Is the insurgency burning itself out?

[MKSheppard]

I'm been reading unofficial reports posted on message
boards by relatives of those fighting in Iraq now who
have talked to their relatives in Iraq, and they're stating
200 to 1 or 100 to 1 kill ratios, and couple this with
the switch to once again, car bombs by the insurgents,
do you think they're changing tactics now that they have
no more warm bodies and because of the flow of armed
men from Syria and Iran being starved off by US Forces
stationed on the border stepping up border patrolling?

[Admiral Valdemar]

Where there's a will, there's a way. I'd say it's cooling off, at least from what I hear, but if they still oppose US involvement or any occupation then there will be an extremist there to back them.

Just have to hope it doesn't flare up again else the handover is truly screwed.

[Darth Wong]

I'm been reading unofficial reports posted on message boards by relatives of those fighting in Iraq now who have talked to their relatives in Iraq, and they're stating 200 to 1 or 100 to 1 kill ratios, and couple this with the switch to once again, car bombs by the insurgents, do you think they're changing tactics now that they have no more warm bodies and because of the flow of armed men from Syria and Iran being starved off by US Forces stationed on the border stepping up border patrolling?

It's no secret that the American soldier is vastly superior to the Iraqi soldier, never mind the Iraqi militiaman. They learned this a year ago, they're probably learning it again now that they've been foolish enough to come out into the open. But just as they did a year ago, they can simply fall back into guerilla mode. If the goal of this insurgency was to overthrow the Americans, it failed and it was hopeless from the start. But mind you, if the goal was to turn the Iraqi people against the US, it has achieved at least partial success.

[Ma Deuce]

The rebels are either stupid, or they don't really want the Americans out of Iraq (they just want the chance to get martyred). The longer they keep stirring up shit, the longer the Americans will have to stay in Iraq, because nothing they can do will make the Americans leave (aside from voluntarily ending the uprising).
Oh, wait. Alot of the rebels are Islamic fundies anyway, who are not well known for rational thought...

[The Kernel]

Shep, you're thinking about this from the wrong angle. Of course the rebels couldn't possibly hope to militarily overpower the US occupation force, but they don't need to. Turning public opinion against the US occupation force in the minds of the Iraqis, Americans, and other coalition members will suffice for their purposes.

Already several minor members of the coalition have pulled out, which doesn't weaken the US force, but it DOES bring worldwide public opinion against us. If people in the US don't see any kind of improvement in the situation in Iraq, then we might be forced to pull out or face the wrath of the voters.

I don't think it is a coincidence that the US hasn't been hit by another terrorist attack since 9/11. If I were leading the insurgents, I would make every effort to discourage an attack on the US on their soil for fear of turning public opinion against those who wish to pull out. If they can keep Iraq unstable and avoid any public connections between the terrorists and the Iraqi rebels, then eventually the US will be forced to withdraw and they will have won.

[Vympel]

The insurgents are getting stronger and more skilled, actually:

Agence France Presse April 22, 2004
Iraqi insurgents an evolving force: officials, analysts

By Peter Mackler

Facing stubborn resistance on two fronts, US commanders in Iraq are showing signs of grudging appreciation for the combat capacity and organization of insurgents still officially written off as isolated thugs and terrorists.

After more than two weeks of fierce fighting, particularly in the city of Fallujah, US officers speak about well-coordinated "enemy forces," many with clear military training and some operating in platoon-like units.

Battling Sunni Muslim militants in Fallujah or facing down Shiite radicals in central and southern Iraq, the US-led coalition has a growing sense of what it is up against a year after toppling Saddam Hussein.

"This is probably the most significant uprising we've had since the end of the war," Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, the coalition's deputy director of operations, told reporters in Baghdad this week.

With more than 100 Americans killed so far this month, General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pulled no punches testifying before the US Congress on Wednesday.

"This is a serious situation. We're at war," Myers told the House Armed Services Committee. "We have a lot at stake against these extremists in Iraq."

US officials say the resistance in Fallujah is being waged by hundreds of fighters from the former Special Republican Guard, elite Fedayeen Saddam militia, Mukhabarat intelligence services, special services, diehard residents and some foreigners.

Witnesses in the city west of Baghdad say the insurgents carry a range of weapons, from Kalashnikov assault rifles to mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank rockets and even Russian-made Strela ground-to-air missiles.

No-one is sure where the weapons are coming from: some officials and experts say they may be smuggled in from Syria or stolen from poorly guarded weapons dumps. Others suggest they were stockpiled by Saddam's defeated army.

The Iraqis have been using classic urban guerrilla tactics against the Marines, including sniper fire and hit-and-run strikes, trying to catch the Americans in narrow streets with little maneuvering room, officers said.

The Americans accuse the Iraqis of using ambulances for transporting weapons, mosques for fire bases and women and children as human shields against the Marines, basically daring them to attack and pile up civilian casualties.

Insurgents have also been stepping up their attacks on vital supply routes, obliging the US military to divert troops to protect convoys, and last week shot down one American helicopter in the Fallujah area and forced down another.

Myers acknowleged in a television interview this week that the insurgents in Fallujah were displaying "pretty good coordination," but most officials and military experts believe their organization is loose at best.

A militant in Fallujah said the insurgency there was led by three major groups. "Each has its leaders, its intelligence arm and its hierarchy," the rebel told Ahmad Faddam, an AFP correspondent who entered the city last week.

If the Marines have been so far stymied in their drive on Fallujah, with officials seeking a negotiated settlement, coalition forces have had little more luck with militiamen loyal to firebrand Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr.

Officials play down the threat from Sadr's Mehdi army, comprised of an estimated 3,000-6,000 poorly armed and trained fighters who have squared off against coalition troops in cities across central and southern Iraq since April 4.

But coalition forces have not been able to impose their will fully on any of the cities, including Kut, southeast of Baghdad, where they sent in a battalion-sized US force with armored personnel carriers and other mechanized vehicles.

Sadr himself is holed up in the holy Shiite city of Najaf south of Baghdad, with thousands of American troops massed outside as mediation efforts continue.

Officials doubt there is any degree of real coordination between the Sunnis and the Shiites although Kimmitt said "what you're starting to see are some marriages of convenience between some of these extremist groups."

Military analysts have seen the Iraqi insurgency develop in the last year from random attacks on coalition forces to the more sophisticated use of roadside explosives, coordinated ambushes and now sustained combat mixed with bombings and kidnappings.

US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said Wednesday a branch of the old Iraqi intelligence service, dubbed M-14, has helped plan and carry out anti-coalition attacks throughout Iraq with car bombs and remote-controlled explosives.

Kimmitt said the insurgents, unable to tackle the coalition head-on, were resorting to "asymmetric" tactics such as abductions and bombs "to try to break the will of the coalition ... by creating fear."

For John Pike, director of the GlobalSecurity.org think tank, such operations represent a new dimension in the insurgency, moving from tactics to strategic thinking aimed at undermining support for the occupation in the United States and elsewhere.

"What we are seeing in the last three weeks is a strategy to strike at the points of political vulnerability," Pike said.

[The Kernel]

*snip*

Looks like they might be getting reinforced by ex-Iraqi military...

[Darth Wong]

I like the way the Americans accuse the insurgents of using women and children and ambulances for cover, while the Bush Apologist Guard here on the board dismisses any and all reports of Marines shooting women and children and ambulances as utter bullshit. Gee, do you think they're accusing the Iraqis of using women, children, and ambulances for cover because they've been shooting at said cover?

Of course, one could argue that they have no choice, but that, of course, ignores the option of not attempting to immediately seize control of the city by force. To bring up the Waco example again, they didn't just flatten the compound with artillery, and they were still mercilessly pilloried for going too far; people like Glocksman even accuse them of outright murder.

[Aaron]

Looks like they might be getting reinforced by ex-Iraqi military...

Thats exactly why the Iraqi Army should have been kept intact and placed under US/UK control. The soldiers would be getting paid which would put money into the Iraqi economy and they wouldn't be lending their expertise to the rebels. If they refuse to engage the Iraqi rebels than have them pull security duty in the quiet parts of Iraq, this would free up Coalition troops to fight the rebels.

[Ma Deuce]

Of course, one could argue that they have no choice, but that, of course, ignores the option of not attempting to immediately seize control of the city by force

The grunts on the ground are the ones that don't have a choice. If someone is shooting at your squad from a crowd of non-combatants, or from inside an ambulance, what are you supposed to do? It's really a no-win scenario. If you don't return fire, you can either pull out or watch your squad get slaughtered, or you can shoot back and and run the almost certain chance of killing civilians. This no-win scenario is the reason the rebels are taking cover among civilians: both options available to the US soldiers fighting them will contribute to bad press back home.

[JME2]

Shep, you're thinking about this from the wrong angle. Of course the rebels couldn't possibly hope to militarily overpower the US occupation force, but they don't need to. Turning public opinion against the US occupation force in the minds of the Iraqis, Americans, and other coalition members will suffice for their purposes.

Interesting side-note: This is exactly what the Rebels were trying to do to the Empire during the Galactic Civil War.

[Patrick Degan]

For some additional perspective:

Why We Get It Wrong

Why We Get It Wrong

by William S. Lind


One of the few consistencies of the war in Iraq is America’s ability to make the wrong choices. From starting the war in the first place through outlawing the Ba'ath and sending the Iraqi army home to assaulting Fallujah and declaring war on Shiite militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr, we repeatedly get it wrong. Such consistency raises a question: can we identify a single factor that consistently leads us in the wrong direction?

I think we can. That is not to say other factors are not also in play. But one wrong notion does appear to underlie many of our blunders. That is the belief that in this war, the U.S. military is the strongest player.

We hear this at every level from the rifle squad to the White House. In Fallujah, Marine privates and sergeants want to finish the job of taking the city, with no doubt whatsoever that they can. In Baghdad, spokesmen for the CPA regularly trumpet the line that no Iraqi fighters can hope to stand up to the US military. Washington casts a broader net, boasting that the American military can defeat any enemy, anywhere. The bragging and self-congratulation reach the point where, as Oscar Wilde might have said, it is worse than untrue; it is in bad taste.

In fact, in Iraq and in Fourth Generation war elsewhere, we are the weaker party. The most important reason this is so is time.

For every other party, the distinguishing characteristic of the American intervention force is that it, and it alone, will go away. At some point, sooner or later, we will go home. Everyone else stays, because they live there.

This has many implications, none of them good from our perspective. Local allies know they will at some time face their local enemies without us there to support them. French collaborators with the Germans, and there were many, can tell us what happens then. Local enemies know they can outlast us. Neutrals make their calculations on the same basis; as my neighbor back in Cleveland said, one of Arabs’ few military virtues is that they are always on the winning side.

All our technology, all our training, all our superiority in techniques (like being able to hit what we shoot at) put together are less powerful than the fact that time is against us. More, we tend to accelerate the time disadvantage. American election cycles play a role here; clearly, that is what lies behind the June 30 deadline for handing Iraq over to some kind of Iraqi government. So does a central feature of American culture, the desire for quick results and "closure." Whether we are talking about wars or diets, Americans want action now and results fast. In places like Fallujah, that leads us to prefer assaults to talks. Our opponents, in contrast, have all the time in the world – and in the next world for that matter.

Time is not the only factor that renders us the weaker party. So does our lack of understanding of local cultures and languages. So also do our reliance on massive firepower, our dependence on a secure logistics train (we are now experiencing that vulnerability in Iraq, where our supply lines are being cut), our insistence on living apart from and much better than the local population. But time still overshadows all of these. Worse, we can do nothing about it, unless, like the Romans, we plan to stay for three hundred years.

Until we accept the counterintuitive fact that in Fourth Generation interventions we are and always will be the weaker party, our decisions will continue to be consistently wrong. The decisions will be wrong because the assumption that lies behind them is wrong. We will remain trapped by our own false pride.

What if we do come to understand our own inherent weakness in places like Iraq? Might we then come up with some more productive approaches? Well, the Byzantines might have something to teach us on that score. Greek fire notwithstanding, what kept the Eastern Roman Empire alive for a thousand years after Rome fell was knowing how to play weak hands brilliantly.

April 22, 2004

Copyright © 2004 William S. Lind

I would also like to add an observation regarding Arab psychology: in the Arab world, chess is one of the most popular games in their culture. Research suggests that they invented much of what is still incorporated into the modern game but the Medieval version of the game is still played in some quarters and it has a couple of interesting wrinkles to it. In addition to checkmate, it is possible to attain a win by achieving what is known as baremate, in which you wipe all of your opponent's pieces off the board and thus isolate his king.

Alternatively, however, if the weaker player can outlast and outmanoeuver his opponent into stalemating him, it is the stalemated player who wins because his opponent can never bring him to checkmate.

I will further point out at this juncture that Arabs have been playing chess for over 1300 years.

[Col. Crackpot]

I like the way the Americans accuse the insurgents of using women and children and ambulances for cover, while the Bush Apologist Guard here on the board dismisses any and all reports of Marines shooting women and children and ambulances as utter bullshit. Gee, do you think they're accusing the Iraqis of using women, children, and ambulances for cover because they've been shooting at said cover?

are you refering to that thread which cited an op-ed piece from the Guardian and two funde religious sites as a source?

[MKSheppard]

Looks like they might be getting reinforced by ex-Iraqi military...

Or by Syrian/Iranian commandos wearing civvie clothes.

[The Kernel]

Looks like they might be getting reinforced by ex-Iraqi military...

Or by Syrian/Iranian commandos wearing civvie clothes.

Possible, but I think very unlikely. The chance of them being caught and talking is simply to great. I'm sure Syria and Iran would just love to help destabilize Iraq, but neither of them want that so bad that they are willing to risk becoming the next Iraq.

Besides, despite all the talk of this we've heard lately, I haven't seen any real evidence of the claims.

[Vympel]

Or by Syrian/Iranian commandos wearing civvie clothes.

Commando units of any nation are no joke- if they really were Syrian commandos (who, IIRC, are specially trained to give Israeli forces- especially their armor, a hard time) I'd expect much more serious opposition.

I think this is just the Fallujah insurgents especially becoming more hardcore through combat experience. If you're lucky enough to live through a few ambushes of US troops, you start to get instincts and skills from the experience- especially things like accurately firing your AK and RPG (good RPG gunners are capable of persistently doing scary shit).

[MKSheppard]

I will further point out at this juncture that Arabs have been playing chess for over 1300 years.

Funny, this is an actual Iraqi battle cry from the 1920 uprising
against the british:

"iltob ahsan lo migwaari!"

What that means is:

"Which is better? Your cannon or my migwaarr!"

For the unenlightened, a migwaarr is a wooden rod with a
stone ball attached to it.

This is the final proof that Arab men have an extra set of balls
in their heads instead of a brain.

[Sir Sirius]

The rebels are either stupid, or they don't really want the Americans out of Iraq (they just want the chance to get martyred). The longer they keep stirring up shit, the longer the Americans will have to stay in Iraq, because nothing they can do will make the Americans leave (aside from voluntarily ending the uprising).
Oh, wait. Alot of the rebels are Islamic fundies anyway, who are not well known for rational thought...

Ah, but the islamofasists don't just want Americans out of Iraq, they also want to be in charge in Iraq after the Americans leave. If the insurgents left the Amercans alone all together, it would far easier for the Americans to plant a U.S. friendly goverment in Iraq, something the islamofasists do not want to see happening.