The Guild System in Medieval Europe
Posted: 2014-11-18 02:50am
I was curious if there was anyone here with more in-depth knowledge of the guild system in the Middle Ages, particularly in western and northern Europe. I found an interesting paper that's very negative in terms of how it views the guilds, particularly in terms of their exclusiveness and impact on trade and production (perhaps unsurprisingly, the author is a professor of economic history in England). My general view beforehand was that the guilds were a mixed bag - they constrained trade, were exclusive, and the benefits were exaggerated, but they also provided a bulwark against the power of the nobility and generally served as a base of power for city governments.
Here are some excerpts:
On the numbers and sizes of guilds:
Here are some excerpts:
On the numbers and sizes of guilds:
On the exclusivity of guilds, and their minority status:
The number and size of guilds covered a wide spectrum. Some cities had
many: London had 72 livery companies and 14 other occupational associations in
1500 (Rappaport 1989); Paris had 103 guilds in 1250, 124 in 1700, and 133 in 1766
(Saint-Léon 1922; Bourgeon 1985). But other cities had very few: Florence, one
of the largest cities in Europe, had only 21 guilds in 1300 (Najemy 1979). Some
guilds had only a handful of members: in seventeenth-century Paris, with half a
million inhabitants, the metal-engravers’ guild permitted a maximum of 20 masters,
the clockmakers a maximum of 72 (Saint-Léon 1922). Other guilds did not have a
formal upper limit, but nonetheless restricted entry via a required career track of
apprenticeship, journeymanship, and mastership with strict conditions for admission
(discussed below). Even in Florence, with 100,000 inhabitants in 1300, each of
the 21 guilds averaged only about 350 members, ranging from 100 in the smallest
to 1,600 in the largest (Najemy 1979). In the small German town of Fulda in 1784,
with just 8,500 inhabitants, the 21 guilds averaged only 13 members apiece, ranging
from the four dyers to the 60 shoemakers (Walker 1971).
Case of guild law violation, in this case with two women:
Most guilds also excluded Jews, bastards, migrants, laborers, farmers, propertiless
men, former serfs and slaves, gypsies, members of other guilds, adherents of
minority religions, men of “impure” ethnicity, and those who couldn’t afford the
admission fees (La Force 1965; Walker 1971; Ogilvie 1997; Caracausi 2014). As
one nineteenth-century Spaniard put it, those without funds “called in vain at the
door of the guild, for it was opened only with a silver key” (as quoted in La Force
1965, p. 92).
Guild membership was reserved to a privileged minority, even in towns. At the
high end lay sixteenth-century London or Augsburg, where guild masters made
up 50–60 percent of householders and 12–13 percent of inhabitants (Rappaport
1989; Roper 1989). In the middle range lay Barcelona, Rouen, or Venice, with guild
masters comprising 40–50 percent of householders and 9–10 percent of inhabitants
(Amelang 1986; Hafter 1989; Rapp 1976). But in Paris, Florence, or Turin, guild
masters made up at most 20 percent of householders and 5 percent of inhabitants
(Bourgeon 1985; Becker 1962; Cerutti 2010). Guilds were not all-encompassing
workers’ associations but exclusive organizations for middle-class businessmen.
The costs of getting into a guild, which the author uses as an argument against claims that the guilds were so ineffectual in restraining trade that their impact was minimally harmful:
Archival records are replete with cases of guild members penalized by the public
authorities for producing above their guild quota, using prohibited techniques, or
employing women. In 1669, for instance, when the weaver Hannss Schrotter broke
his guild’s rules by employing a female servant to weave, his town court fined him the
equivalent of a maidservant’s average annual wage (Ogilvie 2003). Public law-courts
also punished black-market producers for illegally infringing on guild monopolies,
as in 1711 when the Württemberg state responded to complaints by the retailers’
guild against a converted Jew’s widow by closing down her village shop, or in 1742
when a town court jailed a villager’s wife after a complaint by the local nailsmith
that she was “dealing in foreign nails, which violated the nailsmiths’ guild ordinance,
and damaged him in his craft” (as quoted in Ogilvie 2003).
Some examples of expansion happening when guild restrictions were relaxed:Although not all guilds have been investigated in detail, where documents
survive they show that people at the time were willing to pay money to obtain, defend,
attack, circumvent, or subcontract into guild privileges, suggesting strongly that
those privileges were enforced sufficiently to have a real economic impact (Kisch
1989; Rosenband 1997; Wiesner 2000; Ogilvie 2005, 2011; Horn 2006; Boldorf 2009;
Lindberg 2009; Caracausi 2014). Applicants paid high fees to get into guilds: the
sixteenth-century Parisian grocers’ guild charged a journeyman the equivalent of
about nine years of wages for mastership (Larmour 1967); the eighteenth-century
Parisian furriers’ guild charged even a master’s son (who paid the lowest fees) the
equivalent of over nine years of wages (Kaplan 1981). Outsiders spent large sums
circumventing guild monopolies or subcontracting into them, as in 1706 when
illegal wigmakers were bribing Paris guild officials with sums equivalent to 1–2 years’
journeyman’s wages to let them practice without a license (Gayne 2004). Guilds themselves
engaged in costly political lobbying and interguild conflicts to obtain, defend,
and extend their privileges: one German weavers’ guild spent a sum equivalent to
115 days of earnings for a guild master on lobbying and external conflicts every
year between 1598 and 1760 (Ogilvie 1997).
A criticism of claims that the guilds enforced quality control:In the 1750s, when some Dutch town governments compelled guilds
to lower their entry barriers, crafts and trades saw a huge influx of poorer entrants,
especially women (van den Heuvel 2007). In the 1760s, when the woolen-weavers’
guilds of the Bohemian town of Brno lost their power to regulate entry and technology,
the industry immediately took off (Freudenberger 1960).
In 1791, when France abolished its guilds in the wake of the Revolution, tens of thousands
of women and men applied for permission to practice previously guilded occupations
(Fitzsimmons 2010). In the early nineteenth century, when the German city
of Aachen abolished guilds, the textile industry expanded in the countryside and
factories sprang up in neighboring Burtscheid and Monschau (Kisch 1989).
And finally, an argument about problems with the Guild training systems (specifically nepotism):Moreover, guild guarantees of quality were often weak because guilds existed
not primarily to constrain or penalize their members, but rather to secure and
defend those members’ rents. As a result, guilds typically penalized their members’
quality violations too mildly to deter them (Homer 2002; Forbes 2002; Ogilvie 2005).
Customers often described guild quality controls as inadequate, and wholesale
merchants added their own quality inspections at point of purchase. As one German
guild inspector declared in 1660, “the cloth-sealing takes place very badly, and when
one says anything about it, one incurs great enmity” (as quoted in Ogilvie 2004a,
p. 295). Guild inspectors lacked the incentive to develop the skills and deploy the
effort necessary to detect low-quality work beyond superficial features (such as
size), which were readily apparent to wholesale merchants and consumers anyway
(Ogilvie 2005; Boldorf 2009).
I think that's probably enough in terms of citation - the link is here. Some of it is problematic because she includes citations to her own work, but it looks like she's been doing some academic work in the area of research in question for some time going off her google scholar citation list.
Contemporaries often complained that guilds failed to penalize
neglectful masters of apprentices, issued certificates to apprentices without examination,
or granted mastership without training or examination to masters’ relatives
and well-off youths who paid for “privileges” (La Force 1965; Kaplan 1981; Horn
2006). A Thuringian merchant explained in 1681 that he preferred to buy textiles
from nonguilded rural producers because among the guilded urban weavers,
“masters’ sons hardly ever went traveling [as journeymen], were not required to
demonstrate their knowledge through any masterpiece, and hence did not know
how to do anything” (as quoted in Ogilvie 2004a, p. 312). In the mid-eighteenth
century, the Paris goldsmiths’ guild admitted one-quarter of its new masters via
special “privileges,” one-third as nonapprenticed masters’ offspring, and less than
half by proper apprenticeship (Kaplan 1981). The Rouen ribbon-makers’ guild
admitted one-third of its masters via “privileges,” over one-half as nonapprenticed
masters’ sons, and less than one-tenth after guild apprenticeship (Hafter 2007).
Situations such as these were widespread because guilds, as associations of masters,
had an incentive to certify the relatives of members regardless of skill and to reap
rents by selling admission to untrained entrants who could afford to pay for privileges
(Kaplan 1981; Ogilvie 2007a; Hafter 2007).