On the US Navy's Littoral Combat Ship...

[Sidewinder]

"This is USS Freedom, I need a pair of Rhinos with Harpoons at my location."

As far as I know, "Rhino" was a nickname for the F-4 Phantom II fighter, the last of which have been retired. (I'm assuming you're not referring to the armored personnel carrier from the 'Warhammer 40,000' games.) Has it been reused for another aircraft, maybe the F/A-18E or F Super Hornet?

[Kitsune]

"This is USS Freedom, I need a pair of Rhinos with Harpoons at my location."

As far as I know, "Rhino" was a nickname for the F-4 Phantom II fighter, the last of which have been retired. (I'm assuming you're not referring to the armored personnel carrier from the 'Warhammer 40,000' games.) Has it been reused for another aircraft, maybe the F/A-18E or F Super Hornet?

http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx? ... 57d1a5df97

It is basically the informal name for the F/A-18E/F with the F-4 long retired

[Patroklos]

LCS update: Not looking good and it appears the cost issue is a trainwreck especially in life cycle terms.

The USS Freedom deployment provided beneficial data on operational support and sustainment concepts for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), but these data have limitations, and the Navy still lacks key data on LCS ships and concepts. The USS Freedom deployed for 10 months with a surface-warfare mission package, and the Navy collected data on items such as systems reliability and crew sleep hours. However, several factors limited the operational lessons learned. For example, mechanical problems prevented the ship from spending as much time at sea as planned. Further, the Navy continues to lack operational data for key operational and warfighting concepts, such as deployment with the other mission packages—mine countermeasures and antisubmarine warfare—and data on the other LCS variant which, under current plans, will comprise half the ship class.

Although the Navy is adjusting some operational support and sustainment concepts, it has not yet addressed risks that remain in executing key concepts.

•Manning: The crew experienced high workload and fell short of the Navy's sleep standards despite adding personnel for the deployment.

•Training: Gaps remain in fully training LCS sailors prior to deployment.

•Maintenance: The Navy is adjusting maintenance requirements and has not yet determined the optimal mix of contractor and crew workload to perform preventative maintenance.

•Logistics: The Navy is reallocating duties among crew and shore support, but the infrastructure needed to support both variants is incomplete.

Without fully analyzing risks in key concepts, the LCS may have operational limitations, deficits in personnel and materiel readiness, and higher costs.

The Navy has produced life-cycle cost estimates for the LCS seaframes and mission modules. Although those estimates contain uncertainty and there are inherent difficulties in comparing the life-cycle costs of ships with differing capabilities and missions, the best available Navy data indicate that the annual per ship costs for LCS are nearing or may exceed those of other surface ships, including those with greater size and larger crews, such as frigates.

http://gao.gov/assets/670/664672.pdf

Annualized Life-Cycle Cost Estimates of LCS and Navy Surface Ships