Cracked.com on WW2 myths

[JBG]

It's definitely true the US didn't "win on its own" and it certainly wasn't Germany's biggest opponent during the war. I just still think American industrial contributions to the war are worth mentioning though. Lend Lease usually doesn't get as much credit as it should in these myth busting sessions.

The article should have included "The Nazis rebuilt Germany's economy" myth.

Again, however, the same objection applies. The Russians managed to crank out vast supplies of equipment despite being forced to move much of their industrial base in order to avoid the German advance in the early part of the war. That is a pretty damned impressive achievement, and by the end of the war they were cranking out truly vast quantities of equipment. The T-34 swarm alone was a seemingly limitless horde.

As for the myth of Nazi economic prowess, I agree that this really needs to be deflated. I still run into morons claiming that today.

If the above interests you I would strongly recommend Richard Overy's "Why the Allies Won the War", specifically chapter 6 - "A Genius for Mass Production:Economies at War".

The US produced by the end something like 2/3 of all allied military production. The Ford Motor Company produced more than the sovereign nation of Italy. And it goes on like that....

Once mobilised the US industrial economy was a true behemoth. The resurrection of Soviet industrial production was necessary to allied success. The German war economy and the whole design/production of weapons was a disaster until later reforms, which were too little and too late for them .

Systems, like the Panther, became complex for complexities' sake and so difficult to manufacture and even if not chronically unreliable, difficult to maintain otherwise. Later Panthers did not burn so readily and if meticulously maintained were reasonably reliable. The French Army adopted the Panther as it's MBT after WW2. It was still well armed, well armoured and fast.

The Tiger had different problems, apart from mechanical unreliability caused by complex design and battlefield maintenance. You mentioned the slow turret traverse - not so much an issue if you operate as a mobile pill box firing at medium to long ranges - but another problem goes to the state of German industry itself. The design had a fundamental flaw in that it's gearbox was not strong enough for the engine's outputs ( and the engine was barely sufficient as it was) and only one gearbox for every engine, for some time was produced. Tigers are sitting all over the place with blown transmissions and there are no spares available!

Darth, Nazi economic prowess was little tested. It was mostly non-existent. They left most things to the usual conglomerates. Their industrial war economy prowess was tested and was shown to be at best inept and at worst simply a process of continually shooting one's foot. Imagine what the US or the Soviets would have done with the VW plant at Wolfsburg!

[thejester]

To the Red Army tanks like the Panther and King Tiger were a joke.

Really? Have you got any sources for this?

The Russians performed tests on captured Panthers during the war, and were pretty giddy to find out the piece of shit couldn't even perform a basic 200km road march before breaking down. This meant that the Panther literally gave every mobile initiative to the Russians. They could far outflank it and know it could not redeploy to meet them. Even if the Panthers won, the Russians could then take solace in that it would not be able to pursue a breakthrough in Russian lines before half of them broke down.

Again, I'd love to see some sources for this. I certainly wouldn't disagree that the unreliability of the Big Cats was an obvious problem that is too often overlooked and severely hindered the usefulness of the tanks. But I also find it hard to believe that the Red Army would simply laugh them off, particularly after an engagement like Prokhorovka - and stating that the Panther's mechanical unreliability 'gave every mobile initiative to the Russians' is laying it on a bit thick, every issue from lack of fuel to lack of numbers played its part.

A quick bit of googling found this:

German comparison of German tanks with the new (at the time) Russian T-34/85 and JS-II (122mm), from March 23rd of 1944, stated that: "The Panther is far superior to the T34-85 for frontal fire (Panther Ausf G could penetrate frontal armor of T-34/85 at 800m, while T-34/85 could penetrare frontal armor of Panther Ausf G at 500m), approximately equal for side and rear fire, superior to the JS for frontal fire and inferior for side and rear fire."In 1943 and 1944, Panther was able to destroy any enemy tank in existence at ranges of 2000m, while in general veteran Panther crews reported 90 percent hit rate at ranges up to 1000m. According to US Army Ground Forces statistics, destruction of a single Panther was achieved after destruction of 5 M4 Shermans or some 9 T-34s.

"To destroy a Panther, a tank destroyer with a three inch (Gun Motor Carriage M10) or 76mm gun (Gun Motor Carriage M18 Hellcat) would have to aim for the side or rear of the turret, the opening through which the hull-mounted machine gun projected, or for the underside of the gun shield (mantlet)." - U.S. Army report prior to September of 1944.

Since 1943, Soviets captured some number of various variants of Panther, which equipped some of their tank units such as Lieutenant Sotnikov’s Guard Company. This unit used captured Panthers as late as spring of 1945, when they had 3 Ausf As, while operating in Prague (Praga) - district of Warsaw. Soviets held Panthers in high regard and considered captured Panther to be a prize.Captured Panthers were then given to successful crews as a kind of reward.In order to keep them running captured German mechanics were pressed into service and in 1944, Panther’s manual was printed in Russian for distribution among tank crews. Captured vehicles temporarily remained in theiroriginal colors but with markings of their new owners. Later, some were repainted in dark green and were marked withlarge tactical markings and white stars for indentification purposes.

So use it till it breaksdown and then get rid of it...I guess German crews didn't really have that luxury

Do I even need to explain why the King Tiger sucked? It's ground cross-country was a pitiful 5-10mph. Infantry could outrun it.

It was designed as an infantry support tank, so...? Again, there's things I'd rather be rumbling around the steppe in but given it only came into (limited) service in early 1944 and was grouped in specialist battalions this criticism seems a bit off the mark. It was meant to fill a niche role and speed wasn't that a big a deal within that role.

[PainRack]

Lend-Lease doesn't get much credit in these myth busting sessions because when it is brought up by the majority it is usually in the same vein as the original myth being discredited; that America won the war on its own, while giving out aid and money to those too ineffectual to play anything other than support anyway because they're not America. A full discreditation would bring up and discredit the idea of Lend-Lease as being some sort of charity give away to ungrateful Europeans and nasty Soviets who then stabbed the States in the back, and instead giving credit to what Lend-Lease actually accomplished with the Americans as the benefactors and also point out that the US also demanded that the rent eventually be settled.

As I seem to recall, there was a blurb in a history text on how American generals argued that Lend-Lease was beneficial for the American military, as it allowed for expansion of their military industrial complex with foreign credits while testing such equipment with foreign lives. Such an expansion was unlikely to have occured for the Army. Is there any evidence for this?

[MKSheppard]

Lend-Lease doesn't get much credit in these myth busting sessions because when it is brought up by the majority it is usually in the same vein as the original myth being discredited; that America won the war on its own, while giving out aid and money to those too ineffectual to play anything other than support anyway because they're not America.

Incorrect.

Lend Lease pretty much equipped the commonwealth armies in armored vehicles -- The Commonwealth got 17,000~ Shermans, for example.

And it also kept the Soviet Union punching above it's weight.

The USSR produced only 197,000 trucks in WWII, but got 435,000 via lend lease; allowing them to equip mechanized forces for 1944-45's advance; and provided major portions of the Soviet Wartime economy

92.7% of all soviet railroad rails
81.6% of all soviet railroad locomotive
80.7% of all soviet railroad cars
59% of all soviet aviation fuel
55.5% of all soviet aluminum
45.2% of all soviet copper ore
33% of all soviet explosives
30% of all soviet tires

(this is combined US/UK aid in the percentages above).

The Soviets are certainly not going to be doing much attacking if the US isn't giving them railroad equipment or aviation fuel.

This let them re-orient their wartime economy to produce only those items that were big ticket items, such as tanks, artillery, and aircraft, and to let whole sectors wither on the vine, to be supported or propped up by Lend Lease -- which did provide a whopping 15% of the soviet meat products during the war.

[Masami von Weizegger]

Incorrect.

Lend Lease pretty much equipped the commonwealth armies in armored vehicles -- The Commonwealth got 17,000~ Shermans, for example.

And it also kept the Soviet Union punching above it's weight.

The USSR produced only 197,000 trucks in WWII, but got 435,000 via lend lease; allowing them to equip mechanized forces for 1944-45's advance; and provided major portions of the Soviet Wartime economy

92.7% of all soviet railroad rails
81.6% of all soviet railroad locomotive
80.7% of all soviet railroad cars
59% of all soviet aviation fuel
55.5% of all soviet aluminum
45.2% of all soviet copper ore
33% of all soviet explosives
30% of all soviet tires

(this is combined US/UK aid in the percentages above).

The Soviets are certainly not going to be doing much attacking if the US isn't giving them railroad equipment or aviation fuel.

This let them re-orient their wartime economy to produce only those items that were big ticket items, such as tanks, artillery, and aircraft, and to let whole sectors wither on the vine, to be supported or propped up by Lend Lease -- which did provide a whopping 15% of the soviet meat products during the war.

Happily conceded. I have to admit my own history courses did not delve into the subject much and most of my own research on World War II since then has been ashamedly restricted to mostly the Irish Free State and the United Kingdom.

That said, the extremely muddled point I failed to make was not that Land-Lease was an inconsequential or irrelevant act but rather that if someone is making a point of refuting a particular aspect of American involvement in World War II then bringing up another act, presumably as some sort of effort to not run down the United States too bad is somewhat pointless when no amount of grandstanding or anti-Americanism could reduce the perception of American influence in the war, especially in the eyes of those most concerned about this, Americans themselves.

[spaceviking]

The USSR produced only 197,000 trucks in WWII, but got 435,000 via lend lease; allowing them to equip mechanized forces for 1944-45's advance; and provided major portions of the Soviet Wartime economy

I think people tend to ignore the importance of trucks and similar vehicles when looking at the Second World War. The T-34 certainly won battles, but the Soviet Union ability to capitalize on them owed a lot to American supplied vehicles.

[Darth Wong]

That's a good point. The vast armies of Russia required extraordinary logistical support simply by virtue of their ridiculous size, not to mention the nature of the devastated scorched-earth territory that they were retaking.

[Serafina]

American material was mostly used to fill gaps in soviet production.

E.g. since they got perfectly fine trucks delivered, they did not bother to ramp up their own production and concentrated on other things.
Lend-lease was certainly very valuable - getting the right stuff at the right time - but that does not prove that the Soviet Union would have collapsed without it.

[Surlethe]

Think about it in terms of "guns and butter". In some sense, lend-lease significantly reduced the cost of butter so the USSR could build more guns. You can't definitively say whether the USSR would have collapsed without it, but you could make guesses about Soviet production in the absence of lend-lease, compare that to known German forces, and make a projection.

[Marcus Aurelius]

Think about it in terms of "guns and butter". In some sense, lend-lease significantly reduced the cost of butter so the USSR could build more guns. You can't definitively say whether the USSR would have collapsed without it, but you could make guesses about Soviet production in the absence of lend-lease, compare that to known German forces, and make a projection.

Lend-lease from the US did not really start to arrive in numbers until after the Battle of Stalingrad. Before that it was much more meager support from the UK. This gives us a fairly firm basis to conclude that the Soviet Union likely would not have collapsed without lend-lease. However, the rapid advances of the Red Army after Stalingrad probably would not have been possible without it, either. It's even possible that the resulting stalemate would have convinced both Hitler and Stalin to reach a peace treaty, probably along the lines of the WW1 Brest-Litovsk treaty, despite the German atrocities and the obvious ideological differences.

[His Divine Shadow]

Think about it in terms of "guns and butter". In some sense, lend-lease significantly reduced the cost of butter so the USSR could build more guns. You can't definitively say whether the USSR would have collapsed without it, but you could make guesses about Soviet production in the absence of lend-lease, compare that to known German forces, and make a projection.

I'd be interested to see this projection. Seriously it sounds like an intriguing idea.

[Darth Yan]

well they do honestly point out the falsehoods of how we assign American history to events that we really had no part in (U571), as well as how we downplay the heroism of others; as well as the fact that there were plenty of other key battles that we didn't win. The sites pretty accurate for the most part.

[JBG]

Think about it in terms of "guns and butter". In some sense, lend-lease significantly reduced the cost of butter so the USSR could build more guns. You can't definitively say whether the USSR would have collapsed without it, but you could make guesses about Soviet production in the absence of lend-lease, compare that to known German forces, and make a projection.

Lend-lease from the US did not really start to arrive in numbers until after the Battle of Stalingrad. Before that it was much more meager support from the UK. This gives us a fairly firm basis to conclude that the Soviet Union likely would not have collapsed without lend-lease. However, the rapid advances of the Red Army after Stalingrad probably would not have been possible without it, either. It's even possible that the resulting stalemate would have convinced both Hitler and Stalin to reach a peace treaty, probably along the lines of the WW1 Brest-Litovsk treaty, despite the German atrocities and the obvious ideological differences.

That is a very good point. It is difficult to imagine Operation Bagration, to take an extreme example, being feasible without the trucks, rail cars, radios, spam etc.

[CaptainChewbacca]

I'd actually never known about the Pavlov house before. That kind of a standoff is pretty freaking awesome.

[wautd]

Ironically, the article contains some myths on its own (Hitler's haltbefehl etc...) but it was nice to learn things I havn't known before (I didn't known they ever invaded Madagascar).

I was actually suprised to see that appearantly "Hitler Was an Evil Genius" was there. I always tought most people thought of him as an idiot (especially when it came to military decisions). However, could it be said he was a political genius during the 30's or was he simply the right man at the right time that enabled him to seize power?

[Medic]

Well either Lend-Lease fueled Ruskies blunt the Nazi war machine or eventually Allied bombers effect a slow strangulation of the same as Germany starves of petrol and eventually succumbs to the Bomb. If that sounds just too rosy just consider LeMay was pulled out of the 8th USAF just as it was hitting it's battle rhythm to fix the B-29 operation then nascent against Japan. If America doesn't Lend-Lease or Russia for some reason nevertheless sues for peace, it just means that much more effort poured into the bombing campaign and a LeMay never retasked to the PTO. Hell, he'd probably get the B-29's in Europe (e.g., the Germany first policy) although Germany would've actually been able to field interceptor's capable of making it sweat more than Japan ever did.

Albert Speer said himself years after the war that people didn't appreciate the contribution of the bombing campaign against Nazi Germany, not so much in destruction of industry -- although eventually it was effective -- but in siphoning off a great deal of resources which then didn't go to the East Front. (guns, ammo, concrete, planes and men)

[Marcus Aurelius]

I was actually suprised to see that appearantly "Hitler Was an Evil Genius" was there. I always tought most people thought of him as an idiot (especially when it came to military decisions). However, could it be said he was a political genius during the 30's or was he simply the right man at the right time that enabled him to seize power?

Hitler's idiocy at military decisions has in fact been widely exaggerated, since all the German generals and field marshalls post-war memoirs placed the blame on him. That is not to say that he wasn't an incompetent military leader, but he didn't have that much direct power over military decisions before Stalingrad. It was only towards the end of the war when he started to insist on things being done his way and micromanage things like deployment of divisions and in some cases even smaller units.

As for Hitler's political genius, it can be pretty much reduced to the fact that he was ruthless and did not play the game by the established rules of politics. That allowed him to become a dictator of Germany, take complete control over German society and later fool the Western Allies to accept the Munich agreement. He was also aided by his considerable personal charisma, which often worked even on well educated people such as Albert Speer.

[Duckie]

The most amazingly retarded thing I've noticed in that article is its baldfaced assertation that Hitler not ordering Seelowe was a mistake caused by his idiocy. Sure, the Battle of Britain wasn't the best of ideas, even if it demoralised London, but not attempting to invade Britain as an example of strategic blunders? Maybe in Hearts of Iron, but not in real life.

[Kane Starkiller]

It would be interesting to examine how Germany would've fared had the USSR not provide it with rubber, oil, grain and other strategic materials in 1939-1941.
Good ole uncle Joe thought that by supplying Germany he can prolong the war between the evil capitalist countries and at the same time acquire technology from the Germans. Then France goes and surrenders on him. Whooops!

[thejester]

Well either Lend-Lease fueled Ruskies blunt the Nazi war machine or eventually Allied bombers effect a slow strangulation of the same as Germany starves of petrol and eventually succumbs to the Bomb. If that sounds just too rosy just consider LeMay was pulled out of the 8th USAF just as it was hitting it's battle rhythm to fix the B-29 operation then nascent against Japan. If America doesn't Lend-Lease or Russia for some reason nevertheless sues for peace, it just means that much more effort poured into the bombing campaign and a LeMay never retasked to the PTO. Hell, he'd probably get the B-29's in Europe (e.g., the Germany first policy) although Germany would've actually been able to field interceptor's capable of making it sweat more than Japan ever did.

Um...Le May was never commander of the 8th, he had 3rd Air Division. Jimmy Doolittle took over from him Ira Eaker at the start of 1944 as commander and lead it through Big Week, Berlin etc. Doolittle had another headquarters directly over him anyway (USSTAF) which co-ordinated policy for the 8th and the 15th (as well as the tactical air forces).

[The Dark]

That's a good point. The vast armies of Russia required extraordinary logistical support simply by virtue of their ridiculous size, not to mention the nature of the devastated scorched-earth territory that they were retaking.

Plus, rather than factories devoted to rail stock or support vehicles, the Russians could devote factories to tank spam. When you only make one thing, you can come up with damn good ways to make it.

The Panther was also something like 63 tons. Only 1 ton lighter than the IS-2, yet it did not possess the IS-2's firepower, protection, or even mobility!

The Panzer V Panther was 49.4 short tons. A Tiger I was 62.72 tons.

[Scottish Ninja]

The Panther was also something like 63 tons. Only 1 ton lighter than the IS-2, yet it did not possess the IS-2's firepower, protection, or even mobility!

The Panzer V Panther was 49.4 short tons. A Tiger I was 62.72 tons.

I just checked and while he may have mixed up the Panther and Tiger I weights figures, the IS-2 does in fact weigh 46 tonnes (I don't know what that is in short tons), so the point stands.

[MKSheppard]

Because I'm such a nice guy!

Excerpt from Panther and It's Variants:

Captured Panthers were used after 1945 primarily by the French forces. In 1947 a battalion of the 503rd Armor Regiment in Mourmelon was outfitted with 50 Panthers, while additional Panthers (including Jagdpanthers) were also stationed in Satory and Bourges.

French experience with the Panther were put to paper in the report "Le Panther 1947", published by the Ministre de la Guerre, Section Technique de L'Armée, Groupement Auto-Char, which was graciously made available to us. The following are some excerpts from the report:

— The turret traverse drive is not strong enough to either turn the turret or hold it in place when the Panther is on an incline of more than 20 degrees. The Panther is therefore not capable of firing when driving cross-country.

— Elevating the gun is normally simple, but made difficult if the stabilizer — operated by compressed nitrogen — has lost pressure.

— The commander's cupola with its 7 periscopes provides a nearly perfect all -round visibility. Periscopes damaged by shells can be replaced very quickly.

— A scissors periscope with large magnification power was affixed to a bracket in the commander's cupola.

— Aside from his periscope gun sight ( which is excellent), the gunner has no other type of observation device. He is therefore practically blind — one of the greatest shortcomings of the Panther.

— The gunsight with two magnification stages is remarkably clear and has its field of view clear in the center. The gunsight enables observation of a target and shells out to over 3000 meters.

— No type of hollow charge ammunition is planned for the Panther.

— The HE shell can be fired with a delay of 0.15 seconds.

— The PzGr 40 had better penetration out to 1500 meters than the PzGr 39, but then its trajectory drops off considerably.

— During rapid rate of fire it is not uncommon to be forced to break off firing when the recoil of the gun has reached its permissible limit (cease fire).

— A rate of fire of 20 rounds per minute is only permitted in exceptional cases when circumstances so dictate.

— When firing off a round the chassis demonstrates no unfavorable reaction, regardless of what position the turret is in.

— Once the commander has located a target, it takes between 20 and 30 seconds until the gunner can open fire. This data, which is significantly greater than that of the Sherman, stems from the absence of a periscope for the gunner.

— The fatigue life of the mechanical parts was designed for 5000 km. The wear on many parts is greater than expected. Track and running gear have a life of 2000 to 3000 km. Tracks break very rarely, even on rocky terrain. The bogie wheels, however, can become deformed when driven hard.

— The parts of the power train (with the exception of the final drive) meet the planned fatigue life. The replacement of a transmission requires less than a day.

— On the other hand, the engine was not operable over 1500 km. The average engine life amounted to 1000 km. Engine replacement accomplished in 8 hours by an Unteroffizier (mechanic by occupation) and 8 men with the aid of a tripod beam crane or a Bergepanther. Main gun can be replaced using the same equipment within a few hours. The German maintenance units performed their work remarkably well

— As a result, the Panther is in no way a strategic tank. The Germans did not hesitate to economically increase the engine life by loading the tank onto railcars — even for very short distances (25 km).

— The truly weak spot of the Panther is its final drive, which is of too weak a design and has an average fatigue life of only 150 km.

— Half of the abandoned Panthers found in Normandy in 1944 showed evidence of breaks in the final drive.

— In order to prevent these breaks it is recommended that the following points be closely observed: when driving downhill and in reverse as well as on uneven terrain to be particularly careful when shifting to a lower gear. In addition, a Panther should never be towed without uncoupling the final drive previously. Finally, under no circumstances should both steering levers be operated simultaneously — regardless of the situation.

— A hollow charge round — regardless of what type — will penetrate

armor plating equivalent to its own caliber. It is therefore necessary to use a 105 mm round or, at the very least, an 88 mm round to penetrate the glacis plate of the Panther (Munsingen, 1946)

— A smoke grenade thrown onto the rear deck or the vent openings of the engine will start a fire.

— The running gear is sensitive to HE shells. Calibers 105 mm and greater can render the vehicle immobile (Rammersmatt, 8 December 1944).

— Fragmentation shells or 75 mm rounds which strike in the same spot on the front plate can penetrate it or cause the weld seams to break (Miinsingen, 1946).

— No place of the Panther is so armored that it can withstand a "Panzerfaust" or "Panzerschreck."

— In all cases, the great range of the gun should be exploited to the fullest. Fire can commence at a range of 2000 meters with considerable accuracy. The majority of hits were accomplished at a range of 1400 to 2000 meters. The ammunition expenditure was relatively low; on the average the fourth or fifth shot found its mark, even when using HE shells.

Without a doubt, the Panther was a fully combat-capable tank in 1943, which for its day exhibited remarkable performance in regard to its armament and armor.

Yet even German documents showed that it had considerable weaknesses:

— Inadequate for strategic mobility due to the short fatigue life of its engine, which lay between six and seven times the vehicle's range. The Panther cannot cover large distances and must restrict itself to short distances.

— Deficiency in mobility due to an inadequate steering mechanism, which had a very high breakdown rate.

— Operations required generally specialized personnel: in the Wehrmacht an officer or Oberfeldwebel as tank commander, Unteroffiziers as gunner and driver.

Once the Germans no longer had any experienced tank crews, it was apparent that the Panthers were no longer employed operationally or were abandoned because of mechanical breakdowns

[JBG]

Very interesting Ryan.

It would seem that whilst the Panther had potential it was essentially underdone.

[K. A. Pital]

The USSR produced only 197,000 trucks in WWII, but got 435,000 via lend lease; allowing them to equip mechanized forces for 1944-45's advance; and provided major portions of the Soviet Wartime economy

92.7% of all soviet railroad rails
81.6% of all soviet railroad locomotive
80.7% of all soviet railroad cars
59% of all soviet aviation fuel
55.5% of all soviet aluminum
45.2% of all soviet copper ore
33% of all soviet explosives
30% of all soviet tires.

Just one minor note, Shep.

The 1930-1941 stock is always discounted when we are talking about the lend-lease. Sure, the USSR stopped producing locomotives - but it had a rather huge stock of them; the lend-lease did not provide the majority of that stock.

Same goes for cars - for example, this illustrates the automobile park of the Red Army:

The orange is the Soviet (domestic) cars, the yellow is the import (lend-lease) cars.

I think a similar diagram would be shown in every other department. Lend lease started becoming relevant in 1944-1945, when indeed it became a sizeable addition to the Soviet pre-war + wartime stock of material. Prior to that, when Russia was weathering the bulk of German attacks, the share of lend-lease in the mechanized parks was not that significant.

Some things stuck out more than others (wire, etc.). But the lend-lease was critical to help the "10 Stalin Strikes", the campaigns of 1944-1945, to be more powerful than they could - the RKKA would still do it even without the lend-lease; the deficit of material would be more drastic quite certainly, and perhaps the war would drag for a few more months. The Red Airforce would have huge problems without high-octane fuels near the war's end; USSR's stocks would be depleted and getting such fuels would be a major problem. Possibly a bottleneck.

It would be interesting to examine how Germany would've fared had the USSR not provide it with rubber, oil, grain and other strategic materials in 1939-1941.
Good ole uncle Joe thought that by supplying Germany he can prolong the war between the evil capitalist countries and at the same time acquire technology from the Germans. Then France goes and surrenders on him. Whooops!

I wrote a little about this:

Germany did indeed need oil, and we traded 1 million tons in total with them (that's around 7 million barrels - german annual production, including synthetics, was 12,8 million barrels on the eve of WWII (1939) - the synthetics and imports from Romania increased drastically, and Romania in 1941 provided 13 million barrels, well in excess of what the USSR ever did - so the USSR was not that crucial to Germany running the war, Romania was more important).

Sure, the USSR supplied 1 million tons during the entire 1939-1941 period, but that was about 10% of the German annual oil supply. So Germany would have fared well enough. Same goes for other strategic materials, the trade was fairly minor, overall.

Grain - 1,27 million ton
Cotton - 100 thousand ton
Flax - 9 thousand ton
Oil products - 907 thousand ton

Again, Germany produced ~27,5 million tons of grain annually; the Soviet imports were about 4,5% of the total German grain harvest. I'm not sure where else the Greater Reich imported grain from - if it did, the Soviet imports' importance diminishes further yet.