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Supposing that Nazi Germany wasn't racist but rather merely extremely nationalist, would they have been able to stave off defeat? I imagine that the extra workforce they would have had would provide alot?

Or even if, when they invaded countries, took those people in as their own and promised to make them all great, instead of just Germany proper?

It certainly would have helped the Germans, but the fact of the matter is, Germany wasn't going to survive the combined weight of the U.S.S.R. and the United States and Britain. And the Germans ruled Western Europe with a relatively light touch, and there were still partisan movements there, so you can't count on everyone being happy with their German occupiers. And since the German war economy depended on looting the resources of the conquered territories, I doubt anyone would have been happy with the Germans forever.

The most positive effect for Germany might have been to hold the Russians off for long enough that the Allies ended up capturing most of Germany, as well as Vienna, Prague, and other key points historically lost to the Russians. It would have resulted in a weaker Cold War Soviet Union, practically the only alternate Germany scenario that ends up weakening the postwar Soviets instead of strengthening them.

Germany might have succeeded if they had not tried to fight a war on two front.

Away to Off Topic this goes.

Montcalm wrote:Germany might have succeeded if they had not tried to fight a war on two front.

I don't think so. They defeat France and neuter England in order to protect their rear while invading Eastern Europe, because there's no concievable way those two countries will sit back and allow Germany to become a continental hegemon. Unfortunately, Germany is simply incapable of mounting a cross-channel invasion, even if they had destroyed the BEF at Dunkirk and driven the RAF out of its southern bases. The RAF would have simply withdrawn to bases in the midlands, outside of the range of German bombers, and waited for the Germans to come. In the meantime, the Germans' invasion fleet consisted largely of shallow draft Rhine river barges that were as unsuitable for the open sea as any craft you can think of that retains the ability to float. And the Germans would be hard pressed to keep the Royal Navy out of the Channel--the English Channel was a U-boat death trap, the German surface fleet was inferior to the British, and the Luftwaffe had a lousy record against ships and would have had to fend off the RAF anyway.

And it's all moot anyway, because in the meantime, Uncle Joe is coming in 1943 (IIRC), ready or not (mostly not). A preemptive attack on the Soviet Union was the only way Germany possibly could have scored a victory, and they failed. In any scenario you can think of, the USSR crushes Germany by sheer weight of numbers. Allied involvement serves to prevent the Soviets from establishing Communist puppet states in Western Europe and take some of the pressure off of their front line troops late in the war, saving Soviet lives, but before 1950, Stalin will be the de facto emperor of Eastern Europe with or without Allied help.

kojikun wrote:Supposing that Nazi Germany wasn't racist but rather merely extremely nationalist, would they have been able to stave off defeat? I imagine that the extra workforce they would have had would provide alot?

You'd have to change a lot of WWII history to give Germany even the
simplest chance of winning. Quite put simply, Hitler made too many
fuckups, such as not giving rommel a few extra divisions (not too hard
when they had hundreds of them on the Ostfront)

Montcalm wrote:Germany might have succeeded if they had not tried to fight a war on two front.

Germany can't invade England, and Russia will attack by 1943. Germany can't win any conflict, which looks remotely like the historical WW2. That's what happens when you pit less then 15% of the worlds industrial potential against enemies how have about 75% of it along with access to the worlds resources to feed it.


Germany might do better in the war, but its mostly a case of increased Allied losses, rather then any real gains in time.

MKSheppard wrote:

kojikun wrote:Supposing that Nazi Germany wasn't racist but rather merely extremely nationalist, would they have been able to stave off defeat? I imagine that the extra workforce they would have had would provide alot?

You'd have to change a lot of WWII history to give Germany even the
simplest chance of winning. Quite put simply, Hitler made too many
fuckups, such as not giving rommel a few extra divisions (not too hard
when they had hundreds of them on the Ostfront)

But Rommel only had a use for mech and armored formations, and Germany never had more then 25 or so of those fighting the Reds.

MKSheppard wrote:Quite put simply, Hitler made too many
fuckups, such as not giving rommel a few extra divisions (not too hard
when they had hundreds of them on the Ostfront)

That wouldn't have made any difference. Rommel had stretched Axis logistics in the Med to the breaking point as it was. All extra divisions are going to do in North Africa is make the supply situation untenable. Give him 50,000 extra mouths to feed and guns to load, and Rommel would be lucky to make it to Tobruk.

Little changes aren't going to change the long term problems Germany faced, namely three antagonistic continental sized empires. The only way Germany has a chance of winning a war against any of them is to make sure it is only fighting one of them. And that is a very difficult scenario to devise.

Bartman wrote:

MKSheppard wrote:Quite put simply, Hitler made too many
fuckups, such as not giving rommel a few extra divisions (not too hard
when they had hundreds of them on the Ostfront)

That wouldn't have made any difference. Rommel had stretched Axis logistics in the Med to the breaking point as it was. All extra divisions are going to do in North Africa is make the supply situation untenable. Give him 50,000 extra mouths to feed and guns to load, and Rommel would be lucky to make it to Tobruk.

Little changes aren't going to change the long term problems Germany faced, namely three antagonistic continental sized empires. The only way Germany has a chance of winning a war against any of them is to make sure it is only fighting one of them. And that is a very difficult scenario to devise.

Actually, after the fall of France, the Germans had a large number of infantry divisions sitting idle. They could have given Rommel those divisions (and forced the French to allow German troops into French North Africa). They could have driven the British out of Egypt and Palestine and captured the Suez canal, closed of the strait of Gibraltar, forcing the British to abandon Malta, as they could not then supply it, and turn the Mediterranean into an Axis lake. The capture of French North Africa would have opened up the port of Dakar, Senegal to the Kriegsmarine, and enabled the U-Boats to choke of British merchant shipping coming through the south Atlantic, and British troop and supply convoys to and from Burma. They would have been in a perfect position to move into Iraq as well, and seize the oil fields there, ending their shortage of their number one most needed raw material - oil. Incidentally, this would have put German troops closer to the Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus, and enabled the Germans to plan an invasion of the Soviet Union from the south as well as from the west.

Had I been the Fuehrer, this is what I would have done. Frankly, after that, I'd have stood pat and consolidated my gains (since I would never have entertained those ludicrous fantasies of Lebensraum for the "master race"). This would leave Germany in too strong a position for the Russians to attack, and Britain would have been unable to strike anywhere vital. Given time, Churchill's government would fall to a new Labour government that might be more amenable to negotiation. If were somehow forced to fight the U.S.S.R. anyway, I'd then take their oil fields away, and take the Ukraine as well. Ukrainians first welcomed the Germans as liberators, since they hated Stalin so much. It wasn't till the Einsatzgruppen started committing atrocities that they decided the Nazis were even worse. No such nonsense as that would take place. Ukraine could be turned into an ally, with a puppet government, or annexed outright, and administered as lightly as France, Beldium, and Holland were. Ultimately the aim would be to force Stalin to the negotiating table, since conquering Russia would not be possible.

Cutting off the Straits of Gibraltar is possibly the best thing you could do, for the Allies. It would take operations against Sicily, Italy or Greece out of the question, while North Africa could still be held. At worst the British would be pushed back to the Nile.

Now what that means is there is a fuckload of transport shipping, landing craft, warships, aircraft and a couple dozen divisions of free allied troops. So what to do with the in 1943? The Answer, land in France. The Atlantic wall doesn’t exist, and the ports direct defenses are weak. Mean while Germany doesn’t have all that many extra divisions to man it, and in any case they'd need ten times the troops to sufficiently man it.

With Churchill silenced there will very likely be a 10-15 division landing in 1943. Once a port is seized, and it will be, exploitation wont be very easy for a while. But it isn't needed. But it wont be the goal. A second front will be opened and the Allies could build up the forces assembled for Overlord, but in a section of France.

Meanwhile bombers and artillery would sap German strength both on the front lines and in their lines of communication to a high degree. In addition Germany will need both to sustain its forces in North Africa, while containing a large beachhead in France. That’s going to use up far more resources then the mountainous Italian terrain did. And of course they must still guard the coast, because an outflanking operation would likely be part of any breakout.

By early 1944 there would be a breakout, and while Germany might hold France for longer then historical, there still going to be set months back in the war, while being weaker in Russia. Italy will just be a drain of resources; in the unlikely event it avoids collapsing and requiring a large garrison.

Once allied forces are in Germany, outlying forces in places likely Italy and North Africa don't matter. The Mediterranean was a waste. In the words of Battlefield "Italy only offered a long and tortuous road to the Reich.

You missed the key word in my post Perinquus, logistics. Yes the Germans had plenty of extra troops available in late '40 early '41. What they don't have is any shipping in the Mediterranean, or rail stock in Libya. Hitler could have dumped 100+ divisions in Libya in November '40. But what he couldn't do is feed or equip them. As I said as it was Rommel had already stretched the supply situation to the limit. Adding more men to the situation will only slow the German advance because the units couldn't have been supplied. This is THE driving force for any Axis offensives in the Med. Unless Hitler can pull an additional million tons of shipping out of his ass, the Germans are stuck on the West side of the Nile.

And as far as Dakar and Iraq go; the Germans are as likely to capture either one as Wong is likely to become a mendicant nun preaching against the sin of anal sex in Oman. The Germans couldn't supply a regiment across the Sahara and French West Africa or Trans-Jordan. In contrast the British fleet could maintain a dozen divisions in either location. And how are you proposing the Germans capture Gibraltar? Sorry your scenario just doesn't fly.

Capturing Gibraltar is easy, if Spain will allow for German troops to enter its territory. The plan was for one infantry and one armored division to provide protection for a mountain division and some specialized units that would be behind the direct assault. A few air wings would provide support.

The plan would have succeeded, and with no real hope of relief I doubt the garrison would fight for very long, much like Singapore. But if Spain allows the troops to pass, then the British will slap a tight blockade on it even if Spain takes no offensive actions with its own forces and tires to remain out of the war. Spain had to import large amounts of food and still had major shortages during the war. They could only be an added drain on Germany, while at the same time closing off what was historically a huge drain of resources for the allies.

Dakar is well beyond German reach, and Iraq is a pipe dream at best. Germany managed to get a couple Me110 and He-111's into northern Iraq during the countries short fight against the British in 1941. But that's the best they can do.

Sea Skimmer wrote:Capturing Gibraltar is easy, if Spain will allow for German troops to enter its territory.

But that is the tricky part, isn't it. Franco wasn't an idiot. He could add one and one and was painfully aware of Spain's dependance on British grain exports. Historically Hitler tried to get Franco to join the war. But Franco never went for Hitler's enticements. Perinquus never offered any suggestions on how Gibraltar could be taken or neutralized, so I was wondering how he thought the Germans could have done it.

Franco entering the war isn't all that far out of bounds in terms of reality. Though its unlikely. If Spain is an option Perinquus could just use the Germans historic plan, which advanced to the point that the mountain troops where training for it and building replicas of key defensive positions for practice.

Hmm you have to get rid of Hitler to do this.
A right wing miltary germany might end up on the allied
side in a UK,France, Germany vs USSR and/or Japan war.

Sea Skimmer wrote: Cutting off the Straits of Gibraltar is possibly the best thing you could do, for the Allies. It would take operations against Sicily, Italy or Greece out of the question, while North Africa could still be held. At worst the British would be pushed back to the Nile.

Remember how hard a time Rommel gave the British in North Africa. He only had 3 German divisions, plus an Italian division, and some non-motorized Italian divisions that were practially worthless in desert warfare. Even with this token force, and a very uncertain supply line he gave the British a very tough fight, and managed to take Tobruk. With probably only four of the divisions sitting idle in France he could have beaten the British completely out of Egypt. And the Germans had something like 20 in France. There's no reason the Germans need limit it to four. There is a way to solve his supply problem as well. The Germans launched a successful airborne assault on Crete. They took the wrong island. They should have taken Malta instead; that was the island the Royal Navy operated from. Take it, and you eliminate the British ability to interdict your supply lines. North Africa could not have been held. Not if the Germans had made a serious effort to take it, instead of considering it a mere sideshow as they did.

Sea Skimmer wrote: Now what that means is there is a fuckload of transport shipping, landing craft, warships, aircraft and a couple dozen divisions of free allied troops. So what to do with the in 1943? The Answer, land in France. The Atlantic wall doesn’t exist, and the ports direct defenses are weak. Mean while Germany doesn’t have all that many extra divisions to man it, and in any case they'd need ten times the troops to sufficiently man it.

We're talking about 1941 here. The British left most of their equipment behind at Dunkirk, and at this point they have no landing craft suitable for D-Day type invasions. They were busy recruiting old men and boys for a last ditch defense of the island, and equipping them with whatever weapons they could scrape up. By the time they could put together a force with even a realistic hope of landing in France, the Germans can have defenses set up, especially as there is no invasion of the Soviet Union in the scenario to draw so much of the army's and Luftwaffe's strength off to the east. And the British were always reluctant to try to cross channel invasion anyway, as they feared it would be hideously expensive in terms of casualites. That's why they kept coming up with alternate strategies, like Churchill's so-called "soft underbelly", which the Americans were not keen on. And with North Africa taken away, the Tory government would likely have fallen in a no-confidence vote in Parliament, and a Labour government under Atlee in 41 or 42 might well have been willing to negotiate Britain's exit from the war - especially as the German's never wanted war with the UK in the first place, and would not have demanded much at the table.

Sea Skimmer wrote: With Churchill silenced there will very likely be a 10-15 division landing in 1943. Once a port is seized, and it will be, exploitation wont be very easy for a while. But it isn't needed. But it wont be the goal. A second front will be opened and the Allies could build up the forces assembled for Overlord, but in a section of France.

With Churchill silenced, it is more likely, not less, that Britain will exit the war. And with no Soviet invasion being undertaken, and only a fraction of that number of German troops being needed in the Middle East, the Atlantic Wall will be finished a lot sooner. It is by no means certain that the British would be willing to undertake a cross channel invasion at this point, or that they would succeed in capturing a port if they did.

Sea Skimmer wrote: Meanwhile bombers and artillery would sap German strength both on the front lines and in their lines of communication to a high degree. In addition Germany will need both to sustain its forces in North Africa, while containing a large beachhead in France. That’s going to use up far more resources then the mountainous Italian terrain did. And of course they must still guard the coast, because an outflanking operation would likely be part of any breakout.

By early 1944 there would be a breakout, and while Germany might hold France for longer then historical, there still going to be set months back in the war, while being weaker in Russia. Italy will just be a drain of resources; in the unlikely event it avoids collapsing and requiring a large garrison.

Once allied forces are in Germany, outlying forces in places likely Italy and North Africa don't matter. The Mediterranean was a waste. In the words of Battlefield "Italy only offered a long and tortuous road to the Reich.

Again, depends on the highly uncertain prospect that the British are both still in the war, and able to establish a beach head against the larger number of German troops available, given the lack of a Soviet Front.

Bartman wrote:You missed the key word in my post Perinquus, logistics. Yes the Germans had plenty of extra troops available in late '40 early '41. What they don't have is any shipping in the Mediterranean, or rail stock in Libya. Hitler could have dumped 100+ divisions in Libya in November '40. But what he couldn't do is feed or equip them. As I said as it was Rommel had already stretched the supply situation to the limit. Adding more men to the situation will only slow the German advance because the units couldn't have been supplied. This is THE driving force for any Axis offensives in the Med. Unless Hitler can pull an additional million tons of shipping out of his ass, the Germans are stuck on the West side of the Nile.

See above. Capturing Malta solves most of the supply problem, closing off Gibraltar would go still further to solve it. And the Italians actually did have a decent navy, which would now be in control of the Mediterranean.

If German troops occupy French North Africa, they can approach Gibraltar from the south, through the small strip of Morocco ruled by Spain. Spain could be forced to grant transit rights, or stand aside if the Germans occupied the strip without permission. Spain could not resist for fear of a German attack on Spain itself from occupied France. If German airfields and shore batteries are set up on the southern shore, they don't even need to bother assaulting the British garrison on Gibraltar itself; they can effectively close the strait to British shipping. This sucks for Spain, but faced with a real choice between a British blockade and a German invasion, Franco will almost certainly accept the blockade as the lesser of two evils.

Bartman wrote:And as far as Dakar and Iraq go; the Germans are as likely to capture either one as Wong is likely to become a mendicant nun preaching against the sin of anal sex in Oman. The Germans couldn't supply a regiment across the Sahara and French West Africa or Trans-Jordan. In contrast the British fleet could maintain a dozen divisions in either location. And how are you proposing the Germans capture Gibraltar? Sorry your scenario just doesn't fly.

As for Dakar, and the rest of North Africa, you're overlooking something. You're looking at them purely from the point of how the German's could have taken them militarily. I don't propose to try any such thing. When Germany negotiated France's surrender, they could have easily made admission of German troops into North Africa (Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco) a condition of allowing France the Vichy government. In any case, the French had few troops in North Africa, little modern equipment, and virtually no armor or air cover, and could not have put up any effective resistance to a German occupation force. With cooperation of Vichy France, German troops could have been inserted into Dakar - The Vichy French government had beaten off a combined British/Free French effort to take the port. Again, the Germans could have made access to this port a condition of allowing the French a Vichy government.

As for Iraq... The Germans, with adequate forces in North Africa, could have driven the British out of Egypt and taken the Suez. They could then have advanced through Palestine as far as Turkey. This prospect was greatly feared by Churchill, who saw the possibility for an Allied victory as remote, even with American aid. With Egypt and the Suez under control, the eastern Mediterranean would be closed to the British. The British Fleet would have to retreat to the Red Sea, as it could not be supplied in the western Med. The Germans would have been able to move into Iraq at this point, because the British had no substantial forces in the region to oppose them. Hitler was already gaining Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania as allies. Turkey would thus be surrounded, and open to invasion from Europe, or up from Palestine. Turkey could be forced to join the Axis, or at least grant passage to Axis forces and supply trains. Turkey did not have a hope of withstanding the Germans militarily. The Germans would thus be poised to strike into Iraq.

This, incidentally was planned by Admiral Raeder.

Perinquus wrote: Remember how hard a time Rommel gave the British in North Africa. He only had 3 German divisions, plus an Italian division, and some non-motorized Italian divisions that were practially worthless in desert warfare. Even with this token force, and a very uncertain supply line he gave the British a very tough fight, and managed to take Tobruk. With probably only four of the divisions sitting idle in France he could have beaten the British completely out of Egypt. And the Germans had something like 20 in France. There's no reason the Germans need limit it to four. There is a way to solve his supply problem as well. The Germans launched a successful airborne assault on Crete. They took the wrong island. They should have taken Malta instead; that was the island the Royal Navy operated from. Take it, and you eliminate the British ability to interdict your supply lines. North Africa could not have been held. Not if the Germans had made a serious effort to take it, instead of considering it a mere sideshow as they did.

So somehow the tiny ports in North Africa spring the ability to handle a massive increase in shipping, while the roads also magically increase in capacity and a couple railway lines spring up, UK subs disappear, Tobruk somehow becomes a far bigger supply point for the Germans, despite being in a worse position with Crete in British hands and the Royal navy totally free to attack it.

Rommel reached the extent of his supply lines. Removing Malta doesn't change that. It does however free up a bunch of warships for bombarding the roads and port any advance to the Nile depends on. At best he can reach it, but a crossing isn't going to happen.

We're talking about 1941 here. The British left most of their equipment behind at Dunkirk, and at this point they have no landing craft suitable for D-Day type invasions. They were busy recruiting old men and boys for a last ditch defense of the island, and equipping them with whatever weapons they could scrape up. By the time they could put together a force with even a realistic hope of landing in France, the Germans can have defenses set up, especially as there is no invasion of the Soviet Union in the scenario to draw so much of the army's and Luftwaffe's strength off to the east. And the British were always reluctant to try to cross channel invasion anyway, as they feared it would be hideously expensive in terms of casualites. That's why they kept coming up with alternate strategies, like Churchill's so-called "soft underbelly", which the Americans were not keen on. And with North Africa taken away, the Tory government would likely have fallen in a no-confidence vote in Parliament, and a Labour government under Atlee in 41 or 42 might well have been willing to negotiate Britain's exit from the war - especially as the German's never wanted war with the UK in the first place, and would not have demanded much at the table.

Except North Africa couldn't be taken away unless a large port is spawned in-between Tobruk and Alexandria while the Royal navy suddenly loses its fleet in the eastern med despite not having to fight the battle for Crete.

With Churchill silenced, it is more likely, not less, that Britain will exit the war. And with no Soviet invasion being undertaken, and only a fraction of that number of German troops being needed in the Middle East, the Atlantic Wall will be finished a lot sooner. It is by no means certain that the British would be willing to undertake a cross channel invasion at this point, or that they would succeed in capturing a port if they did.

Except vast numbers of troops are still needed to guard against a coming Russian attack in 1943, and are still needed in the middle east because the British can hold. The Atlantic wall won't exist because before Rommel showed up the plan was to only hold the ports, not the coast. In any cases, building the wall up to sufficient strength would have taken two decades.

Roundup will have an easy time establishing its self, and the mighty port of Cherbourg took only a few days to capture. But in 1943 no port had anything like its defenses. Indeed, they're sufficiently weak that a direct assault might be possibul.

Again, depends on the highly uncertain prospect that the British are both still in the war, and able to establish a beach head against the larger number of German troops available, given the lack of a Soviet Front.

More troops, but also all 50-100 miles inland. Meaning they either sit in place behind there minor fortifications or move out to fight. Moving in the face of naval gunfire doesn't work.

See above. Capturing Malta solves most of the supply problem, closing off Gibraltar would go still further to solve it. And the Italians actually did have a decent navy, which would now be in control of the Mediterranean.

Except for all those cruisers, destroyers, subs and bombers flying out of Egypt that are within easy range of Tobruk, which must supply any assault. The Italian fleet proved quite inept at night fighting, and radar makes it all the worse. It wont be able to stop the raids that will turn Tobruk into a torch every night.

If German troops occupy French North Africa, they can approach Gibraltar from the south, through the small strip of Morocco ruled by Spain. Spain could be forced to grant transit rights, or stand aside if the Germans occupied the strip without permission. Spain could not resist for fear of a German attack on Spain itself from occupied France. If German airfields and shore batteries are set up on the southern shore, they don't even need to bother assaulting the British garrison on Gibraltar itself; they can effectively close the strait to British shipping. This sucks for Spain, but faced with a real choice between a British blockade and a German invasion, Franco will almost certainly accept the blockade as the lesser of two evils.

Enjoy trying to install 15 inch guns in the face of naval bombardment.

As for Dakar, and the rest of North Africa, you're overlooking something. You're looking at them purely from the point of how the German's could have taken them militarily. I don't propose to try any such thing. When Germany negotiated France's surrender, they could have easily made admission of German troops into North Africa (Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco) a condition of allowing France the Vichy government. In any case, the French had few troops in North Africa, little modern equipment, and virtually no armor or air cover, and could not have put up any effective resistance to a German occupation force. With cooperation of Vichy France, German troops could have been inserted into Dakar - The Vichy French government had beaten off a combined British/Free French effort to take the port. Again, the Germans could have made access to this port a condition of allowing the French a Vichy government.

Long drive to Dakar, impossibly long actually and the base commander has a battleship, or more likely a half dozen since the French fleet will not be staying at Oran or in northern Morocco

As for Iraq... The Germans, with adequate forces in North Africa, could have driven the British out of Egypt and taken the Suez. They could then have advanced through Palestine as far as Turkey. This prospect was greatly feared by Churchill, who saw the possibility for an Allied victory as remote, even with American aid. With Egypt and the Suez under control, the eastern Mediterranean would be closed to the British. The British Fleet would have to retreat to the Red Sea, as it could not be supplied in the western Med. The Germans would have been able to move into Iraq at this point, because the British had no substantial forces in the region to oppose them. Hitler was already gaining Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania as allies. Turkey would thus be surrounded, and open to invasion from Europe, or up from Palestine. Turkey could be forced to join the Axis, or at least grant passage to Axis forces and supply trains. Turkey did not have a hope of withstanding the Germans militarily. The Germans would thus be poised to strike into Iraq.

Good luck with logistics, I suggest you invest in a physics breaking device. You're going to need it for your planning. You think removing Malta makes everything a done deal. Actually it doesn't, which is why you become so devoiced from reality by the end of all this.

Here is a what if:

Going along with the same Germany as previously mentioned (extreemly nationalist, non-racist government). They sit back and keep rearming. Build a big navy, complete with carriers, and start chugging out destroyers and battleships. Building a sizeable, but not huge, U-Boat fleet, just enough for countering shippping.

And keep developing jet aircraft and ICBMs. If the 262 is built in sizeable forces, alongside FW-190s and other aircraft, and manned with trained crews, the skys can be owned.

If the Hard Water projects are completed, and Nuclear weapons are developed, along with fairly decent rockets, then they would be mostly unstoppable.

As long as the tactical mistakes aren't made, such as taking on a two front war.

NF_Utvol wrote:Here is a what if:

Going along with the same Germany as previously mentioned (extreemly nationalist, non-racist government). They sit back and keep rearming. Build a big navy, complete with carriers, and start chugging out destroyers and battleships. Building a sizeable, but not huge, U-Boat fleet, just enough for countering shippping.

Where are you getting the resources for this? Are you diverting from tank production or what?

And keep developing jet aircraft and ICBMs. If the 262 is built in sizeable forces, alongside FW-190s and other aircraft, and manned with trained crews, the skys can be owned.

Jets can be countered; the Luftwaffe's ascendacy would only be temporary before their enemies brought their own out to play. Any ICBM would be incredibly inaccurate and probably highly expensive.

If the Hard Water projects are completed, and Nuclear weapons are developed, along with fairly decent rockets, then they would be mostly unstoppable.

Very big if. It is unlikely that they'll get nuclear weapons working until the 1950s, even if they did have a competent program.

As long as the tactical mistakes aren't made, such as taking on a two front war.

The USSR will have enough forces to steamroll Germany before she can complete her buildup, though.

Perinquus wrote:Remember how hard a time Rommel gave the British in North Africa. He only had 3 German divisions, plus an Italian division, and some non-motorized Italian divisions that were practically worthless in desert warfare. Even with this token force, and a very uncertain supply line he gave the British a very tough fight, and managed to take Tobruk. With probably only four of the divisions sitting idle in France he could have beaten the British completely out of Egypt. And the Germans had something like 20 in France. There's no reason the Germans need limit it to four. There is a way to solve his supply problem as well. The Germans launched a successful airborne assault on Crete. They took the wrong island. They should have taken Malta instead; that was the island the Royal Navy operated from. Take it, and you eliminate the British ability to interdict your supply lines. North Africa could not have been held. Not if the Germans had made a serious effort to take it, instead of considering it a mere sideshow as they did.

Bull. In 1941, together with the Italians, the Axis force in Libya totaled seven divisions which, when combined with air force and naval units, required 70,000 tons per month (this rose dramatically during active campaigning). In practice Tripoli (the only Libyan port of real value) could only offload about 70,000 tons per month. Of course they did everything they could to increase this and by June they were able to offload 125,000 tons. Great you think, right? Wrong. At that point more than 50% of all the goods being offloaded remained sitting on the wharfs. Why? Because Rommel didn’t have enough trucks to deliver the supplies to his front. So you say well they should increase the number of trucks assigned to DAK. The problem is that proportionally speaking Rommel received 10 times the number of trucks as the Eastern Front. Rommel was using 70 divisions worth of trucking. If they increase Rommel’s forces by your 20 divisions they also need to find an extra 200-300 divisions’ allotment of trucks. They would need a months worth of shipping just to offload the trucks. But that’s not all. They also have to find a way to increase the transportation network. The collection of dusty dirt roads that were being used were pretty much saturated by the trucks already on them. So they would have to build a whole new series of roads. And they can’t do that for free so they have to find a way to bring even more men and material over build them. That is going to impinge on their supply even more. And by the time Rommel makes it to Tobruk he is using nearly 50% of his fuel supply just for the trucks bringing supplies in.

There are 3 chokepoints for bringing supplies into Rommel. Capturing Malta solves only one of them, shipping. And that was the least problematic. By mid ’42 the Germans had effectively neutralized Malta anyway. The port facilities are the next chokepoint. And outside of June ’41 they were only offloading 70-75,000 tons/month (they averaged 72,000 tons/month from July-November). That is enough to supply 7 divisions (barely). Adding additional divisions to this mix only makes the force as a whole weaker not stronger. The final chokepoint is trucking. And the only way to get more trucking into Libya will be at the cost of greatly weakening continental forces. And only an idiot would do that with Stalin lurking in Eastern Europe. Even then massive improvements would need to be made to the road and preferably rail network before it would do the Axis any good. Might I suggest you read Supplying War by M. Van Creveld, before you draw conclusions about what kind of forces the Axis could support in NA and the Middle East.

Perinquus wrote:See above. Capturing Malta solves most of the supply problem, closing off Gibraltar would go still further to solve it. And the Italians actually did have a decent navy, which would now be in control of the Mediterranean.

As pointed out Malta is helpful but less so than you seem to be thinking. The RN largely abandoned the Western Med anyway so the loss of Malta means virtually nothing to the RN. But in any case it doesn’t matter as the bulk of the RN is based in Alexandria, which is why the Italians rather studiously avoided the Eastern Med. While the Italian Navy was ‘decent’ it was so grossly outmatched by the British they could risk an engagement outside of land based air cover.

Perinquus wrote:If German troops occupy French North Africa, they can approach Gibraltar from the south, through the small strip of Morocco ruled by Spain. Spain could be forced to grant transit rights, or stand aside if the Germans occupied the strip without permission. Spain could not resist for fear of a German attack on Spain itself from occupied France. If German airfields and shore batteries are set up on the southern shore, they don't even need to bother assaulting the British garrison on Gibraltar itself; they can effectively close the strait to British shipping. This sucks for Spain, but faced with a real choice between a British blockade and a German invasion, Franco will almost certainly accept the blockade as the lesser of two evils.

But the strait was already effectively closed to British shipping. The only convoys that ran through the West Med were supply convoys to Malta. And if the Axis takes Malta the British don’t need to do that any more. So you have effectively ticked off two minor allies Vichy and Spain to do something you didn’t need to do.

Perinquus wrote:As for Dakar, and the rest of North Africa, you're overlooking something. You're looking at them purely from the point of how the German's could have taken them militarily. I don't propose to try any such thing. When Germany negotiated France's surrender, they could have easily made admission of German troops into North Africa (Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco) a condition of allowing France the Vichy government. In any case, the French had few troops in North Africa, little modern equipment, and virtually no armor or air cover, and could not have put up any effective resistance to a German occupation force. With cooperation of Vichy France, German troops could have been inserted into Dakar - The Vichy French government had beaten off a combined British/Free French effort to take the port. Again, the Germans could have made access to this port a condition of allowing the French a Vichy government.

Have you ever wondered why France got such relatively easy terms from the Germans? The Germans were rightfully concerned with the French fleet and colonies. They knew that there was a strong sentiment that France should keep fighting. If the Germans forced a harsher peace on the French, the fleet and most of the colonies would have turned Free French rather than neutral. The Germans needed Vichy more than France did. If such a condition was a requirement for Vichy, the Vichy government never would have come into being. And rather than easy to transit NA the Axis gets enemy held NA. And even if by some miracle the Germans do get a free transit to Dakar they have to do it across the Sahara, which is even worse than Libya as a supply line. As a said before they would be lucky to be able to support a full regiment there. The British by comparison had great sealift capability and by mid December ’40 could have sent several divisions, and that would be it for the Dakar occupation force.

Perinquus wrote:As for Iraq... The Germans, with adequate forces in North Africa, could have driven the British out of Egypt and taken the Suez. They could then have advanced through Palestine as far as Turkey. This prospect was greatly feared by Churchill, who saw the possibility for an Allied victory as remote, even with American aid. With Egypt and the Suez under control, the eastern Mediterranean would be closed to the British. The British Fleet would have to retreat to the Red Sea, as it could not be supplied in the western Med. The Germans would have been able to move into Iraq at this point, because the British had no substantial forces in the region to oppose them. Hitler was already gaining Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania as allies. Turkey would thus be surrounded, and open to invasion from Europe, or up from Palestine. Turkey could be forced to join the Axis, or at least grant passage to Axis forces and supply trains. Turkey did not have a hope of withstanding the Germans militarily. The Germans would thus be poised to strike into Iraq.

Good Lord what a pipe dream. As mentioned above there was no way in hell that Germany could have ever crossed the Nile. But even if they had somehow driven the British out of the Med they start the whole horrible supply bit from Alexandria. Meanwhile the British are supplying through Basra along several relatively good rail lines. Explain to me how a few supply-starved divisions are going to drive the British out of Iraq. Especially since the British will be able to put large forces on their flank on the upper Nile.

Perinquus wrote:This, incidentally was planned by Admiral Raeder.

Oh yes the same man who thought that the Heer was going to be able to operate without supplies for 30 days during Sealion. There is a man I would trust to have viable logistic ideas.

Sea Skimmer wrote:

So somehow the tiny ports in North Africa spring the ability to handle a massive increase in shipping, while the roads also magically increase in capacity and a couple railway lines spring up, UK subs disappear, Tobruk somehow becomes a far bigger supply point for the Germans, despite being in a worse position with Crete in British hands and the Royal navy totally free to attack it.

Are you paying attention? The Royal Navy is not totally free to attack anything if Gibraltar is closed, Malta taken, and the Suez canal fallen to German troops. They can't resupply. They can use up existing stores of fuel and ammo, and then what? Rommel got insufficient supplies not because Tobruk was too small a port or the roads from Tobruk insufficient, but because the Royal Navy sent half his supply ships to the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea. With their base in Malta taken, the British no longer have the same freedom to operate against the German supply ships. Crete is not that important strategically, which is why Admiral Raeder and navy high command, and OKW were all against the assault. Once the Balkans had been siezed by the Germans, Crete became even less important. Any airplanes flying out of Crete would have been operating at the same disadvantage of range the Germans faced over England during the Battle of Britain, and their time over the target area would have been similarly limited. Moreover the British airbases on Crete could be blasted by German planes based in Greece a hundred miles away.

Moreover, without the distraction of Crete, a great deal of the Luftwaffe's strength is freed up to protect the German supply convoys for Rommel. In the real history, when the German campaign in Greece ended, Rommel's forces were poised within striking distance of the Suez canal, siezure of which would end Britain's ability to resupply her naval or land forces in the eastern Mediterranean. When the Greek campaign was ended, all that would have been needed was the immediate transfer of two panzer divisions to reinforce Rommel. The British were on the ropes after their defeats in Greece and Libya, and could not have withstood a concerted attack. Powerful German motorized forces could have siezed the whole of the British-occupied Mediterranean coastline, including the port of Alexandria. If Rommel had been reinforced, he almost certainly would have occupied Egypt by the end of 1941.

With the Suez closed to British shipping, and Egypt in German hands, it would have isolated southeastern Europe. Greece, Yugoslavia, and Crete would have had to submit, because supplies and support from the British Empire would have become impossible.

Sea Skimmer wrote: Rommel reached the extent of his supply lines. Removing Malta doesn't change that. It does however free up a bunch of warships for bombarding the roads and port any advance to the Nile depends on. At best he can reach it, but a crossing isn't going to happen.

These "freed up" British warships are "freed up" from any resupply, and "freed up" from access to their repair facilities - which they'll be sorely in need of given that no German assault on Crete means more Luftwaffe planes available to bomb British warships and protect German convoys. Capture of the port of Alexandria solves a lot of the problem of extended supply lines as well.

Sea Skimmer wrote: Except North Africa couldn't be taken away unless a large port is spawned in-between Tobruk and Alexandria while the Royal navy suddenly loses its fleet in the eastern med despite not having to fight the battle for Crete.

Again, it was not the difficiency of Tobruk as a port, or the lack of transport from Tobruk to the front lines that was the problem; it was the loss of so many of his supply ships. Rommel felt himself quite capable of taking Egypt, given reinforcements and more regular supplies, and he repeatedly asked Hitler to give him these things. Hitler, however, was so fixated on his Soviet strategy that he didn't even seriously consider it.

And once Egypt has fallen, as I said, the Germans can move up through Palestine, and either violate Turkish neutrality, or persuade Turkey to become an ally. Then they can drive for the Iraqi oil fields. They already had the makings of a client regime in Iraq. On 3 April, 1941, Rasid Ali had overthrown the pro-British government of Iraq and asked for German help. German aircraft arrived at Mosul on 13 May, having staged through Syria, the Vichy French garrisonn feeling powerless to impede.

Sea Skimmer wrote: Except vast numbers of troops are still needed to guard against a coming Russian attack in 1943, and are still needed in the middle east because the British can hold. The Atlantic wall won't exist because before Rommel showed up the plan was to only hold the ports, not the coast. In any cases, building the wall up to sufficient strength would have taken two decades.

The British cannot hold. Rommel, given the reinforcements he asked for, and given better supply, had every chance of driving the British out of Egypt. And with Malta taken, the Luftwaffe operating in greater strength to protect the convoys, plus the Italian navy, and with a couple of extra panzer divisions, Egypt was within Germany's capability.

Moreover, a Soviet invasion in 1943 is simply not a given. If the Germans can take Northa Africa and Egypt and consolidate their hold on the Mediterranean, and prop up Rasid's pro-German government, or take control of Iraq themselves, their position would be strong enough to make Russia hesitate before attacking. Stalin was a realist. He would not have attacked a strong Germany, only a weak one.

Finally, a defeat crushing enough to drive the British out of Egypt, and lose them control of the Mediterranean means there may well be no need whatever to build an Atlantic wall, because the political consequences of a defeat that severe would very likely have toppled the Tory government. Such a bleak prospect for the future of the war might very easily have caused popular opinion in Britain to force the new Labour government to negotiate an end to the war.

Also, something else to help make the British withdraw would be a change in German naval strategy. Germany's mistake at sea was trying to build a surface fleet to oppose the Royal Navy. It would have been better by far to have given Admiral Doenitz what he wanted, and start the war with about three times as many U-Boats as they did. The effects on British convoys would have been disastrous, and would also help push a new British government to negotiate.

Sea Skimmer wrote: Roundup will have an easy time establishing its self, and the mighty port of Cherbourg took only a few days to capture. But in 1943 no port had anything like its defenses. Indeed, they're sufficiently weak that a direct assault might be possibul.

More troops, but also all 50-100 miles inland. Meaning they either sit in place behind there minor fortifications or move out to fight. Moving in the face of naval gunfire doesn't work.

Assuming an assault even comes. See above.

Sea Skimmer wrote: Except for all those cruisers, destroyers, subs and bombers flying out of Egypt that are within easy range of Tobruk, which must supply any assault. The Italian fleet proved quite inept at night fighting, and radar makes it all the worse. It wont be able to stop the raids that will turn Tobruk into a torch every night.

But the Luftwaffe will have more planes in the area, since they are not going to be needed to cover a German assault on Crete.

Sea Skimmer wrote: Enjoy trying to install 15 inch guns in the face of naval bombardment.

Enjoy trying to maintain the naval bombardment while the ships are being dive bombed.

Sea Skimmer wrote: Long drive to Dakar, impossibly long actually and the base commander has a battleship, or more likely a half dozen since the French fleet will not be staying at Oran or in northern Morocco

You mean the French fleet Churchill ordered the Royal navy to sink?

Sea Skimmer wrote: Good luck with logistics, I suggest you invest in a physics breaking device. You're going to need it for your planning. You think removing Malta makes everything a done deal. Actually it doesn't, which is why you become so devoiced from reality by the end of all this.

You're not paying attention. The capture of Malta, plus the capture of the Suez canal, plus the opening of a land route through Turkey. German operations in the Soviet Union prove that the Germans could have easily traversed the Anatolian terrain. The Turks had no capability of stopping the Germans, and Belgium proved that the Germans would, if necessary, violate another country's neutrality. A rapid advance to the Causcasus barrier, Russia's frontier with Turkey, would have secured the Wehrmacht's flank with the Soviet Union. From Anatolia, the Germans could easily have irrupted into Iraq and Iran, and positioned its vanguards to envelop the Caspian Dea and menace Russian Central Asia.

Why you think I need a "physics breaking device" I can't for the life of me imagine, since none of this makes the German forces operate with supply lines that are impossibly long, especially given that the route is overland, and beyond the ability of the Royal Navy to interdict, even supposing that there are active units left in the eastern Med after their bases have been taken.

Remember also that the Germans are not sustaining an offensive once they've moved into Iraq either. They're simply propping up a pro-German government, and consolidating their hold on the oil fields, then building up forces in the area to threaten Russian oil fields in the Caucasus. This makes it unlikely that Stalin carry out that 1943 invasion you're counting on.

Bartman wrote:
Bull. In 1941, together with the Italians, the Axis force in Libya totaled seven divisions which, when combined with air force and naval units, required 70,000 tons per month (this rose dramatically during active campaigning). In practice Tripoli (the only Libyan port of real value) could only offload about 70,000 tons per month. Of course they did everything they could to increase this and by June they were able to offload 125,000 tons. Great you think, right? Wrong. At that point more than 50% of all the goods being offloaded remained sitting on the wharfs. Why? Because Rommel didn’t have enough trucks to deliver the supplies to his front. So you say well they should increase the number of trucks assigned to DAK. The problem is that proportionally speaking Rommel received 10 times the number of trucks as the Eastern Front. Rommel was using 70 divisions worth of trucking. If they increase Rommel’s forces by your 20 divisions they also need to find an extra 200-300 divisions’ allotment of trucks. They would need a months worth of shipping just to offload the trucks. But that’s not all. They also have to find a way to increase the transportation network. The collection of dusty dirt roads that were being used were pretty much saturated by the trucks already on them. So they would have to build a whole new series of roads. And they can’t do that for free so they have to find a way to bring even more men and material over build them. That is going to impinge on their supply even more. And by the time Rommel makes it to Tobruk he is using nearly 50% of his fuel supply just for the trucks bringing supplies in.

There are 3 chokepoints for bringing supplies into Rommel. Capturing Malta solves only one of them, shipping. And that was the least problematic. By mid ’42 the Germans had effectively neutralized Malta anyway. The port facilities are the next chokepoint. And outside of June ’41 they were only offloading 70-75,000 tons/month (they averaged 72,000 tons/month from July-November). That is enough to supply 7 divisions (barely). Adding additional divisions to this mix only makes the force as a whole weaker not stronger. The final chokepoint is trucking. And the only way to get more trucking into Libya will be at the cost of greatly weakening continental forces. And only an idiot would do that with Stalin lurking in Eastern Europe. Even then massive improvements would need to be made to the road and preferably rail network before it would do the Axis any good. Might I suggest you read Supplying War by M. Van Creveld, before you draw conclusions about what kind of forces the Axis could support in NA and the Middle East.

I'm well aware of the problems of logistics. And you are right as far as the port facilties of Tripoli are concerned. They are limited in what they could bring in. But you seem to be neglecting to mention that that was not the only port available to the Afrika Korps by the time it was in a position to make a thrust toward Egypt. Tobruk, which fell to the Germans, was several hundred miles further to the east, closer to the objectives of Alexandria and the Suez canal. This will rather seriously shorten the German supply lines, and alleviate those problems of transport. Rommel understood this, which is why he did not doubt his ability to take these objectives, given reinforcements and more regular supplies.

Bartman wrote: As pointed out Malta is helpful but less so than you seem to be thinking. The RN largely abandoned the Western Med anyway so the loss of Malta means virtually nothing to the RN. But in any case it doesn’t matter as the bulk of the RN is based in Alexandria, which is why the Italians rather studiously avoided the Eastern Med. While the Italian Navy was ‘decent’ it was so grossly outmatched by the British they could risk an engagement outside of land based air cover.

If Alexandria can be captured, however, the RN has to abandon the eastern Med, as they have no other base. This will also sever the supply line to Malta, assuring its capitulation or abandonment. With the British stranglehold on his supply lines gone, and with Tobruk and Alexandria in his hands, Rommel could bring in ample supplies with which to sieze the Egyptian Delta, Palestine, and Syria.

The crucial battle was El Alamein. After the loss of Tobruk, General Ritchie had lost the confidence to lead the 8th Army, so Auchinleck took direct command, and withdrew to El Alamein, which was only 60 miles from Alexandria. El Alamein was literally the last ditch defense for Egypt and the Middle East.

It was crucial for the Axis. The British were close to their supply sources, and had many more tanks, auircraft, guns and troops. Rommel, on the other hand, was at the extreme end of a long and tenuous supply line, and the Italians did not dare sens convoys to Mersa Matruh for fear of the Royal Navy. In other words, Rommel had to sieze El Alamein at once, or he had lost the campaign.

After capturing Mersa Matruh on 26 June, Rommel reached El Alamein on the 30th. Rommel believed Auchinleck had concentrated his tanks north of the Qattara Depression. He hadn't. They were still in the desert to the southwest, trying desperately to reach El Alamein. In the meantime, the British defenses consisted of four boxes of infantry between the sea and the depression, with the intervals covered by small, mobile columns. Had Rommel struck at once, he could have rushed into Alexandria and the Nile Delta. He didn't, and thus lost the campaign.

Quicker action could have won the battle for the Germans, even with their weakened force. With Tobruk now in German hands, the supply situation was somewhat better than it had been. The Germans could have strengthened Rommel's forces and supplied them. Malta in German hands, and a greater concentration of Luftwaffe aircraft in this theater would have made this easier to achieve. With Alexandria fallen, the RN driven out of the eastern Med, and the supply problem thus largely solved, the Germans could have driven into Palestine and Syria, and stood on the Turkish border. Then it becomes possible to contemplate that drive into Iraq through Anatolia in Turkey.

Bartman wrote: Good Lord what a pipe dream. As mentioned above there was no way in hell that Germany could have ever crossed the Nile. But even if they had somehow driven the British out of the Med they start the whole horrible supply bit from Alexandria. Meanwhile the British are supplying through Basra along several relatively good rail lines. Explain to me how a few supply-starved divisions are going to drive the British out of Iraq. Especially since the British will be able to put large forces on their flank on the upper Nile.

Once again... it is not a few supply starved divisions. With Tripoli, Tobruk, and Alexandria in German hands, the port and road situation is not nearly so bad, thus it becomes possible to supply a larger force, which is available, because the Germans don't have any troops tied down on a Russian front.

And just what large forces are the British going to put on the Germans' flank on the Upper Nile? The British forces in Palestine, Syria and Libya numbered only 7 divisions. The British had no other substantial forces in the Middle East. They're not going to be moving divisions in from Iraq, when Rasid Ali raised his revolt, the British had to move troops into Iraq from the Transjordan to oppose it.

Auchinleck and Churchill were both sweating Alamein. They understood the possible consequences if the British had lost there.

Bartman wrote:

Perinquus wrote:This, incidentally was planned by Admiral Raeder.

Oh yes the same man who thought that the Heer was going to be able to operate without supplies for 30 days during Sealion. There is a man I would trust to have viable logistic ideas.

Well seeing as most of his staff, a large number of senior officers in OKW, and Rommel himself also believed in this strategy, I would not be so quick to dismiss it so sneeringly.

kojikun wrote:Supposing that Nazi Germany wasn't racist but rather merely extremely nationalist, would they have been able to stave off defeat? I imagine that the extra workforce they would have had would provide alot?

Extreme nationalism implies racism. Its parts of the nationalist structure.

Or even if, when they invaded countries, took those people in as their own and promised to make them all great, instead of just Germany proper?

Then they probably would have fared a lot better without the irritations of partisans, under-producing farmers and industries and the skeptical eyes of the rest of the world.

In other words IF the Germans acted like the Romans