Bugsby wrote:1. If moral imperatives are hypothetical, then Hume's Law carries all the weight in the word. If it's a hypothesis, it needs to be proven.
You misunderstand. Suppose a psychopath points a gun at you and tells you that if you will be shot unless you act like a chicken for the next minute. Do you have a reason to act to comply because of the possible outcome of your refusal? That's what hypothetical means: it is embodied in the conditional "if I do not comply, I will be shot." Categorical ethics are unconditional.
Bugsby wrote:And to prove it, we need to use logic. Hume's Law is a law of logic.
As in the previous post, some things must be taken as axiomatic. There's no escaping it. Even infinitist theories of truth make certain assumptions, and they are devised specifically to deal with this very problem.
Bugsby wrote:I don't care what weight you think "ought" might or might not carry. The weight of "ought" in ethics is pretty rigid. It needs to be weighty enough to bind our actions to a certain course. Are you suggesting that because hypothetical ethics doesn't revolve around the idea of a categorical imperative, then it should have no influence on our actions? That sounds like a pretty untenable position to me.
You misunderstand my position. In consequentialist ethics, "I ought to do X" needs to only to be interpreted as "I have a reason to do X". No more, no less. Consequentialism needs only to posit that people have a reason to do what will achieve their desires, which seems straightforward enough, even if not deductively provable. 'Ought' does not need to carry any more cognitive content than that in consequentialism.
Bugsby wrote:Ethics are laws that govern behavior. To suggest that ethics with a hypothetical formulation have no weight demeans that branch of ethics. If you really do want to do that.... well, that's another discussion altogether.
In this discussion thus far, I've attempted to stay completely neutral as to whether ethics [are/should be/must be/...] hypothetical or categorical. My purpose in the above is to simply explore how different views of ethics might deal with Hume's Law.
Bugsby wrote:2. It seems you are a fan of the categorical imperative. I have yet to hear a convincing argument as to what this categorical imperative is. If you can give one to me, by all means, proceed. I agree that there should be no "conflict of maxims," but I don't see how a "immoral act" has a direct conflict of maxims. Kant says "there is a conflict," but he kind of mumbles when it comes to pointing out what that conflict is.
Kant's starting point is the axiom that a good will (roughly, the decision-making capability of the mind) is the only intrinsically good thing. This is because there is no other attribute or possession of a sapient being that is good if controlled by a will set towards evil. It is the thing that has absolute value, not relative to the fulfillment of some goal, or any other thing.
I can will a lot of things, as mundane as raising my arm, and even those that are not consistent with each other (or even themselves), or are impossible due to external constraints. E.g., if I will that I be in London in an hour, this volition is inconsistent because I there is no existing method of transportation available to me that will achive that.
In consequentialist ethics, what decides the morality of an action is its consequences. In deontological ethics, the key issue is intent, or more precisely
motive. As such, we are required to actually think about
why we are doing the action. Kant's own example may illustrate this. Suppose there two shopkeepers, and after some reflection, both resolve to always give their customers the correct change. The first does this because he thinks a reputation of honesty will give him more business. The second does so because he decides that cheating is morally wrong. The two generalized maxims are:
1. Whenever anyone can promote their business by giving the correct change, he or she should give the correct change.
2. Whenever anyone can perform a moral action by giving the correct change, he or she should give the correct change.
Their only difference is motive, which is what decides whether or not they are moral. There is some contention, however, whether [1] is actually immoral or simply amoral. I favor the latter interpretation.
Bugsby wrote:He also fails to say what maxim it is in every human being that will conflict with an immoral act. Or, more accurately, he fails to say how he knows that within every human being there is a fundamentally held maxim that will contradict any immoral act. Maybe my professor was just really bad at explaining this to me. So here's your shot. What the HELL is Kant talking about?
Very well. The categorical imperative is simply this:
act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that should be come a universal law; i.e., an act is morally right only if its maxim is universalizable. For example (another one of Kant's), consider question whether it is acceptable to make promises one has no intention of keeping. By definition, a promise is an assurance that a particular act will be done in the future. This action's maxim is therefore inconsistent, since if it is universalized, there will no longer be any such assurance. Therefore, it cannot be moral to make false promises.
Another example: can a person commit deliberate suicide? This volition removes the will, the very capability that enabled it, which is inconsistency on one level, but, more importantly, inconsistency with the primary principle that the will has absolute value.