There were 22 seperate civil positions to negotiate ).

At Jitra itself, Simson blamed the lack of urgency and care on the officers involved, especially upper levels(Perceival). This is a tad unfair, since Murray Lyons primary concern days before the war broke out was in mustering the brigade for Operation Matador and his staff was tied up with the logistic work involved. The scale of works could be seen in that 5 million pounds was authorised and by April, 4 million was already spent.


Of interest is Simson allegations. His claims that the defences at Jitra was incomplete and that only the Southern coast of Singapore was fortified is valid. The most damming charge is the construction of defences in Johore and the northern coast of Singapore. There is actually very little proof that Percival entirely ignored Stimson suggestions, just that he was unable to do so. In Dec 26, Stimson claims Perceival refuse to endorse his proposal, for the fear of destroying morale(a claim made post war, after Perceival had died). However, on 20th Decemember, Perceival had issued orders to prepare defences in Johore and northern Singapore. Simson was allowed to petition his case to Simmons which was supposedly rejected. But on 28th Dec, Perceival ordered Simmons to draft plans to demolish the CAuseway, and on 29th Dec, the respective commanders of the Indian Corp, the AIF and Fortress Singapore was informed that the Public Works Dpartment had been directed to build fixed defences, and they were to prepare the positions for said work. Interestingly, the army CRE Stimson wasn't involved in this....... supposed to work up north perhaps.

Desertion
A placeholder here, since I couldn't find the book that had actual figures on desertion. The problem with calculating desertion was due to stragglers. Units outflanked or retreating back to Fortress Singapore often dispersed and went through the jungle, scattering men.

There were accounts of Australian soldiers reaching Singapore town utterly lost and scattered from their parent unit, after the retreat from the beaches. Were these thus deserters?

Furthermore, stragglers did become deserters if they failed to be picked up, especially in the ending days of Singapore.
The Australians had their famous desertion. An armed party displaced civilian evacuatees and took over the Empire Star on the 11th of February. Most infamously, Bennett abandoned his men and took ship for Australia days later, albeit, only after the situation was utterly lost and the garrison was surrendered.

The Indian Army on the other hand.... we know that desertion on the mainland was relatively few. Recruits for the INA was from POWs mostly and pickings were relatively slim. This would change drastically on Singapore, although the impact of the INA is debatable.

There are contradictory claims, but 4/19 Hyderabad had a mass desertion in the face of japanese attack on 10th February. The retreat from the north was inflicted by communications/command error and complicated by seeing troops withdraw, 1/15 Punjabi withdrawal south is mostly blamed as desertion but its been argued otherwise. 1/8 Punjabi retreated without orders late on 11th Feburary when it was mortared, it was rallied by the British officer Key but the next day, 3 companies disappeared. On 14th February 2/10th Baluch dissolved, and Indian deserters were shelled upon by division artillery.

The question rests whether the desertion and withdrawals were prompted more by green troops wishing to reach safety or giving up what seemed a hopeless fight or active recruitment by the INA. We do know that General Wavell had a report by Major Thomas comissioned after the surrender and he blamed the Australians for the morale/discipline issues and general desertion. HOWEVER, Wavell personal bias might had also come into play here, so the AIF counter-argument might also be true.

Nevertheless, given the known language/training issues of the absolutely green Indian formations sent as reinforcements, isn't that reasonable to show why soldiers refused to fight after retreating to Japanese attack? Especially if the rear area was disorganised? We do know that there was no system of straggler post/MP patrols to pick up stragglers and reform them. Furthermore, given the field conditions and the staff, stragglers were reformed into punitive units that soon dispersed afterwards.

Accck... Forgot an edit.

Regarding defences in Singapore...... with regards to defences, in January, some of the defensive work that got laid in was on the southern coast and involved laying anti beach obstacles.......

God knows why.

Brian P Farell points out the weak state of the RAF/RAAF in Singapore by poring through documents, that show due to the need to provide fighter cover and reconnitore the Sumatra invasion flotilla, only one Buffalo was available to patrol the Johore Straits during the period before Singapore was invaded.

With only one airplane to provide information, its no longer becomes unbelievable that the British believed 5 Japanese divisions was preparing to invade Singapore.

A Great Betrayal? The Fall of Singapore revisited is a conference held in 2000 in Singapore, meant to present new views about the defeat, around the theme of "betrayal".

Unfortunately, the book that collated the essays and speeches presented does not have any footnotes.

Anyway, Peter Stanley presented material gathered from the Australian POWs memoirs and notes taken after Changi, where they analyzed their defeat. Its the standard material that came out, about how the Japs force was superior in mobility and enjoyed air superiority and more equipment, the Indian divisions weaknesses and etc.

Of intereste is this though.
According to Brigadier Arthur Blackburn VC, an Australian brigadier in Singapore-and there were only two-told him that "I knew it was hopeless so I drew my men back from the beaches and let the Japanese through."


While Peter did not go into more details, this clearly referred to the numerous unauthorised and too rapidly executed withdrawals by AIF forces, on from Bukit Timah and the other from the beaches itself.

Convention states that the withdrawals were blamed on poor communications, command & control, but it turned out that Taylor had a different battle plan than Benett.... or Perceival.

Taylor orders to his battalion commanders was to prepare them to fall back to the Ama Keng position, a village north of Tengah Airbase. These orders were verbal however, an no written orders were sent informing the artillery, 8th Australian Division or Malaya command.

This isn't true defeatism however, since Taylor simply recognised the gaps in the official battle plan and inserted his own opinion on it. If it had turned out successfully, we would be praising Taylor for his own initative. As it was, history proved him correct, when the lack of artillery fire and the thin, spread out 22nd Australian Brigade exposed gaps for the Japanese to land and turn their positions. Command was inefficient and no devastating counter-attack could be launched on the beachead immediately. A problem that plagued Malaya Command popped up again, as battalion radios were unreliable, and Benett complicated this with his own orders. Once the landlines were knocked out, C3 became impossible. Attempts to control the battle and direct artillery fire were by flares...... this in thick jungle........


But... did this mean the AIF wasn't broken? Taylor disobeyed orders to fight on the beaches to the death and planned to withdraw, and withdraw early. The results of this withdrawal and Bennett/Perceival response resulted in Australian stragglers having to retreat all the way back to Singapore town to be reformed into scratch units and redeployed... If they did get redeployed, which accounts for the difficulties in counting desertions from the AIF, as some stragglers did rejoin their units but others didn't. And stragglers which were sent back to Depot may not have been reformed, and they thus deserted.


The problem however rests in Maxwell, formerly from 2/19 AIF and assigned to command the second brigade that was now responsible to stop the Japanese after they consolidated at Tengah.Brian P Ferrell asserts that Maxwell altered the unit diary and lied to the official historian. What occurred was that Maxwell asserted that permission was granted to him, by Major C.B Dawkins, division GSO 2 to withdraw and "change his front" to face west. Bennett refused permission and no record could be found that permission was granted to withdraw, furthermore, this from a lesser officer. Sadly, Maxwell withdrawal changed the tactical situation completely, preventing the Australians from potentially winning the only battle that they could had won in the Singapore campaign, as artillery and other units were out of position to engage the piecemeal Japanese assault. Indeed, the battle was so demoralising, that Corporal Tsuchikane, records that he felt that he was caught in Abikyokan, hell, and the Japanese officer Nishimura demanded Yamashita call off the attack, ultimately calling off the planned invasion of Singapore as this would had forced the Japanese to retreat.

Meanwhile, the withdrawal was concealed and no information sent up the line to Benett or Malaya command at the battle box. This was aggravated because Oakes withdrew further than intended, exposing the trunk road and exposing Bukit Timah, for the Japanese driving charge to attack.


Given this information, one wonders if Arthur Blackburn confession was referring to Taylor, who had a legitimate reason to withdraw even though he disobeyed orders, or Maxwell, who didn't. It also exposed the poor morale in leadership in the AIF, showing the utterly broken elements of both armies in Singapore.

Neither the Australians nor the Indians were capable of offerring determined resistance to the Japanese in February 1942.