First Mid-Course Interceptor Emplaced

[Vympel]

I wouldn't put any stock in recent tests, Ma Deuce. None of those tests have been remotely realistic.

Link

[MKSheppard]

I wouldn't put any stock in recent tests, Ma Deuce. None of those tests have been remotely realistic.

Those are the same guys who badmouth the Russian ABM system:

http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/m ... pageID=609

. The Moscow defense was unable to deal with countermeasures, such as decoys and chaff, and could be overwhelmed by US missiles armed with MIRV warheads, which were cheap compared to the cost of maintaining or expanding the defense system.

I think I'll take the word of Seer Stuart, when he says that in Polaris
Days, it took the entire British deterrent to be reliably assured of giving
Moscow the aforementioned dose of instant sunrise, over these guys.

[Vympel]

There's a clear emphasis in that article on the use of decoys; not to mention a vague seamless transition from talking about various iterations of the system. Regardless, their opinion on the Russian ABM system doesn't have any bearing on the lack of any combat realistic testing of the current US system. That's why I told Ma Deuce not to site those tests as reasoning.

[Crown]

Hmmm, NMD, a botemless money pit with no end in sight .. Yes please!*





*The above might be based on slightly subjective point of view due to the fact that I want a freakin' job already!

[Beowulf]

Cao Cao's insane raving's split and HoSed.

[Gandalf]

How long will this system last before it has to be replaced?

[Darth Wong]

I think I'll take the word of Seer Stuart, when he says that in Polaris Days, it took the entire British deterrent to be reliably assured of giving Moscow the aforementioned dose of instant sunrise, over these guys.

Keep in mind that when you're the one planning the offense, you have to be conservative. It doesn't necessarily mean that this was actually necessary; it means that given a lot of conservative assumptions that any good planner should use, he ended up needing that much to be sure of success anyway.

When you're planning the defense, it looks a lot different. What was "conservative" for the person planning the offense now becomes reckless for you.

[MKSheppard]

When you're planning the defense, it looks a lot different. What was "conservative" for the person planning the offense now becomes reckless for you.

That's why when you plan the defense, you do shoot-shoot-shoot-shoot-look.

I'd want a 10 to 1 difference in interceptors vs incoming ICBMs for a reliable defense,
but that's in the future, we just have to hope that the idiots in congress don't kill it.

Right now, that interceptor just introduced a big deal of uncertainity
for North Korea and China. It's very possible that one of your missiles
is not going to hit it's target due to it being shot down; probably a 30%
chance if you're pessimistic or a 60% chance if you're optimistic on
NMD.

For a country like Russia, that doesn't matter, as they still have enough
ICBMs so they don't care about it; but for countries like China, with just
14~ ICBMs capable of hitting the US West Coast, targeteering becomes
problematic, on top of the uncertainity involved in being assured of the
missile actually working and the RV actually hitting it's target when the
order goes out having dramatically increased. They can no longer cackle
insanely and place red Xes onto the map of the West Coast knowing that
the missile will hit it's target with exceptions of a malfunction.

Vympel; as for decoys, in order to actually put a decoy that'll fool the defenses
for any longer than a short period of time, you are going to have to delete
warheads from the Topol-M, instead of 4 you might have just 3 warheads
on the MIRV version of Topol-M.

When applied to the entire Topol-M force of say....270 missiles using that SWAG,
the Topol-M Force goes from 1,080 MIRVs to just 810 MIRVs, the equivalent of
90 Topol-Ms being shot down simply by NMD existing and having to counter it.

Virtual Attrition Baby!

[phongn]

That's why when you plan the defense, you do shoot-shoot-shoot-shoot-look.

IIRC, its SSLSS, still four interceptors per salvo.

I'd want a 10 to 1 difference in interceptors vs incoming ICBMs for a reliable defense, but that's in the future, we just have to hope that the idiots in congress don't kill it.

There are three ABM sites planned (Alaska, California and North Dakota); I'm wondering if there will be an emplacement near the East Coast as well.

For a country like Russia, that doesn't matter, as they still have enough
ICBMs so they don't care about it; but for countries like China, with just
14~ ICBMs capable of hitting the US West Coast, targeteering becomes
problematic, on top of the uncertainity involved in being assured of the
missile actually working and the RV actually hitting it's target when the
order goes out having dramatically increased. They can no longer cackle
insanely and place red Xes onto the map of the West Coast knowing that
the missile will hit it's target with exceptions of a malfunction.

Globalsecurity says they think China has 24 DF-5s with an unknown number MIRVed and most with unitary loadings.

When applied to the entire Topol-M force of say....270 missiles using that SWAG, the Topol-M Force goes from 1,080 MIRVs to just 810 MIRVs, the equivalent of90 Topol-Ms being shot down simply by NMD existing and having to counter it.

Well, 810 RVs still sucks to get hit with, but then again we don't even seem to be attempting to counter the Russian strategic arsenal so its a bit moot.

[RedImperator]

I think I'll take the word of Seer Stuart, when he says that in Polaris Days, it took the entire British deterrent to be reliably assured of giving Moscow the aforementioned dose of instant sunrise, over these guys.

Keep in mind that when you're the one planning the offense, you have to be conservative. It doesn't necessarily mean that this was actually necessary; it means that given a lot of conservative assumptions that any good planner should use, he ended up needing that much to be sure of success anyway.

When you're planning the defense, it looks a lot different. What was "conservative" for the person planning the offense now becomes reckless for you.

Doesn't matter. Half the point, maybe more than half the point, of missile defense is to screw up his plans. The Russian ABM system might have been a joke that could't shoot down a single incoming warhead (it wasn't and isn't, but hypothetically speaking), but it still forced the British to target their entire arsenal on one city until they spent the money and resources to upgrade their missiles and warheads. IIRC, the British deterrent at the time was 32 warheads, all on SLBMs. Without worrying about ABM, the British could have fired on 32 targets (fewer than that realistically because SLBMs aren't as accurate as ICBMs and missiles aren't 100% reliable in any case, so you have to duplicate targets no matter what). With ABM, the British were down to one. The Russian ABM system just saved anywhere between 1 and 31 targets without firing a shot. For all practical purposes, they just took the entire British strategic deterrent out of the equation, because Moscow was going to get pounded anyway. Same deal for France, less so for China but still a consideration because they're well back in third place.

That's virtual attrition, and other than shooting down one or two accidential launches or an attack from someone with a very small arsenal, that's what missile defense is for. Nobody expects to build a perfect missile shield, and the defense we're building now won't even put much of a dent in Russia's arsenal under the most optimistic projections of its performance, but countries with small arsenals can be badly eroded by even minimal defenses.

[Admiral Valdemar]

I remain unconvinced this system is anything more than a pork barrel for the aerospace industry hoping for another Star Wars project to line their pockets.

Of course, I may eat my words one day, but I'll likely be paved into the ground around me, glowing green and looking very much like glass by the time that day arrives.

At least the KKV is somewhat doable today, though not perfect. The original project called for railguns, orbital, land and submersible based radar and other detection and guidance methods and lasers, particle beams and even nukes.

I have far more faith in the ABL, but that's somewhat limited to a tactical mission, though a point-defence laser is far easier (relatively) to score a mission kill than "hitting a bullet with a bullet" as it were.

[phongn]

At least the KKV is somewhat doable today, though not perfect. The original project called for railguns, orbital, land and submersible based radar and other detection and guidance methods and lasers, particle beams and even nukes.

IIRC, NMD is nowhere near the scope that SDI proposed (or, for that matter, the Nike Zeus and Safeguard systems).

I have far more faith in the ABL, but that's somewhat limited to a tactical mission, though a point-defence laser is far easier (relatively) to score a mission kill than "hitting a bullet with a bullet" as it were.

If deployed to, say, the ROK, it can undertake a strategic mission and engage any DPRK ICBMs in the boost phase. We're also working on a boost-phase interceptor on land and sea to be forward deployed. That's not expected to reach testing until 2010, IIC.

[Ma Deuce]

Globalsecurity says they think China has 24 DF-5s with an unknown number MIRVed and most with unitary loadings.

Oh, they have 24 DF-5s, alright: It's just that not all of them are based within range of the US West Coast.

The PRC stations all of it's DF-5s at 3 bases: Luoning, Tongdao, and Xiao Qaidam: The first two bases are in Eastern China, and can hit the entire US West Coast. However, the third base (Xaio Quindam) is in the fucking middle of Tibet, and it's DF-5s cannot hit the US West Coast by virtue of being too far away (they could still hit Alaska or Hawaii, however).

FYI, it's believed that Xaio Quindam is home to at least 10 DF-5s.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

The most important thing about this system is that for the first time since 1976 we have the capability to shoot down an accidental launch. Even if it is capable of intercepting only a single missile at current based on the targeting plan of four interceptors to a missile, that provides a pad against an accidental launch, which I would argue is entirely worthwhile. Who the hell wants a nuclear war to get started by accident? The debate should really be about a larger system, not about the obvious concept of having a few interceptors around as an insurance against accidental launch. A pity Scoop Jackson wasn't elected President in the 70s.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

I have far more faith in the ABL, but that's somewhat limited to a tactical mission, though a point-defence laser is far easier (relatively) to score a mission kill than "hitting a bullet with a bullet" as it were.

That analogy isn't really accurate. Think of the facts--once you detect an ICBM, it follows a ballistic trajectory. Anyone with a basic knowledge of math can figure out where it's going to be a set time after launch with some really simply observational data available for satellites overlooking the launch site. The problem is just getting the interceptor to a place where you know the warhead will end up. Decoys must have the same ballistic characteristics as the real warheads or else they can be discounted and ignored, which begs the question of why not just add more warheads in the first place.

The system is obviously not as effective as Nike-Zeus, which could have killed an ICBM even if it had a CEP of 5mi thanks to the nuclear warhead it carried, but it's still quite capable of intercepting a missile within a reasonable margin of probability. Direct kinetic-kill intercepts were made of IRBMs by the HAWK system and a Nike-Hercules even k-killed another Nike-Hercules which was on a powered descent (to simulate a terminal stage ICBM).

[The Duchess of Zeon]

NOTE: Yes, I know that bullets also follow ballistic trajectories, making it superficially appropriate, but the difference is that an ICBM is a much larger target following a much longer trajectory--giving you much more time to run all the necessary computations for the intercept.

[phongn]

The problem is just getting the interceptor to a place where you know the warhead will end up. Decoys must have the same ballistic characteristics as the real warheads or else they can be discounted and ignored, which begs the question of why not just add more warheads in the first place.

Well, that isn't cheap to do, esp if you have "must kill" hard targets instead of "should kill" targets like cities. More RVs means more missiles, more silos and whatnot.

Direct kinetic-kill intercepts were made of IRBMs by the HAWK system and a Nike-Hercules even k-killed another Nike-Hercules which was on a powered descent (to simulate a terminal stage ICBM).

Nike Zeus made a kinetic kill in 1960. IIRC, Hercules was not considered effective as an ABM even with its performance and nuclear warhead.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Nike Zeus made a kinetic kill in 1960. IIRC, Hercules was not considered effective as an ABM even with its performance and nuclear warhead.

I believe it was referred to as "marginal" sort of like some Soviet anti-aircraft missiles that came out later. With the nuclear warhead it had a reasonable chance of killing an early pre-MIRV ICBM if fired in sufficient quantities.

[phongn]

I believe it was referred to as "marginal" sort of like some Soviet anti-aircraft missiles that came out later. With the nuclear warhead it had a reasonable chance of killing an early pre-MIRV ICBM if fired in sufficient quantities.

The early ICBMs had subsonic reentry profiles as well, so that doesn't really give me the most confidence in them