SAC PAL code During the Cold War: 00000000
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SAC PAL code During the Cold War: 00000000
You cannot make this shit up
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Last month I asked Robert McNamara, the secretary of defense during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, what he believed back in the 1960s was the status of technical locks on the Minuteman intercontinental missiles. These long-range nuclear-tipped missiles first came on line during the Cuban missile crisis and grew to a force of 1,000 during the McNamara years — the backbone of the U.S. strategic deterrent through the late 1960s. McNamara replied, in his trade-mark, assertively confident manner that he personally saw to it that these special locks (known to wonks as “Permissive Action Links”) were installed on the Minuteman force, and that he regarded them as essential to strict central control and preventing unauthorized launch.
When the history of the nuclear cold war is finally comprehensively written, this McNamara vignette will be one of a long litany of items pointing to the ignorance of presidents and defense secretaries and other nuclear security officials about the true state of nuclear affairs during their time in the saddle. What I then told McNamara about his vitally important locks elicited this response: “I am shocked, absolutely shocked and outraged. Who the hell authorized that?” What he had just learned from me was that the locks had been installed, but everyone knew the combination.
The Strategic Air Command (SAC) in Omaha quietly decided to set the “locks” to all zeros in order to circumvent this safeguard. During the early to mid-1970s, during my stint as a Minuteman launch officer, they still had not been changed. Our launch checklist in fact instructed us, the firing crew, to double-check the locking panel in our underground launch bunker to ensure that no digits other than zero had been inadvertently dialed into the panel. SAC remained far less concerned about unauthorized launches than about the potential of these safeguards to interfere with the implementation of wartime launch orders. And so the “secret unlock code” during the height of the nuclear crises of the Cold War remained constant at OOOOOOOO.
After leaving the Air Force in 1974, I pressed the service, initially by letters addressed to it and then through congressional intermediaries, to consider a range of terrorist scenarios in which these locks could serve as crucial barriers against the unauthorized seizure of launch control over Minuteman missiles. In 1977, I co-authored (with Garry Brewer) an article (reprinted below) entitled “The Terrorist Threat to World Nuclear Programs” in which I laid out the case for taking this threat more seriously and suggesting remedial measures including, first and foremost, activating those McNamara locks that apparently he and presidents presumed had already been activated.
The locks were activated in 1977.
It is hard to know where to begin, and end, in recounting stories like this one that reveal how misinformed, misled, and misguided on critical nuclear matters our top leaders have been throughout the nuclear age.
http://www.cdi.org/blair/permissive-action-links.cfm
Last month I asked Robert McNamara, the secretary of defense during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, what he believed back in the 1960s was the status of technical locks on the Minuteman intercontinental missiles. These long-range nuclear-tipped missiles first came on line during the Cuban missile crisis and grew to a force of 1,000 during the McNamara years — the backbone of the U.S. strategic deterrent through the late 1960s. McNamara replied, in his trade-mark, assertively confident manner that he personally saw to it that these special locks (known to wonks as “Permissive Action Links”) were installed on the Minuteman force, and that he regarded them as essential to strict central control and preventing unauthorized launch.
When the history of the nuclear cold war is finally comprehensively written, this McNamara vignette will be one of a long litany of items pointing to the ignorance of presidents and defense secretaries and other nuclear security officials about the true state of nuclear affairs during their time in the saddle. What I then told McNamara about his vitally important locks elicited this response: “I am shocked, absolutely shocked and outraged. Who the hell authorized that?” What he had just learned from me was that the locks had been installed, but everyone knew the combination.
The Strategic Air Command (SAC) in Omaha quietly decided to set the “locks” to all zeros in order to circumvent this safeguard. During the early to mid-1970s, during my stint as a Minuteman launch officer, they still had not been changed. Our launch checklist in fact instructed us, the firing crew, to double-check the locking panel in our underground launch bunker to ensure that no digits other than zero had been inadvertently dialed into the panel. SAC remained far less concerned about unauthorized launches than about the potential of these safeguards to interfere with the implementation of wartime launch orders. And so the “secret unlock code” during the height of the nuclear crises of the Cold War remained constant at OOOOOOOO.
After leaving the Air Force in 1974, I pressed the service, initially by letters addressed to it and then through congressional intermediaries, to consider a range of terrorist scenarios in which these locks could serve as crucial barriers against the unauthorized seizure of launch control over Minuteman missiles. In 1977, I co-authored (with Garry Brewer) an article (reprinted below) entitled “The Terrorist Threat to World Nuclear Programs” in which I laid out the case for taking this threat more seriously and suggesting remedial measures including, first and foremost, activating those McNamara locks that apparently he and presidents presumed had already been activated.
The locks were activated in 1977.
It is hard to know where to begin, and end, in recounting stories like this one that reveal how misinformed, misled, and misguided on critical nuclear matters our top leaders have been throughout the nuclear age.
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The more security, the less efficiency...
But all-zeros? For every silo? Would it kill them to invent and memorize at least one set of codes per missile field?
As for no accidents happening, I didn't have any security measures on my old computer, and nothing really bad ever happened. Therefore, Security Measures are useless. They are equally useless if my computer may just have to control the lives of 100,000 people, and a guy with the code might just kill them using my computer.
Not using security because that technology does not exist is different from not using it because you are lazy.
The only merit in all this is that assuming it doesn't leak out, any person that doesn't know the secret and wants to launch a missile for whatever reason will never guess SAC used such an imbecilic password.
As for no accidents happening, I didn't have any security measures on my old computer, and nothing really bad ever happened. Therefore, Security Measures are useless. They are equally useless if my computer may just have to control the lives of 100,000 people, and a guy with the code might just kill them using my computer.
Not using security because that technology does not exist is different from not using it because you are lazy.
The only merit in all this is that assuming it doesn't leak out, any person that doesn't know the secret and wants to launch a missile for whatever reason will never guess SAC used such an imbecilic password.
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I can see the disbelieving Brezhnev now:JME2 wrote:Heh. Spaceballs says it all:
That's the stupidest combination I've ever heard in my life! The kind of thing an idiot would have on his luggage!
...and somebody change the combination on my luggage!
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Re: The more security, the less efficiency...
IIRC, the logic was that neither side would dare do anything that might make one side so nervous as to go on an alert where nukes might be deployed. 'Twas too dangerous when someone could press a button and fire a nuclear artillery shell (as was the case in the '50s).Kazuaki Shimazaki wrote:But all-zeros? For every silo? Would it kill them to invent and memorize at least one set of codes per missile field?
As for no accidents happening, I didn't have any security measures on my old computer, and nothing really bad ever happened. Therefore, Security Measures are useless. They are equally useless if my computer may just have to control the lives of 100,000 people, and a guy with the code might just kill them using my computer.
What good would it do them if they did know the PAL? It would do them more harm then good if they managed to somehow get on the US nuclear command and control network and tell everyone to punch in straight-zero on their systems to activate the warheads.JME2 wrote:On a more serious note, I am amazed that the Russians never seriously thought that this might actually be the code.
They could have accessed them, launched them at some politcally non-aligned country or a country that the U.S. had failed to stop communism from spreading. They would blame it on the U.S. and say that this was capitalisim's response to a Communist victory. True, you've got a radiation problem, but at least you've got a chance to turn world favor against the U.S.phongn wrote:What good would it do them if they did know the PAL? It would do them more harm then good if they managed to somehow get on the US nuclear command and control network and tell everyone to punch in straight-zero on their systems to activate the warheads.JME2 wrote:On a more serious note, I am amazed that the Russians never seriously thought that this might actually be the code.
JME2 wrote:They could have accessed them, launched them at some politcally non-aligned country or a country that the U.S. had failed to stop communism from spreading. They would blame it on the U.S. and say that this was capitalisim's response to a Communist victory. True, you've got a radiation problem, but at least you've got a chance to turn world favor against the U.S.
That would have almost certainly triggered a massive nuclear war between the major power blocks -- more or less meaning the destruction of the USSR (and the USA, Europe, China, etc. etc.)
Eh and letting the roaches take over. Alright, I concede that this information, while ingenious in its sinplicity, was of no real value to the Soviets or anyone else in the government - unless you actually wanted a nuclear winter...phongn wrote:JME2 wrote:They could have accessed them, launched them at some politcally non-aligned country or a country that the U.S. had failed to stop communism from spreading. They would blame it on the U.S. and say that this was capitalisim's response to a Communist victory. True, you've got a radiation problem, but at least you've got a chance to turn world favor against the U.S.
That would have almost certainly triggered a massive nuclear war between the major power blocks -- more or less meaning the destruction of the USSR (and the USA, Europe, China, etc. etc.)
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If they could launch the rockets, they might try to launch one missile at Denver or Washington or some other city. The resulting turmoil just can't be good for the US economy.phongn wrote:What good would it do them if they did know the PAL? It would do them more harm then good if they managed to somehow get on the US nuclear command and control network and tell everyone to punch in straight-zero on their systems to activate the warheads.JME2 wrote:On a more serious note, I am amazed that the Russians never seriously thought that this might actually be the code.
Since they only launched one missile, and the US can see it is one of theirs on the surveillance system, that should prohibit any massive retaliation. Positive evidence would be hard to come by in that era that the Russians did it.
Even if they eventually figured that it was the Russians for sure, I wonder whether they would say to the whole world one of the major reasons the Russians did it so easily was that their PAL code was 000.
They'd recover, but the judicious use of this might just set the US back a few years, allowing the USSR to catch up.
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Re: The more security, the less efficiency...
That was the same logic behind the infamous Plan R...phongn wrote: IIRC, the logic was that neither side would dare do anything that might make one side so nervous as to go on an alert where nukes might be deployed. 'Twas too dangerous when someone could press a button and fire a nuclear artillery shell (as was the case in the '50s).
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Re: The more security, the less efficiency...
But...we have to protect the purity of our fluids!The Kernel wrote: That was the same logic behind the infamous Plan R...
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Well... I don't think it's fair to condemn the whole programme because of a single slip up.The Kernel wrote:That was the same logic behind the infamous Plan R...phongn wrote: IIRC, the logic was that neither side would dare do anything that might make one side so nervous as to go on an alert where nukes might be deployed. 'Twas too dangerous when someone could press a button and fire a nuclear artillery shell (as was the case in the '50s).
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Not really- The USSR dosen't have to counterstrike on behalf of a minor communist nation. They could simply sitback and take the moral high ground.phongn wrote:JME2 wrote:They could have accessed them, launched them at some politcally non-aligned country or a country that the U.S. had failed to stop communism from spreading. They would blame it on the U.S. and say that this was capitalisim's response to a Communist victory. True, you've got a radiation problem, but at least you've got a chance to turn world favor against the U.S.
That would have almost certainly triggered a massive nuclear war between the major power blocks -- more or less meaning the destruction of the USSR (and the USA, Europe, China, etc. etc.)
As for the claim that the USSR could "catch up" to the USA if it used a US missle to destroy a US city (and got away with it)- its absolutly rediculous.
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OTOH, the US might see a nuclear launch against a WARPAC ally and think "oh shit" -- remember, they don't know that this is a dastardly Soviet plan -- and launch the remainder of their arsenal. There are too many things to go wrong to play games like this.BlkbrryTheGreat wrote:Not really- The USSR dosen't have to counterstrike on behalf of a minor communist nation. They could simply sitback and take the moral high ground.
IIRC, the USAF never implemented an "attack unless recalled" plan for their bombers; too dangerous to do that. And referring to a movie is hardly a useful attack against the actual attack plan! The missiles are another issue (can't recall them), but even in the pre-PAL days (for the Titan and Atlas ICBMs) I find it extraordinarily unlikely that such a launch order would execute.The Kernel wrote:That was the same logic behind the infamous Plan R...
No, but I don't think Denver or Washington are within the ability of the US ICBMs to hit. Furthermore, even if you did have the PALs you don't neccessarily have the knowledge about how to reprogram their launch coordinates.Kazuaki Shimazaki wrote:If they could launch the rockets, they might try to launch one missile at Denver or Washington or some other city. The resulting turmoil just can't be good for the US economy.
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