Logic AS morality.

[Kuroneko]

Look, you silly ethics professors, you. Hume's Law (or the naturalist falacy - whatever) is set in stone. It's true. It's fact. And what do you do when a fact conflicts with your theory? Multiple choice:
a) change the theory
b) stubbornly stick to the old theory and insist that the fact just doesn't apply to you.

Time's up! If you said b), you are a moron.

Let me briefly reiterate my previous post, which you've ignored:
1. If moral imperatives are hypothetical, then Hume's Law is easily bypassed by a slight reformulation of ethics. Here, 'ought' does need as much baggage as it does in deontological ethics, hence we can re-interpret such statements in a consistent and meaningful fashion.
2. If moral imperatives are categorical, then Hume's Law is irrelevant to ethics, as such moral imperatives would be a priori. Quite simply, descriptive premises would be completely unnecessary for ethics.

Boyish-Tigerlily, I reccomend that you hit your professor just as hard as she is hitting you when you get to an analysis of "objective ethics."

It becomes clear to me now: you have no clue whatsoever what "objective" means in ethics. You seem to be under the delusion that it has something to do with the formulation or argumentative support of an ethical theory. This may come as a revelation, but the same words can mean different things in different fields of study. The real criterion is quite simply: any ethical theory that contains an absolute moral principle (and here, 'absolute' means not relative to some person or group of persons) is objective.

Ask for a valid logcial argument (premises lead to conclusion) for any statement. Shoot down any appeals to intution. "So do you really believe that..." has no place in a logical argument. Ask for the normative premise necessary to support a normative conclusion. If the professor makes a normative conclusion without any normative premises, the argument is invalid. And if the professor provides a normative premise, ask how you know that one is true, using an argument that includes a normative premise. YOUR PROFESSOR WILL NOT BE ABLE TO BACK HERSELF UP.

Congrutulations, you have discovered that absolutely any premiss can be reasonably questioned by any halfway competent skeptic. The initial premiss(es) of any ethical system is (are) axiomatic, possibly excepting those supported by compatible metaphysics (though that really just moves the issue out of the ethical domain into another). The supporting arguments for those axioms are inductive at best (if they are given at all), and it never was or ever will be otherwise. Your expectations lead to nothing but solipsism, altough a truly competent speaker can even question whether cogito ergo sum is even an inference.

[Kuroneko]

I think that the tendency to describe ethical systems' recommendations as "right and wrong" is the root cause of many misconceptions about ethics. What does it mean for something to be absolutely "right"? Does it mean it's correct, as opposed to being incorrect? If it's the correct answer, then what is the question?

The question is provided implicitly in the ethical system itself. For example, utilitarianism's question would be something along the lines "which alternative would achieve the maximization of happiness?"

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

I think the major difference between solipsism and ethics is that it is pretty easy to dismiss solipsism as legitimate because there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

There is considerable, reasonble evidence to support reality exists, but there is no such evidence of objective ethics. It's one word against someone else's word, and nothing to back it up factually.

2. If moral imperatives are categorical, then Hume's Law is irrelevant to ethics, as such moral imperatives would be a priori. Quite simply, descriptive premises would be completely unnecessary for ethics.

How can anyone prove that they are innate? That's like what Plato said; Knowlege is innate.

It becomes clear to me now: you have no clue whatsoever what "objective" means in ethics. You seem to be under the delusion that it has something to do with the formulation or argumentative support of an ethical theory.

I don't think he means that. I think he knows that Objective mean's a set of rules divorced from people's opinion. They are golden standards that come from somewhere, but the somewhere and proof of their existence cannot ever be proven.

Why choose objective ethics when you can choose subjective ethics. It just makes more sense? It's very confusig. At least there is reasonable visual evidence and experience for the latter.

[Kuroneko]

I think the major difference between solipsism and ethics is that it is pretty easy to dismiss solipsism as legitimate because there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

However, the nature of the evidence falls to precisely the same line of attack. Sooner or later, some things must be taken as axiomatic. Why single out ethics if even the laws of logic themselves are not immune to this?

2. If moral imperatives are categorical, then Hume's Law is irrelevant to ethics, as such moral imperatives would be a priori. Quite simply, descriptive premises would be completely unnecessary for ethics.

How can anyone prove that they are innate? That's like what Plato said; Knowlege is innate.

Thanks for reminding me: naturalist ethics are also immune to Hume's Law.

It becomes clear to me now: you have no clue whatsoever what "objective" means in ethics. You seem to be under the delusion that it has something to do with the formulation or argumentative support of an ethical theory.

I don't think he means that. I think he knows that Objective mean's a set of rules divorced from people's opinion. They are golden standards that come from somewhere, but the somewhere and proof of their existence cannot ever be proven.

I see that you share his insistence on equivocating that word. "Objective" as said of an ethical theory does not refer to the formulation or support of that theory. Objective ethics are simply those that contain [an] ethical principle(s) that are "divorced from people's opinion" in their content, not in the manner they are arrived at.

How someone can possibly insist on total objectivity in the sense you're using it is completely beyond me. Even something as trivial as "every natural number has a successor", long part of basic arithmetic, fails to satisfy your criterion for objectivity: how does one prove it? Answer: one doesn't; it's axiomatic.


Here Mr. Wong's stance is much more illuminating. One doesn't prove axioms, or even believe in the axioms "just because"... the best support for accepting an axiom are its logical consequences. From Mr. Wong's engineering perspective, the criterion is some sense of useful, while the mathematician's standpoint is some sense of interesting. Regardless, that is always based on intuition. Absolutely nothing is "objective" in the sense you're using it, not even logic itself.

Why choose objective ethics when you can choose subjective ethics. It just makes more sense? It's very confusig. At least there is reasonable visual evidence and experience for the latter.

I agree that you are very confused.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

However, the nature of the evidence falls to precisely the same line of attack. Sooner or later, some things must be taken as axiomatic. Why single out ethics if even the laws of logic themselves are not immune to this?

Difference is, you can reasonably assume the evidence gained in Epistomology is real and that what you are seeing/testing is real. There is no reason to assume it's fake, all in your head, or a trick. Ethics is nothing but an opinion, and there is no evidence to proove otherwise that can't be called opinion.

Thanks for reminding me: naturalist ethics are also immune to Hume's Law.

NOt according to most Ethicists. They say they are guilty of it. You are free to disagree, however.

see that you share his insistence on equivocating that word. "Objective" as said of an ethical theory does not refer to the formulation or support of that theory. Objective ethics are simply those that contain [an] ethical principle(s) that are "divorced from people's opinion" in their content, not in the manner they are arrived at.

No. That is exactly what I see Objective ethics as being. THey are absolute principles of what ought to be backed up by nothing.

How someone can possibly insist on total objectivity in the sense you're using it is completely beyond me.

I don't need total, absolute knowledge, but there is zero reason to believe these rules are comming down from some mystical realm or not created by the very people they are made to serve.

Even something as trivial as "every natural number has a successor", long part of basic arithmetic, fails to satisfy your criterion for objectivity: how does one prove it? Answer: one doesn't; it's axiomatic.

Those aren't subject to opinion, in my view, because you can use reasonable testing and rational thought to come to a good conclusion. You can't explain it away as an opinion. Logically, all natural numbers have a successor, since they are infinite. Whether or not it's right/wrong to wear white after labour day is arbitrary.

I agree that you are very confused.

I am confused on some issues, but I don't believe in Objective ethics. There is no reason to.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

Oh well. I appreciate your information on Kantian Ethics. It was pretty interesting. Do you recomend any good websites for further study?

[Bugsby]

Let me briefly reiterate my previous post, which you've ignored:
1. If moral imperatives are hypothetical, then Hume's Law is easily bypassed by a slight reformulation of ethics. Here, 'ought' does need as much baggage as it does in deontological ethics, hence we can re-interpret such statements in a consistent and meaningful fashion.
2. If moral imperatives are categorical, then Hume's Law is irrelevant to ethics, as such moral imperatives would be a priori. Quite simply, descriptive premises would be completely unnecessary for ethics.

I disagree thoroughly.
1. If moral imperatives are hypothetical, then Hume's Law carries all the weight in the word. If it's a hypothesis, it needs to be proven. And to prove it, we need to use logic. Hume's Law is a law of logic. I don't care what weight you think "ought" might or might not carry. The weight of "ought" in ethics is pretty rigid. It needs to be weighty enough to bind our actions to a certain course. Are you suggesting that because hypothetical ethics doesn't revolve around the idea of a categorical imperative, then it should have no influence on our actions? That sounds like a pretty untenable position to me. Ethics are laws that govern behavior. To suggest that ethics with a hypothetical formulation have no weight demeans that branch of ethics. If you really do want to do that.... well, that's another discussion altogether.
2. It seems you are a fan of the categorical imperative. I have yet to hear a convincing argument as to what this categorical imperative is. If you can give one to me, by all means, proceed. I agree that there should be no "conflict of maxims," but I don't see how a "immoral act" has a direct conflict of maxims. Kant says "there is a conflict," but he kind of mumbles when it comes to pointing out what that conflict is. He also fails to say what maxim it is in every human being that will conflict with an immoral act. Or, more accurately, he fails to say how he knows that within every human being there is a fundamentally held maxim that will contradict any immoral act. Maybe my professor was just really bad at explaining this to me. So here's your shot. What the HELL is Kant talking about?

It becomes clear to me now: you have no clue whatsoever what "objective" means in ethics. You seem to be under the delusion that it has something to do with the formulation or argumentative support of an ethical theory. This may come as a revelation, but the same words can mean different things in different fields of study. The real criterion is quite simply: any ethical theory that contains an absolute moral principle (and here, 'absolute' means not relative to some person or group of persons) is objective.

I know exactly what objective ethics means. That's why I put quotes around "objective ethics" every time I said it. Because I didn't like the term, but I was using what Boyish-Tigerlily gave me. Although I said "objective," every time I was using it as a substitue for "absolute." I know full well that words mean different things in different fields. Don't insult my intelligence. I know exactly what absolutist ethics is. Forgive me for asking it to give an answer to the basic ethical problems besides "that's what I think."

Congrutulations, you have discovered that absolutely any premiss can be reasonably questioned by any halfway competent skeptic. The initial premiss(es) of any ethical system is (are) axiomatic, possibly excepting those supported by compatible metaphysics (though that really just moves the issue out of the ethical domain into another). The supporting arguments for those axioms are inductive at best (if they are given at all), and it never was or ever will be otherwise.

I draw the line at questioning observations made by your senses. There could be an evil deceiver, but parsimony makes that not a matter for consideration. However, since there is no way to directly observe something moral, there is no way to make a moral obsertavion. Take this example: "The ball is big, and red, and round, and good." Seems a little off, right? Because "good" is not a sensation. It is an interpretation. Once you can show me a particle or wave that things emit that is picked up by sense organs, transmitted to your brain, and then interpreted as good, then I will consider "moral observations" accurate. As to them being axiomatic, that is just rediculous. Moral premises are taken for granted?? Why should they be? Because everyone believes them? Thats not a valid argument. That's appeal to public opinion, or something like that *vows to check falacy thread*. The only way that it would be true for these to be axiomatic is if there truly is a categorical imperative, and I have yet to hear your explanation of where the contradiction takes place. And yes, I did read Kant, and he wasn't very clear on the matter.

In addition, I find your statement that ethical statements will always be axiomatic and inductively determined a bit disturbing. In the best of times, with the clearest examples, inductive logic can only give a good idea of what the answer will be. Trying to apply it to the complicated matters of ethics are a step away from laughable. And saying that these axioms don't even need to be proven inductively? To me, that sounds a whole lot like "I can't prove it, so why try? Besides, it's better that way." Sure....

Your expectations lead to nothing but solipsism, altough a truly competent speaker can even question whether cogito ergo sum is even an inference.

No. I'm not talking about solipsism. Im talking about a legitimate inquiry into why we act the way we do. This inquiry leaves out abstract concepts like "categorical imperatives" and focuses on direct observations of interactions of human beings within society. I think this is a much more concrete way of examining the subject, because the observations are all empirical and thus true, unless you want to argue that there truly is an evil deceiver. While this inquiry might not yield deep, penetrating results as to what EXACTLY is the morally absolutly correct course of action to take in every case, I am more than content with it because it is based on FACT.

[Bugsby]

Kuroneko, I am looking forward to your own discription of Kantian ethics that will satisfy me. If you do provide suh a thing, please focus on how we know that there is a categorical imperative. Im looking over my Kant notes now, and his train of thought goes "there are categorical imperatives and hypothetical imperatives. Hypothetical imperatives are nothing more than means to an end, so the categorical imperative is the true moral law." This makes a whole lot of sense if you assume that there is some true moral law. I don't. How do we know that a categorical imperative exists other than our impressions of what is right or wrong. Because those "impressions" support ANY ethical theory. Why the CI?

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

There is no proof of the categorical imperitive. This is why other philosophies still exist and compete. There is no one ueber roxors all ethical theory.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

Kuroneko, I am looking forward to your own discription of Kantian ethics that will satisfy me. If you do provide suh a thing, please focus on how we know that there is a categorical imperative. Im looking over my Kant notes now, and his train of thought goes "there are categorical imperatives and hypothetical imperatives. Hypothetical imperatives are nothing more than means to an end, so the categorical imperative is the true moral law." This makes a whole lot of sense if you assume that there is some true moral law. I don't. How do we know that a categorical imperative exists other than our impressions of what is right or wrong. Because those "impressions" support ANY ethical theory. Why the CI?

You are right. I am looking at BOTH my ethics books now, and they say one major criticism of Kant is that his CI is extremely vague, imprecise and that is why it lost popularity in the last century. There is also no evidence that something is good in and of itself. It's an assumption with no basis. Kant Ignores consequences even. It's fluff.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

Anyhoo. I would rather not drag this out and have yall argue on my behalf. It's not really going to lead anywhere anyway... Even professiols still bicker and quibble.

No harm. Thanks for all the info, and please don't argue?

[Bugsby]

Anyhoo. I would rather not drag this out and have yall argue on my behalf. It's not really going to lead anywhere anyway... Even professiols still bicker and quibble.

No harm. Thanks for all the info, and please don't argue?

No, no. It's really OK. I'm not arguing here, at least not beyond the definition of arguing a case. I am genuinely interested in the answers to my questions. I want to hear an argument that can persaude me (if such an argument exists - I don't think it does). And don't think that the disagreement is all your fault. Your comments sparked the ideas behind a non-hostile intellectual debate about what makes a moral theory worthwhile. Don't be embarassed. Be happy. You started a successful thread. Keep on posting your experiences in ethics class. Ethics was my favorite subject last semester, I want to hear what you have to say.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

Well. I kinda got one convert in the class, but he was badgered to death when he got out, so I don't know now. THey all call us the Ethi-nazis

[Kuroneko]

Difference is, you can reasonably assume the evidence gained in Epistomology is real and that what you are seeing/testing is real. There is no reason to assume it's fake, all in your head, or a trick. Ethics is nothing but an opinion, and there is no evidence to proove otherwise that can't be called opinion.

You insist on deductive proof for ethics, but you'd settle for an inductive one against solipsism?

Thanks for reminding me: naturalist ethics are also immune to Hume's Law.

NOt according to most Ethicists. They say they are guilty of it. You are free to disagree, however.

It is only a problem for the staunch moral realist. If one stops insisting that moral statements are literally true or false, most systems of ethics can be reinterpreted consistently.

Even something as trivial as "every natural number has a successor", long part of basic arithmetic, fails to satisfy your criterion for objectivity: how does one prove it? Answer: one doesn't; it's axiomatic.

Those aren't subject to opinion, in my view, because you can use reasonable testing and rational thought to come to a good conclusion. You can't explain it away as an opinion. Logically, all natural numbers have a successor, since they are infinite.

No, that is simply your assumption. There is absolutely nothing logical about the claim that there must be an infinity of natural numbers. You can't prove it. The only justification for it is that it gives as an interesting and useful system--and that's very far from an absolute, deductive argument that you seem to require. Mathematicians have long accepted that axioms (of which the above is one of those made by Peano) are simply things we assume more or less arbitrarily. The only requirement, for a mathematician, is self-consistence. This was not always thought to be so, but historically it was made apparent by the problem of deciding which of the alternative axioms is 'true' in geometry:
For any given line and any point not on the line, (1) there exist no lines parallel to the given line that pass through the given point, or (2) the exists precisely one such line, or (3) there exist more than one line with that property.
It was shown that if there is a deductive argument against any one of these alternatives, then none of them can be 'true'.

Note that the requirement of self-consistence is actually much looser than logical consistency. That is because even logic is not immune to this. For example, the the law of non-contradiction ["~(p&~p)"] is challenged by dialetheist logics, and many other so-called "paraconsistent" logics exist besides (fuzzy logic an obvious example).

The difficulty with ethics is that although everyone can agree that there needs to be more requirements for an ethical system than just self-consistency, there is no agreement as to what that is.

Whether or not it's right/wrong to wear white after labour day is arbitrary.

Indeed it is, but for different reasons.

I am confused on some issues, but I don't believe in Objective ethics. There is no reason to.

I don't mind that; no ethical system that I've encountered is both complete and satisfactory in my view. However, I do mind accusations against ethical objectivism that I do not think it is actually guilty of.

[Kuroneko]

1. If moral imperatives are hypothetical, then Hume's Law carries all the weight in the word. If it's a hypothesis, it needs to be proven.

You misunderstand. Suppose a psychopath points a gun at you and tells you that if you will be shot unless you act like a chicken for the next minute. Do you have a reason to act to comply because of the possible outcome of your refusal? That's what hypothetical means: it is embodied in the conditional "if I do not comply, I will be shot." Categorical ethics are unconditional.

And to prove it, we need to use logic. Hume's Law is a law of logic.

As in the previous post, some things must be taken as axiomatic. There's no escaping it. Even infinitist theories of truth make certain assumptions, and they are devised specifically to deal with this very problem.

I don't care what weight you think "ought" might or might not carry. The weight of "ought" in ethics is pretty rigid. It needs to be weighty enough to bind our actions to a certain course. Are you suggesting that because hypothetical ethics doesn't revolve around the idea of a categorical imperative, then it should have no influence on our actions? That sounds like a pretty untenable position to me.

You misunderstand my position. In consequentialist ethics, "I ought to do X" needs to only to be interpreted as "I have a reason to do X". No more, no less. Consequentialism needs only to posit that people have a reason to do what will achieve their desires, which seems straightforward enough, even if not deductively provable. 'Ought' does not need to carry any more cognitive content than that in consequentialism.

Ethics are laws that govern behavior. To suggest that ethics with a hypothetical formulation have no weight demeans that branch of ethics. If you really do want to do that.... well, that's another discussion altogether.

In this discussion thus far, I've attempted to stay completely neutral as to whether ethics [are/should be/must be/...] hypothetical or categorical. My purpose in the above is to simply explore how different views of ethics might deal with Hume's Law.

2. It seems you are a fan of the categorical imperative. I have yet to hear a convincing argument as to what this categorical imperative is. If you can give one to me, by all means, proceed. I agree that there should be no "conflict of maxims," but I don't see how a "immoral act" has a direct conflict of maxims. Kant says "there is a conflict," but he kind of mumbles when it comes to pointing out what that conflict is.

Kant's starting point is the axiom that a good will (roughly, the decision-making capability of the mind) is the only intrinsically good thing. This is because there is no other attribute or possession of a sapient being that is good if controlled by a will set towards evil. It is the thing that has absolute value, not relative to the fulfillment of some goal, or any other thing.

I can will a lot of things, as mundane as raising my arm, and even those that are not consistent with each other (or even themselves), or are impossible due to external constraints. E.g., if I will that I be in London in an hour, this volition is inconsistent because I there is no existing method of transportation available to me that will achive that.

In consequentialist ethics, what decides the morality of an action is its consequences. In deontological ethics, the key issue is intent, or more precisely motive. As such, we are required to actually think about why we are doing the action. Kant's own example may illustrate this. Suppose there two shopkeepers, and after some reflection, both resolve to always give their customers the correct change. The first does this because he thinks a reputation of honesty will give him more business. The second does so because he decides that cheating is morally wrong. The two generalized maxims are:
1. Whenever anyone can promote their business by giving the correct change, he or she should give the correct change.
2. Whenever anyone can perform a moral action by giving the correct change, he or she should give the correct change.
Their only difference is motive, which is what decides whether or not they are moral. There is some contention, however, whether [1] is actually immoral or simply amoral. I favor the latter interpretation.

He also fails to say what maxim it is in every human being that will conflict with an immoral act. Or, more accurately, he fails to say how he knows that within every human being there is a fundamentally held maxim that will contradict any immoral act. Maybe my professor was just really bad at explaining this to me. So here's your shot. What the HELL is Kant talking about?

Very well. The categorical imperative is simply this: act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that should be come a universal law; i.e., an act is morally right only if its maxim is universalizable. For example (another one of Kant's), consider question whether it is acceptable to make promises one has no intention of keeping. By definition, a promise is an assurance that a particular act will be done in the future. This action's maxim is therefore inconsistent, since if it is universalized, there will no longer be any such assurance. Therefore, it cannot be moral to make false promises.

Another example: can a person commit deliberate suicide? This volition removes the will, the very capability that enabled it, which is inconsistency on one level, but, more importantly, inconsistency with the primary principle that the will has absolute value.

[Kuroneko]

Anyhoo. I would rather not drag this out and have yall argue on my behalf. It's not really going to lead anywhere anyway... Even professiols still bicker and quibble.

True, but there's no reason why they should have all the fun.

No harm. Thanks for all the info, and please don't argue? :oops:

You're welcome. But I don't see the harm in arguing.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

I think some of the Prima Facie duties devised by Ross (I think it was ross) are a big improvment in terms of Deontology. They make it less vague, and less absolute. Circusmtances of right/wrong make it more acceptable, i think.

[Kuroneko]

I think some of the Prima Facie duties devised by Ross (I think it was ross) are a big improvment in terms of Deontology. They make it less vague, and less absolute. Circusmtances of right/wrong make it more acceptable, i think.

You didn't approve of some objectivist theories mentioned in this thread because they made tacit appeals to intuition in their foundations, but you believe that intuitionist ethics (e.g., Ross) are a big improvement? This seems to be a curious turn-around; please clarify.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

Well. What I meant was I think that the Prima Facie duties are a better extention of Deontology than the original layout made by Kant. It is less vague and helps more with practical moral dilemmas. I still don't believe in the Absolute nature, rather subjective, but I do like their opinion.

I think people could use it as a subjective theory.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

I don't necessarily hate all objective opinions, I just think they aren't objective.

[Kuroneko]

Well. What I meant was I think that the Prima Facie duties are a better extention of Deontology than the original layout made by Kant. It is less vague and helps more with practical moral dilemmas. I still don't believe in the Absolute nature, rather subjective, but I do like their opinion.

Now your comment makes sense to me, although I disagree with how practical it is. The problem I have with intuitionism is that it leaves almost no room for rational discussion of ethical dillemas... one either 'feels' it, or one doesn't.

I think people could use it as a subjective theory.

Yes, quite. Intuitionist deontology is basically just one step away from relativism/subjectivism.

I don't necessarily hate all objective opinions, I just think they aren't objective.

And they're not objective in the sense you're using the word, and should not be claimed to be so. How about instead of the subjectivism/objectivism distiction, we call it, say... relativism/non-relativism? That will hopefully stop the persistent equivocation of the word.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

By objectivism i mean absolute/non-relativistic. Yea. I just don't think they are absolute in the first place. I don't mean to say anything about objective evidence for them. Maybe it's just comming out like that lol.


ALthough, I don't think there is any reason to believe they're absolute due to the nature of Ethics. Relativism makes more sense to me.

[Bugsby]

Kuroneko, thats for the refresher on Kant. After I postd that, I went and looked through my Kant notes one more time and realized that I had made some silly comments. Thanks for the correct analysis. All confusion has been cleared.

You still have yet to answer my key question, which is how do we know that there is a categorical imperative. Kant makes a good case that if there WERE one, that it would act in the way he describes. Yet I am unconvinced that such a thing exists. In my experience, all of morality can be easily explained as rules created by society for its own preservation. Even in moral cases that are unrelated to the preservation of society, this is just when circumstances echo the situations for which that morality was created and people react in the same way (for example, some people act on abortion the same way they do on murder).

Kant's categorical imperative makes a certain degree of sense, but I don't believe that it exists at all. You talk about the concept of will and give the example of the shopkeepers. I think that EVERY example of people acting "morally" has roots in the hypothetical construct. Even Kant admitted that he had difficulty coming up with examples of people who were acting according to the categorical imperative rather than a hypothetical one, since it is always at least POSSIBLE that they were acting in accordance with the hypothetical construct.

I believe in the hypothetical construct in EVERY case, because that can be explained away by simple observations of cause and effect. Thinking of a categorical imperative involves another set of assumptions to be laid on top of this hypothetical morality, and parsimony rules that extra layer out. Not out of possibility, mind you, just out of consideration. I, for one, always try to act morally, yet I will tell you that I cannot think of a single thing that I have done that I cannot explain by saying that it was what was expected of me, and therefore at least somewhat incumbant on me to do it, rather than say it was my autonymous will that saw the good and acted on it.




And Boyish-Tigerlily: Ethi-Nazis? What kind of school do you go to? Who are these ignorant pricks? I dont mind that they dont believe you, but derogatory terms for belief in a certain structure behind the ethical system is just ludicrous.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

Yet I am unconvinced that such a thing exists. In my experience, all of morality can be easily explained as rules created by society for its own preservation.

It's interesting about morality. I looked in my Cultural and physical anthropology book and it directly states that Morality is nothing more than a cultural construction used for survival and/or guidlines. It basically says it's relative to each society.

I like anthropology

And Boyish-Tigerlily: Ethi-Nazis? What kind of school do you go to? Who are these ignorant pricks? I dont mind that they dont believe you, but derogatory terms for belief in a certain structure behind the ethical system is just ludicrous.

I go to a college. It's not bad, but it's a community college. Cheaper, but I get the first 2 or so years out of the way. THese people are the classmates who are all objectivists. They say since I said the Nazis were moral according to their own system, I am a Nazi, which i'm not. I don't even think they were moral, but that doesn't matter for some reason. Apparently they think I approve of genocide and serial killers.

[Kuroneko]

By objectivism i mean absolute/non-relativistic. Yea. I just don't think they are absolute in the first place. I don't mean to say anything about objective evidence for them. Maybe it's just comming out like that lol.

In which case, you are simply wrong. There are many non-relativist ethical systems.