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Curious as to what people's opinions might be on the different historical outcomes.

For the purposes of this thread I am referring to the arguments presented in:

War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe by Victoria Hui
http://www.amazon.com/State-Formation-A ... ctoria+hui

In short, she posits that the ancient kingdom of Qin in Warring States China succeeded in conquering its rivals and forming a unified state (and subsequently taken over by the Han dynasty) because of "self-strengthening" reforms and "ruthless strategies", by which she defines as:

1. Extension of the state apparatus as far as possible to the lowest level of society, the household, in order to extract maximum taxes, productivity, labor, and manpower for war, thereby removing the need to gain funds through merchant loans or tax farming.
2. Lack of intermediary or competing centers of power, such as the medieval church or nobility. After the Shang Yang reforms, Qin had implemented a centralized bureaucracy with the head of state at the top, and broken the power of the old nobility
3. Ruthless strategems such as wholesale slaughter of defeated armies to irreversibly sap the manpower of competing states, as well as state sponsored subversion and bribery of other state officials in order to influence policy or military strategy.
4. Taking advantage of the short-term opportunism of other rival states to bandwagon on top of Qin's successes, in order to prevent them from allying together to maintain a balance of power.
5. Late monetization of the economy (which occurred in China after the Qin dynasty) which meant there was no easy means to raise funds (like merchant loans) short of directly taxing the population.
6. Territories directly adjacent to Qin were targeted for conquest and absorption, rather than piecemeal holdings that could be separated geographically (which sometimes occurred in the past due to noble fiefs). Conquered territories were also directly absorbed into the existing Qin state structure, with dismantling of the conquered state's structure.

In contrast, she felt Europe (up to and including Napoleon's era) failed to unite due to essentially "self-weakening" reforms, which were short-term expedients that led to long term bad consequences. The most severe of these was:
1. Reliance on mercenaries which were expensive and unreliable instead of national armies.
2. Fund raising methods. Instead of trying to rationalize and extend the tax gathering apparatus both in breadth and in depth, monarchs sold public offices, took out loans, or secured immediate funds through selling rights to tax farm from their lands. This was posited to be due to the stage of monetization of the economy, which took place and offered easier ways to raise money and troops in the short term in Europe, whereas Qin was not a heavily monetized economy.
4. Wars pursued with short term goals such as piecemeal territorial gains (which could be discontinuous with the main state) or settling succession questions, rather than ultimate wars of national annihilation and absorption of rival states.
5. Competing centers of power such as local nobility and the Church, which counterbalanced the power of the ruler.
6. The balance of power mechanism being different in that one state (Britain) was separated by water and thus its core territory and economy unable to be permanently damaged by the wars on the continent. Intact Britain therefore was able to preserve its strength and play one continental power off another.

These she theorized had left such a legacy (such as crippling debts and recalcitrant nobles) for European monarchs that even when they did attempt self-strengthening reforms, they were of limited effect.

She discounted terrain as reasons through comparing the territories of continental Europe versus the territories of China. Likewise she dismissed the claim of culture, citing the different national identities and cultures of the Chinese Warring States, despite a shared culture, and said this is analogous to the separate identities of post-Roman Europe (despite the use of a common scholarly language and Roman legacy).

Essentially she argued that while balance of power was one outcome of a multi-state system, another outcome was what she called "the universal Leviathan" whereby a tipping point is reached that results in one state overwhelming all others. The author for China points to the Battle of Changping as the final tipping point whereby the last realistic military rival to Qin was decisively defeated, and after which everything else became essentially a matter of time and mop up.

I realize not everyone will have read nor be necessarily interested in reading that work, but I am still curious as to what people's opinion or what might be debated as to the reason for the difference in outcomes. I am not saying one is necessarily better or worse as an outcome.

In the modern age Russia and Britain seem to be the decisive factor. They are too difficult to conquer, too powerful to ignore, and have a strong interest in preventing the continent consolidating. At the same time they're not powerful enough to conquer the continent themselves.

The Roman Empire seems to have similar problems. It was not able to conquer Persia or Eastern Europe and these eventually carved up the Empire.

energiewende wrote:In the modern age Russia and Britain seem to be the decisive factor. They are too difficult to conquer, too powerful to ignore, and have a strong interest in preventing the continent consolidating. At the same time they're not powerful enough to conquer the continent themselves.

The Roman Empire seems to have similar problems. It was not able to conquer Persia or Eastern Europe and these eventually carved up the Empire.

However Russia didn't coalesce as a state until quite late comparatively. No other European kingdom managed to consolidate the rest of Europe before Russia formed. Even Britain wasn't a meddler on the continent til later. Why didn't anyone else roll up Europe before Britain was rich enough to play power broker?

For China, there was also the issue of the nomadic states along the west and north periphery. These were often militarily powerful and the ability of the Chinese states to expand was ultimately curtailed by geography and these nomads, with the military efforts then being limited to either defense or limited punitive expeditions to weaken the nomads militarily (but which never ended their threat). So China didn't absorb these west and northern areas til much later (farhttp://bbs.stardestroyer.net/index.php beyond the initial unification period).

So if China united despite not absorbing its peripheral neighbors, why didn't a European state consolidate Europe until it abutted against the borders of Persia or whatever other eastern border one wants to define?

The author is mistaken considering we had such a strong unifying force, which was the Roman Empire, which at the height of its power controlled either directly or indirectly Europe. Also, if you compare the Roman Empire to the Qin Empire then the Qin empire fails to measure up in nearly every indicator I know.

That being said, the book sounds laughably simplistic assuming the OP summary of the theories is accurate.

I mean:

1. Extension of the state apparatus as far as possible to the lowest level of society, the household, in order to extract maximum taxes, productivity, labor, and manpower for war, thereby removing the need to gain funds through merchant loans or tax farming.
2. Lack of intermediary or competing centers of power, such as the medieval church or nobility. After the Shang Yang reforms, Qin had implemented a centralized bureaucracy with the head of state at the top, and broken the power of the old nobility
3. Ruthless strategems such as wholesale slaughter of defeated armies to irreversibly sap the manpower of competing states, as well as state sponsored subversion and bribery of other state officials in order to influence policy or military strategy.
4. Taking advantage of the short-term opportunism of other rival states to bandwagon on top of Qin's successes, in order to prevent them from allying together to maintain a balance of power.
5. Late monetization of the economy (which occurred in China after the Qin dynasty) which meant there was no easy means to raise funds (like merchant loans) short of directly taxing the population.
6. Territories directly adjacent to Qin were targeted for conquest and absorption, rather than piecemeal holdings that could be separated geographically (which sometimes occurred in the past due to noble fiefs). Conquered territories were also directly absorbed into the existing Qin state structure, with dismantling of the conquered state's structure.

All of this applies to the Roman Empire as well, which did all of these things.

energiewende wrote:The Roman Empire seems to have similar problems. It was not able to conquer Persia or Eastern Europe and these eventually carved up the Empire.

Nope, and the reason it fell had very little to do with failing to conquer someone.

Thanas wrote:The author is mistaken considering we had such a strong unifying force, which was the Roman Empire, which at the height of its power controlled either directly or indirectly Europe. Also, if you compare the Roman Empire to the Qin Empire then the Qin empire fails to measure up in nearly every indicator I know.

That being said, the book sounds laughably simplistic assuming the OP summary of the theories is accurate.

I mean:

1. Extension of the state apparatus as far as possible to the lowest level of society, the household, in order to extract maximum taxes, productivity, labor, and manpower for war, thereby removing the need to gain funds through merchant loans or tax farming.
2. Lack of intermediary or competing centers of power, such as the medieval church or nobility. After the Shang Yang reforms, Qin had implemented a centralized bureaucracy with the head of state at the top, and broken the power of the old nobility
3. Ruthless strategems such as wholesale slaughter of defeated armies to irreversibly sap the manpower of competing states, as well as state sponsored subversion and bribery of other state officials in order to influence policy or military strategy.
4. Taking advantage of the short-term opportunism of other rival states to bandwagon on top of Qin's successes, in order to prevent them from allying together to maintain a balance of power.
5. Late monetization of the economy (which occurred in China after the Qin dynasty) which meant there was no easy means to raise funds (like merchant loans) short of directly taxing the population.
6. Territories directly adjacent to Qin were targeted for conquest and absorption, rather than piecemeal holdings that could be separated geographically (which sometimes occurred in the past due to noble fiefs). Conquered territories were also directly absorbed into the existing Qin state structure, with dismantling of the conquered state's structure.

All of this applies to the Roman Empire as well, which did all of these things.

Actually the Roman Empire engaged in tax farming. The eastern half of the Empire was a golden assignment precisely for the amount of wealth that could be squeezed from it.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farm_(revenue_leasing)
"Tax farming was originally a Roman practice whereby the burden of tax collection was reassigned by the Roman State to private individuals or groups. In essence, these individuals or groups paid the taxes for a certain area and for a certain period of time and then attempted to cover their outlay by collecting money or saleable goods from the people within that area."

The problem raised in the book was the fact the state had essentially sold its future revenues to a private individual (often at a discount) in return for immediate funds, and this person would have every interest in maximizing what they could extract, which could lead to unrest. Aside from that, the loss of future revenue constrained the abilities of future rulers to act, and attempts to take back these revenues sources was problematic or provoked rebellion.

Iracundus:

Well I did say "in the modern age". There was a long time when states were very weak and Britain and Russia were less important but:

1. this was fall-out from Rome. Feudalism was first established in some recognisable form by Diocletian.

2. they did "self-strengthen" and very successfully. All 1700s states were considerably more centralised than any major state in 1400. The only one that really bucked the trend was Poland-Lithuania and they ended up being annexed by the Prussians and Russians.

China did border nomads but they didn't have a Persia-equivalent (which was a centralised peer competitor militarily) and Siberia isn't quite Germany and Scythia. Perisa is very important because even though it tended to lose its wars with Rome it pinned large numbers of troops in the East, eventually leading to voluntary administrative division that later became involuntary. I suppose the largest difference is that when nomads eventually did conquer China the Empire stayed intact, whereas the Western Roman Empire was broken up between many different Kingdoms. An accident of circumstance maybe but one made a lot easier by the fact that Eastern Europe (which, I believe, was more settled farming communities, just not as centralised as the Med states) could chip away at Rome over a long period; China could only be conquered by some incredible Mongol deluge that simply overwhelmed all resistance.

Thanas wrote:

energiewende wrote:The Roman Empire seems to have similar problems. It was not able to conquer Persia or Eastern Europe and these eventually carved up the Empire.

Nope, and the reason it fell had very little to do with failing to conquer someone.

This is another thread of course. But my point is not why the Empire fell but what are the consequences of it doing so. The Empire suffered repeated civil wars, but the victory always put it back together. It suffered plague and other economic contraction, but that doesn't necessarily matter unless someone is there to take advantages of it. The presence of Germany and the rest of Eastern Europe, and Persia bordering the Empire meant that when it became internally weakened there was someone always pressing to see if the door would fall in. China's position was much more secure in this regard, so when the Empire "fell" it was just especially long civil war resulting in a new dynasty.

I think the point is slightly drifting. It's not so much a why the Roman Empire fell and why the Chinese Empire didn't (or re-formed), but why Qin could unite in the first place, and why no post-Roman kingdom succeeded in doing so?

In particular, the examples of the Habsburgs and Valois France were held up as examples of the self-weakened European state, especially their dire financial straits. The example is given of Charles V having 103.9% of his tax revenues being consumed by interest payments in 1560. The end result being both states declaring bankruptcy in 1557. and exhausted, agreeing to peace 2 years later.

2 quotes from the book for discussion re: finances and war

The French and Spanish courts did not fail to raise more revenues to support their military ambitions. In fact, they managed to double and triple their tax receipts. What they failed to do was improve extractive capacity, that is, the ability to assess the liability on the basis of productivity or wealth, to collect payments, and to remit tax receipts from the points of collection to the state treasury. Instead of appointing salaried tax collectors, French and Habsburg rulers were dependent on tax farmers over whom they exercised little control. At the same time, mercenary armies were so expensive that even significantly increased ordinary revenues could not cover war costs. When budget deficits escalated to fiscal crises, both France and the Habsburg empire deepend their reliance on intermediate resource holders by contracting loans and selling offices...The more loans were contracted and the more exemptions were auctioned off, the more future sources of ordinary revenues were alienated; and the more ordinary revenues were signed away, the more desperate the court became in searching for additional extraordinary revenues...Even worse, because capital holders were worried that kings and princes - who were above the law - would repudiate debts, they typically demanded that rulers sign away not just the yield but also the administration of future ordinary revenues...Both French kings and Habsburg emperors had to subordinate strategic calculations to financial constraints. Worse, bankruptcies led to mutines, thereby crippling the best armies with little fighting.

p. 118-119, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe

It is noteworthy that the practices of mercenary armies, venal offices, and sovereign loans involved commercialization and monetization of public functions...As early as the medieval era, knight services was gradually commuted into scutage or money payment, which allowed rulers to substitute mercenary armies for feudal levies. The use of mercenaries in turn, pushed up the costs of war so much that heavy borrowing became a usual recourse and bankruptcy a recurring threat in the midthirteenth century...

...In ancient China, trade began to expand only after the onset of system formation. With a low level of monetization, the earliest hegemonic rivals had no easy recourse. The only way they could build larger armies and raise higher revenues was to extend military service and land tax ever deeper to the lower orders and ever wider to the hinterlands. Ancient China thus witnessed smooth transitions from feudal levies to national armies and then to universal conscription.

p. 141-142, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe

In essence this part of the book is arguing that these European rulers ended up hopelessly in debt to other power holders and had to sign away ever more future revenues, offices, or rights over territories to live a sort of hand to mouth existence, with occasional resetting of their debts via wholesale repudiation of debt. And all because of ultimately the use of expensive mercenaries, that would then mutiny if not paid.

I suppose in one form it is saying nervos belli pecuniam infinitam, though "money" could be also literal raw manpower and resources.

Won't you be better off comparing the Hellenistic and Roman empires with the Qin dynasty? If you are serious about answering the prospect of a democratic china, it makes little sense to compare an ancient empire with early modern Europe.

I've created a similar thread to yours a while ago, and I've linked several articles you might be interested in. You should seriously look up Walter Scheidel if you are interested in comparing ancient China with the Roman empire.

http://bbs.stardestroyer.net/viewtopic. ... 2&t=157583

ray245 wrote:Won't you be better off comparing the Hellenistic and Roman empires with the Qin dynasty? If you are serious about answering the prospect of a democratic china, it makes little sense to compare an ancient empire with early modern Europe.

I've created a similar thread to yours a while ago, and I've linked several articles you might be interested in. You should seriously look up Walter Scheidel if you are interested in comparing ancient China with the Roman empire.

http://bbs.stardestroyer.net/viewtopic. ... 2&t=157583

This is not about Chinese Empire vs. Roman Empire.

This is about Qin kingdom during the Warring States vs. post-Roman Europe, and why the former was able to overwhelm its rival kingdoms to form an empire, whereas no post-Roman state was able to consolidate Europe into one state. Both were multi-state systems at the time, yet one remained divided while in the other, one managed to conquer and absorb the rest. That is why those particular time periods were examined.

One of the issues tackled in the book was whether a balance of power is the "natural" or expected outcome of a Westphalian system of sovereign states. The author Victoria Hui contested that it was not, and that the example of China shows one of the possible outcomes is a slide into one state overcoming all, with the European system of states a result of sufficiently self-weakened (or incompletely self-strengthened) states that could not establish a decisive enough advantage relative to their rivals to begin the snowball effect of unification of Europe.

If one were to bring China from the fall of Han onwards, one might conceivably argue the same. Three Kingdoms China and beyond was significantly more feudal with regional centers of power that led to rapid fracturing such as in the case of the Jin dynasty. The loss of centralized state extractive power weakened the ability of the successor states to decisively triumph over their rivals. Hell if you wanted to really argue, it could be said Eastern Han was becoming more feudal ever since Eastern Han was founded with its reliance on local wealthy families to maintain order. A few centuries of that and the result was the rise of de facto warlords and the Three Kingdoms.

Iracundus wrote: This is not about Chinese Empire vs. Roman Empire.

This is about Qin kingdom during the Warring States vs. post-Roman Europe, and why the former was able to overwhelm its rival kingdoms to form an empire, whereas no post-Roman state was able to consolidate Europe into one state. Both were multi-state systems at the time, yet one remained divided while in the other, one managed to conquer and absorb the rest.

Why the Qin dynasty though? Won't the Tang dynasty be a much better alternative, given that the concept of a universal empire was relatively new during the warring states period.

But if your goal is to answer why no post-Roman state was able to consolidate Europe, shouldn't you be better off comparing the Roman Empire itself with all the post Roman states?

One of the issues tackled in the book was whether a balance of power is the "natural" or expected outcome of a Westphalian system of sovereign states. The author Victoria Hui contested that it was not, and that the example of China shows one of the possible outcomes is a slide into one state overcoming all, with the European system of states a result of sufficiently self-weakened (or incompletely self-strengthened) states that could not establish a decisive enough advantage relative to their rivals to begin the snowball effect of unification of Europe.

Hmm, you might want to read "the Roman empire in context". There is an article that compare the Roman empire with the Hapsburg Empire under Charles V and analysis why the Hapsburg empire failed to create a long lasting pan-European empire.

How much did geography work into it? China's largely a basin surrounded by massive mountains, jungle, desert, and Siberia, and with only Sichuan of the core regions being isolated geographically, whereas Europe and the Mediterranean is more broken up by peninsulas and mountain ranges. From my understanding, the Roman empire was largely maritime with most of the important commerce traveling along the Med and the attached rivers, whereas China was more about continental travel. China also has a large, fertile core region of the northern plain and the loess plateau while the major agricultural regions of Rome were spread out in smaller chunks like France and Egypt. Assuming I'm correct about all three and not misunderstanding any, the first and third seem to be things that would help China consolidate while making it harder for Europe and the Med., and the second one may go one way or the other or be entirely irrelevant since I don't understand enough to have any idea.

ray245 wrote:

Iracundus wrote: This is not about Chinese Empire vs. Roman Empire.

This is about Qin kingdom during the Warring States vs. post-Roman Europe, and why the former was able to overwhelm its rival kingdoms to form an empire, whereas no post-Roman state was able to consolidate Europe into one state. Both were multi-state systems at the time, yet one remained divided while in the other, one managed to conquer and absorb the rest.

Why the Qin dynasty though? Won't the Tang dynasty be a much better alternative, given that the concept of a universal empire was relatively new during the warring states period.

I cannot speak for the author but I would think that it was because after the first unification, it was always a goal to be looked up to by the rest, and was actually accomplished multiple times before Tang if you count the Chu-Han contention after Qin's fall, the Wang Mang interregnum between Western and Eastern Han, Wei during the Three Kingdoms, etc... So it would have become a question of who would succeed rather than if one would succeed.

As for why post-Roman states, I again cannot presume to speak for the author, but my guess would be that the Roman Empire expanding into continental Europe was more a centralized state conquering and absorbing tribal states and societies rather than other centrally organized states. The Chinese comparison might be early Qin expanding west and absorbing the tribes along its initial western border. The author appears to be looking at multi-state political systems where the states involved are all centrally organized (to varying degrees).

Grandmaster Jogurt wrote:How much did geography work into it? China's largely a basin surrounded by massive mountains, jungle, desert, and Siberia, and with only Sichuan of the core regions being isolated geographically, whereas Europe and the Mediterranean is more broken up by peninsulas and mountain ranges. From my understanding, the Roman empire was largely maritime with most of the important commerce traveling along the Med and the attached rivers, whereas China was more about continental travel. China also has a large, fertile core region of the northern plain and the loess plateau while the major agricultural regions of Rome were spread out in smaller chunks like France and Egypt. Assuming I'm correct about all three and not misunderstanding any, the first and third seem to be things that would help China consolidate while making it harder for Europe and the Med., and the second one may go one way or the other or be entirely irrelevant since I don't understand enough to have any idea.

The issue of geography was tackled as well:

However, any topographical map of the Chinese continent can show that the area of the zhongguo system is marked by significant geographical barriers, including the Qin Ranges, Taihang Mountains, Yellow River, Yangtze River, Dan River, Huai River, and other secondary rivers and mountains. John Fairbank observed that 'the North China plain and its extension toward the Yangtze delta are no easier to traverse...than the North European plain.'

Chu was for centuries protected from Qin by the very steep and rough Qin Ranges...Zhao was originally separated from Qin by the Yellow River and the steep Taihang Mountains. With such formidable geographical barriers, Zhao was relatively free of Qin's encroachmen well into the early third century BC.

p. 91, 92-93

In other words, the geography is argued to be varied and the view of a featureless flat central plain is a stereotype. In fact another section argues the geographical features are why among other reasons separate kingdoms developed in the first place. Qin at least was definitely physically and culturally defined by its separation from the other kingdoms by mountains and rivers, which formed a defensive barrier.

Also much of the logistics in ancient China was by river. It was vastly more efficient. Some documentary estimated that by a certain overland route to a Qin dynasty army far in the south of modern China, it took 190 dan of grain to actually deliver 1 dan to the stationed troops. The river systems in China flow mostly west to east, which is among other reasons how Qin conquered Chu, by conquering upstream and then using the rivers as invasion routes into Chu.

Iracundus wrote: As for why post-Roman states, I again cannot presume to speak for the author, but my guess would be that the Roman Empire expanding into continental Europe was more a centralized state conquering and absorbing tribal states and societies rather than other centrally organized states. The Chinese comparison might be early Qin expanding west and absorbing the tribes along its initial western border. The author appears to be looking at multi-state political systems where the states involved are all centrally organized (to varying degrees).

I will not call all the various cities states and empires conquered as tribes and societies. Carthage, the successor kingdoms and the greek city states are all centrally organised states.

If we were to bring technology into it, another the reason for maritime transport in Rome was also partly due to their inefficient throat-girth method of harnessing horses, which severely limited how much they could pull, and also their utility for plowing. This would have also limited total agricultural productivity in both Roman and post-Roman Europe for a long time (since the more efficient Chinese style horse collar developed during the Warring States reached Europe about 1000 AD). It also meant Rome was inordinately reliant on Egypt as a source of grain.

I suppose lower agricultural productivity would have limited the maximum size of armies and thus also the ability to engage in full scale state absorbing warfare. Although admittedly this doesn't explain why Rome succeeded in the past despite the inefficient use of its horses.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horse_collar
Needham, Joseph, Science and Civilization in China: Volume 4, Physics and Physical Technology, Part 2, Mechanical Engineering.

Iracundus wrote:I think the point is slightly drifting. It's not so much a why the Roman Empire fell and why the Chinese Empire didn't (or re-formed), but why Qin could unite in the first place, and why no post-Roman kingdom succeeded in doing so?

Well as Thanas said it pretty much did, so the question really is why didn't Rome reform. I think this has its roots in the manner of Rome's collapse. Not the cause necessarily, but the fact it created numerous divided feudal (ie. decentralised) states. By the time we get to 1600 or 1700 the question becomes a little obvious doesn't it? The edge of Europe no longer was the edge of the world and the nationalisms had crystallized. If she really claims it, I don't believe that China's subdivisions were equivalent to the European nationalisms of 1700, just as the local parochialisms of the late Roman Empire were not equivalent to the European nationalisms of the same places in 1700.

In particular, the examples of the Habsburgs and Valois France were held up as examples of the self-weakened European state, especially their dire financial straits. The example is given of Charles V having 103.9% of his tax revenues being consumed by interest payments in 1560. The end result being both states declaring bankruptcy in 1557. and exhausted, agreeing to peace 2 years later.

Interest payments on debts accrued fighting wars of conquest. This indicates that even the limited wars they did win were actually beyond their capabilities. So why didn't Chinese states bankrupt themselves with half-finished conquests and fail to complete them? This is more of an effect than a cause.

Iracundus wrote:Actually the Roman Empire engaged in tax farming. The eastern half of the Empire was a golden assignment precisely for the amount of wealth that could be squeezed from it.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farm_(revenue_leasing)
"Tax farming was originally a Roman practice whereby the burden of tax collection was reassigned by the Roman State to private individuals or groups. In essence, these individuals or groups paid the taxes for a certain area and for a certain period of time and then attempted to cover their outlay by collecting money or saleable goods from the people within that area."

A horribly simplistic (and incorrect) view, as usual for wikipedia.

energiewende wrote:

Thanas wrote:

energiewende wrote:The Roman Empire seems to have similar problems. It was not able to conquer Persia or Eastern Europe and these eventually carved up the Empire.

Nope, and the reason it fell had very little to do with failing to conquer someone.

This is another thread of course. But my point is not why the Empire fell but what are the consequences of it doing so. The Empire suffered repeated civil wars, but the victory always put it back together. It suffered plague and other economic contraction, but that doesn't necessarily matter unless someone is there to take advantages of it. The presence of Germany and the rest of Eastern Europe, and Persia bordering the Empire meant that when it became internally weakened there was someone always pressing to see if the door would fall in. China's position was much more secure in this regard, so when the Empire "fell" it was just especially long civil war resulting in a new dynasty.

Ah okay. This is a valid point.

energiewende wrote:Well as Thanas said it pretty much did, so the question really is why didn't Rome reform. I think this has its roots in the manner of Rome's collapse. Not the cause necessarily, but the fact it created numerous divided feudal (ie. decentralised) states.

You are falling into the trap of assuming this author is correct in the first place and that a one-size-fits-all theory can be even applied to societies of vastly different resources, languages and culture.

Iracundus wrote:If we were to bring technology into it, another the reason for maritime transport in Rome was also partly due to their inefficient throat-girth method of harnessing horses, which severely limited how much they could pull,

Harnessing horses got nothing to do with it as they were not the main drag animals anyway. Anybody who says Romans used horses as pulling animals needs to read up on basic Roman society/economy.

Besides, up until the days of Daimler no land-based transport ever beat maritime transport, so the point is moot anyway.

and also their utility for plowing. This would have also limited total agricultural productivity in both Roman and post-Roman Europe for a long time (since the more efficient Chinese style horse collar developed during the Warring States reached Europe about 1000 AD). It also meant Rome was inordinately reliant on Egypt as a source of grain.

No. Ability to pull has nothing to do with it (as horses were never used in agricultural capacity in Rome). The quality of grain is the real kicker here and it has nothing to do with "limited Roman productivity". Also, I see you are spouting the old (and incorrect) adage about Rome being dependent on Egypt for Grain. No, not since the second century, if not much earlier.



In any case, comparing the Qin empire to medieval Europe is nonsensical in the first place. How are the situations comparable in the first place?

Iracundus wrote:In other words, the geography is argued to be varied and the view of a featureless flat central plain is a stereotype. In fact another section argues the geographical features are why among other reasons separate kingdoms developed in the first place. Qin at least was definitely physically and culturally defined by its separation from the other kingdoms by mountains and rivers, which formed a defensive barrier.

Well the Qin and Taiheng are both on the border of the central plain rather than bisecting it, and while the Taiheng do separate it from the western plateaus, the Yellow River seemed to have helped with connecting the two more than it hurt it. I'm also curious how much the Qin mountains were a barrier to centralisation, since the maps I've seen have shown the state of Qin as having first crossed them to conquer both Sichuan and the Han river valley before conquering eastward into the heart of the plains.

I'm not disputing that China has geographical barriers, but the only range of note within the central plain is the mountains of western Shandong, which is smaller than Massif Central, a range that, while imposing, wasn't enough to keep France from being unified earlier than many places in Europe. China's main geographical barriers are on the periphery, which seem to have done a good job protecting it from outside aggression aside from the northern Steppes, while Europe and the Med. doesn't have any comparable ones besides the Sahara.

energiewende wrote:

Iracundus wrote:I think the point is slightly drifting. It's not so much a why the Roman Empire fell and why the Chinese Empire didn't (or re-formed), but why Qin could unite in the first place, and why no post-Roman kingdom succeeded in doing so?

Well as Thanas said it pretty much did, so the question really is why didn't Rome reform. I think this has its roots in the manner of Rome's collapse. Not the cause necessarily, but the fact it created numerous divided feudal (ie. decentralised) states. By the time we get to 1600 or 1700 the question becomes a little obvious doesn't it? The edge of Europe no longer was the edge of the world and the nationalisms had crystallized. If she really claims it, I don't believe that China's subdivisions were equivalent to the European nationalisms of 1700, just as the local parochialisms of the late Roman Empire were not equivalent to the European nationalisms of the same places in 1700.

It think it is a bit dismissive to claim the Warring States divisions were not that big considering they used separate script systems. Linguistic drift was also taking their languages in different directions. The unification of the script system after Qin's conquest could arguably be said to be one major factor in preventing further balkanization.

Qin is mentioned in Sima Qina's histories as being ostracized due to their apparent "barbaric" ways, since they had incorporated more nomadic culture into them and were a blend of that and the accepted Zhou culture of the central plains. People of the different states were said to have different characters just as the Greeks characterized people north and south of them like Thracians and Egyptians as having particular characters influenced by their view of the "humors" of the body. If the Greeks could be said to be distinct from the Thracians who were just a little north east, why couldn't the same be said for the difference between Qin and Qi or between Zhao and Chu, both pairs of which were separated by as great or even greater distances.

In particular, the examples of the Habsburgs and Valois France were held up as examples of the self-weakened European state, especially their dire financial straits. The example is given of Charles V having 103.9% of his tax revenues being consumed by interest payments in 1560. The end result being both states declaring bankruptcy in 1557. and exhausted, agreeing to peace 2 years later.

Interest payments on debts accrued fighting wars of conquest. This indicates that even the limited wars they did win were actually beyond their capabilities. So why didn't Chinese states bankrupt themselves with half-finished conquests and fail to complete them? This is more of an effect than a cause.[/quote]

The book chalks this up to the use of mercenaries by the European powers. The Warring States of China didn't use mercenaries (at least not on any major scale), and relied on peasant infantrymen.

Qin in particular is mentioned as fostering a meritocracy based around agriculture and war instead of blood. Achievements in battle or exceeding quotas in farming were rewarded by grants of social rank that had sumptuary benefits and waiving of certain obligations. There is mention of peasant immigration into Qin, which would presumably have sapped the strengths of its rivals, considering all of them were reliant on peasants for their armies and their primary production.

Harnessing horses got nothing to do with it as they were not the main drag animals anyway. Anybody who says Romans used horses as pulling animals needs to read up on basic Roman society/economy.

You are missing the point, which is a horse collared horse outperforms oxen in agricultural productivitiy:

A properly harnessed horse is as strong as an ox but 50 percent faster. It also has more endurance and so can work several more hours per day. Thus with a horse, a man can plow nearly twice as much land as he could with an ox. Furthermore, the greater speed of the horse revolutionized transportation. Markets grew in size as produce could be economically hauled longer distances.

Uncommon Sense: The Heretical Nature of Science

The above admittedly general work does also reference Needham. I think I will take the word of a professor in Physics and Needham, whose magnum opus on ancient technology in China is pretty definitive.

As for the repeated claims of "tax farming" being simplified, can someone elucidate? Because its existence is repeatedly mentioned in scholarly sources. As just one,

Cicero accused Verres of stealing the foregone interest from tax farmers!
Tax farming is well documented in the late Republic. It continued into the early Empire, although it is less well documented, and appears to have been replaced eventually by direct taxation.

http://humanities.tsu.edu.ge/data/file_ ... Empire.pdf

In whatever the exact details though, it can be hardly argued that tax farming is weakening to the central state and eats into the revenues that the central government actually receives.

I am sensing a bit of placing Rome on a pedestal here. Yes Rome was great, but Qin's accomplishment is not to be dismissed either especially considering Qin accomplished its unification about 2 centuries earlier in what was still the end of the Bronze Age. Aside from just purely the military aspects, Qin engaged on massive irrigation projects, at least 2 of which are credited with massively expanding its agricultural output and hence also its ability to field larger armies and support them in the field.

It also again is topic drift as the issue was why no post-Roman European state could amass sufficient power to repeat the process of unification.

If she really claims it, I don't believe that China's subdivisions were equivalent to the European nationalisms of 1700, just as the local parochialisms of the late Roman Empire were not equivalent to the European nationalisms of the same places in 1700.

If as this poster claims, the late Roman Empire's regions differences were parochialisms, why didn't someone unify Rome all together again before further drift apart?

Now it is also a bit far fetched to claim there are no major senses of identity even within the Chinese regions. Northern China and even "southern China" where the state of Chu/modern Shanghai latitude have cultural differences. These Warring States had existed as separate for centuries. There was also no previous unification to suggest to people of the time that these states could be permanently merged together.

Grandmaster Jogurt wrote: Well the Qin and Taiheng are both on the border of the central plain rather than bisecting it, and while the Taiheng do separate it from the western plateaus, the Yellow River seemed to have helped with connecting the two more than it hurt it. I'm also curious how much the Qin mountains were a barrier to centralisation, since the maps I've seen have shown the state of Qin as having first crossed them to conquer both Sichuan and the Han river valley before conquering eastward into the heart of the plains.

I'm not disputing that China has geographical barriers, but the only range of note within the central plain is the mountains of western Shandong, which is smaller than Massif Central, a range that, while imposing, wasn't enough to keep France from being unified earlier than many places in Europe. China's main geographical barriers are on the periphery, which seem to have done a good job protecting it from outside aggression aside from the northern Steppes, while Europe and the Med. doesn't have any comparable ones besides the Sahara.

Qin's mountain defenses were one of the reasons why the founder of Han chose the site of the old Qin capital to base his capital. The main strategic Hangu Pass was the means by which Qin invaded the eastern states and was a strategic site afterwards in being able to access the "area within the pass" i.e. the main Qin heartland.

As for the difficulty of crossing those mountains, Sima Qian talks of roads built in the mountains during the founding of Han. Essentially for some sections, they were holes drilled into the side of the cliff face with wooden poles inserted, then wood planking laid over those poles, creating a sort of pontoon-like section clinging to the side of a cliff face. If that's what could be managed, then I'd say the obstacle was significant for the time.

The Qin mountains were also mentioned as the source by which Qin invaded Chu in one attack as Chu was dismissive of the ability of an army to traverse those mountains:

When Qin planned to strke a fatal blow at Chu in 280 BC, Qin contemplated the alternative routes of 1) the easily accessible but heavily garrisoned central plain, 2) the similarly guarded Yangtze River valley, or 3) the rough but practically unguarded mountain ranges...Qin's planners indeed decided to send expeditionary forces to climb the unguarded mountains to catch Chu off-guard and then send reinforcements and supplies downstream on the Yangtze River.

p.93, Hui 2003

Now one might just say Chu was stupid given hindsight, but given how long Chu had existed as a neighboring state of Qin, their assessment of the mountains probably was considered reasonable at the time.

Iracundus wrote:If the Greeks could be said to be distinct from the Thracians who were just a little north east, why couldn't the same be said for the difference between Qin and Qi or between Zhao and Chu, both pairs of which were separated by as great or even greater distances.

Nobody with a grasp of the history of ancient immigration into Thrace would claim the Thracians to be similar to the greeks. There was no idea of a common culture or common identity among Thracians, Greek and Egyptians, nor did it really develop until it was forced on all three of them by the Romans.

The book chalks this up to the use of mercenaries by the European powers. The Warring States of China didn't use mercenaries (at least not on any major scale), and relied on peasant infantrymen.

That is funny considering most mercenaries where not hired because pleasant levvies were unavailable (they were) but because mercenaries were so much better.

Harnessing horses got nothing to do with it as they were not the main drag animals anyway. Anybody who says Romans used horses as pulling animals needs to read up on basic Roman society/economy.

You are missing the point, which is a horse collared horse outperforms oxen in agricultural productivitiy:

A properly harnessed horse is as strong as an ox but 50 percent faster. It also has more endurance and so can work several more hours per day. Thus with a horse, a man can plow nearly twice as much land as he could with an ox. Furthermore, the greater speed of the horse revolutionized transportation. Markets grew in size as produce could be economically hauled longer distances.

Uncommon Sense: The Heretical Nature of Science

The above admittedly general work does also reference Needham. I think I will take the word of a professor in Physics and Needham, whose magnum opus on ancient technology in China is pretty definitive.

Look man, the above point is nearly worthless. For example, nobody used horses as main drag animals until we are well into the middle ages. Even if it were, just claiming "horse better than ox" also is not that great of a point, considering that we have no way of knowing if that a) actually applies to antiquity b) does not take into context that during the medieval age animals (with the exception of warhorses, which were definitely not used for plowing) reached about 60-80% of the size of their Roman counterparts, so their ability and power to drag things was also limited. It also does nothing with regards to the overall productivity limit enforced by the inferior grain (nowadays grain has a 1:40-60 yield. In roman times it was 1:4-8. There is also the issue of land quality etc. So you can see why I am skeptical about this whole issue and why the introduction of horse-plows would have probably done nothing for Rome and why it was just inefficient to use them as such (Roman horses had the size of ponies).

As for the repeated claims of "tax farming" being simplified, can someone elucidate? Because its existence is repeatedly mentioned in scholarly sources. As just one,

Cicero accused Verres of stealing the foregone interest from tax farmers!
Tax farming is well documented in the late Republic. It continued into the early Empire, although it is less well documented, and appears to have been replaced eventually by direct taxation.

http://humanities.tsu.edu.ge/data/file_ ... Empire.pdf

Okay. You need to take a step back here now and reexamine your argument. First of all, Cicero's claims against Verres are not necessarily based on facts, as it was courtroom propaganda designed to sway the masses. Even moreso, it is talking about a situation during the late Republic and (at best) Early Empire period. The Roman empire during the late 1st-4th century AD developed a massive administration with regards to revenue. Revenue was collected by state officials (at first soldiers, later on specialized bureucrats). Outsourcing to local municipalities was done, but appears to be done increasingly less so during the Late Roman Empire.

In whatever the exact details though, it can be hardly argued that tax farming is weakening to the central state and eats into the revenues that the central government actually receives.

Yes, it can be argued because apparently nations with no knowledge of the local culture thought it to be more efficient than just building up their own tax apparatus and financial administration until the Romans came and instituted a financial administration so efficient it survived well beyond the fall of the empire, albeit in a somewhat diminished form.

BTW, even if tax farming, the Roman gold and silver intake/output far outstrips the Qin dynasty.
You might find this interesting: bbs.stardestroyer.net/viewtopic.php?f=52&t=143944

I am sensing a bit of placing Rome on a pedestal here.

I might be guilty of that, true. But I shall note that whatever bias I have is borne out of my understanding of the Roman system.

Yes Rome was great, but Qin's accomplishment is not to be dismissed either especially considering Qin accomplished its unification about 2 centuries earlier in what was still the end of the Bronze Age. Aside from just purely the military aspects, Qin engaged on massive irrigation projects, at least 2 of which are credited with massively expanding its agricultural output and hence also its ability to field larger armies and support them in the field.

Nobody is denying that Qin china is a massive achievement in itself.

It also again is topic drift as the issue was why no post-Roman European state could amass sufficient power to repeat the process of unification.

Yeah, but I have yet to see value in comparing Qin China to Europe when there is a 1000+ years of difference here.

If as this poster claims, the late Roman Empire's regions differences were parochialisms, why didn't someone unify Rome all together again before further drift apart?

Attempts were made by several people. Some failed due to court intrigue (Aetius), some failed due to chance (the united attempt by the east and west to reconquer north africa which failed when the transport fleet was sunk in a storm) etc.

However, a successful attempt was made by Justinian. His reunification project united vast tracts of the western empire and the wealthiest provinces of the western empire with the east again. Provinces that were held (in whole or in parts) for several centuries after his death. His successors might have succeded in regaining a few more provinces had it not been for the arrival of the arab threat (which, I'll note, the Tang empire was also powerless against as evidenced by Talas). However, even if the political attempts failed, the ideological superiority of the Roman Emperor to the rest of christendom was not questioned until the arrival of Charlemagne and even after him the Eastern Roman Empire still continued to be the most advanced nation of its age (in Europe).

In any case, I'd like to get an answer to my general point: Why is it a good idea to compare the Qin empire to medieval and early modern Europe? Would it not be better to look at the European countries that successfully unified and compare their formation process to medieval times? Would it not be better to compare those formation processes to the process of assimilation/integration/conquest of Rome?

What is it that makes Qin even suited to this comparison, given the time difference of over a thousand years and the vast differences in technology, ideology etc.?