Logic AS morality.

[Kuroneko]

I've discovered that I have failed to address a large section of your previous reply to me (indeed, I've managed to not notice it altogether). That's what I get for replying on the fly and cutting and pasting text instead of using the quote function directly. I apologize, and will correct this oversight here.

I draw the line at questioning observations made by your senses. There could be an evil deceiver, but parsimony makes that not a matter for consideration.

Why do you draw that line? In order to conclude that there is a background reality thats causing your sense experience, one needs a system of causality, which also needs to be highly nontrivial if it is to withstand the test of logical coherency (cf. the first cause argument). Even if you did not elucidate it, you have simply taken this complex system as a given. I contend that you've done so because it allowed you to derive a conclusion that matches your intuitive sense of 'reasonable'.

Personally, I'm rather suspicious of the whole notion of causality. I do not see it as necessary--for science, or for any reasonable endeavour, except possibly as a useful linguistic construct. However, that's not at the central issue here, so I'll leave that alone. It remains a fact that you must have assumed some sort of framework or principle to allow you to derive the existence of objective reality from nothing but your sense experience, since it is not deductively implied without some additional assumption(s). I do not question your conclusion in this particular matter.

However, since there is no way to directly observe something moral, there is no way to make a moral obsertavion. Take this example: "The ball is big, and red, and round, and good." Seems a little off, right? Because "good" is not a sensation. It is an interpretation. Once you can show me a particle or wave that things emit that is picked up by sense organs, transmitted to your brain, and then interpreted as good, then I will consider "moral observations" accurate.

Once again, your comments are based on the mistaken notion that for an ethical system to be objective, it is necessary for it to be rooted in objective reality (except in the most oblique of senses). I've covered this before, but I'll attempt to make this clear once and for all.

There are essentially two different but related areas of ethics: descriptive and normative. Descriptive ethics is simply the study of what is considered moral. Relativist ethics holds that descriptive statements ascribed to some group of persons directly imply the corresponding normative statement. For example,

• Descriptive: My society considers X to be immoral.
• Normative: I ought not do X.

On the other hand, non-relativism [objectivism] holds that there are some actions that are moral or immoral regardless of whether or not anyone considers them to be so. That is actually quite a loose condition. For example, the distilled version of Rand's ethics (confusingly, also called Objectivism, which is why I'll use 'non-relativism' from here on) is simply this:

• Everyone ought to always act in his or her self-interest.

An ethical system containing this principle is non-relativist (to my personal outrage), because it does not matter whether or not my society, myself, or any other group of persons considers some act to be moral or immoral: if it is in my self-interest, I am obligated to do it.

As to them being axiomatic, that is just rediculous. Moral premises are taken for granted?? Why should they be? Because everyone believes them?

I'm perplexed why you freely use this very process in some matters (e.g., metaphysics, as above), but cry 'foul!' when it is employed in ethics. Feel free to make an argument that this process is not necessary for ethics, or deny the normative aspect of ethics altogether (leaving it as a purely descriptive, if nihilistic, topic), but your position as you've presented it here is not supported.

Thats not a valid argument. That's appeal to public opinion, or something like that *vows to check falacy thread*.

I'm not claiming the axiomatic method is a valid argument, but I am claiming it is necessary. Without it, it is not possible to conclude anything as basic as there being an objective reality behind sensory experience. It is even impossible to do purely interal mental tasks like arithmetic without making some assumptions about numbers. But your concerns are quite reasonable--because it is not valid, we need to seek the minimization of the number of axioms (and their complexity) and primitives (undefined terms). For example, 'moral' is a primitive property in this case: since we are using our system to define its meaning, we do not know its precise meaning before we have an actual system, although we may have some intuitions about it.

Of course, we need to have some goal for our ethical system. What is its purpose? You claimed it was the preservation of a stable society, and I've objected at the artificially inserted reference to society. I quote you directly: "Therefore, an action is immoral only if it is of such a nature that allowing that action to go unchecked will undermine the very existance of society." I propose instead the following:

• The purpose of ethics is to provide guidance as to which actions will preserve the most significant interests of people [or sapient life, if one likes].

It is intentionally very permissive; in fact, it doesn't directly contradict the purpose you stated. The key difference is that it does not make any claims as to which interests are "most significant". In your case, it is the preservation of societies, which of course implies collective survival of its inhabitants. A society which permits its inhabitants to die out obviously failed your criterion. However, I only need a much more general statement:

• Survival (either individual, collective, or both) is either one of the most significant needs, or is an implication of one of them.

From this, the following normative statement can be posited:

• One ought not to kill people [or sapient life forms] whimsically.

However precisely or loosely 'whimsically' is interpreted (even 'without any reason whatsoever'), this is a non-relativistic principle derived from the most general of premises, which are themselves direct consequences of your stated position. In short, your own ethical views require at least partially non-relativist ethical system, despite your claims to the contrary.

---

You still have yet to answer my key question, which is how do we know that there is a categorical imperative. Kant makes a good case that if there WERE one, that it would act in the way he describes. Yet I am unconvinced that such a thing exists.

I don't recall you asking me this question, so I'm unsuprised that I have not answered it.

Kant takes it as axiomatic that autonomy of the will is good. He is incensed at the idea that someone can be considered moral if he or she is forced into doing an action. Appealing to consequence (e.g., fear of not doing the action) is just another form of that, although not necessarily that extreme. This rules out hypothetical imperatives ('Do not steal, because you may get caught'), leaving only categorical ones ('Do not steal, because it is immoral').

In my experience, all of morality can be easily explained as rules created by society for its own preservation. Even in moral cases that are unrelated to the preservation of society, this is just when circumstances echo the situations for which that morality was created and people react in the same way (for example, some people act on abortion the same way they do on murder).

That presupposes that explanatory power of descriptive facts is the only purpose of ethics, which is false.

I believe in the hypothetical construct in EVERY case, because that can be explained away by simple observations of cause and effect. Thinking of a categorical imperative involves another set of assumptions to be laid on top of this hypothetical morality, and parsimony rules that extra layer out. Not out of possibility, mind you, just out of consideration.

Irrelevant. Simplicity by itself implies neither truth nor adequacy for some purpose. Furthermore, you are mistaken in thinking categorical imperatives are some wholly new breed of imperatives posited by Kant. They would exist whether or not Kant based his ethics on them.

I, for one, always try to act morally, yet I will tell you that I cannot think of a single thing that I have done that I cannot explain by saying that it was what was expected of me, ...

Again, you recognize only descriptive ethics. Why?

... and therefore at least somewhat incumbant on me to do it, rather than say it was my autonymous will that saw the good and acted on it.

In other words, you have not acted morally according to Kant. You were simply afraid of the consequences of not doing the action (e.g., failing to meet expectations forced on you).

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

Boyish-Tigerlilly wrote:
By objectivism i mean absolute/non-relativistic. Yea. I just don't think they are absolute in the first place. I don't mean to say anything about objective evidence for them. Maybe it's just comming out like that lol.

In which case, you are simply wrong. There are many non-relativist ethical systems.

What about am I wrong. I gave the exact definition of moral objectivism that several books on ethics give. There is nothing wrong about it.

I cannot be wrong about them being absolute in the first place, since it's only an opinion that they are. I don't harbour that opinion, becaues I think it's unwarrented.

I respect your belief in Objectivism, but I don't agree with it. I know there are many non-relativist theories, but there is no reason to believe them over anything else. They are just cleverly disguised opinions.

I will go with my anthropology book when it says "morality is a social construction." That suits me well enough

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

Why do you draw that line? In order to conclude that there is a background reality thats causing your sense experience, one needs a system of causality, which also needs to be highly nontrivial if it is to withstand the test of logical coherency (cf. the first cause argument). Even if you did not elucidate it, you have simply taken this complex system as a given. I contend that you've done so because it allowed you to derive a conclusion that matches your intuitive sense of 'reasonable'.

He draws the line because in Ethics, there is no basis by which they can back their statements up. THere is no need to believe an absolute system when you don't need to. No one can tell you what you ought to do and have it mean anything, whereas in metaphysics, it's silly to believe in extra entities and complex versions of reality. Scienctific outlooks beat skepticism. There is no reason to not trust your senses and testing. That's something you can't do with with morality, so it's much like a different organism.

You ought not to wear white after labour day. WHo cares? Is there a reason? Can it be shown? How can we prove it's not just your opinion? And if you say it's non-relativistic..why does anyone have to listen?

Reality exists...it's hard to deny that.

[Bugsby]

Dividing that whole thing up line by line will take forever, and forgive me that I don't have the patience with myself to do it. Sorry if I leave anything out...

We seem to be in agreement on the basic premise that we can trust our senses. The first split I see in our opinions lies at whether we can make assumptions about morality. I say that common belief is not enough, and you point out that this seems to contradict my initial stndpoint that common belief is enough to justify belief in physical sensations. This isn't the case. The reason I credit my physical senses to revealing some non-relativist truth of what reality consists of is because of the method by which I sense things. Like I said before, these descriptive statements which I can make based off of physical sensations are all of a certain type that cannot be applied to moral statements. "The ball is big and round and shiny and red and good" does not make much sense, because of the difference in the sensations described. "Goodness" is interpreted, not observed. And when I talk about goodness, I do indeed mean it in the normative sense. In our everyday functioning, we do encounter many things which we label as "good or bad," just as we encounter many things that we label as "red or blue." But just because we can say we perceive "good and bad" just as well as we perceive "red or blue" does not make these the same types of observations. Physics can explain what it is about the ball that makes it red or blue. But it fails to describe what it is about the action that makes it "good or bad:" that is the realm of psychology, which is also a science, but a science of a different type. This is why I allow physical observations to pass as axiomatic, but not ethical ones. One basic axiomatic assumption can explain all physical phenomenon.

The issue comes when we get into asserting ethical claims. I can already see your argument forming. "If you accept an axiomatic claim as the basis for all physical observation and analysis, why not accept an axiomatic basis for all ethical observation and analysis?" Because it's another axiom, that's why. Through the scientific method, the logical conclusion that follows from crediting physical observation, we can explain away all ethical issues through the realm of social science, through observation of how people act towards each other. This explains all behavior, as well as the motivation behind all behavior, without having to even touch the normative realm. Not even looking at the possibility of the existance of normative ethics creates a model that fits our observations exactly and yet does not introduce another axiom that is, in light of our exploration of society, unnecessary to our purposes.

I'm perplexed why you freely use this very process in some matters (e.g., metaphysics, as above), but cry 'foul!' when it is employed in ethics. Feel free to make an argument that this process is not necessary for ethics, or deny the normative aspect of ethics altogether (leaving it as a purely descriptive, if nihilistic, topic), but your position as you've presented it here is not supported.

You claim this is nihilistic. Damn right it is. But the thing is, nihilism is where accepting only the physical axiom takes us. But nihilism doesn't mean lawlessness and chaos, the end of morality as we know it. Far from it. It merely posits that what we see is all there is. Nihilism isn't lawlessness. It is law, because law is something we can observe. It is not immorality, because moral action is something that we can recognize. Nihilism just says that there is no greater purpose behind all of this law and morality. Nihilism simply denies that there is a huge normative world that hides behind the descriptive world and has a bearing on it somehow. I am a big fan of nihilism.

One last thing remains, as far as I see it: my own system. You say that my system has some non-relativist aspects to it. That is both true and false at the same time. There are some axiomatic moral goods that exist everywhere. Yet these goods are not good everywhere because of anything that can be considered normative. It is just that these goods are required of every descriptive ethical system. For example, it is true that murder is immoral: "One ought not to kill people [or sapient life forms] whimsically." This is because a system of society could not exist if it allowed for anything different. Allowing whimsical murder would land us squarely in Hobbes' state of war, a situation that is so undesirable that every society ensures its own survival by preventing the State of War, which in turn is accomplished by preventing murder.

Let me give an explanation for this evolution. At first, people live apart from each other, in Rousseau's concept of the state of nature, i.e. people who don't interact. As society forms, the first whimsical murder happens.
Immeidately after this first murder, society devolves as people move away from each other. Human beings are smart with a survival instinct keenly developed by millions of years of evolution: "If that guy was whimsically murdered, I'm not sticking around him anymore. And I'm not sticking around anyone who might kill me!" Yet once society breaks apart, people do poorly as well. Specialization and exchange is the only way that people can maintain a high quality of life. This means trade is necessary, which means cohabitation (as well as fair rules for interpersonal dealings) is also necessary. So people move together once again, but wary of the concept of whimsical murder. They found the society on the idea that whimsical murder is NOT ALLOWED (immoral) out of fear for their own safety. When whimsical murder is outlawed, the society flourishes, and the founding moral doctrine becomes ingrained. Those who violate it are not only shunned for breaking the moral code, but also punished for breaking the legal code. (You will notice that in almost every example, criminal law is merely an attempt to codify morality). Hence does the society flourish, and a non-relativist system of morals is created without any appeal to the normative.

I admit that in the case above, the example I have given doesn't really make a non-relativist system. The system is relativist. Yet it is relativist in such a way that there is no way that an individual or group could function if it took up the other side. I cannot think of how a society could function if it allowed whimsical killing, and history proves this for me. Such a society does not exist. There have been some abberrations, of course, but those have quickly either fallen apart or been supplanted.

I can see where Kant is coming from when he says that only autonomy can be the dictate of morality. And it's a nice thought. But there is utterly no basis for it. There is no need to assume the additional axiom that a categorical imperative exists, therefore we ought not do it if we wish to be logically concise. As depressing as a descriptive, nihilistic description of morality might be, it is the one that follows naturally from positing the fewest axiomatic beliefs.

Simplicity by itself implies neither truth nor adequacy for some purpose.

Yes it does. That's Ockham's Razor. You will find yourself thoroughly outnumbered if you try to say that Ockham's Razor is not a viable tool. Again, it does not say that if something is excluded by the Razor than it is untrue. Rather, it should NOT BE CONSIDERED unless some real evidence can be found for it.

Furthermore, you are mistaken in thinking categorical imperatives are some wholly new breed of imperatives posited by Kant.

I never said that. I am just pointing out Kant as being the worst example of someone falling into the incorrect belief that a categorical imperative must exist. A lot of people make this mistake.

They would exist whether or not Kant based his ethics on them

They exist? Really?



Finally, I just want to say that this has been a very high quality debate thus far. Helped me refine my ideas a bit, which is just what I needed...

[Kuroneko]

The issue comes when we get into asserting ethical claims. I can already see your argument forming. "If you accept an axiomatic claim as the basis for all physical observation and analysis, why not accept an axiomatic basis for all ethical observation and analysis?" Because it's another axiom, that's why.

Yes, but do you agree that to avoid ethical nihilism, we must posit at least one ethical axiom? Surely you would grant that much, since at this point the real issue in our dispute seems to be whether or not ethical nihilism should be avoided in the first place.

Through the scientific method, the logical conclusion that follows from crediting physical observation, we can explain away all ethical issues through the realm of social science, through observation of how people act towards each other. This explains all behavior, as well as the motivation behind all behavior, without having to even touch the normative realm. Not even looking at the possibility of the existance of normative ethics creates a model that fits our observations exactly and yet does not introduce another axiom that is, in light of our exploration of society, unnecessary to our purposes.

Now, here's the very point where we have our little schism. Your position, if I understood correctly, is something along the following lines:

• Ethics is to describe and explain behavior in certain situations. Therefore, ethics does not need a normative component, and settle for a descriptive one.

Whereas, my view is this:

• Ethics is not only to describe and explain behavior in certain situations, but also to guide decisions. Therefore, ethics needs both descriptive and normative components.

The "therefore" portion of the preceding statement will be examined below.

You claim this is nihilistic. Damn right it is. But the thing is, nihilism is where accepting only the physical axiom takes us. But nihilism doesn't mean lawlessness and chaos, the end of morality as we know it. Far from it. It merely posits that what we see is all there is. Nihilism isn't lawlessness. It is law, because law is something we can observe. It is not immorality, because moral action is something that we can recognize. Nihilism just says that there is no greater purpose behind all of this law and morality. Nihilism simply denies that there is a huge normative world that hides behind the descriptive world and has a bearing on it somehow. I am a big fan of nihilism.

This is nothing but an enormous distortion of normative ethics. It is not and does not require any portion of Platonism or Neo-Platonism. Prescriptive propositions are used all the time; for example, giving advice is quite an obvious example. It's not as if prescriptive propositions were invented solely for use in ethics, so I have no idea why you imagine that normative ethics posits or even requires some kind of "huge normative world that hides behind the descriptive world".

Using anything as guidance automatically gives rise to a prescriptive component, even if only privately. [For example, history can often be used for guidance, but this does not mean that history proper prescribes anything--it stays private.] If this component is allowed into ethics, moral judgements follow immeadeately through the rather trivial definition "an action is said to be moral if, and only if, it is prescribed." As far as ethics is concerned, normative and prescriptive are equivalent.

One last thing remains, as far as I see it: my own system. You say that my system has some non-relativist aspects to it. That is both true and false at the same time. Yet these goods are not good everywhere because of anything that can be considered normative. It is just that these goods are required of every descriptive ethical system. For example, it is true that murder is immoral: "One ought not to kill people [or sapient life forms] whimsically." This is because a system of society could not exist if it allowed for anything different.

So you do grant this as a valid principle of the ethical system you outlined earlier. Let's see where that takes us. First, let me briefly reiterate the definitions, since the entire question rests on that. If you believe there is a substantive difference between the definition I state and those actually used in the field of ethics, feel free to correct me (in fact, I insist).

• Ethical relativism is the position that moral principles are valid in so far as they are chosen to be belived in by some person or group of persons. Ethical subjectivism is sometimes used as a synonym for relativism and sometimes as a particular type of relativism (individual choice), the latter of which is contrasted with ethical conventionalism (relativism with societal choice).
• Ethical objectivism is the pretty much the direct negation: there are some moral principles which are valid regardless of anyone's choice to believe or endorse them. Ethical absolutism is the extremization of that view, such that this is claimed of all moral principles, and that there is one unique correct action for any moral situation.

I admit that in the case above, the example I have given doesn't really make a non-relativist system. The system is relativist. Yet it is relativist in such a way that there is no way that an individual or group could function if it took up the other side. I cannot think of how a society could function if it allowed whimsical killing, and history proves this for me. Such a society does not exist. There have been some abberrations, of course, but those have quickly either fallen apart or been supplanted.

Let me remind you of your criterion: "Therefore, an action is immoral only if it is of such a nature that allowing that action to go unchecked will undermine the very existance of society." It is quite conceivable that the society chooses to believe in moral principles which, in fact, will undermine its very existence. You've acknowledged this possibility directly above. I now revise my conclusions about your ethical system: it is not just "at least partly" non-relativist, but wholly so! Nowhere in your criterion does the society's belief in or endorsement of a moral principle come into play. Your ethics are objectivist.

Furthermore, does it bother you that your own ethics contains normative claims?

I can see where Kant is coming from when he says that only autonomy can be the dictate of morality. And it's a nice thought. But there is utterly no basis for it. There is no need to assume the additional axiom that a categorical imperative exists, therefore we ought not do it if we wish to be logically concise.

The existence of categorical imperatives is not an ethical axiom. It is a linguistic fact. Kant's only assumptions are those regarding the relationship between the will and the good, which he does give a fairly convincing argument for (although it is not deductive, of course).

As depressing as a descriptive, nihilistic description of morality might be, it is the one that follows naturally from positing the fewest axiomatic beliefs.

Only at the cost of eliminating the any prescriptive elements from ethics--a cost I find unacceptable, although you disagree.

Simplicity by itself implies neither truth nor adequacy for some purpose.

Yes it does. That's Ockham's Razor. You will find yourself thoroughly outnumbered if you try to say that Ockham's Razor is not a viable tool. Again, it does not say that if something is excluded by the Razor than it is untrue. Rather, it should NOT BE CONSIDERED unless some real evidence can be found for it.

I reiterate myself: "Simplicity by itself..." If a simpler system fails to achieve our goals, it should not be picked over a more complex, axiom-heavy system that does. However, it seems clear now that what we really disagree on are the goals of ethics.

Furthermore, you are mistaken in thinking categorical imperatives are some wholly new breed of imperatives posited by Kant.

I never said that. I am just pointing out Kant as being the worst example of someone falling into the incorrect belief that a categorical imperative must exist. A lot of people make this mistake.

They would exist whether or not Kant based his ethics on them.

They exist? Really?

Die!

The preceding sentence written in boldface expresses a categorical imperative. In what sense do you deny it existence?

[Kuroneko]

What about am I wrong. I gave the exact definition of moral objectivism that several books on ethics give. There is nothing wrong about it.

You've stated it, but you have completely failed to understand it.

I cannot be wrong about them being absolute in the first place, since it's only an opinion that they are. I don't harbour that opinion, becaues I think it's unwarrented.

How many times do I have to repeat myself: an ethical theory being objective, as defined in the field of ethics, has absolutely nothing to do with either the formulation or argumentative support of that theory. Here's an example. Suppose I propose the following ethical theory, which contains no principles save the following:

• Kuroneko's Principle: An action is moral if, and only if, it increases the number of healthy cats in the universe.

Notice that I did not provide any shred of argument as to why this is so, and yet this ethical theory is objectivist according to the definition given by ethical philosophers, because the principle itself does not refer to anyone's beliefs.

I respect your belief in Objectivism, but I don't agree with it. I know there are many non-relativist theories, but there is no reason to believe them over anything else. They are just cleverly disguised opinions.

Yet again, you are equivocating the word "objectivism". How it is defined in ethical texts does not imply what you think it does. For the record, I'm an ethical objectivist, not an Objectivist. The (capitalized) word has a separate meaning--an adherent to Ayn Rand's ethical system, which I despise.

I will go with my anthropology book when it says "morality is a social construction." That suits me well enough

Morality being a social construction in no way implies relativism.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

Ethical Relativism can be normative just like objectivism. They both say what "ought" to be, but since what "ought" to be is flimsy and kinda whimsical, it's meaningless outside culture.


I believe morality starts are a subjectivist level, and then it progresses to a conventional ethical relativism once people realize they have to live in a society. The culture norms reflect the desires and needs of a particular society. Many societies have different ideas of what is moral, and underneath them, they have similiar ideas, like care for the young, the old, respect for the family. These however, I personally believe just to be commonalities in subjective opinion, rather than objective, non-relative principles.

People can have the same opinion right? It doesn't automatically mean they hold some objective standard. They could just have similar wants/needs that vary to a degree.

Culture I seea s the great tool and creater of morality, since it's the aggregate of the people and their ideolology. People make society, society has problems; culture helps deal with issues; morality, as part of the cultural superstructure, is produced to try to cope. Having everyone make up their own morality wouldn't be efficient, so cultural oversight seems more practical.

Culture servces several purposes:

1. Integrated
2. Instrumental
3. Biological needs

To fulfill these needs to the best of their ability, they develope a set of rules/guidelines/values which set the people on a specific course of action.
Call these moral objects.

These might/might not work all to the same level of efficiency, but they are still created by society for society. We should only judge a system of morality based on how functional/dysfunctional it is within a particular society as one would judge how equally functional/dysfunctional a culture is as a whole from a holistic, yet neutral, unbiased standpoint.

what a culture wants should be measured against how it is achieveing that goal.

I guess the decision to believe in relativism stems from a certain mind-set. I just don't like how many characterize it as evil, vile, and wrong, when they themselves, in Objective Ethics, allow for equally vile, unfair rules that seem more dogmatic, sloganized, and top-to-bottom.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

You've stated it, but you have completely failed to understand it.

I understand it fully.

How many times do I have to repeat myself: an ethical theory being objective, as defined in the field of ethics, has absolutely nothing to do with either the formulation or argumentative support of that theory. Here's an example. Suppose I propose the following ethical theory, which contains no principles save the following:

* Kuroneko's Principle: An action is moral if, and only if, it increases the number of healthy cats in the universe.

Notice that I did not provide any shred of argument as to why this is so, and yet this ethical theory is objectivist according to the definition given by ethical philosophers, because the principle itself does not refer to anyone's beliefs.

I understood you fully, but I don't agree with you. I also don't think that it being objective has anything to do with it's support. I do think, however, that I don't have to believe something that can't convince me of why, and since there is no proof for them being non-relative, I don't believe it as much as I wouldn't believe it if someone told me sugar is bad because god said so.

The example you gave is one reason I think non-relativism is silly. Dogmatic principles handed down with no reason to believe them and no grounding. WHY are they non-relative and how can they make you believe such a claim? Why do you have to? They say it is divorced from opinion, but it's just another opinon cleverly disguised. I don't care if the theory sounds good; I am trying to figure out why I would believe them non-relative. I just can't do it. THere is no convincing evidence.

et again, you are equivocating the word "objectivism". How it is defined in ethical texts does not imply what you think it does. For the record, I'm an ethical objectivist, not an Objectivist. The (capitalized) word has a separate meaning--an adherent to Ayn Rand's ethical system, which I despise.

How am I evuivocating when I know what definition is? I am saying that THEY say morals are non-relative. I am saying they are. They are two competing theories. I don't believe they are objective because there is no reason to.

In our ethics class, they DO try to give proof for why morals are SUbjective, and it seems more substantial than the reasoning behind non-relativism. It seems more real and empirical. Tell me what I am doing?

I know some of Objectivism of Ayn Rand, and she's just as good as any other "objective" philosophy. If she's non-relative....I don't know why anyone would support relativism, since they are all just opinions. She is just as absolute as any other non-relative theory.

Mind you. I don't agree with her capitalism morality, as our book calls it.
Our book however, uses caps for both Objectivsm and the Objectivism of Ayn Rand. That might be why we have some confusion with communication. My book does some things different maybe.

Morality being a social construction in no way implies relativism.

It says that morality is the product of culture. IT is a social creation and construction.

In other words, culture creates morality. You are right. IT doesn't imply it, it directly states it. IT says that morality is part of culture, and that it creates it. They have a relationship.

[Kuroneko]

He draws the line because in Ethics, there is no basis by which they can back their statements up. THere is no need to believe an absolute system when you don't need to.

Key word: if.

No one can tell you what you ought to do and have it mean anything, whereas in metaphysics, it's silly to believe in extra entities and complex versions of reality. Scienctific outlooks beat skepticism. There is no reason to not trust your senses and testing. That's something you can't do with with morality, so it's much like a different organism.

You are under the delusion that metaphysics has no relevance to science. Philosophy of science has been spawned by the study of metaphysics. Theories the relationship between causes and their effects are also a part of metaphysics, which science seems to invoke at every turn.

You ought not to wear white after labour day. WHo cares?

I don't know of anyone that does.

Is there a reason?

None that I'm aware of.

Can it be shown?

Dubitable.

How can we prove it's not just your opinion?

If it is mandated by an ethical system that serves its function, it should be followed. The crux of the matter is the question: what are the goals for an ethical system?

And if you say it's non-relativistic..why does anyone have to listen?

See above.



Oh yes, and....

Finally, I just want to say that this has been a very high quality debate thus far. Helped me refine my ideas a bit, which is just what I needed...

I'm glad you think so. I have to say I'm enjoying myself quite a bit.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

One of my problems is that if something is said to be objective, it's NOT an opinion.


Rand Objectivism IS objectivism. It isn't an opinion. how can you not agree with it if it's not an opinion, but an objective, non-relative moral code? If you don't agree with it, then the idea of morality not being an opinion seems bogus. If you can disagree with Rand, you can disagree with the others. YOu might as wel ljust make up your own morality that's better.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

You are under the delusion that metaphysics has no relevance to science. Philosophy of science has been spawned by the study of metaphysics. Theories the relationship between causes and their effects are also a part of metaphysics, which science seems to invoke at every turn.

Some things are important, but I can't say I am into metaphysicis that I have been exposed to. I haven't heard much good on this board either about metaphysics so far from what I have read in past threads. It was interesting for a few semesters, but after that....

I don't know of anyone that does.

I do. Apparently it's immoral to wear white after labour day, or so I am told.

If it is mandated by an ethical system that serves its function, it should be followed. The crux of the matter is the question: what are the goals for an ethical system?

Cultural Relativism can do the same thing. They make morals, you follow the morals because they are creations of the people. Relativism can have a function.

[SirNitram]

One of my problems is that if something is said to be objective, it's NOT an opinion.


Rand Objectivism IS objectivism. It isn't an opinion. how can you not agree with it if it's not an opinion, but an objective, non-relative moral code? If you don't agree with it, then the idea of morality not being an opinion seems bogus. If you can disagree with Rand, you can disagree with the others. YOu might as wel ljust make up your own morality that's better.

I must ask. Do you actually beleive the first sentence of the second paragraph? You're going to be in for a rather rude awakening if so. Rand is pure looney-bin shit; calling it objective is to handwave away the biological imperatives that made humanity intelligent.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

I must ask. Do you actually beleive the first sentence of the second paragraph? You're going to be in for a rather rude awakening if so. Rand is pure looney-bin shit; calling it objective is to handwave away the biological imperatives that made humanity intelligent.

Well. Since it's taught as objectivism, I really don't have a choice. I am not going to argue with the curriculum. I assume they know more than I do. I don't agree with her opinion, like I don't agree with the opinion of many non-relativist theories, as are stated in the courses I have taken.


My philosophy is: Learn it, forget what seems stupid, but learn it anyway. LIke I said. I really don't have a choice.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

Her philsophy may seem cruel and stupid, but so do others. THey still call them objective. I don't really like Rand though.

[SirNitram]

I must ask. Do you actually beleive the first sentence of the second paragraph? You're going to be in for a rather rude awakening if so. Rand is pure looney-bin shit; calling it objective is to handwave away the biological imperatives that made humanity intelligent.

Well. Since it's taught as objectivism, I really don't have a choice. I am not going to argue with the curriculum. I assume they know more than I do. I don't agree with her opinion, like I don't agree with the opinion of many non-relativist theories, as are stated in the courses I have taken.


My philosophy is: Learn it, forget what seems stupid, but learn it anyway. LIke I said. I really don't have a choice.

Just wondering. There's surprisingly many who go 'It's called objectivism.. It must be objective, therefore true!!!!'.

[SirNitram]

Her philsophy may seem cruel and stupid, but so do others. THey still call them objective. I don't really like Rand though.

It's not so much cruelty that gets me as much as the batshit insanity. Anyone with a modicum of understanding about how intelligence has begun to arise sees that it's a product of a society-based creature.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

Just wondering. There's surprisingly many who go 'It's called objectivism.. It must be objective, therefore true!!!!'.

That's another reason I am skeptical of "objectivism." If it's not an opinion...how can it be wrong?

They lable her theory, OBjectivism, under non-relative objectivism just like Utiltarianism, Fem Ethics, Deontology..ect. It's all very stupid. All their theories sound like people banging out dogmatic slogans with giant megaphones. T Hey are all just opinions to me.

If the academic world calls Rand objectivism, I don't believe in objectivism.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

It's not so much cruelty that gets me as much as the batshit insanity. Anyone with a modicum of understanding about how intelligence has begun to arise sees that it's a product of a society-based creature.

The only thing I remotely have seen to resemble Rand's idea was in ANthropology. I saw some really wacked cultures that highly valued "captialist ethics" and the virtue of selfishness.

I think Benedict labled that civil "paranoid" and delusional.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

One interesting thing is: Ayn Rand seems to be praised IN both book and curriculum in Ethics. They say she is the forerunner, and extremely important figure in the field of "natural rights" Ethics, which evolved out of her loathing of communism and collectivism.

[Kuroneko]

I understood you fully, but I don't agree with you. I also don't think that it being objective has anything to do with it's support. I do think, however, that I don't have to believe something that can't convince me of why, and since there is no proof for them being non-relative, I don't believe it as much as I wouldn't believe it if someone told me sugar is bad because god said so.

Your position seems to me somewhat schizophrenic. It's sort of akin to the following:

• Chemist: The mole is the number of atoms in a kilogram of Carbon-12.
• Boyish-Tigerlily: I understand this, but I don't agree with it.

The example you gave is one reason I think non-relativism is silly. Dogmatic principles handed down with no reason to believe them and no grounding. WHY are they non-relative and how can they make you believe such a claim?

Because they do not fit the definition of ethical relativism. My principle does not refer to anyone's beliefs, hence it is non-relativist. I don't care whether my stating it gives you any reason to believe in my principle, whether or not it is grounded in anything, and whether or not you are concinvced by it. Those things are not part of the relativism/objectivism distinction.

How am I evuivocating when I know what definition is? I am saying that THEY say morals are non-relative. I am saying they are. They are two competing theories. I don't believe they are objective because there is no reason to.

In our ethics class, they DO try to give proof for why morals are SUbjective, and it seems more substantial than the reasoning behind non-relativism. It seems more real and empirical. Tell me what I am doing?

I think I see your problem now: you do not agree that "the true morality" is non-relativist. That's fine. However, that is not the same as claiming that a particular ethical system is non-relativist. The system (Kuroneko's Principle, Kant, utilitarianism, Rand, or whatever) are non-relativist, but whether or not they are "true" (in any reasonable interpretation of that word), useful (for any purpose), convincing (to anyone), or even logically coherent... those are all entirely separate issues. They have no bearing on whether they are relativist or non-relativist.

In other words, just because you do not find any objectivist ethical systems convincing does not mean that they are not objectivist.

Morality being a social construction in no way implies relativism.

It says that morality is the product of culture. IT is a social creation and construction.

Yes, I expect it does. But it doesn't imply ethical relativism.

In other words, culture creates morality. You are right. IT doesn't imply it, it directly states it. IT says that morality is part of culture, and that it creates it. They have a relationship.

I thought we've already covered this. Many, many times. It has absolutely nothing to do with either the formulation or argumentative support of that theory. Just because society creates it doesn't make it relativistic. A more relevant example mind be the ethical system which has the Ten Commandments, excepting those with direct reference to God: the Ten Commandments do not, in their content, refer to anyone's opinion (despite that people have made them, or perhaps God if you're feeling generous), and so they would fit the definition of ethical objectivism.

[Kuroneko]

Rand Objectivism IS objectivism. It isn't an opinion. how can you not agree with it if it's not an opinion, but an objective, non-relative moral code? If you don't agree with it, then the idea of morality not being an opinion seems bogus. If you can disagree with Rand, you can disagree with the others. YOu might as wel ljust make up your own morality that's better. :shock:

I've italicized your strawman of my (and by proxy, all of ethical philosophers') claims. Opinions, even those without a single iota of evidence for their validity, can be objectivist as the word is defined by ethical philosophers.

I think now you're just trolling.

[Kuroneko]

Let me amend that:

• Chemist: The mole is the number of atoms in a gram of Carbon-12.
• Boyish-Tigerlily: I understand this, but I don't agree with it.

Cripes, I can't believe I actually did that... but the point remains.

[Kuroneko]

... and thus, I prove myself a fool once again. Woe is me.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

Yes, I expect it does. But it doesn't imply ethical relativism. [/quoite]

Ok. According to anthropology, it doesn't imply, it states it.

I thought we've already covered this. Many, many times. It has absolutely nothing to do with either the formulation or argumentative support of that theory. Just because society creates it doesn't make it relativistic. A more relevant example mind be the ethical system which has the Ten Commandments, excepting those with direct reference to God: the Ten Commandments do not, in their content, refer to anyone's opinion (despite that people have made them, or perhaps God if you're feeling generous), and so they would fit the definition of ethical objectivism.

Ok. I will say it. Morality is not Objective. It's subjective. Purely. There is no absolute right/wrong outside culture and the people within it. This way we don't equivocate, and we don't get terms mixed up,and you can't say im troilling. I don't believe it in, I see no reason to. Society makes morality.

According to all the books on ethics I have, the teacher, and the entire curriculum, if your culture creates ethical systems or if they are construct of that culture, they are considered relative. It's Conventional Ethical Relativism.

I believe in it to a degree. There is no trolling about that.

In other words, just because you do not find any objectivist ethical systems convincing does not mean that they are not objectivist.

I understand what you are saying. I don't think they are not objective because I don't believe in them. I don't find them objective because I find them subjective, and they can't both be subjective and objective at the same time.

My principle does not refer to anyone's beliefs, hence it is non-relativist.

Ok. This goes back to how I don't follow the same system. I think they are all relative to culture and the people within it.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

Let me amend that:
Quote:

* Chemist: The mole is the number of atoms in a gram of Carbon-12.
* Boyish-Tigerlily: I understand this, but I don't agree with it.


Cripes, I can't believe I actually did that... but the point remains.

Actually this example is wrong.

It should go

1. Dogmatic Believe: It is immoral to do X.
2. I understand you think that, but since morality is subjective, that is only your opinion, and since I hold another opinion, I don't agree



I can't disagree that a mole is a certain thing. I cannot disagree with math, or science, but I can and will disagree when someone tells me something is non-relativistically moral/immoral.