The Fall of France

[Rob Wilson]

When they grew too cocky and depended on the Maginot line as their only line of defense.

Actually the Maginot line made perfectly sense once you examine the defensive problems that France faced when it was built.
Generally it receives a bad name and in effects it probably acted in a bad way on the french morale.But as concept it was sound once you examine all the factors involved.
Keep in mind that the germans built something of similar as well.
Their defeat in WW2 was due to a variety of factors,not last grossly incompetent (well incompetent is an euphemism) leadership,but please note that the germans defeated practically everyone else until they invaded Russia.

He is correct though, they did infact rely on the Maginot line, thinking that the time taken to defeat it would buy them the time to mobilise the Army and get themselves ready to counter-attack. This corrlates with your Incompetence argument, and the fact that no French General was prepared to believe that the Germans would ever attack the line so France was safe to negotiate from a position of strength (how wrong were they? ). So your both right.

As to the French as a people, the ones in the large Cities are the most insufferable buch of elitist wankers in the world, the people out in the country (towns and small villages) are really nice and not that different from anyone anywhere else. Because most people only get to meet the City folk, and the policies they reflect in big government the French as a whole get bad press.

[Admiral Piett]

I smell generalizations.

I certainly don't fear Europe or Europeans.

You personally no.But as far I can see on internet boards and newspaper articles there is plenty of right wingers in the USA who consider the EU a future threat that should be eliminated.

I am so sick and freaking tired of those anti-Semitic, effeminate, cowardly French bastards screwing with the minds of everyone on the planet. Paris: the city of whores. France: looser of wars… they start them than leave! Why do we care about what they say? France has never been an asset, they are a liability and should be cut off from us altogether! We need to bomb them, kill all the froggie bastards and re-colonize the land with normal people!

See? This is just an example I picked here.While this is not specifically antieuropean in general there is plenty of idiots like this or Machiavelli wannabees already considering the EU a competitor.Now,idiots are everywhere and in the EU there is plenty of them as well.However when you see that Bush has managed to convince the people that Iraq is a first class threat you cannot really blame someone for worrying about what the future might bring.If a politician has managed to convince the people that Iraq is a threat then it should not be difficult to do the same tomorrow with the EU,which after all has the potential to be a far more serious threat.

He is correct though, they did infact rely on the Maginot line, thinking that the time taken to defeat it would buy them the time to mobilise the Army and get themselves ready to counter-attack. This corrlates with your Incompetence argument, and the fact that no French General was prepared to believe that the Germans would ever attack the line so France was safe to negotiate from a position of strength (how wrong were they? ). So your both right.

Not exactly.The purpose of the installation was essentially to reduce the extension of the border that had to be defended.It was anticipated that the true battle would have been fought between the french and the german army,in Belgium,if I recall correctly.The purpose of the Maginot was to deter any attack along the Rhine and Alsace Lorraine,not stopping the german army.They lacked the resources to protect all the borders,so fortifications were seen as a cost effective solution to reduce the possible vectors of approach of the german army.They costed only a fraction of what would have been necessary to spend to equip a mechanized army and besides a tank built in the early 30's,when the most of the fortifications were built,
would have been probably a piece of shit in the 40's,while the fortifications remained still a formidable obstacle.
Unfortunately no one anticipated seven german armored divisions puching throught the Ardennes,hitting the weakest point of the french defense, between the Maginot and the bulk of the french army in the north.
That doomed them.

[Stuart Mackey]

When they grew too cocky and depended on the Maginot line as their only line of defense.

Actually the Maginot line made perfectly sense once you examine the defensive problems that France faced when it was built.
Generally it receives a bad name and in effects it probably acted in a bad way on the french morale.But as concept it was sound once you examine all the factors involved.
Keep in mind that the germans built something of similar as well.
Their defeat in WW2 was due to a variety of factors,not last grossly incompetent (well incompetent is an euphemism) leadership,but please note that the germans defeated practically everyone else until they invaded Russia.

Ahh, but when Gamelin was replaced by Wegand, they improved greatly, but it was too late by then.

[Stuart Mackey]

When they grew too cocky and depended on the Maginot line as their only line of defense.

Actually the Maginot line made perfectly sense once you examine the defensive problems that France faced when it was built.
Generally it receives a bad name and in effects it probably acted in a bad way on the french morale.But as concept it was sound once you examine all the factors involved.
Keep in mind that the germans built something of similar as well.
Their defeat in WW2 was due to a variety of factors,not last grossly incompetent (well incompetent is an euphemism) leadership,but please note that the germans defeated practically everyone else until they invaded Russia.

He is correct though, they did infact rely on the Maginot line, thinking that the time taken to defeat it would buy them the time to mobilise the Army and get themselves ready to counter-attack. This corrlates with your Incompetence argument, and the fact that no French General was prepared to believe that the Germans would ever attack the line so France was safe to negotiate from a position of strength (how wrong were they? ). So your both right.

Err Rob, the French army was fully mobilised by the time of the German Invasion, With the Idea being to push a large part of it into Belgium, with the BEF, to fight there. The problem was poor morale, training and leadership combined with overall poor equipment.

[Perinquus]

Actually, French military blunders go back to well before WWI. Remember that thing called the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. The Germans beat the French in about as short a time as they did in 1940, and the crucial victory was won on the same battlefield - Sedan. They also did this in spite of the fact the French possessed superior infantry weapons, including the Mitrailleuse - an early form of mechanical machine gun.

They probably would have beaten the French in jig time during WWI as well if the British Expeditionary Force had not been present, and if von Moltke the Younger had not fatally altered the Schlieffen Plan, unnecessarily strengthening the eastern front armies at the expense of those which were to invade France.

[Admiral Piett]

They also did this in spite of the fact the French possessed superior infantry weapons, including the Mitrailleuse - an early form of mechanical machine gun.

It is not true.The prussians had far better rifles and knew how to use them.The machine guns were deployed without the appropriate training, because the emperor wanted to use them as a suprise weapon.The result was that they were used very ineffectively.

They probably would have beaten the French in jig time during WWI as well if the British Expeditionary Force had not been present, and if von Moltke the Younger had not fatally altered the Schlieffen Plan, unnecessarily strengthening the eastern front armies at the expense of those which were to invade France.

The Schlieffen Plan was probably too ambitious and the strengthening of the eastern front was a response to to the strengthening of the russian army which happened before than expected.

training and leadership combined with overall poor equipment.

Not really that poor.The wermacht at that time was not really that uber powerful monster.Motorization was still somewhat limited,and the bulk of the armored forces was made by tin can Mk I and Mk II tanks, only backed by czech tanks and some Mk III and Mk IV (early version with that ridicolous short barrelled gun for infantry support).For protection and firepower french tanks were much better.In the few instances french tanks confronted german tanks the germans were in trouble.88mm guns and air support saved their asses.
Doctrine made the difference.

[Perinquus]

It is not true.The prussians had far better rifles and knew how to use them.The machine guns were deployed without the appropriate training, because the emperor wanted to use them as a suprise weapon.The result was that they were used very ineffectively.

I beg to differ. The French Chassepot Modele 1866 had a longer range than the Prussian Dreyse Needle Gun which, dating from 1841, was a quarter century older. The Chassepot was a more recent, and slightly more advanced design than the rifle the Germans were using, and proved amenable to conversion for firing metallic cartridges, once they were developed.

As for the Mitrailleuse, the French tried to employ it as a form of artillery, and since the Prussian field artillery could comfortably outrange it, the Mitrailleuse batteries were generally shot to pieces before they could fire a single effective shot. At Gravelotte they were intelligently employed, with devastating results, but this was the exception, not the rule.

The Schlieffen Plan was probably too ambitious and the strengthening of the eastern front was a response to to the strengthening of the russian army which happened before than expected.

It still might well have worked, given the unpreparedness of the Russian army. There were Russian troops, for example, who went into battle unarmed, expected to pick up weapons from the fallen once the battle had begun.

[Admiral Piett]

I beg to differ. The French Chassepot Modele 1866 had a longer range than the Prussian Dreyse Needle Gun which, dating from 1841, was a quarter century older. The Chassepot was a more recent, and slightly more advanced design than the rifle the Germans were using, and proved amenable to conversion for firing metallic cartridges, once they were developed.

Yes,you are correct,I was under the impression of the opposite.

As for the Mitrailleuse, the French tried to employ it as a form of artillery, and since the Prussian field artillery could comfortably outrange it, the Mitrailleuse batteries were generally shot to pieces before they could fire a single effective shot. At Gravelotte they were intelligently employed, with devastating results, but this was the exception, not the rule.

Yes,keep in mind however that there was often a shortage of personnel trained to use them,like Bazaine discovered in the hard way.

It still might well have worked, given the unpreparedness of the Russian army. There were Russian troops, for example, who went into battle unarmed, expected to pick up weapons from the fallen once the battle had begun.

I doubt.Men were exhausted and the unexpected Belgian resistance did not improve the things either.But this is just my impression.

[Stuart Mackey]

training and leadership combined with overall poor equipment.

Not really that poor.The wermacht at that time was not really that uber powerful monster.Motorization was still somewhat limited,and the bulk of the armored forces was made by tin can Mk I and Mk II tanks, only backed by czech tanks and some Mk III and Mk IV (early version with that ridicolous short barrelled gun for infantry support).For protection and firepower french tanks were much better.In the few instances french tanks confronted german tanks the germans were in trouble.88mm guns and air support saved their asses.
Doctrine made the difference.

French A divisions were ok, and proved it in combat but the bulk of the french army was low quality reservists, read Sir Alan Brook's commentry on these men. Colonel A Goutard summerised the situation as "Three demoralisng factors, inactivity, propaganda, drink.
While the French did have some good equipment there was not enough of it to count, and when Weygand took over command and improved the other factors the equipment shortage remained. Of course it was too late by then.

[Cpt_Frank]

I beg to differ. The French Chassepot Modele 1866 had a longer range than the Prussian Dreyse Needle Gun which, dating from 1841, was a quarter century older. The Chassepot was a more recent, and slightly more advanced design than the rifle the Germans were using, and proved amenable to conversion for firing metallic cartridges, once they were developed.

The difference was that the needle of the Dreyse had to penetrate the whole cartridge to ignite the load. That made it more unreliable.