The Battle of Tsushima, 99 years ago today...
Posted: 2004-05-27 06:18am
by Frank Hipper
On this day in 1905, the Russian Second and Third Pacific Squadrons under Vice Admiral Zinovy P. Rozhestvesnky met the Japanese fleet under Admiral Count Heihachiro Togo and was virtually anihilated.
After a nine month voyage around the world, consisting of hardship piled on top of frustration piled on top of bungling incompetence in the naval High Command, the Russian fleet met with a fate that was obvious to practically everyone involved from the day they sailed.
The flagship
Kniaz Suvorov was gunned into a blazing wreck, and with the exception of Rozhestvensky (who was severely injured and unconcious) and his staff, she went down with all hands.
Second in the Russian line,
Imperator Alexandr III capsized and sank, with no survivors out of a crew of nearly 900.
The
Borodino suffered a magazine detonation and sank with three survivors out of a crew of nearly 900.
The Russian's second in command, Rear Admiral Felkersam, died of a stroke the day before the battle unbeknownst to the fleet, so when his flagship
Osliabia was sunk early in the action, his was merely one of hundreds of corpses that she took to the bottom with her.
More than 200 of her crew were saved, but the following day 90 of them were killed on board the cruiser
Dmitri Donskoi's heroic final fight.
Out of a fleet of nearly fifty ships, only three ships made it to their destination of Vladivostock, the converted yacht
Almaz, and the destoyers
Bravi and
Grozny.
The cruisers
Aurora,
Oleg, and
Zhemchug ran to Manila where they were interned, and another destroyer was found drifting by a British steamer after having used up all her fuel and burned her wooden fittings.
The battleships
Nicolai I,
Admiral Graf Apraksin, and
Admiral Senyavin all surrendered to the Japanese on the 28th of May.
All told, nearly 6000 Russians had their lives thrown away by a prideful, moronic monarch, and his incompetent naval ministers that day.
They were not trained, nor were they equipped properly. They weren't even provided with shells to conduct gunnery practice. They sailed most of the way around the world to their deaths, relying on their own resources to get there because St. Petersburg could not, or would not, support them.
A horrifying waste of life, a meaningless destruction of beauteous naval architecture, and it all occurred
months after any reasoning high command would have realised the war was lost.
Posted: 2004-05-27 10:27am
by Gil Hamilton
At least not all ships were lost. I mean, eventually international pressure forced the Japanese to give all the ships they rightfully captured as prizes back to Russia. Unfortunately, that had the rather large side effect of pissing off Japan in a way that they only got over after they lost WW2, but hey.
Still, I have very little sympathy for Russia there. They were the ones who started the war, hoping to score a quick victory on the poor stupid Japanese because of internal Russia unrest. Then they went an vastly underestimated the military arm of Japan and sailed to Japan completely unprepared to fight. The Russians have no one to blame but themselves for the destruction of that fleet and the thousands of sailors lost.
Posted: 2004-05-27 01:55pm
by Sea Skimmer
From Naval Blunders by Geoffrey Regan
The Voyage of the Damned (1905)
The 18,000-mile voyage of the Russia Baltic Fleet to face the Japanese at Tsushima in 1905 is one of the epics of naval warfare. However, for much of the journey it was only the strength and determination of its commander, Admiral Rozhestvensky, that prevented it from dissolving into farce. It was as if Rozhestvensky was cast as the Flying Dutchman in Wanger's opera, condemned to sail the oceans of the world, while the other parts were played by the Marx brothers. There was even a comic subplot provided by the fleet repair ship, Kamchatka, which could be relied upon for a laugh even at the most serious moments.
The Russo-Japanese war had broken out when, without any formal declaration of war Japan made a pre-emptive strike against the Russian Far East Fleet. On the night of 8th February 1904, the Japanese torpedoed two battleships and a cruiser at Port Arthur. From that moment onwards Japan kept a tight grip on the seas which the Russians were never able to break. When they did try to break out of port in August, they suffered a resounding defeat at the Battle of the Yellow Sea. Rather then convincing the Russian government that the war was lost this seatback only seemed to make them more determined, and they reached the extraordinary decision that their Baltic Fleet – to be renamed the Second Pacific Squadron – should sail most of the way round the world to meet an enemy who had already defeated a naval squadron stronger then itself. To make matters worse, between the Gulf of Finland and Port Arthur there were no Russian bases, and the ports of neutral nations and even those of Russia's ally, France, would be closed to them. To supply the immense amount of coal needed by the fleet – half a million tons – Admiral Rozhestvensky had to rely on prearranged meetings at sea with sixty colliers of the German Hamburg-Amerika line, and the length of the journey would mean that his forty warships would need to re-coal on as many as thirty occasions, each time in the open sea, subject to wild weather and heavy waves. Yet, making light of every obstacle, the Russian government sent Rozhestvensky forth on his odyssey.
For all the Impressive appearance of Rozhestvensky's quartet of battleships – Kniaz, Suvoroff, Borodino, Alexander III, and Oryol – the strength of the Russian fleet was more apparent then real. Like many battleships built during this time they were top heavy – 1,500 tons above specifications – the result of their long gestation period during which every new gadget and device was added to their superstructure regardless of its effect on stability. One of the results was that in heavy seas the secondary armament could no be used, another that the main armor belt was below the water line and thus no defence against enemy shells. The Oryol had actually sunk at anchor in Kronstadt Harbor a year before because of a mechanical fault, and had to be relocated. So top heavy, indeed, were these ships that the admiral was warned not even to raise flag singles – and definitely no celebrator bunting. Not that there would be much to celebrate.
If the ships looked better than they were, the crews did not even look good in the first place. Few were drawn from the coastal, seafaring parts of Russia; most of the sailors were simply untutored peasants, who received little training at sea as the Baltic was iced over for half the year. With the greater technical demands of modern sea warfare, the lack of education of the Russian sailors was a particular drawback. During one raining exercises Rozhestvensky sprang a surprise alarm – "defence against torpedo attack." He waited on the bridge of his flagship but nothing happened – no men took up their posts – for everyone, officers and men, was fast asleep. On British sailor described the Russians he met as, "odorous, rough, coarse, but a happy lot." An officer aboard the Suvoroff complained about his gunners: "one half have to be thought everything because they know nothing; the other half because they have forgotten everything; but if they do remember anything then it is obsolete." What nobody could have guessed at the outset was that some of the seamen were revolutionaries, who tried to foment unrest among the crews. It was not a happy situation for any commander. Nor was Rozhestvensky very happy about his senior officers, describing the obese Read Admiral Folkersam- his second-in-command – as "a manure sack," and Read Admiral Enkvist – who commanded the cruisers – as "a vast empty space."
As the fleet left the Russian Baltic port of Libau on 16th October, the flagship set the pattern for the entire journey by running aground, and a cruiser lost her anchor, wasting hours trying to locate it. While this was going on a destroyer rammed the battleship Oslyaba and had to return to Reval for repairs. But once these wrinkles had been smoothed out the fleet moved peacefully into the narrow waters between Denmark and Sweden. Here, reports that the Japanese had torpedo boats stationed along the Danish coast meant that the Russians were continually on the lookout for spies, saboteurs, or indeed Japanese warships disguised as trawlers or yachts. Their paranoid helps to explain the evens of the next few days. The Russian movement had paid its agents huge sums of money to prevent any more Japanese surprise attacks. A certain captain Hartling had been sent to organize counter-espionage in Copenhagen, where he inhabited a fantasy world of spies and secrete weapons, and from which he transmitted daily to the fleet. Everyone it seemed was against them and the seas were awash with Japanese mines, submarines and especially torpedo boats. The mass hallucinations o the part of the Russian crews are more suitable as the subject of a psychological study then military history. Against this background Rozhestvensky ordered that "no vessel of any sort whatever must be allowed to get in amongst the fleet." When two fishermen were sent out by a Russian consular official to deliver a telegram to the flagship they were nearly blown out of the water by the trigger-happy Russians. in fact , the telegram informed Rozhestvensky that he had been promoted to Vice Admiral by Tsar Nicholas. Other terrors for the Russians were two silvery balloons seen in the distance (but never traced afterwards), which convinced the fleet that the Japanese were observing their every move. As if to lighten the gloom, the Kamchatka – self-appointed fleet comedian – reported that she was under attack by torpedo boats. When Rozhestvensky asked how many, the vessel replied "About eight, from all directions." Naturally it was a false alarm, - but fleet comedians are like that.
Once in the North Sea, Rozhestvensky almost brought a war between Russia and Great Britain. Identifying the Hull trawler fleet as Japanese torpedo boats, the Russians let fly with everything they had. Pandemonium broke loose. The trawlers, known as the Gamecock Fleet, were tiny 100-ton vessels out of hull, carrying a crew of eight and finishing on the Dogger Bank. How the Russians could have identified them as Japanese warships is beyond comprehension. Some Russian ships actually claimed they had been hit by torpedoes though in the light of dawn there were no signs of any damage. It was another case of mass hysteria. Some sailors on the battleship Borodino actually donned lifebelts and jumped overboard; others lay prone on the decks with their hands over their ears. Some even ran around the decks wielding cutlasses and shouting that the Japanese were boarding them. Meanwhile, the big guns of the battleships kept firing at the trawlers, damaging four and sinking one, as well as inflicting hits on each other – the cruiser Aurora took four hits below the waterline and the ship's chaplain was cut in half by a shell. As soon as he realized his mistake Rozhestvensky was like a man possessed, throwing one of his own gunners overboard who was continuing to fire at a damaged trawler. The truth dawned with the coming light. It had been a night of madness, with seven battleships in line firing at the cruisers Aurora and Donskoy. Fortunately the gunnery had been deplorable – the Oryol fired over 500 shells without scoring at hit But hw would the British react too this unprovoked assault on their fishermen? The British press worked itself into a fury of jingoistic hatred for Russia an demanded war, while the German newspaper Berliner Tagablatt wrote that the Russian commander must have lost his mind.
Although the Russian government made an official apology, Britain was slow to forgive. Twenty-eight British battleships raised steam and prepared for action, while swarms of British cruisers shadowed Rozhestvensky's fleet as it moved fearfully across the Bay of Biscay and down the coast of Portugal. The diplomatic storm caught up with Rozhestvensky at Vigo, where he was ordered to leave behind those of his officers who had been responsible for the attack on the trawlers. The admiral took the opportunity of leaving behind his most bitter enemy, Captain Klado. As Klado left the Suvoroff, another officer was heard to say, "I see the rats are leaving the sinking ship." But Klado was to get his revenge on Rozhestvensky, when he returned to St. Petersburg to organize reinforcements for the Second Pacific Squadron. Anything would do, however unfit and derelict it might be. After it would increase the number of targets the Japanese would have to fire at. Klado knew that Rozhestvensky had previously condemned these "old tubs" as worthless and nothing more then a millstone, which would hold back the rest of the fleet. Jokingly he called them the "sink-by-themselves" squadron. But like it or not he was going to get them.
When the fleet reached Tangier the Kamchatka, which had been detached for some days, caught up and exactly reported to Rozhestvensky that she had survived that in battle in the North Sea, having fired 300 shells in a tussle with three Japanese ships, and vehemently denying that theses had in fact been a Swedish merchantmen, a German trawler, and a French schooner. Before leaving Tangier one of the Russian vessels fouled the underwater telegraph cable with her anchor and cut off communication between the city and Europe for four days.
At Dakar, in West Africa, ten German colliers awaited Rozhestvensky's fleet. Double loads of coal were taken on board each ship; these had to be stored on the deck and the dust spread everywhere. In the heat of the equator, life became hell for the crews of the Russian ships. The atmosphere resembled a mineshaft and mine died, choking in the filthy air. during a storm off the coast of Angola, presumably to keep up the spirits of the fleet, the Kamchatka singled to the flagship, "Do you see torpedo boats?" A general alarm was sounded throughout the fleet until the repair ship admitted it had used the wrong code and had simply meant, "We are all right now."
At Cape Town Rozhestvensky received news that Klado was sending the "sink-by-themselves" squadron to join him and so he decided to do everthing in his power to avoid a rendezvous with them. He was furious; "If they are so old that they can't stream then they may go to the devil. We have no use for rubbish here." Meanwhile, discipline among the men of the squadron had reached an all-time low. Certain by now that they were sailing to destruction, the Russian sailors tired to take their minds off the future by indulging in all kinds of exotic pursuits, the most popular of which was bringing pets back with them from shore visits. unfortunately some of the pets were unsuited to long sea voyages – like the crocodile brought back aboard on battleship, and the poisonous snake, which bit and nearly killed one of the engineers. On another ship monkeys and dogs, first primed with champagne, were se to fight each other. The whole fleet resounded to a curious babel of farmyard noises, as pigs, cows, sheep – not to mention the parrots, porcupines, chameleons, frogs, and so forth – rushing around the decks, squealing, mooing, barking and squawking, turning the Second Pacific Squadron into a floating zoo. One pet goat lived only on paper, with a predilection for visiting cards. On a shore visit it refused an offer of hay and instead ate a Frenchman's newspaper.
Rotting meat had to be thrown overboard when the refrigeration ship Esperance broke down, with the result that the fleet was surrounded by swarms of sharks. For two weeks at Madagascar Admiral Rozhestvensky stayed in his cabin suffering from acute neuralgia, while his chief-of-staff had a brain hemorrhage and was partly paralyzed. Nobody really commanded the fleet and the Russians spent increasing amounts of time ashore at a makeshift city – known as Hellville – which sprang up to cater for their needs. Saloons, gambling houses, and brothels flourished. Meanwhile, barnacles smothered the hulls of the ships and their speed was cut by the sea grass which grew there and trained them as they sailed.
Disease was rife in the fleet. Malaria, dysentery, and typhoid took their tool and funeral services were a daily event. The Kamchatka did what she could to relieve the gloom of these occasions. A shell she fired to honor one of her dead turned out to be live and ricocheted off the unfortunate and long-suffering cruiser Aurora, which seemed to be the butt of all the fleets' jokes. Lunatics abounded, overcome by the long period at sea. Some men roamed the decks in a kind of religious fervor, believing they saw the Day of Judgment at hand; others merely muttering things like "Do you fear death?" A young officer wrote to his wife in Russia, "If, by God's grace, I ever see you again, I shall have things to tell you past belief or imagining." The worse cases – along with mutineers and revolutionaries from the Admiral Nakhimov – were sent back to Russia on the Malay.
Rozhestvensky's greatest problem was to maintain the fleet in tiptop fighting condition. Yet his officers were frequently drunk or drugged. One who had bought 2,000 cigarettes in Nossi-Be found that they were filled with Opium. The Admiral needed to be re-supplied with shells because so many had been expended in the battle with the trawlers. Expectations were high, therefore, when the supply ship Irtysh arrived, supposedly carrying shells for the battleship's main armament. in the sweltering African heat the sailor had to unload the cargo which turned out to be 12,000 pairs of fur-lined boots and a similar number of Russian winter coats.
At gunnery practice Rozhestvensky, who had been renowned for his gunnery as a young officer, watched while his destroyers scored not a single hit on a stationary target. When the battleships joined in, his flagship managed just one hit, which was on the ship towing the target. The gunnery hoist of one battleship hammed because there was a cobra wrapped around the rope. A formation of destroyers, ordered to form line barest, scattered in every direction because they had not been issued with the new codebooks. The torpedo were even worse; of seven that were fired, one jammed, while two swung at right angles to pot, one at right angles to starboard, two chugged slowly ahead but missed the target, and the last went round in circles causing all the ships to scatter in panic. The Kamchatka, robbed of her chance to join in these capers, signaled instead that she was sinking. Further investigation revealed a cracked pipe in the engine room.
Meanwhile, Klado's reinforcements had sailed from Reval under the gentle and fair Admiral Nebogatoff. How this old man felt about his mission is not recorded but his whole performance in the weeks to come breathed a refreshing air of humanity and common sense into the affair. All the Admiralty could tell him was that Rozhestvensky was currently at Madagascar; further then that they knew nothing. They were aware that the commander of the Second Pacific Squadron had no intention of rendezvousing with Nebogatoof's "archaeological collection of naval architecture." Few Admirals can ever have set sail with such vague instructions as, "You are to join up with Rozhestvensky, whose route is unknown to us..." For Nebogatoff it became an exercise in detective work, in which he had to enquire at neutral ports new news of the main fleet and plot his course accordingly. For Rozhestvensky it was if nemesis following him in the shape of these "ghost ships."
Rozhestvensky suffered the final insult when he read in a newspaper that St. Petersburg had ordered him to destroy the Japanese Fleet, sail on to Vladivostok, and there hand over command to Admiral Biriloff, who was traveling to the Russian Pacific port by the Trans-Siberian Railway. Biriloff, known as "the fighting Admiral" had never even been in action.
After Crossing the Indian Ocean, the fleet was met by one of their transports, the Gortchakoff, which it was hoped would be bringing letters from home. The mood aboard the Russian ships lifted at the thought of hearing from their loved ones. But it was soon dashed when it was found the transport was still carrying the letters the sailors had sent home from Madagascar a month before. This was too much. The Russians felt completely abandon and nobody more then their commander. but help was coming – even though it was as unwelcome as an attack by Japanese torpedo boas- the Third Pacific Squadron, the floating dead, were about to join them. On 11th May, of the coast of Indo-China, the two fleets met. Although Rozhestvensky did not welcome the new arrivals, at least they brought news from home; of unrest, mutiny, and revolution.
Rozhestvensky was nearing the end of his voyage. In many ways he had achieved a miracle in getting this far and it was not his fault that the ships and crews which were being sent against the Japanese were not adequate to their task. He had known this from early on but had stuck at his job like an admiral going down with his ship. In a sense the whole voyage resembled a protracted sinking and only though his own personality had the Russian commander managed to stave ff the final cataclysm. But the stress of command had worn away his health and by the time he met the ebullient and immensely confident Togo at Tsushima – the island aptly named the 'Donkey's Ears" –he had accepted fate's decree that he should be the victim. The destruction of the Russian fleet that followed was a one-sided encounter in which the achieved one of the most crushing victories in naval history. Rozhestvensky was even denied the chance to perish with his flagship, being plucked wounded from the sea and taken to a Japanese hospital where he was later visited b Togo himself. On his return to Russia he found himself – as he had expected – to be the scapegoat. Witnesses had reported that during the battle Rozhestvensky had been delirious, but he was long past that stage. It was fatalism that commanded the Russian fleet at Tsushima. And fate had not quite finished laughing at Rozhestvensky. While staying at a hotel in St. Petersburg in 1908, he received a telegram giving details of a requiem service in his memory to be he in the city. Apparently he was dead - and nobody had bothered to tell him.
Posted: 2004-05-27 02:15pm
by Frank Hipper
Jeez, I forgot to mention how on the morning of the 28th, the light cruiser Izumrud, surrounded by the entire Japanese fleet, broke from the group led by Nicolai I and ran for Vladivostock successfuly, but having having lost her charts during the battle on the 27th, wrecked herself outside the harbor there.
As to who started it, the Japanese did spring a surprise attack on Port Arthur before hostilities were formally announced, but Russia (the Czar, really) had been aching for war with Japan for quite some time, and doing nothing diplomatically to prevent it.
The European powers forced Japan to give up quite a bit of territory she gained during the Sino-Japanese war, especially Manchuria, and then the Russians waltzed back in and re-took it.
Japan may have shot first, but they were definetly provoked.
What really kills me about the Russo-Japanese war is how in a series of war games dating from 1900, the Russians new exactly how deadly a trap Port Arthur was, that the Japanese would more than likely launch a sneak attack at the outset of hostilities, and that they couldn't realistically reinforce their Pacific fleet.
They knew all this, but didn't do a damned thing about it when war finally came.
Alexiev should have been shot.
Posted: 2004-05-27 02:17pm
by Sea Skimmer
Gil Hamilton wrote:At least not all ships were lost. I mean, eventually international pressure forced the Japanese to give all the ships they rightfully captured as prizes back to Russia.
No it didn't. The Japanese willingly sold some of them back to Russia in 1916 because they had absolutely no need of such obsolete pieces of junk while the Russians were desperate for more warships. Though it was a very stupid move since there was no way to get them to the Black Sea or Baltic fleets.
Unfortunately, that had the rather large side effect of pissing off Japan in a way that they only got over after they lost WW2, but hey.
No, turning a nice profit off ships that otherwsie would have gone to the scrapyard had nothing to do with that.
Still, I have very little sympathy for Russia there. They were the ones who started the war, hoping to score a quick victory on the poor stupid Japanese because of internal Russia unrest.
The war was started by Japan and with the objective of conquering Korea and Manchuria and returning Port Arthur to Japan. The port had been leased to Japan in the aftermath of China's defeat in the 1895 Sino-Japanese war. However the Japanese had to give it up because of western and Russian pressure. They then of course got pissed when China turned around and leased the same area to Russia, while also giving permission for the Trans-Siberian railway to make a shortcut across Manchuria and to Port Author with Russian garrisons established to protect it.
It was the Japanese who sought to exploit weakness, if they'd waited much longer then a great many new battleships would have joined the Russian Pacific fleet and the Trans-Siberian would have been fully completed. As it was that railway operated at a far higher capacity then the Japanese thought possibul and could have proven fatal to them had the war lasted much longer, Japan ended the war deep in debt and with its manpower reserves exhausted. If the Russians had had there way, at least the military anyway they'd have waited at least another year.
Then they went an vastly underestimated the military arm of Japan and sailed to Japan completely unprepared to fight. The Russians have no one to blame but themselves for the destruction of that fleet and the thousands of sailors lost.
The Second and Third Pacific squadrons very much knew what they were going to have to fight. What was underestimated, by a few orders of magnitude was the combat readiness of there own fleet. But as it was when the fleet sailed they expected it was to go to the relief of Port Arthur and to join with the relatively efficient First Pacific squadron, which had gotten the best ships and men before the war. Had the Second Pacific squadron been quicker, and it could have been, then it might well have arrived before Port Arthur was captured and before Japanese howitzers knocked out the remaining Pacific fleet ships. If that had happened the Japanese wouldn't have had a very good chance at sea. And if they lost control of the sea even partly they would be utterly fucked.
Even as it was, had not the abortive 1905 revolution occurred the Russian goverment would have continued the war on land, which would have led to the total destructive of Japanese armies on the continent and the recapturing of Port Arthur. That would have made history very interesting.
Posted: 2004-05-27 04:09pm
by Gil Hamilton
Sea Skimmer wrote:No it didn't. The Japanese willingly sold some of them back to Russia in 1916 because they had absolutely no need of such obsolete pieces of junk while the Russians were desperate for more warships. Though it was a very stupid move since there was no way to get them to the Black Sea or Baltic fleets.
According to "100 Decisives Battles" by Paul Davis, that isn't all true. The Treaty of Portsmouth was bitter to the Japanese because they had repaired the
Nikolai I and
Orel and were incorporating them into their fleets when the Russians demaded their return (because as you said, they were hurting for ships).
No, turning a nice profit off ships that otherwsie would have gone to the scrapyard had nothing to do with that.
Sorry but that's not all true. The returning of those ships along with the laws being passed in the US against Japanese immigrants had left a very bad taste in the mouth of the Japanese public, even to the point that some newspapers were calling for action against them. Fortunately, the Great White Fleet helping lead to the Root-Takahira Agreement managed to keep US/Japanese relations decent... at least for a while.
The war was started by Japan and with the objective of conquering Korea and Manchuria and returning Port Arthur to Japan. The port had been leased to Japan in the aftermath of China's defeat in the 1895 Sino-Japanese war. However the Japanese had to give it up because of western and Russian pressure. They then of course got pissed when China turned around and leased the same area to Russia, while also giving permission for the Trans-Siberian railway to make a shortcut across Manchuria and to Port Author with Russian garrisons established to protect it.
Remember what the Russian Minister of the Interior said to the Minister of War about a "short, victorious war to stem the tide of Revolution"? They certainly had political motivations from within Russia to go to war with Japan.
It was the Japanese who sought to exploit weakness, if they'd waited much longer then a great many new battleships would have joined the Russian Pacific fleet and the Trans-Siberian would have been fully completed. As it was that railway operated at a far higher capacity then the Japanese thought possibul and could have proven fatal to them had the war lasted much longer, Japan ended the war deep in debt and with its manpower reserves exhausted. If the Russians had had there way, at least the military anyway they'd have waited at least another year.
Attacking them before the Russians were ready to attack them first seems like a good strategy to me.
The Second and Third Pacific squadrons very much knew what they were going to have to fight. What was underestimated, by a few orders of magnitude was the combat readiness of there own fleet. But as it was when the fleet sailed they expected it was to go to the relief of Port Arthur and to join with the relatively efficient First Pacific squadron, which had gotten the best ships and men before the war. Had the Second Pacific squadron been quicker, and it could have been, then it might well have arrived before Port Arthur was captured and before Japanese howitzers knocked out the remaining Pacific fleet ships. If that had happened the Japanese wouldn't have had a very good chance at sea. And if they lost control of the sea even partly they would be utterly fucked.
That's why I mean, they came to Tsushima completely unprepared for a serious battle. Sure, they know they were going to have to fight, but they were completely in no condition to do so. That sounds unprepared to me.
Besides, Czar Nicholas II sent the Russian Baltic Fleet to the Pacific to avenge the lost of the Pacific Squadron during the Seige of Port Arthur, when the Japanese fleet shelled the hell out of it on April 14-15, 1904. They weren't even close to getting their in time, as the Russian fleet was at Madagascar when the Japanese finally captured Port Arthur in January of 1905.
Posted: 2004-05-27 04:50pm
by Sea Skimmer
Gil Hamilton wrote:
According to "100 Decisives Battles" by Paul Davis, that isn't all true. The Treaty of Portsmouth was bitter to the Japanese because they had repaired the Nikolai I and Orel and were incorporating them into their fleets when the Russians demaded their return (because as you said, they were hurting for ships).
That book is full of crap from what I've heard. It makes absolutely no sense for Japan to have been repairing obsolete battleships in 1916, 11 years after the things where captured. The reality is that Japan repaired all of those captured battleships, which could be by 1911. This comes from Conway's All the Worlds Fighting Ships 1906-1921, which is sort of the best source ever put out for that sort of information. It is backed by Battleships of WW1 by Antony Preston.
Sorry but that's not all true. The returning of those ships along with the laws being passed in the US against Japanese immigrants had left a very bad taste in the mouth of the Japanese public, even to the point that some newspapers were calling for action against them. Fortunately, the Great White Fleet helping lead to the Root-Takahira Agreement managed to keep US/Japanese relations decent... at least for a while.
So you say. However the Root-Takahira Agreement was signed in 1908 and the Japanses sold the battleships back to Russia in 1916, before the US even entered the war so what your point is I cannot tell.
Remember what the Russian Minister of the Interior said to the Minister of War about a "short, victorious war to stem the tide of Revolution"? They certainly had political motivations from within Russia to go to war with Japan.
Yes. That doesn't mean they started the war, which was your claim.
Attacking them before the Russians were ready to attack them first seems like a good strategy to me.
Yeah it was. That still doesn't mean that the Russians attacked first. Good job backtracking.
That's why I mean, they came to Tsushima completely unprepared for a serious battle. Sure, they know they were going to have to fight, but they were completely in no condition to do so. That sounds unprepared to me.
Yes, but they had no other choice if they where to secure control of the sea in the far east and avoid the destruction of the Pacific fleet. The fact that they were unprepared is another torpedo into your Russia was ready to attack and struck first claim.
Besides, Czar Nicholas II sent the Russian Baltic Fleet to the Pacific to avenge the lost of the Pacific Squadron during the Seige of Port Arthur, when the Japanese fleet shelled the hell out of it on April 14-15, 1904.
Wrong. When the Balitic fleet formed the Second Pacific Squadron the Pacific fleet had suffered losses but was still largely operational. It was a renforcement mission not some revenge plot. The Japanses fleet did shell Port Arthur several times. However it never did any significant damage to the fleet at anchor and took considerable damage from Russian shore batteries every time. The Russian Pacific Fleet was eventually put out of action by 280mm howitzers on shore, but only after 203 meter hill was captured in November. That hill provided a clear view into Port Arthur and its harbor and esnured the rapid fall of the city. But by then the second and third Pacific squadrons where well on there way to the Pacific.
They weren't even close to getting their in time, as the Russian fleet was at Madagascar when the Japanese finally captured Port Arthur in January of 1905.
Its true they weren't even close to arriving on time, but that's irrelevant to the reason why they where dispatched in the first place. It is very clear that your source of information is horribly flawed and riddle with inaccuracies. I suggest you throw it into the trash.
Posted: 2004-05-28 03:15am
by Frank Hipper
BlkbrryTheGreat wrote:Question for the military minded individuals who read this thread; how much would proper training and good moral have made on the outcome of the battle itself? (Those were listed as BIG problems for the Russian fleet).
A great deal of difference. A sizable number of the crews felt they were sailing to their deaths from the first day out, no better way to hand your enemy victory than to defeat yourself first.
However, the Russians actually made the Japanese somewhat nervous during the first half hour of the battle, their shooting was considerably better than what they had been led to expect of the Russian Baltic Fleet. After that, the superiority of Japanese gunnery took it's toll in both accuracy and rate of fire, something better trained crews would have dealt with more easily.
Morale was somewhat better than should be expected after the ordeal they went through to get there, too. Admiral Nebogatov had several instances of near mutiny while surrendering his surviving ships, and
Izumrud disobeyed his orders by running for Vladivostock.
Had Rozhestvensky not been utterly exhausted and highly demoralised himself, he no doubt could have taken better advantage of the situation. Togo made a turn-in-succession early in the action that some of the writers I've read have scathingly criticised, and have made good points about how Rozhestvensky could have not only escaped destruction by more creatively capitalising on it, but possibly could have won a moinor victory.
