This monumental and ambitious work sets out to provide the definitive account of the “offensive realism” school of international relations theory. Offensive realism represents a kind of synthesis of the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau and the structural or “defensive” realism of Kenneth Waltz. With Morgenthau it assumes that states (or major states) seek to accumulate as much power as possible for themselves, but it accepts Waltz’s view that the reason they do so lies in the structure of the international system rather than in the human lust for power. Mearsheimer must therefore show that Waltz and his many followers have been overly optimistic in analyzing the implications for state behavior of the anarchic character of the international system. According to Mearsheimer, they have wrongly assumed that a cautious or defensive approach to safeguarding a state’s security is the only rational approach and hence the norm for most states. Rather, he insists, aggressive or expansionist behavior is both more common in the recent history of the great powers than this would allow and more rational in the sense that it is not infrequently very successful.
Mearsheimer’s thesis is richly illustrated, from the history of the great powers from the wars of the French Revolution through the end of the Cold War. It also looks out into the future to test the theory against the common if vaguely articulated belief that great-power war has become obsolete. For these reasons, and because it is written in a clear and jargon-free style, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics holds much interest even for those with limited patience for the theological disputes of international relations theorists. At the same time, it is a formidable challenge to mainstream realism. It scores many points off an approach that somehow never comes to grips with what one is tempted to call the sheer bloody-mindedness of international politics. Particularly novel and persuasive is Mearsheimer’s analysis of “buck passing” (not “bandwagoning”) as the fundamental alternative to balancing against another power.
Yet the book has its limitations, which are largely the limitations of the realist school as such. Mearsheimer never quite convinces when he argues that the domestic regimes and leadership of, for example, Britain, the United States, Nazi Germany, and imperial Japan had no fundamental impact on their international behavior. But perhaps the weakest part of the book is its disregard of the ideological context of nineteenth-century European diplomacy. The antirevolutionary alliance of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and the “Concert of Europe,” were arguably at least as important in maintaining the long great-power peace through much of this period as were the abstract structural characteristics of the European state system. For that matter, the fact that many of the wars that did occur were connected in some way with the decay of the Ottoman Empire seems to suggest, contra Mearsheimer, that wars can be caused as much by the weakness as by the strength of a key actor. Both these points have suggestive applications as we look to the twenty-first century. The war against terrorism might well be the occasion for the formation of a global “concert” of the great powers. The greatest threat to such a concert could well be the continuing weakness of Russia—not, as Mearsheimer holds, the rising strength of China.
CARNES LORD
Naval War College
This is now next on my reading list. I thought to repost the review here for those who might be interested, regardless of what view they may take on the conclusions reached in the subject matter.