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Since I'm British, I get exposed to a lot of stuff regarding the "blitz" and the whole "Keep calm and carry on" attitude people (supposedly) had. Today, I started a university module about myths in history, focussing on the blitz. This got me thinking - I know about the stereotypical British "stiff upper lip" attitude (regardless of how much that may or may not have actually been the case), but how did the Germans and Japanese (i.e. the other two major recipients of strategic bombing) respond? Are there any accounts like diaries from people living in Tokyo, Hiroshima, Dresden or Berlin? Has there been any sort of historical study of that sort of thing? Do they have their own mythical attitude?

Thanks in advance for any answers.

There are mountains of such things; I am unfortunately not very familiar with them. One thought that occurs to me is that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were very unusual in terms of what we might call the 'strategic bombing experience.' Those two Japanese cities were hit once each, by a single tremendous blow, of strange and previously unknown type.

By contrast, most other cities that received massive destruction from strategic bombing suffered this damage over extended periods of time. They were usually bombed more than once (with a few exceptions), so what they experienced was more like an enlarged and deadlier version of what happened to British cities like London and Coventry.

By and large, people in all nations involved "kept calm and carried on." Prewar, the dominant theories of strategic air warfare were the brainchildren of a man named Giulio Douhet, who greatly exaggerated the amount of destruction aerial bombardment could cause to cities.

Prewar theorists exaggerated the accuracy bombers could drop their payloads with. Peacetime training took place at low altitudes under favorable conditions, with no one shooting at you, making it easier to hit the target.

Prewar theorists also exaggerated the amount of destruction that would be caused per ton of bombs dropped on the target. Speaking roughly, they thought that a hundred or so sorties* of 1930s bombers would probably be enough to wreck a whole city; this did not turn out to be true. In practice it took thousands of sorties by much heavier bombers to put a major urban area 'out of action' for even a relatively short time.

Among the reasons for this, the theorists assumed that chemical weapons would be used to kill the populace, and that small incendiary bombs would easily and reliably start major fires. In other words, they thought that you could simply assume that each Molotov cocktail you drop out of an airplane would automatically burn a whole house down, and multiply by the (large) number of Molotovs each plane could carry. Neither of these assumptions was correct- the first because people didn't use gas in WWII as a military weapon, and the second because most of the fires started by small incendiaries were simply put out by firefighters.

Anyway, the prewar image of what strategic bombing could do was greatly exaggerated, so everyone was surprised. They expected what we'd call a "World War III" level of devastation, with entire cities pretty much thrown down in ruins in the opening weeks of the war, millions of refugees wandering the countryside, and the population too demoralized and panicked to actually support a war effort effectively. It was something of a surprise to most of the combatants that populations were able to dig in, rebuild damaged cities, and keep fighting as long as they did.
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*One sortie is one plane flying one time and dropping its full payload once.

VX-145 wrote:Are there any accounts like diaries from people living in Tokyo, Hiroshima, Dresden or Berlin? Has there been any sort of historical study of that sort of thing?

Yes to both but I am not going to do your university work for you.

Do they have their own mythical attitude?

Not in Germany as such. I mean, people remember it and revanchist use it for a lot of silly theories and things but in general there is no official grand theory or myth.

Some things are memorized in huge ceremonies like the restoration of the Frauenkirche finally completed but that is because a lot of people donated money for it.

Simon: If I recall correctly, there was actually a lot of pre-war hysteria about the effect of bombing a city - it probably didn't affect the decisions of policy makers in a large way, but it does help explain why most people were reluctant to start a war (not to say there weren't other reasons). It's quite interesting in a way; most films that covered such things in the run-up to the war do give quite a similar vibe to films covering World War III and its aftermath. (There was one in particular I was trying to find, but my google skills are not up to the task ).

Thanas: Rest assured this is actually pure curiosity - something which occurred to me during a lecture. Anyway, it's an interesting comparison; over here you get quite a bit about the "blitz spirit" and so on, it's pretty much the official account of the war.

By the way, this is the first part of the official state TV broadcast regarding the rebuilding of the church in Dresden.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FT_xu5Sx-aI

Were the bombings really called "air piracy"?

First I have heard of it but I am not an expert on the topic.

Flagg wrote:Were the bombings really called "air piracy"?

I think Goering coined that term, but I could be mistaken... Came up during the strategic bombing of the Ruhr area March–July 1943.

Meier said a lot of crazy things.

'43, eh? Turtledove, you have failed yet again. In his latest bowel movement the War That Came Early series he has both sides calling the raids "air piracy" from the start. I read Turtledove the way some people watch bad movies. You know, when you run out of crack and there are no available dicks to suck for cash, so you resort to whatever possible in order to kill brain cells.

Thanas wrote:Meier said a lot of crazy things.

I actually got that.

Ditto- but then, I wrote at least one paper on German air defenses in college, so I know where it's from.

VX-145 wrote:Simon: If I recall correctly, there was actually a lot of pre-war hysteria about the effect of bombing a city - it probably didn't affect the decisions of policy makers in a large way.

I recall reading that in 1939 His Majesty's Government was trying to make sure they could prepare a quarter million hospital beds for anticipated casualties from a massive Luftwaffe bombardment of London that they anticipated in the opening days of the war.

Barring the Reich's nuclear program succeeding, that is... pretty excessive, and a nontrivial impact on policymaking.

Flagg wrote:'43, eh? Turtledove, you have failed yet again. In his latest bowel movement the War That Came Early series he has both sides calling the raids "air piracy" from the start. I read Turtledove the way some people watch bad movies. You know, when you run out of crack and there are no available dicks to suck for cash, so you resort to whatever possible in order to kill brain cells.

There's nothing about the term that would stop it from being used earlier. I've seen 1900-era cartoons referring to pirates in blimps. Given that people were capable of saying something like "pirate submarines" in the '30s, I see no reason to treat "air pirates" as an anachronism. It's not like, say, having radar and jet engines arbitrarily have their invention pushed forward by two years.

....I'm sorry, but this is still my mental image of an Air Pirate:

I know Biggles in his Air police stories used the term air pirates once, although its no Karnage:D

The term air pirates probably wouldn't have been so implausible

I've never heard the term air piracy used in period reference to WW2 bombing, and I think it unlikely that the Germans would have used it publicly as it would be seen as far too dismissive of the real hardship people were suffering, exactly the sort of thing the Nazi's were good at avoiding. They learned the propaganda lessons of WW1 well, and had in any case made a big deal of there own bombing campaigns already. If Goring said it in private or some such, well, he might well have made a joke of it. Propaganda in the war was generally a serious thing, not the cartoon insanity most people attribute as being 'normal' propaganda.

Earliest public accusations I know of air piracy all come from the 1960s when it became a legal 'thing' in international treaties, with Vietnam accusing the US of it in international press releases. Though the North Vietnamese idea of air piracy didn't synch with the legal definition anyway.

The pirate submarines of the Spanish civil war were called such because no nation claimed responsibility for the attacks and even when spotted on the surface they flew no flag and had no markings. In reality everyone bloody well knew they were Italian, and possibly Germany, but the British and French governments were dead set on avoiding full scale intervention and thus could not admit in public that they were of generally known identity. The Soviets took a similar path, because the only possible result of open war with the Germans and Italians over Spain would have been the certain doom of Spanish Republicans.

Everyone else on earth wanted even less to do with the situation, and wasn't loosing ships, so they followed the Britfrank line. As I recall Italy actually signed onto the eventual British led international effort to protect shipping from the pirate submarines, which also happened to see the attacks evaporate. I also seem to recall a few merchants were sunk by aircraft fairly far out in the med, but I don't think that was ever called air piracy because the planes were flying from Spanish Nationalist territory.

Also worth keeping in mind that in the 20s and 30s real attack for plunder and booty pirate attacks were still somewhat common in China, particularly on Chinese rivers.

Didn't the US keep a few river gunboats for that reason in China or am I mistaken?

It was used - a quick lookup found these examples:

Hitler speech, 4. September 1940 wrote: "Wir werden diesen Nachtluftpiraten das Handwerk legen, so wahr uns Gott helfe".

"God help us, we will stop these nightly air pirates."

Headline Salzburger Landeszeitung, 20. September 1940 wrote: „Die Luftpiraten morden Kinder und Frauen – Krankenhäuser bombardiert“

"Air pirates murder childen and women - hospitals bombarded"

The term was used to point out that the Allied are barbaric, and are nothing better than pirates raiding helpless civilians - there was an order to hush most air raids, exept for ones that damaged monuments, hospitals, churches, retirement homes, or those that were too big to hush - those would be used as propaganda tools.

Actually, the raids of September 4th were one of the reason for the two month nonstop bombarment of London, or at least a very good excuse. Of couse, the bombs dropped on London in retaliation were only aimed at military targets, only, according to German internal propaganda...

Ah, that makes sense then, the first months of British raids were incredibly weak, and referring to those as piracy wouldn't seem so unreasonable as compared to even the 1941 campaign.

Thanas wrote:Didn't the US keep a few river gunboats for that reason in China or am I mistaken?

Partly, they did exist, one, USS Wake was forced to surrender December 8th 1941 as she happened to be tied up to a dock in Shanghai, the only US commissioned warship to surrender in the war. The others were far up the Yangtze and given to the Chinese Nationalists. The British at the time also still had China gunboats, I'm not sure on the status of the French ones which were generally in the south in line with the span of French commercial interests. At times Russia, German and Japanese gunboats also prowled Chinese rivers and coastal waters, not to mention the habit most people had of keeping cruisers or old battleships in Chinese ports in case of Boxer Rebellion Mark 2, something which continued in some cases even after Japan occupied said ports from 1937 onward.

That's kinda the thing, anti piracy was only one of the things these vessels did. More then a few times after 1911 before the nationalists consolidated power along the whole Yangtze in the early 30s they got involved in battles with Chinese warlords, and the difference between a local warlord and pirates could get very iffy. The original purpose of everyone's gunboats was merely to browbeat local Qing officials into respecting foreign merchant, transit and religious rights under the unequal treaties, as well as ensuring quick evacuation of foreign civilians should rebellion break out. As it was of course, the 1912 revolution did not unleash another murder orgy because well, it seems clear enough that the Chinese had figured out that the Qing were far more a problem then westerners selling them kerosene.

All of this started right back up as well in 1945, before coming to a quick halt in the months after the Amethyst Incident as the communists seized control of all major Chinese waterways and ports.

For a bonus tangent fact, some of these China gunboats had a significant portion of the crew recruited locally, generally almost all of the engine room and boiler men. The US squadron at the battle of Manila Bay in 1898, normally based at Hong Kong, had mostly Chinese stokers. Some RN ships were like that too even into WW1.

I've heard that the RN continued using Chinese laundrymen for a very long time (and even to the present, if some hearsay is to be believed*).

*I personally doubt that.

VX-145 wrote:Since I'm British, I get exposed to a lot of stuff regarding the "blitz" and the whole "Keep calm and carry on" attitude people (supposedly) had. Today, I started a university module about myths in history, focussing on the blitz. This got me thinking - I know about the stereotypical British "stiff upper lip" attitude (regardless of how much that may or may not have actually been the case), but how did the Germans and Japanese (i.e. the other two major recipients of strategic bombing) respond? Are there any accounts like diaries from people living in Tokyo, Hiroshima, Dresden or Berlin? Has there been any sort of historical study of that sort of thing? Do they have their own mythical attitude?

Thanks in advance for any answers.

I don't think that there is really much of a comparison to be made in the first place. The blitz, for all of its destructiveness, never resulted in the gutting of entire cities that rendered tens of thousands dead. One raid in Tokyo for instance resulted in 100,000 dead, or twice the number of casualties suffered during the blitz.

The effect on industry on Germany and Japan were also very different. In Germany, the effect of bombing proved to be relatively undecisive until the very end of the war. The focus on cities did not actually greatly degrade the industrial capacity of the German economy - there was a rise in absenteeism and lowered productivity - but it did not stop Germany from in fact producing more tanks and weapons in 1943 and 44 than it did before the bombing. It was only raids that attacked the center of German raw material output - the steel centers of the Ruhr, the electric plants, and the synthetic oil plants - which caused true economic dislocation.

In Japan meanwhile the fire-bombing of cities had a devastating effect on the economy and the war effort; simply because the firebombing also did torch the factories (or at least the small subcontractors spread among the populated areas).

That said, there really isn't quite as much of a mythology because the bombing was just one in a long litany of horrors suffered by both Germany and Japan as an effect of losing the war. Both lost millions of men in the battlefield, had their homelands occupied, and in the case of Germany there was a massive dislocation of ethnic German populations; all of which weigh heavier than the losses due to strategic bombing.

The last assertion needs some proof.

First of all, the military vs civilian losses:

For Japan, the commonly cited figure for military deaths is 2 million, whereas the civilian death toll is 1 million (this includes both bombing and casualties due to deprivations caused by the blockade).

For Germany, the military deaths hover at around 5 million, whereas civilian losses are cited as around 1 to 2 million, of which 500,000 are attriuted directly to strategic bombing.

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Next, we have the dislocation of ethnic Germans. The figures for this vary widely but many sources cite at least 10 million people being forced to move from their homes in Eastern Europe (even traditionally German areas such as Silesia), and these movements killed off another half a million civilians. Again, weightier than the deaths due to strategic bombing.

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Finally, the occupation: Germany ended up being two countries for the next half a Century. The Japanese constitution was basically rewritten by the occupying powers; and their military was reduced to a police force that, legally speaking, has renounced war. Now, I may have overstepped by saying these are "horrors" (though less so in East Germany), because they did provide the groundwork for a very peaceful and prosperous present-day Germany and Japan; but the simple reality remains that the politics of both of these nations were heavily dominated by the wishes of the occupying powers and would have a much weightier effect on the national psyche.

SO you got no proof for your assertion that the displacement had a bigger effect than the bombing.

Meanwhile, in a german book used in schools you see figures cited that the bombing was the worst thing most people experienced because it created mass homelessness. Every German city was destroyed to at least 40%, with most of them hovering in the 80-90% destruction range. That is far weightier than any other effect of the war on the civilian population.

Thanas wrote:SO you got no proof for your assertion that the displacement had a bigger effect than the bombing.

Meanwhile, in a german book used in schools you see figures cited that the bombing was the worst thing most people experienced because it created mass homelessness. Every German city was destroyed to at least 40%, with most of them hovering in the 80-90% destruction range. That is far weightier than any other effect of the war on the civilian population.

Thanas, I literally just pointed out that as many people died in the displacements, and that there were more than 10 million people displaced. Moreover, a quick google of the homelessness figures caused by strategic bombing would show that 7.5 million people were made homeless (US Strategic Bombing Study), which is still less than the lowest estimate of the number of people displaced.

Frankly, I think those figures are referring to the wartime surveys conducted by the regime (which I've seen cited in other works), which do in fact cite bombing as the one causing the highest detrimental effect on morale (which was made worse because Germany was in fact suffering from a severe housing shortage even without the bombing); whereas the displacements occured mainly just in the last year of the war and the five years after it, and were definitely not covered by these same surveys.