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I suggested this idea once, but screwed up when it came to posting it.

The question is- if Napoleon had designed to give Davout some sort of command in Spain, how would he have faired? Obviously this scenario has a lot of potential variations (early in the Spanish campaigns, late in the Spanish campaigns etc), but also a few common elements- how well suited Davout was to the basic 'Spanish Ulcer' problem.

What do the people here think?

If you want sensible responses, I think you are going to have to be more specific. What is "some sort" of command? Would he be replacing Ney, Murat, Junot, (etc.) or supplementing them?

Is there any reason to suppose that Davout would have done better than, say, Massena? What about Davout's career presupposes that he would be specially suited to understanding and reacting to the problems faced on the peninsula?

It wasn't that he was particularly suited, but more that I've heard quite a few good things said about Davout overall (admittedly on internet forums and possibly unfairly- I'm not sure) relative to Napoleon's other marshals, and that he didn't get a shot at Wellington.

Say Davout ends up being given a shot when historically Massena was. What do people think would have happened from that?

Carinthium wrote:Say Davout ends up being given a shot when historically Massena was. What do people think would have happened from that?

Wellington gets thumped at Fuentes d'Onoro, badly. Given an opponent of Massena's quality he should have got thumped anyway, and he knew it.

It's hard to say really. Davout has an excellent reputation due to his numerous victories, but the opponents Wellington faced in Spain were no slouches either.

Even at Salamanca (Wellington's big victory in Spain) he was initially badly wrongfooted by Marmont and forced to start withdrawing back to Portugal. It was only Marmont's overconfidence that caused the French lines to become dangerously overextended, allowing Wellington to counter-attack and crush Marmont's army. Even so, it's arguable that the battle would have been much closer had Marmont and his 2nd in command had not been wounded and taken out of action early in the battle by a British howitzer shell.

Captain Seafort wrote: Wellington gets thumped at Fuentes d'Onoro, badly. Given an opponent of Massena's quality he should have got thumped anyway, and he knew it.

What would Davout have been able to change? Would he have been able to force Lepic to commit his cavalry when Massena was not? That was, arguably, the defining moment of the battle that decided it in favor of Wellington.

Far as I know there's only really one English language biography of Davout, John G Gallaher's "The Iron Marshal"; what emerges from it is that he and Wellington could have stepped into each other's shoes with little difficulty at all. Similar command styles, similar approaches to war and logistics, similarly iron- handed approach to organisation and authority, similar sense of duty and honesty, similar small circles of personal friends and wide circles of acquaintances;

the first main difference is that while Wellington could be charming and urbane when it suited him, Davout was a dour, grumpy, miserable, moody bastard, who took to diplomacy like a rhinoceros to embroidery; never happy at court or with the people of the Empire, although recognised it as his duty to try.

Big pointer here is his time in Poland- which is the time that he otherwise would have spent in the Peninsula. He was the best rewarded of Napoleon's marshals (after Berthier), because as the Corsican said "I have to; he won't go out and steal for himself." The one thing he did try to steal was the crown of Poland- the position, not the artifact.

He spent quite a lot of the two and a half years after Aspern- Essling as the French military governor of Poland, and insofar as he gave his thoughts away at all he seems to have liked Poland and her people, enough to think of settling there, and conciliating and consolidating his position with the Polish with a view to making his position permanent. Not being a fool, he was well aware of his own reputation and how he had come by it, and worked hard to overcome it.

Which is actually a distinct point in his favour. The only French Marshal to make any real political gains- to come close to reconciling the Spanish to French rule- was Suchet in the north- east, who took the starting advantage of Catalonian separatism and worked it up into a system of local government, community authorities elected by a broader franchise than had existed under Madrid and supported by locally recruited police ultimately backed by French troops, Spanish judiciary with a right of appeal to French courts- that would have stood a chance of holding Spain for the French if it had been more widely implemented.

Question then becomes, would Davout- given several previous experiences as military governor, of Berlin and Vienna for two- have seen the need for something of the sort, and have been able to implement it on a broad enough scale early enough, and protect it with enough force judiciously applied, that it would have a chance to spread and grow? Shifted down from Poland to make room for the more realistically acceptable candidate Poniatowski, say, if allowed to take III Corps with him especially, I have to reckon yes.

Whether it would have been enough, now there, there's the rub- Suchet's Catalans were loyal to him, within a loose definition of the term; how loyal would Davout's Castillians have been? He could hardly have failed to make the British/Portugese/free Spanish prosecution of the Peninsular war more difficult, but difficult enough to cause the collapse of the war effort? Only in the absence of Wellington, which brings us back to the battlefield.

The victor of Assaye against the victor of Auerstaedt? That would be fun. Not that much to choose between them- for all Wellington's supposed reserve, he did have the talent of turning up everywhere on a batlefield. Bringing it down to the men under their command, to be honest I'd reckon advantage the French, up until the turn of 1811-12. By that point attrition from guerilla has affected them and Wellington has had a chance to mould the Peninsular army into his own image- before that I'd say that the men Davout moulded, who were the class of the grande armee, have the edge.

Ultimately though, even if Napoleon's best man can take and keep Spain, there's still the economically inevitable Russian war to come, and the snow, from Borodino to Berezhina, and the Battle of the Nations, and Montmirail. The final outcome of French victory in Spain would probably be the total collapse of the overseas Spanish empire and independence for the pieces there and then, and probable civil war in Spain between modernists and nationalists rumbling on for maybe a couple of decades after the end of the Napoleonic Wars.

ECR->

Could you elaborate a bit on Davout's time in Poland? Sounds like a fascinating little episode in Davout's life that is seldom covered.

First of all, mea culpa on the dates, I had those wrong. He was governor of Poland from Eylau to Aspern-Essling, not from Aspern- Essling on.

That said, from Gallaher,chaper 8 is the relevant section, and p165,

The question of Polish independence was one which tended to separate the Emperor and his newly created Duke. Davout had always been sympathetic towards the cause of Polish independence. "An ally is worth more than a slave." he had frequently advised the Emperor. Furthermore he tended to take Napoleon at his word, as indeed did many Poles, when the Emperor spoke of re- establishing the Polish kingdom. This genuine sympathy gradually became suspect during 1809-10 as personal ambitions became involved. Was Davout's interest in Poland motivated by his desire to ascend the Polish throne, or was it simply on behalf of the Polish people? If it had started as the latter, there were few in Europe by 1812 who did not believe that Davout was actively seeking a crown.

From p166,

There is no doubt but that Napoleon believed Davout aspired to kingship. Indeed, as he believed every soldier carried in his knapsack a Marshal's baton, so he saw in the baggage train of every Marshal a crown. Napoleon once declared to M. de Narbonne that Davout spoke of Polish affairs from personal interest, and concluded that this type of political egotism was always unpleasant.

From page 166-167,

As one Polish historian wrote, he was a friend of the Poles. The Countess de Bloqueville [Davout's daughter] statesthat there was a party in Poland which avoured Davout's candidacy.Furthermore, the Marshal made a conscious effort to win the support and the affection of the Polish people. The latter was somewhat difficult for a man of Davout's temperament and personality. Respected for his military abilities as he was, no-ine ever accused the "Iron Marshal" of being well liked- much less loved- by his comrades in arms. Yet, while in Poland he gave frequent dinners, banquets and balls to which he invited the local dignitaries, both civil and military, in ever increasing number. At one of these banquets, honoring the installation fo the new Polish government, Davout rose and toasted "the good health of the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Poland."

My interpretation is that Davout was mistaken in thinking he had a chance at the crown of Poland, but for interesting reasons-he never really stopped being a man of the revolution, or at least the new order it was supposed to bring; carried on being so long after Napoleon himself had turned away. A large part of his job in Poland was implementing social and legal reform, including the Code Napoleon, which caused major distress and turmoil among the upper nobility and the extremely religious, but which tended to improve things for everyone else, including an already more or less pro- French grass roots movement.

If there was to be an independent Kingdom of Poland instead of the half way there Duchy of Warsaw (which would probably involve a war with the Russians to make happen), somebody had to be in charge, after all, and the existing nobility (in Davout's view) were mostly not pro- French and fighting reform- not openly with weapons, but being obstructive and awkward, delays and deliberate miscommunications; his plan was to sideline the existing nobility, creating the vacancy, stengthen the pro- French elements of the population (most of what middle class there was to be found and a probable majority of the common people), and bring Poland into the nineteenth century on the French model.

He was getting ahead of himself, though. Even if the project had been Napoleon's as well as his own (which it was not), he was maybe third on the list of candidates, behind Napoleon's younger brother Jerome and the leading Polish candidate Stanislas Poniatowski, despite having done most of the actual work of reform and reconstruction.

So, oddly, the route to Davout in Spain leads through Napoleon's sincerity or lack of it in his promises to Poland. If he had been entirely serious, and it's hard to imagine Alexander of Russia sitting still for it, and Davout didn't get the job, he might have been granted the booby prize- the Peninsula.

Thanks for elaborating. Davout, King of Poles would have been a fun (even if all but impossible) historical what-if .

I think the overall issue with the French command in spain was not one of bad supreme commanders but rather one of bad divisional commanders. Give Massena say, Oudinot and Lasalle at Fuentes de Oñoro and Wellington would suffer badly. Or even have Kellermann in command of the Cavalry - it would very well have turned out differently.

Thanas wrote:I think the overall issue with the French command in spain was not one of bad supreme commanders but rather one of bad divisional commanders. Give Massena say, Oudinot and Lasalle at Fuentes de Oñoro and Wellington would suffer badly. Or even have Kellermann in command of the Cavalry - it would very well have turned out differently.

This piqued my interest so I took a look at the French Divisional commanders at Salamanca (because I know that battle better).

And going through the list (mostly via Wiki, for I was weak ), most of the French Divisional commanders in that battle were recently promoted Brigade commanders with nothing particularly extraordinary in their record with the exception of Foy. And of all the French Divisions, only Foy's emerged from Salamanca intact.

So, yes, there does seem to be a problem of bad French Divisional commanders for the Spanish campaign and not just at Fuentes de Onoro.