Great Asskickers Of History

[General Zod]

a battle fought in that era with a million soldiers would have been difficult to arrange to say the least. not to mention coordinate, move the troops, feed the troops. . .thousands is far more likely.

[wautd]

The 100 or so Spartans that held off the Persian army (about a million soldiers IIRC) for days. They fought to the death and took thousands of Persians with them

Current research put the Persian Army at several hundred thousand not close to million!

that still not makes it less impressive

[Pablo Sanchez]

Robert Guiscard.

Damn! Good on you, man, that was the very first name that came to my mind when I read the title. The Weasel was a fucking monster and terror of the whole mediterranean basin.

EDIT:
In addition--

Timur Lenkh, AKA Tamerlane. Went from a bandit chieftan to founder of a brief Mongol dynasty. By ruthlessness and military brilliance he siezed the whole of Persia, Transoxiania, and Afghanistan. Then he dealt severe beatdowns to several of the strongest nations on Earth, including the Sultan of Delhi and the Ottoman Sultan Bayazid. He was going to conquer China but died before he could do so. He accomplished more and killed more than any of his contemporaries, and he did it all despite a crippling leg injury. He is truly an inspiration to the disabled.

Basil the Bulgar Slayer. Defeated the extremely strong Bulgarian Empire of the Balkans and ruthlessly prevented their recovery by blinding 99 of every 100 prisoners... leaving the remainder with only one eye, so they could lead the rest home.

Maybe more later, as I think of them.

[Sea Skimmer]

The 100 or so Spartans that held off the Persian army (about a million soldiers IIRC) for days. They fought to the death and took thousands of Persians with them

Current research put the Persian Army at several hundred thousand not close to million!

I'm fairly sure current research puts the Persians at less then one hundred thousand acutally and the Spartans actual strength at several thousand rather then three hundred.

[Pablo Sanchez]

I'm fairly sure current research puts the Persians at less then one hundred thousand acutally and the Spartans actual strength at several thousand rather then three hundred.

It was 300 land-owning citizen fighters plus retainers, which would have brought the number up considerably. It's still a major victory against the odds.

[HemlockGrey]

The biggest exponent of the light cavalry, an excellent strategist, cunning politician, scholar and a truly benevolent dictator loved by all his subjects as well as a fearsome warrior given his small stature.

The Companions were heavy cavalry, weren't they?

Not quite. Lee would have won at Gettysburg had Richard Ewell acted to seize the Round Tops on the first day of the battle. Stonewall Jackson would have, but he of course was killed at Chancellorsville. And without command of those heights, the battle's outcome was foreordained.

Still, he shouldn't have invaded in the first place without a clearly defined objective, which I don't think he had. Of course, the southern cause was further hampered by their utter incompetancy in the West...

[Lonestar]

Not quite. Lee would have won at Gettysburg had Richard Ewell acted to seize the Round Tops on the first day of the battle. Stonewall Jackson would have, but he of course was killed at Chancellorsville. And without command of those heights, the battle's outcome was foreordained.

.

Negative. Lee's Greatest victory, Chanchellorsville, was almost due to entirely to Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson's influence, i.e., splitting the army and making Bold moves. Lee's other victories were against mediocre Union Generals who had an even harder time grasping what effect rifles were having on the Battlefield. His mindset can be best distilled down to one sentence:

"The enemy is there, I will fight them." (in reference to the Union occupation of Seminary Ridge at Gettysburg, Longstreet commented "If their there, it's because they want you to fight them there". Lee obliged them)

[Patrick Degan]

Not quite. Lee would have won at Gettysburg had Richard Ewell acted to seize the Round Tops on the first day of the battle. Stonewall Jackson would have, but he of course was killed at Chancellorsville. And without command of those heights, the battle's outcome was foreordained.

Negative. Lee's Greatest victory, Chanchellorsville, was almost due to entirely to Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson's influence, i.e., splitting the army and making Bold moves. Lee's other victories were against mediocre Union Generals who had an even harder time grasping what effect rifles were having on the Battlefield. His mindset can be best distilled down to one sentence:

"The enemy is there, I will fight them." (in reference to the Union occupation of Seminary Ridge at Gettysburg, Longstreet commented "If their there, it's because they want you to fight them there". Lee obliged them)

Wrong. On the first day of the battle, he sent an order to Richard Ewell to take the high hills (the Round Tops) but qualified it with the phrase "if practicable". Lee was used to Jackson taking decisive action at any opportunity and expected that Ewell, who then had Jackson's corps, would follow through in like manner. But Ewell, new to command, decided otherwise and because of Lee's qualifier there wasn't any way to force him to take action.

Lee was obstinant in staying in for the fight after the troops had already been engaged and did so in large measure because he wanted to preserve the morale of his army by not retreating. It would have been better had he taken Longstreet's advice and swung around to the south of the town to force Meade to come out after him. Gettysburg is perhaps Lee's one real mistake in his career as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia.

BTW, it was Cemetary Ridge. The position commanded by the Round Tops.

Still, he shouldn't have invaded in the first place without a clearly defined objective, which I don't think he had. Of course, the southern cause was further hampered by their utter incompetancy in the West...

Lee had a very definite strategic objective to his 1863 invasion: to interpose his army between the north and the Federal capitol, forcing the Army of the Potomoc to withdraw from Virginia to meet this new threat and march to its destruction upon a battlefield of Lee's choosing. With this accomplished and Washington surrounded by Confederate armies, Lee was then to deliver a letter to Abraham Lincoln proposing peace on terms of the recognition of the South's independence. Gettysburg was not Lee's choice: the battle started by accident when Henry Heth's division ran into John Buford's cavalry who weren't expected to be in the town. Lee was very much disserved by the lack of information as a result of Jeb Stuart's glory-hunting ride all over the Pennsylvania countryside to make up for a humiliation when his cavalry were surprised by a Federal attack two weeks earlier which resulted in a much-publicised retreat.

[HemlockGrey]

Lee had a very definite strategic objective to his 1863 invasion: to interpose his army between the north and the Federal capitol, forcing the Army of the Potomoc to withdraw from Virginia to meet this new threat and march to its destruction upon a battlefield of Lee's choosing. With this accomplished and Washington surrounded by Confederate armies, Lee was then to deliver a letter to Abraham Lincoln proposing peace on terms of the recognition of the South's independence.

So his objective is essentially to destroy the Union army and take Washington. But this fails on a strategic level because if the Army of the Potomoc is destroyed, the Union still has the manpower and industrial capacity to simply build another one, Vicksburg still falls, the Confederacy is still cut in half, and unless Lee somehow manages to wipe out the AoP without taking heavy casualties he's basically fucked.

The idea that a single, decisive battle could end a war was obselete and he failed to realize this. The destruction of the Army of Potomoc, even if it could have been pulled off, would merely have depleted his forces and prolonged the Confederacy's life for maybe another year. The British aren't going to recognize a slaveowning Confederacy that's blockaded, divided, and totally outgunned and Lee has no way of forcing the North to it's knees. The invasion of the North could only have ended in the hastening of his ultimate defeat.

[phongn]

Degan, could he have forced the AOP out from whatever defensive emplacement it was at to its destruction? I'm not so sure about that. If entangled (say, from the taking of the Little Round Top), could Meade have retreated back to the Pipe Creek Line and awaited Lee?

[Z-Ha-Dum]

Admiral Yi Sun Sin of Korea - One of the most brilliant admirals in Asian history. Created one of the first ironclads and devastated Toyotomi Hideyoshi's navy. A one of a kind leader, the Korean King was forced to call him back into service to fight the Japanese after he was discarded due to political intrigue.

Shih Huang Ti - First emperor of China and founder of the Ch'in Dynasty. Through military ruthlessness he unified the 7 kingdoms of China's warring states.

Huo Qubing - Brillian general during the reign of Han Wudi. Modernized the Han army. He initiated and led China's military victories against the Huns.

[Patrick Degan]

Degan, could he have forced the AOP out from whatever defensive emplacement it was at to its destruction? I'm not so sure about that. If entangled (say, from the taking of the Little Round Top), could Meade have retreated back to the Pipe Creek Line and awaited Lee?

You have to recall how easily the Lincoln cabinet could be panicked by anything which hinted at a threat to Washington. There was every expectation that Meade would have been ordered to intercept Lee at all costs. Meade also was fairly new to command and cautious; not the type to take the initiative on his own, as his failure to pursue and destroy the Army of Northern Virginia when it was at its weakest following the battle demonstrates.

As long as Lee was continuing toward Washington and moving in such manner as threatened to interpose between the city and the Federals, Meade would have been compelled to go wherever Lee might have gone. That was Longstreet's thinking at any rate.

[Straha]

I dunno about Lee. Sure, he crushed a succession of incompetant Union generals but once he started his grand invasion and started facing competant commanders everything went rather rapidly downhill.

Not quite. Lee would have won at Gettysburg had Richard Ewell acted to seize the Round Tops on the first day of the battle. Stonewall Jackson would have, but he of course was killed at Chancellorsville. And without command of those heights, the battle's outcome was foreordained.

My problem with Lee was that he was a one trick horse. Divide the forces, and attack. Divide, attack, divide, attack. While he won big at times, he never really did anything that was especially brilliant or stunning.

[Patrick Degan]

Lee had a very definite strategic objective to his 1863 invasion: to interpose his army between the north and the Federal capitol, forcing the Army of the Potomoc to withdraw from Virginia to meet this new threat and march to its destruction upon a battlefield of Lee's choosing. With this accomplished and Washington surrounded by Confederate armies, Lee was then to deliver a letter to Abraham Lincoln proposing peace on terms of the recognition of the South's independence.

So his objective is essentially to destroy the Union army and take Washington. But this fails on a strategic level because if the Army of the Potomoc is destroyed, the Union still has the manpower and industrial capacity to simply build another one, Vicksburg still falls, the Confederacy is still cut in half, and unless Lee somehow manages to wipe out the AoP without taking heavy casualties he's basically fucked.

The idea that a single, decisive battle could end a war was obselete and he failed to realize this. The destruction of the Army of Potomoc, even if it could have been pulled off, would merely have depleted his forces and prolonged the Confederacy's life for maybe another year. The British aren't going to recognize a slaveowning Confederacy that's blockaded, divided, and totally outgunned and Lee has no way of forcing the North to it's knees. The invasion of the North could only have ended in the hastening of his ultimate defeat.

No it wasn't. Lee's objective was not to take Washington but isolate it from the rest of the Union and thereby play on the politics of the situation. There was very strong antiwar sentiment up North, and if Washington could be isolated, it would at that time have been the clear signal that Lincoln's war effort was a failure. And while England still might not have recognised a slaveowning Confederacy, Louis Napoleon of France might have, and the spectre of France offering to mediate the conflict would have added to the pressure on the Lincoln government to find a political solution to the war.

[Sarevok]

The 100 or so Spartans that held off the Persian army (about a million soldiers IIRC) for days. They fought to the death and took thousands of Persians with them

IIRC the Spartans numbered about 300.

[Exmoor Cat]

I nominate the following -
General Sir John Moore, whose leadership formed the British Light Infantry Regiments and also the 95th Rifles. He revolutionised British infantry warfare, and was also a damned good commander in the field. The defence of Corunna was a masterful fighting retreat, allowing the bulk of the british army to eascape Napoleon's troops. If he had not been killed in the battle, it is likely that Wellington - my second nomination - would not have gained the prominence he did.

A little earlier I also nominate Marechal de Saxe, for creating some of the best tactics ever - witness his defeat of the Anglo-Hanovarian-Dutch at Fontenoy; And the Duke of Marlborough fr his blinding campaigns in Germany.

Sir Ralph Hopton, Royalist general in the West, for consistently trouncing successive Parliamentarians until the New Model Army swept in to clear out the shattered remains.

For naval commanders, I go with Sir Sidney Smith, for stopping Naploeon at Acre.

[HemlockGrey]

No it wasn't. Lee's objective was not to take Washington but isolate it from the rest of the Union and thereby play on the politics of the situation. There was very strong antiwar sentiment up North, and if Washington could be isolated, it would at that time have been the clear signal that Lincoln's war effort was a failure. And while England still might not have recognised a slaveowning Confederacy, Louis Napoleon of France might have, and the spectre of France offering to mediate the conflict would have added to the pressure on the Lincoln government to find a political solution to the war.

Napoleon III offered to mediate during the takeover of Mexico, was refused, and did not intervene. Sure, it was after a Confederate defeat at Gettysburg, but, militarily, a victory over the Army of the Potomoc, as indicated above, does not put the Confederacy in anything approaching a solvent military situation.

Playing on the political situation strikes me as a dangerous gamble, because it assumes Lee is able to annhilate the Army of the Potomoc while keeping his army in working order and secure peace fast enough, which Lincoln will never consent to unless forced, so that the Union simply doesn't send another army and drive him back into Virginia.

[Lonestar]

Wrong. On the first day of the battle, he sent an order to Richard Ewell to take the high hills (the Round Tops) but qualified it with the phrase "if practicable". Lee was used to Jackson taking decisive action at any opportunity and expected that Ewell, who then had Jackson's corps, would follow through in like manner. But Ewell, new to command, decided otherwise and because of Lee's qualifier there wasn't any way to force him to take action.

There was nothing in what I said that disagrees with that descirption of the battle. Now, following the AoNV's failure to occupy the high ground, Lee chose to go ahead and charge Cemetary Ridge. This was with a complete disregard for the lessons learned at Fredericksburg (i.e. "Charging across an open field up a ridge = dead chargers"). Lee's most spectacular victory of the War, Chanchellorsville, came soley becaus e he listened to Jackson's recommendation to split the army. Every other battle from there 0on out it was mass against mass....and the North had many more bodies to spare.

Lee was obstinant in staying in for the fight after the troops had already been engaged and did so in large measure because he wanted to preserve the morale of his army by not retreating. It would have been better had he taken Longstreet's advice and swung around to the south of the town to force Meade to come out after him. Gettysburg is perhaps Lee's one real mistake in his career as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia.

Lee made mistakes all the time. Everyone makes mistakes. That isn't a problem in of itself. Lee's problem was that he made a massive Clusterfuck of one. Instead of doing to smart thing, backing away and isolating DC on Ground of his choosing, he chose to charge.

BTW, it was Cemetary Ridge. The position commanded by the Round Tops.

You're probably right. For some reason I'm think Seminary Ridge. I think I'm associating it with a nearby ridge in Gettysburg.

[Patrick Degan]

No it wasn't. Lee's objective was not to take Washington but isolate it from the rest of the Union and thereby play on the politics of the situation. There was very strong antiwar sentiment up North, and if Washington could be isolated, it would at that time have been the clear signal that Lincoln's war effort was a failure. And while England still might not have recognised a slaveowning Confederacy, Louis Napoleon of France might have, and the spectre of France offering to mediate the conflict would have added to the pressure on the Lincoln government to find a political solution to the war.

Napoleon III offered to mediate during the takeover of Mexico, was refused, and did not intervene. Sure, it was after a Confederate defeat at Gettysburg, but, militarily, a victory over the Army of the Potomoc, as indicated above, does not put the Confederacy in anything approaching a solvent military situation.

But it puts Lincoln in a very precarious political situation and it puts the Confederacy in a position of advantage where the Union is weakest.

Playing on the political situation strikes me as a dangerous gamble, because it assumes Lee is able to annhilate the Army of the Potomoc while keeping his army in working order and secure peace fast enough, which Lincoln will never consent to unless forced, so that the Union simply doesn't send another army and drive him back into Virginia.

And where is Lincoln going to get this extra army unless he recalls one from another theatre? Playing the political angle as the situation existed in 1863 is a reasonable gamble, given the unpopularity of the war with the Northern citizenry and the very vocal antiwar faction in Congress. And as for "keeping his army in working order", I'll remind you that Lee managed to do that for nine months at Petersburg with dwindling supplies and manpower and no reinforcements to relieve him in the winter of '65. At the time of Gettysburg, the Confederacy still has sufficent manpower and resources to match the Union in a defensive struggle.

[wautd]

The 100 or so Spartans that held off the Persian army (about a million soldiers IIRC) for days. They fought to the death and took thousands of Persians with them

Current research put the Persian Army at several hundred thousand not close to million!

I'm fairly sure current research puts the Persians at less then one hundred thousand acutally and the Spartans actual strength at several thousand rather then three hundred.

There has been a docu (made by BBC) not so long ago here about that battle. Im pretty sure they had more than 100 000

they used the same technique as in LOTR when they showed the army, was awesome

But, yes evilcat is probably right with the 300 spartans

[Patrick Degan]

Wrong. On the first day of the battle, he sent an order to Richard Ewell to take the high hills (the Round Tops) but qualified it with the phrase "if practicable". Lee was used to Jackson taking decisive action at any opportunity and expected that Ewell, who then had Jackson's corps, would follow through in like manner. But Ewell, new to command, decided otherwise and because of Lee's qualifier there wasn't any way to force him to take action.

There was nothing in what I said that disagrees with that descirption of the battle. Now, following the AoNV's failure to occupy the high ground, Lee chose to go ahead and charge Cemetary Ridge. This was with a complete disregard for the lessons learned at Fredericksburg (i.e. "Charging across an open field up a ridge = dead chargers"). Lee's most spectacular victory of the War, Chanchellorsville, came soley because he listened to Jackson's recommendation to split the army. Every other battle from there on out it was mass against mass....and the North had many more bodies to spare.

It was more that Lee and Jackson were a team. Lee trusted Jackson's tactical brilliance and aggression, and Jackson fully backed Lee's overall strategy. When the ANV's subsequent battles came down to "mass against mass", it was the time when Lee virtually had no other options available to him and had little to do with lacking Jackson or forgetting the lesson of Fredricksburg.

Lee was obstinant in staying in for the fight after the troops had already been engaged and did so in large measure because he wanted to preserve the morale of his army by not retreating. It would have been better had he taken Longstreet's advice and swung around to the south of the town to force Meade to come out after him. Gettysburg is perhaps Lee's one real mistake in his career as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia.

Lee made mistakes all the time. Everyone makes mistakes. That isn't a problem in of itself. Lee's problem was that he made a massive Clusterfuck of one. Instead of doing to smart thing, backing away and isolating DC on Ground of his choosing, he chose to charge.

Actually, Lee had divided his force. Jeb Stuart's calvary (10,000 strong) was intended to sweep in behind Cemetary Ridge and hit the Federal centre from that direction concurrent with Pickett's Charge. This didn't come off because Stuart was intercepted by David Gregg at the Rummel Farm and driven back. It might not have worked in any case, but Lee had something more complex than a simple direct assault.

Overall, however, he would have done better listening to Longstreet.

[phongn]

You have to recall how easily the Lincoln cabinet could be panicked by anything which hinted at a threat to Washington. There was every expectation that Meade would have been ordered to intercept Lee at all costs. Meade also was fairly new to command and cautious; not the type to take the initiative on his own, as his failure to pursue and destroy the Army of Northern Virginia when it was at its weakest following the battle demonstrates.

OTOH, if Meade stayed at (or retreated to) the Pipe Creek Line he would be in between Washington and Lee's ANV, protecting the city (and skittery cabinet members). Meade's cautiousness may well have ensured that he stayed at the Pipe Creek Line.

As for Meade's skittishness at pursuing the retreating ANV, was the AOP really in any shape to do so?

As long as Lee was continuing toward Washington and moving in such manner as threatened to interpose between the city and the Federals, Meade would have been compelled to go wherever Lee might have gone. That was Longstreet's thinking at any rate.

Could not have Meade attempt to interpose himself between the ANV and Washington rather than go all-out on the attack?

[CDiehl]

I'd pick Julius Caesar, for his victory at Alesia. Stuck between the city and a huge relief army, and outnumbered 5 to 1, he beat both armies and took the city.

[Patrick Degan]

You have to recall how easily the Lincoln cabinet could be panicked by anything which hinted at a threat to Washington. There was every expectation that Meade would have been ordered to intercept Lee at all costs. Meade also was fairly new to command and cautious; not the type to take the initiative on his own, as his failure to pursue and destroy the Army of Northern Virginia when it was at its weakest following the battle demonstrates.

OTOH, if Meade stayed at (or retreated to) the Pipe Creek Line he would be in between Washington and Lee's ANV, protecting the city (and skittery cabinet members). Meade's cautiousness may well have ensured that he stayed at the Pipe Creek Line.

He would have done far better to have stayed at Pipe Creek as originally planned. By the time both armies were engaged at Gettysburg, it was too late for Meade to fall back in hopes of outracing Lee, particularly with his army already defensively entrenched.

As for Meade's skittishness at pursuing the retreating ANV, was the AOP really in any shape to do so?

They were certainly in far better condition than the ANV, which had two divisions broken in the fighting on July 2 and 3 and was in a disorganised retreat going to the Potomoc River. Swift action, such as Sherman might have initiated, would have caught Lee at his weakest. The ANV would never have stood a chance.

As long as Lee was continuing toward Washington and moving in such manner as threatened to interpose between the city and the Federals, Meade would have been compelled to go wherever Lee might have gone. That was Longstreet's thinking at any rate.

Could not have Meade attempt to interpose himself between the ANV and Washington rather than go all-out on the attack?

That's why he should have stuck to the Pipe Creek plan in the first place.

[Mayabird]

But, yes evilcat is probably right with the 300 spartans

I've heard 300 also, but I remember also reading that it was 300 Spartans plus some random allies that stuck around. Regardless, IIRC they kicked ass in hand-to-hand fighting and only fell after the Persians shot massive volleys of arrows and spears at them.