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Which general or leader of World War 1 do y'all think was the most incompetent for each of the warring nations? Or overall?

Overall, I can't decide between Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf or Ismail Enver Pasha.

Kaiser Wilhelm. Without his level of epic stupid nobody else being dumb would have even had a chance to matter.

Who ever thought it was a smart idea to form a defensive alliance which includes a small and insignificant country wedged in between the Turks and the Austrians. I am no history expert but from my perspective that's like promising to defend Tibet two weeks after they decide to piss off both China and the Soviets.

Sea Skimmer wrote:Kaiser Wilhelm. Without his level of epic stupid nobody else being dumb would have even had a chance to matter.

This, but only if you include the prewar stuff, which I am not sure OP is doing.

Otherwise, Nikolas II.

What about on a tactical level? I want to say Ian Hamilton, but it's been a while since I read about Gallipoli so I don't recall if he was the one primarily responsible for it being such a fiasco; IIRC he was the major decision maker.

And, to be honest, I'd say there's a good tie at the bottom of the barrel for almost every single commander on the Western Front for a large chunk of the war. There's a reason so many people died for so little gain.

Every single commander? No. If they were all incompetent then someone or the other would have broken through from shear luck. The commanders were on average fine and adaptive, they simply had not been given the tools modern war actually required and it wasn't until the second half of 1916 that this changed on any serious level. The need to attack meanwhile came from political, economic and military realities which were not confined to the Western Front. Most of the problems had been predicted prewar, sometimes by several decades, but nobody wanted to spend the money to change. After all with those huge conscript armies and military spending per GDP being on the low side, it would have been a big deal to change. And everyone thought you could win a war in six weeks with mobile battles, and fully expecting massive losses, which was basically true, but only if one side or another really could mass at a decisive point. But on both the eastern and western fronts both sides managed to mass at different points and more or less, they both punched into thin air in strategic terms, operationally they punched into walls of gunfire, then had to redeploy, robbing both sides of the chance for the decisive battles they'd all expected....

Most records in the west also a tad distorted by the fact that the British and French recorded every scratch as a wounded man if it required any treatment at all, while the Germans only counted men evacuated as wounded. Similar distortions took place in WW2 which some of us still have to fight against (I mean really, were supposed to believe the MASSIVE LOOSERS were super ultimate winners?)

The western front conflict was overall more even then it's given credit for, and Ludendorff's own book, which was revisionist in the first place (because he was rather ashamed of surrendering, even though it was 100% the correct and realistic decision), still largely asserts that anyway. You can get it free off google books. Indeed it says by 1918 the Germans believed defending was net worse then attacking and that this had been true in some of the 1917 battles. The final German defensive plan was to adapt deep defensive mobile battles in eastern Belgium, because trench warfare defense was in fact a route to failure, but none of that combat had a chance to take place because Germany had already lost.

As for Hamilton he was handed a real shitty situation, less then cooperative naval commanders, and hardly enough men or ammunition to even consider making a major landing (the Turks by then after all had had months to specifically prepare, the British near zero time allowed for any such thing). I don't think highly of him at all, or the entire campaign, but it was not really a case of a just a better man being required. A better system was required, rather then more or less the British back in London still acting like it was 1750 or something. Certainly man for man, the command of Sir Frederick Stopford at Suvla Bay was vastly more incompetent then anything Hamilton was given a chance to fail at. Stopford is one of the worst in history, or at least a fine example of the worst in history.

Ironically we know now that a full scale British naval attack would have worked, and the local RN commanders had wanted to renew the attack, but London simply forbid them from doing so, and began a period of reshuffling and poor decisions that turn into Hamilton being ordered to make a landing.

I'd also say John Nixon could be worse too. He was fully responsible for the siege of Kut. While the British losses were only 10% of the total losses of Gallipoli, it was non the less 100% of the force engaged and the worst British surrender ever until Singapore. Plus this was 100% killed or captured for the duration, most of whom then died in Turkish captivity anyway. The whole effort was bonkers.

And unlike so much in WW1, we can put it all on Nixon. Nixon was the head of the India Army which was independent, and did not report to London, and had nobody to meddle with him or his decisions. He only reported to a staff office back in India which was the definition of a rubber stamp and only really intended for administrative functions. His subordinates told him the offensive was dangerous and would likely fail and well, it utterly did. The fall of Baghdad was thus delayed almost two years, and while that had minimal strategic impact because the Ottomans were so weak, one does wonder what it might have done for the Russian campaigns and the Mid Eastern history in general had it not occurred. The ramifications could have been massive if say, the Ottomans imploded in 1917 instead of barely hanging until Germany lost the war anyway.

Course its just extra easy to make fun of the British at the tactical level because this is an English language forum and the British write in English. More to work from.

Arthur Aitken is another one. After an unopposed landing and 8-1 numerical superiority, he was defeated because of...bees and because he failed to notice the disorganized Germans had withdrawn from the empty city.

As for the German side, I nominate the decisions by von Kluck and von Bülow which allowed the battle of the Marne to happen in the first place, namely abandoning the straight approach to Paris and expose their flank to the Allies. This flew in the face of every prewar plan and was what contributed to the battle happening in the first place. They should have pressed straight on.

African Killer Bees! One of the British officers was found barely alive with 300 stings or some such, in other cases wounded men were woken up by the mass bee atacks. Both sides had to flee a large area of the battlefield because of the swarms of bees, this would later happen in several other battles in east Africa as well as later campaigns, the 1960 Congo War had a few. Also the British maps failed to show that a large area of the landing zone was in fact mangrove swamp. Which is kinda understandable in the era before aerial photographs but didn't help the landing. The force that was actually able to engage was much less then 8-1 odds. Though that points to the flaw of landing on a narrow front. On the other hand in WW2 the western allies nearly lost several actions by landing on excessively wide fronts.

Certainly one of the more inept British battles, but also with only about 10% losses while attacking into entrenched machine guns defended by swamps and bee hives. It looks perhaps dumber then it mattered. It did however give the Germans something like 800 modern rifles and some additional machine guns which mattered more long term then retaining control of the town.

For bonus stupid during the battle the crew of one British transport tried to row into the harbor assuming that as civilians they could simply go buy fresh food. The Germans shooting at them did not agree.

The point being anyway, that most stories are very complex, and the smaller the unit level gets, the more and more specific terrain factors and other such details matter. Poor leadership can be magnified anywhere, but it doesn't make everyone equally bad. Just look at all the battles lost because of rain.

Sea Skimmer wrote:African Killer Bees! One of the British officers was found barely alive with 300 stings or some such, in other cases wounded men were woken up by the mass bee atacks. Both sides had to flee a large area of the battlefield because of the swarms of bees, this would later happen in several other battles in east Africa as well as later campaigns, the 1960 Congo War had a few. Also the British maps failed to show that a large area of the landing zone was in fact mangrove swamp. Which is kinda understandable in the era before aerial photographs but didn't help the landing. The force that was actually able to engage was much less then 8-1 odds. Though that points to the flaw of landing on a narrow front. On the other hand in WW2 the western allies nearly lost several actions by landing on excessively wide fronts.

What is missing is why the bees attacked in the first place - because the British started bombarding the swamp, despite being warned of the danger of the bees. Or so the German history claims - I would dismiss it as propaganda but it seems to fit with the theme of this battle.

Certainly one of the more inept British battles, but also with only about 10% losses while attacking into entrenched machine guns defended by swamps and bee hives. It looks perhaps dumber then it mattered. It did however give the Germans something like 800 modern rifles and some additional machine guns which mattered more long term then retaining control of the town.

Well, two machineguns were available for the Germans as part of the base company. Eventually that number rose to twelve at the end of the battle. With that in mind, ~1000 casualties seems a bit excessive, especially if most of the fighting was house-to-house or in the swamp, where MGs weren't that effective as on open field.

Thanas wrote: What is missing is why the bees attacked in the first place - because the British started bombarding the swamp, despite being warned of the danger of the bees. Or so the German history claims - I would dismiss it as propaganda but it seems to fit with the theme of this battle.

Given that large portions of the German line also ran away in common accounts, that sounds like pure and utter bullshit. Of which vast amazingly overflowing amounts exist of 20th century German combat prowess unmatched by any other military I've ever been aware of of.

In fact I have seen it repeatedly and explicitly stated that the Germans abandon the entire line in the end because they had no possible artillery countermeasure to the 6in guns on HMS Fox, and its just not possible to dug simple earthworks proof against that kind of shellfire. And that the bee problem only emerged after close combat was entered with large amounts of rifle and machine gun fire. Had the bee's been raised mainly by the earlier bombardment it rather hard to see how they would affect the British most of a mile away, and not purely the Germans dug in nearby. Some exploiting of the bee hives may have been made, but the German line was where it was for much more straightforward reasons. But then most people whom comment on crap like this probably can't read a map. Course neither can more then a few military officers.

The whole German line was too far forward and too exposed to naval gunfire to have tenable for long, but it really wasn't meant to be either, the Germans couldn't be any further back without abandoning the town. An examination of a map strongly supports this, and does a shitload of other military history. It was just very handy that the British with a bunch of poorly trained and poorly led troops completely lost their nerve. Its not like anyone had any doctrine, let alone experience of training for amphibious assault operations like this with no formal period for consolidation. As far as I can think you'd have to go back to the Sino-French war in the 1880s with black powder guns to get anything even close, and that'd be some noble example of French marines storming Chinese shore batteries from behind at Foochow or such.

Well, two machineguns were available for the Germans as part of the base company. Eventually that number rose to twelve at the end of the battle. With that in mind, ~1000 casualties seems a bit excessive, especially if most of the fighting was house-to-house or in the swamp, where MGs weren't that effective as on open field.

Remember this is before hand grenades even exist, and no light machine guns either. A water cooled machine gun on a tripod is pretty overwhelmingly effective against people armed purely with bolt action rifles at that point. This is one of the vast basic problems of early WW1. Personal and small unit weapons had not kept pace with the basic defensive firepower of machine guns, which was far beyond anything that came before them. That's why grenades, automatic rifles, light machine guns, mortars, prepared demolitions and a bunch of other weapons suddenly exploded into existing commonly from late 1914 on, but it took several years for them to actually be issued on the required scales. And by then machine gun firepower and artillery firepower had exploded too, making the situation all the more difficult. This wasn't some magic of trench warfare created by idiots on the western front. They were needed no matter what.

Many of these sorts of devices had been predicted or even used in small numbers prewar too, no end of documentation exists on the matter, encouraged by the Russo-Turkish War in 1877 and then egged on by the Russo Japanese War, but nobody had made them standard because nobody had fought a really big war in western Europe since 1871 in Europe. And politicians and top military leaders, most of whom would not take the field in 1914, simply didn't care about anything else. Nor have an easy way to pay for it had they bothered, considering that everyone also needed to rearm with 100% brand new quick firing artillery, something Germany blundered on, and buy machine guns in the first place. Nor was such high level leadership really were they in a good position to give a damn given how rapid the changes had been, how specific they were and the naturally conservative nature of any military, because they are constantly assailed by idiots with idiot ideas at the same time. Something which has never stopped either. God knows the internet has with its vast wealth of facts, managed to only make that worse.

Sea Skimmer wrote:Similar distortions took place in WW2 which some of us still have to fight against (I mean really, were supposed to believe the MASSIVE LOOSERS were super ultimate winners?)

These might be an interesting read for you and anyone else who wants to understand just how much this is true.
http://tankarchives.blogspot.com/2013/0 ... stics.html
http://tankarchives.blogspot.com/2013/0 ... art-2.html
http://tankarchives.blogspot.ca/2013/07 ... art-3.html

Sea Skimmer wrote:In fact I have seen it repeatedly and explicitly stated that the Germans abandon the entire line in the end because they had no possible artillery countermeasure to the 6in guns on HMS Fox, and its just not possible to dug simple earthworks proof against that kind of shellfire.

That's strange considering by the time the Germans retreated the shelling had already stopped and the British were already fleeing. What was claimed to have happened was that parts were supposed to withdraw but the bugle calls and orders got mumbled so the likewise inexperienced German troops retreated when only a specific company was supposed to retreat. Keep in mind that the lines were then reestablished the next morning, so shelling does not have been the case.

I can't remember if it was the American generals or junior officers or both who ignored the advice from the French of not charging headlong into German machineguns that led to several self-inflicted massacres for the Doughboys (or more fittingly, "D'OH-boys") in their early encounters. If the former, then Pershing might deserve a place on the roster.

SilverDragonRed wrote:Which general or leader of World War 1 do y'all think was the most incompetent for each of the warring nations? Or overall?

Hard to beat the idiot in charge of the Russian Army in 1914, who's long Russian name I'm never able to remember.

Rennenkampf?

Steve wrote:Rennenkampf?

No, this guy - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikolai_Yanushkevich
The genius who promised to improvise a "Partial mobilization" in an hour... Which caused Serbia to reject the Austrian ultimatum.

Ah. I was thinking of the failure to hook up with Samsonov before he was destroyed at Allenstein. But my WWI Eastern Front knowledge is a tad rusty ATM.

Sea Skimmer wrote:Kaiser Wilhelm. Without his level of epic stupid nobody else being dumb would have even had a chance to matter.

I gotta' disagree with this one. During the war Wilhelm got his position usurped by the general's staff and was barely in charge at all so whatever happened then can't really be blamed on him. His actions before the war also weren't just his faults alone. The Daily Telegraph affair was the ultimately the fault of chancellor Bülow who couldn't be arsed to properly vet Wilhelm's part of the interview despte this being his job. Wilhelm's visit in Tanger during the Morocco crisis was also done on behalf of the german cabinet and not his own idea. The Anglo-German naval race was primarily the idea of Admiral Tirpitz although Wilhelm was in favor of it.

What I see is a ruler who was in over his head and marred by bad advisors. That doesn't scream "epic" stupidity to me.

Metahive, if we just focus on the German responisbility for WWI, you can blame Wilhelm:

1. Fired Bismarck. This alone was so monumentally stupid, for it destroyed any chance of Russian neutrality. As a result, the Rückversicherungsvertrag was left unrenewed. This also meant that Russia would not stay neutral if Germany would act. In short, this is directly what turned Serbia from a local into an international affair.
2. Created the naval race. Tirpitz was the architect, but Wilhelm was the one who started it and the pointless drive for colonies. He was the main instigator. This pushed Britain from being Germany's natural ally to being Germany's natural enemy (with a lot of help from the British press and British big business).

Now imagine a world where Wilhelm does not mess this up. There would be no entente cordiale as France and the UK would still squabble over colonies and sink treasure into them.

Now the following is speculative, but based on the most likely data points.

War is declared between Austria and Serbia. France supports Serbia. Maybe even Russia. But Britain, not being threatened, would most likely stay out. Public opinion might even support Austria. In any case, Britain does what it always does - make money by selling weapons to continental powers fighting.

But in this scenario the German Army is not underfunded as it was in reality. It does not lack manpower that is diverted to the Navy. The most likely result is that Schlieffen actually works, there would be no battle of the Marne due to there being no brits, Paris falls. The Russians still suffer setbacks and quickly sue for peace after the fall of Paris. Britain organizes a peace conference.

As a result, Germany will take a few territorial gains (maybe Champagne or maybe the German-speaking parts of Belgium). Austria takes Serbia, but most likely will be dependent on Germany for the next generation, if it even survives and does not break up - at which point Germany will absorb the Czech and Austrian territories. Germany remains the worlds #1 economic power and once the British Empire collapses becomes the hegemon of Europe.

That is why Wilhelm was a colossal idiot.

Thanas wrote:

Sea Skimmer wrote:Kaiser Wilhelm. Without his level of epic stupid nobody else being dumb would have even had a chance to matter.

This, but only if you include the prewar stuff, which I am not sure OP is doing.

Otherwise, Nikolas II.

I don't see a problem with including anything prewar.

Wilhelm didn't sack Bismarck on a whim, he sacked him because Bismarck attempted to provoke a popular uprising he could use as an excuse to crack down on the socialists. That's hardly a bad or irrational reason to get rid of a high-ranking public official. The canceling of the reinsurance treaty with Russia also wasn't Wilhelm II's idea alone, the Auswärtige Amt stood behind it as well and chancellor Caprivi ultimately supported the decision even when he didn't quite agreed with it at first just because he thought it would improve relations with Britain. That this then was horribly bungled was again just as much the fault of men like Bülow and Tirpitz as it was Wilhelm's.

My point is that most of what gets blamed on Wilhelm II like the naval race and colonialism is just as much fault of the german political establishment of the time who themselves had quite high flying dreams of Germany's place in the sun so singling Wilhelm II out as some sort of "epic fail guy" is not quite hitting home and too simplistic a view on the man. He wasn't an autocratic dictator who decided policy all by himself like Nicolas II who I think deserves more of the blame of things went down than Willy the Second.

Metahive wrote:Wilhelm didn't sack Bismarck on a whim, he sacked him because Bismarck attempted to provoke a popular uprising he could use as an excuse to crack down on the socialists.

Nope. Bismarck tried to introduce a new socialist law, but he never really tried to provoke or organize a popular uprising.

That's hardly a bad or irrational reason to get rid of a high-ranking public official. The canceling of the reinsurance treaty with Russia also wasn't Wilhelm II's idea alone, the Auswärtige Amt stood behind it as well and chancellor Caprivi ultimately supported the decision even when he didn't quite agreed with it at first just because he thought it would improve relations with Britain. That this then was horribly bungled was again just as much the fault of men like Bülow and Tirpitz as it was Wilhelm's.

And again, a better Kaiser would have prevented that. And let us not forget that both Caprivi and Bülow were appointed by Wilhelm. He wanted them as successors to Bismarck, he lobbied for them and got them elected. He chose his own bad advisors.

My point is that most of what gets blamed on Wilhelm II like the naval race and colonialism is just as much fault of the german political establishment of the time who themselves had quite high flying dreams of Germany's place in the sun so singling Wilhelm II out as some sort of "epic fail guy" is not quite hitting home and too simplistic a view on the man. He wasn't an autocratic dictator who decided policy all by himself like Nicolas II who I think deserves more of the blame of things went down than Willy the Second.

No, he didn't. But he was the main impetus. He mobilized millions for his ideas and bullied people and Parliament into supporting them. That is enough to blame him.

Thanas wrote:Nope. Bismarck tried to introduce a new socialist law, but he never really tried to provoke or organize a popular uprising.

Umm, provoking the socialists into a violent clash was his ultimate reason which he himself admitted directly in a council session to the emperor after Wilhelm had repeatedly frustrated him over it. The socialist bill he wanted to introduce was also deliberately made so radical (including the right of the police to expel socialists from their homes at will) to break the government and make himself look indispensable to the emperor as well. Well, Bismarck's fault was that he never thought he had to deal with Wilhelm as an emperor and that he could boss him easily around in any case. I think Mr Blood and Iron has no one to blame but himself for this.

And again, a better Kaiser would have prevented that. And let us not forget that both Caprivi and Bülow were appointed by Wilhelm. He wanted them as successors to Bismarck, he lobbied for them and got them elected. He chose his own bad advisors.

Many of the statesmen of that time could have prevented it and had many chances to do so, but all of them failed. Again, not something you can single out WIlhelm for.

Woodrow Wilson, for even involving America in WW1.