BenRG wrote:I was aware that there were considerable delays on the Osprey. I remember seeing articles about this 'remarkable and revolutionary' aircraft in issues of 'Flight International' back as far as the mid-80s.
On the issue of the Harrier: A lot of people forget that the Harrier is actually just a re-winged and re-engined Hawker Kestrel technology demonstrator.
IIRC, wasn't the Kestrel a developed and improved version of the original P.1127 (which really was a flying test-rig), conceived as a last gasp by Hawker to quickly turn their vectored thrust concept into a aircraft that could actually do something?
Quickly, because at the time the British government had foolishly declared that manned aircraft were obsolete, and only aircraft programmes which had progressed to workable hardware (or designs) would be allowed to continue. And the Kestrel squeaked through by the skin of its teeth.
For some reason, the British government thought that they could turn what was basically just an engine-and-flight-control testbed into a practical fighting aircraft.
'Course, Hawkers were given the task of designing a supersonic V/STOL strike fighter for the RAF and RN (the P.1154), with the Kestrel as an operational research aircraft and potential stop-gap. But the P.1154 collapsed under the conflicting needs of the Air Force and Navy, and was cancelled. The F-4 took its place; but the attraction of V/STOL had made a mark somewhere and the Kestrel was modified and improved into the Harrier. It probably would have never have won the support it did were it not for those who appriciated the aircraft's unique capabilities and, of course, that order from the USMC.
The Harrier Mk1 had no attack sensors, and couldn't carry a worthwhile weapons load.
At the time the Harrier became an operational aircraft (the late 1960s) the Hawker Hunter was still the RAF's primary strike fighter and CAS aircraft. So the Harrier GR.1's lack of warload and sensors was not necessarily the glaring blemish that it appears today - especially when the concepts of dispersal and survivability that V/STOL offered are factored in. The RAF probably considered the trade-offs worth it, all in all.
If it wasn't for the fact that it was 'protected' by being one of the very few indigenous British warplanes in the RAF, it would have likely gone the way of the dodo.
Eventually, the Harrier Mk1 was replaced by the Mk3, which had a much better engine and some attack sensors. Nonetheless, apart from its' STOVL capability, there was little reason to retain the Harrier in service.
That capability became central to the RAF's concept of Harrier operations as the aircraft reached widespread service, and would remain so for the next 20 years.
By drilling the Harrier squadrons in dispersed operations, they were depending upon STOVL to allow a CAS aircraft to be deployed closer to the front-line troops it would support, resulting in a quicker response time (near identical to the USMC's philosophy).
That was in the Cold War. Of course, now the RAF's Harriers earn their keep flying from the RN's carriers, and as an easily deployable asset for peacekeeping and other international operations.
However, as the Ministry of Defence had, in its' wisdom, scrapped all of the Royal Navy's fixed-wing carriers, the fighter/interceptor derivation of the Kestrel, the Sea Harrier, was the only fighter available for use in the Falklands War (and if the Argentinians had waited just a year, the RN would have scrapped even its' cut-price helicarriers and not even the Sea Harrier would have been available to face their attack aircraft
). The Sea Harrier FRS1 (Fighter/Recon/Strike) carried two Sidewinders and two 30-mm cannon. Despite its' limitation to subsonic flight and visual-range-only engagement, it did rack up something like 35 kills without loss. To put these results in proper context, they
were only fighting against ex-USN A4 Skyhawk bombers, IAI Daggers and Mirage III interceptors (the latter two not exactly renowned for dogfighting manoeuvrability).
The A-4 was a mean opponent in subsonic ACM once it delivered its bombload, and the Israelis demonstrated the Mirage series as capable foes in the hands of the skilled - and the Argentine pilots certainly were that.
The story could very well have been different - if it wasn't for the distances involved. Fighting at extreme ranges from the Argeninian mainland, the Mirages, Daggers and Skyhawks had very little time on station and hence little chance to engage the Sea Harriers on equal terms. Additionally, the Argentinian aircraft were primarily targeted (successfully) at warships, landing craft and other ground targets, instead of trying to whittle away the very limited supply of Sea Harriers in ACM. If their priorities had been different, Britain could have lost the war. But the range issues facing Argentina made such an air-to-air offensive difficult.
Incidently, one Argentine Skyhawk pilot very nearly shot down Flt/Lt Dave Morgan's Sea Harrier while the RAF pilot was engaging (and destroying) another A-4. He had a perfect firing position on the Harrier, but his cannon jammed.
There was also a kill against a C-130 (the Herc absorbed all four Sidewinders fired by a pair of Sea Harriers before being shot down using with their twin cannon). Despite the questionable relevence of the Harrier and Sea Harrier's Falklands War record to their suitability for continued service, the little Jump Jet became politically invulnerable. No government would dare threaten the jet that liberated the Falklands.
It was about at this time that the USMC started using the AV-8A (an unmodified Harrier Mk1). The AV-8C was a Harrier Mk1 with some of the aerodynamic improvements of the AV-8B.
Funnily enough, the USMC sent Harriers to sea years before the RN, probably an influencing factor in the RN's eventual selection of the type. The Harrier had been to sea from its genesis, but the success of the USMC in using it day-in, day-out from carriers must have boosted the Sea Harrier's case.
And so, we reach the AV-8B/D second-generation Harriers (the British call this the Harrier Mk5/7). Despite a larger wing, yet another engine power upgrade and some attack sensor and aerodynamic improvements, it is still essentially the Hawker Kestrel technology demonstrator, an experimental aircraft never intended by its' designers to face the rigors of active service.
In the AV-8B+ it now has radar, and BVR capability in the pipline (if not in service). I think the best comparision I've heard was - if the first generation Harrier was a V/STOL Hunter, then the second generation was a V/STOL F/A-18. Yes it's compromised by STOVL, but its warload, sensors and delivery systems are a massive advance over the earlier Harriers - and with the same versatility of basing and operation. A specialist aircraft for specialist applications.
There were meant to be several 'fully realised' VSTOL fighters and bombers (some of which were twin-engine) and even a medium transport aircraft with four Pegasus engines on the wings. The design sketches of these fighters closely resemble the current Y/XF-35 design proposals. Only they would have entered service in the late-1970s. If the British government had not pulled the plug on these aircraft for short-term political gain, the USMC might have found itself with a much more flexible and reliable aircraft than the poor, abused Kestr... sorry 'Super Harrier'.
Bloody government's always the same, spoiling our fun. I'm withholding my vote at the next election.
"Oh, a lesson in not changing history from Mr I'm-My-Own-Grandpa! Let's get the hell out of here already! Screw history!" - Professor Farnsworth