Logic AS morality.

[Kuroneko]

This isn't from my book. I cut and pasted this from a LECTURE from a university webpage BY a professor of Ethics, so I highly doubt it's "ass-backwards," at least in the sense that it provides basic information. I don't agree with the Objective = "teh ueber," but the basic info is very reliable. THIS is what objectivism is, and my book agrees.

My statement may have been too strong, but if you refer to philosophical publications which actually defend ethical objectivism, you would realize that what actual objectivists define objectivism far differently than the definition you quote.

What htey mean by spirit realm is either a "real of perfect moral forms" or the basic universe. Peolple discover these moral principles that exist independently of humanity. That's what ethicists agree is objectivism.

What you describe is called realism, not objectivism. Realism implies objectivism, but the converse is not the case. It's like defining elephants as a grey creatures with such-and-such properties, and completely ignoring that some elephants are white.

Ethical objectivists are concerned about the nature of valid moral principles, i.e., those that are proper guides to action, whereas the definition you quoted commits to Truth of its moral principles, which is something substantially more. It is exactly this kind of situation that is the reason why philosophers have differentiated objectivism from realism.

I agree that's all they should do, but that isn't all they do do as I have just shown. They say it comes either from some type of Form OR discovered from the universe. It is explicitly NOT created by humans.

No, they do not. As I've said, actual essays by philosophers defending objectivism do not claim any such thing, nor is a commitment to 'Forms' implied in any way. Proponents of this view are, for example, Louis Pojman and R.M. Hare.

Well. I have heard of meta-ethics, and it's the study of not what ought to be, but where morals come from. Are they human creations or are they external to humans. They say they are external to humans and discovered.

An oversimplification of the objectivist position. My argument proves that even if morality is a function of human interests (a view I agree with, actually), it does not invalidate objectivism. In fact, if there are sufficiently basic interests that are part of a common human nature, this view actually requires objectivism. The key distinction is that validity only requires results of adherence to those principles, whereas requring objective truth is metaphysical realist baloney.

I highly doubt the definition in a majority of sources I have is wrong, and I also doubt that ethical philosophers fail to understand what Ethics is.
Since most use the same definition, or a close varient, I have no option but to trust it.

Hum. The entry for moral relativism in the [url=http://plato.stanford.edu]Stanford Ency

[Kuroneko]

The previous post was accidental. This is the reply to the last segment.

I highly doubt the definition in a majority of sources I have is wrong, and I also doubt that ethical philosophers fail to understand what Ethics is.
Since most use the same definition, or a close varient, I have no option but to trust it.

I'm in favor of letting the actual proponents of ethical objectivism define what their position is. Hare, for example, denies that moral principles have truth value at all, but they do have validity, in the form of practical results of their application. Pojman assumes essentially this view for his defense of ethical objectivism.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

My statement may have been too strong, but if you refer to philosophical publications which actually defend ethical objectivism, you would realize that what actual objectivists define objectivism far differently than the definition you quote

That was a pro-objectivism page though... AHHHHH my head exploded lol.

An oversimplification of the objectivist position. My argument proves that even if morality is a function of human interests (a view I agree with, actually), it does not invalidate objectivism.

I agree. YOu can have it that happens to suit your interests.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

Wong (1996) has argued that more than one morality may be true, but there are limits on which moralities are true. The first point is a form of metaethical relativism: It says one morality may be true for one society and a conflicting morality may be true for another society. Hence, there is no one objectively correct morality for all societies. The second point, however, is a concession to moral objectivism. It acknowledges that objective factors concerning human nature and the human situation should determine whether or not, or to what extent, a given morality could be one of the true ones.

I went to the site, and they have a lot of stuff there. I didn't go to stanford site before; itw as a diffefent college.

It seems that they teach normative/AND meta-ethical relativism as the same thing. One package. They don't really teach meta-ethics, per se. THey only sAY it's a class on normative ethics.

COnventional Relativism/Subjectivism.

That's why maybe I am not on the same plain as you. I wish they would have a class in it. It might answer some questions. For example, they there can be both relativism AND objectivism together, whereas my book and professor say they are complete, polar opposites that can't be reconciled.

They gave an example.

Morality can be relative to the society and created by it, but it can be subject to natural concerns and situations. That's the exact opposite of what's taught in the class.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

It seems like a big definition game and horridy inaccurate teaching/publication methods. Everyone has his own idea and propogates it, and the definitions aren't standard. I even see different definitions of the purpose of morality.

[Kuroneko]

Wong (1996) has argued that more than one morality may be true, but there are limits on which moralities are true. The first point is a form of metaethical relativism: It says one morality may be true for one society and a conflicting morality may be true for another society. Hence, there is no one objectively correct morality for all societies. The second point, however, is a concession to moral objectivism. It acknowledges that objective factors concerning human nature and the human situation should determine whether or not, or to what extent, a given morality could be one of the true ones.

Interesting.

That's why maybe I am not on the same plain as you. I wish they would have a class in it. It might answer some questions. For example, they there can be both relativism AND objectivism together, whereas my book and professor say they are complete, polar opposites that can't be reconciled. ...

Morality can be relative to the society and created by it, but it can be subject to natural concerns and situations. That's the exact opposite of what's taught in the class.

No, relativism and objectivism are still opposed, because objectivism is really about there being "at least one" objective, universal moral principle. Wong is simply argues for moralities which contain a mixture of relativist and objectivist principles (such moralities would be objectivist in the strictest sense of the word). Read two sentences down: For example, given our biological and psychological make-up, not just anything could count as a good way of life. This is essentially another version of the "common human nature" or "most significant needs" argument.

It seems like a big definition game and horridy inaccurate teaching/publication methods. Everyone has his own idea and propogates it, and the definitions aren't standard. I even see different definitions of the purpose of morality.

That's why I advocate referring to the works of philosophers who actually hold such positions, rather than works done about them, whenever that is possible. In the end, reading philosophy and reading about philosophy are not the same thing. It's akin to the difference between reading, say, a book on quantum mechanics, as compared to reading a book about quantum mechanics, although not as likely to be of the same degree. Still, there can be a substantial amount of handwaving and general fuzziness introduced in the latter.

[Bugsby]

My ethics are not objectivist. It is the belief or endorsement of a society that makes the claims valid, nothing more. The argument I gave was a response to a criticism that I have received multiple times, which is "how do you explain the recurrence of certain moral phenomena like the prohibition aginst murder?" My response to this is that these exist everywhere because every society must endorse them in order to ensure its own survival. It is the endorsement of the society that makes these valid. But the fact is that they are present in every society because of the way a society functions. That's not objectivist. That's an explanation of how subjectivism in the form of a society endorcing an ethical system can actually explain recurring ethical standards that many have used as evidence of a categorical imperative.

Remember, my definition of morality is slightly different than yours. Mine is that morality is a set of rules governing proper interaction between individuals in a society. I use this definition only because it is the best one I can think of that avoids normative concepts, which I believe are entirely irrelevant.

[Kuroneko]

My ethics are not objectivist. It is the belief or endorsement of a society that makes the claims valid, nothing more. The argument I gave was a response to a criticism that I have received multiple times, which is "how do you explain the recurrence of certain moral phenomena like the prohibition aginst murder?" ...

Aa. Well, your initial presentation did not make this clear, and I'm sorry that I misunderstood your subsequent clarification. I thought you were literally relativist, and only metaphorically nihilist, while it seems the reverse is true.

In which case, you were right in your previous post. We're just going to have to agree to disagree, because the difference is too fundamental to reconcile logically--you view ethics as a kind of history or sociology (or both), while I believe it should have some prescriptive power.

Still, it's been enjoyable, and I thank you for your time.

[lgot]

Kuroneko:

Drifting a bit;
There was different developments of moral codes due the different developments of societies, different conflicts to solve, different ways to deal with them ?
But yet, there is a short of universal code, without variations that you believe must exist beforehand any societies development ? (No intention to judge the vallue in the idea of this society is wrong because his code drifts too much from those vallues and in no intention to argue in this direction)
(I have always the notion You had a different view than mine, but seems not so different, but I would always try to call one "Moral" and other "ethic" but sometimes the effect for other's understanding is nill)

[Bugsby]

My ethics are not objectivist. It is the belief or endorsement of a society that makes the claims valid, nothing more. The argument I gave was a response to a criticism that I have received multiple times, which is "how do you explain the recurrence of certain moral phenomena like the prohibition aginst murder?" ...

Aa. Well, your initial presentation did not make this clear, and I'm sorry that I misunderstood your subsequent clarification. I thought you were literally relativist, and only metaphorically nihilist, while it seems the reverse is true.

In which case, you were right in your previous post. We're just going to have to agree to disagree, because the difference is too fundamental to reconcile logically--you view ethics as a kind of history or sociology (or both), while I believe it should have some prescriptive power.

Still, it's been enjoyable, and I thank you for your time.

Yes, an enjoyable debate. Sorry there was that misunderstanding to being with. I was getting ahead of myself in my argument, trying to anticipate your arguments and counter them before I had fully layed out my own. We cool now.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

hey bugsby, can you tell me how to PM people. If I had some questions, or wanted to run something by you, might I? How? I only have used PM several times.

[Kuroneko]

There was different developments of moral codes due the different developments of societies, different conflicts to solve, different ways to deal with them?

Yes. That is an empirical fact. Morality is a function of human needs and interests.

But yet, there is a short of universal code, without variations that you believe must exist beforehand any societies development ?

Basically, yes. That is why I am an ethical objectivist. I am convinced that there is a some core of most significant needs and interests are so fundamental that objectivist principles (i.e., those not swayed by opinions of what is moral) would serve them best. For example, evolution and related theories demonstrate that genetic diversity is a plus for any species, and may in fact prevent extinction. This is an objective fact, and one which is obviously of a significant interest to humanity. Using this, I would call doctrines of Neo-Nazism and the like to be (objectively) immoral, regardless of how many adherents believe otherwise.

As to what degree morality should be objectivist and to what degree it should allow relativist principles... well, that's the real question.

(No intention to judge the vallue in the idea of this society is wrong because his code drifts too much from those vallues and in no intention to argue in this direction)

Traditionally, ethics is the study, and morality is the practice or belief. However, there is a significant blurring of the terms.

(I have always the notion You had a different view than mine, but seems not so different, but I would always try to call one "Moral" and other "ethic" but sometimes the effect for other's understanding is nill)

What are views and what did you perceive the difference to be?

[lgot]

Basically, yes. That is why I am an ethical objectivist. I am convinced that there is a some core of most significant needs and interests are so fundamental that objectivist principles (i.e., those not swayed by opinions of what is moral) would serve them best.

Interesting. I may have understood you wrongly in the past, perhaps because When I saw you seeing "objectivist" I related to a particular model of moral rather than an moral that aim to "universal" principles (in the sense the principles must be objectivelly applied).

As to what degree morality should be objectivist and to what degree it should allow relativist principles... well, that's the real question.

Indeed.
What kind of argumentation would you use against for favorable to an argument that point that objectivism is rather religious (used not in the religion created moral, just as to the sense to not sound the belief in such ethics is not a form of faith), or that such ethics are rather platonic (one "Perfect" moral and many "copies" not perfect, not that I need to explain you this..) ?

What are views and what did you perceive the difference to be?

The Difference was basically that I understood you did not believed in such fundemental principles.
The view, as mine, is basically the moral variation due the societies needs and one fundemental principles. The minor difference is that I would call the variations, the applications as moral (actually this is not different) and ethics those fundemental principles. Reggarding the definition you gave, which is only different about the definition of ethics (I do not even imagine if they are that different and guess they are not even contraditory), I must say that here in Brazil, my ethic teacher used this deffinition. And I found Biology, Law and other different areas to use such definition (as much my personal range of knowledge is able, since I have not searched futher if it is applied in every single place). I wonder if this is because that therminology would work better with class ethics (medical code of ethic, journalism code, etc, etc)...

[Kuroneko]

Indeed.
What kind of argumentation would you use against for favorable to an argument that point that objectivism is rather religious (used not in the religion created moral, just as to the sense to not sound the belief in such ethics is not a form of faith), ...

I would say that my proposed methodology is almost-scientific. I posit that morality needs to serve some purpose (e.g., 'most significant needs and interests of humans/sapient life'), and that means that at least some of its principles could be objectively evaluated to successful they are in achieving that purpose. Full commitment to objectivism follows with the claim that some needs and interests are so fundamental that they are not subject to change. This last claim may be construed as dogmatic, but I disagree. I've given examples (whimsical-killing and Neo-Nazism) that are more a matter of objective facts--e.g., non-extinction is an implicit goal of any species. It's so true it's practically a tautology.

... or that such ethics are rather platonic (one "Perfect" moral and many "copies" not perfect, not that I need to explain you this..) ?

Eh?

Firstly, my methodology above defines morality strictly in reference to humanity or sapient life in general. Commitment to Platonism would require the assumption that their existence is a logically necessary feature of the Universe, unless it's the wholly useless kind of Platonism that requires everything conceivable to be real.

I could think of only other one argument as to why my position leads to some pseudo-Platonism, and that is through the attempt to explain the success (or failure) of moralities (for the purpose given above), since morality as conceptualized above is somewhat open to revision. Let's suppose there is a Form [the Good], which is the True morality. A possible argument would then attempt to explain the success (or failure) by comparing them to the Good. The argument then forms [an argument referencing increasing failure is analogous]:

• Greater resemblance to the Good implies greater success.
• Greater success.
• Therefore, greater resemblance to the Good.

However, affirming the consequent is fallacious.


I can find no reason why my view requires anything resembling Platonism. Unless you present an argument to this effect, I appeal to Ockham's razor.

[lgot]

I would say that my proposed methodology is almost-scientific.

Usually when I am asked about the definition of such principles, i would go near to the "do not use any kind of violence against other living being" (to resume it at best). Of course your explanation is much better build than mine here but I think you are very clear.

I can find no reason why my view requires anything resembling Platonism. Unless you present an argument to this effect, I appeal to Ockham's razor.

No argument, I was just thinking exactly in the idea of Form to be the true morality (in other word, all the principles very basic), while not to judge sucess, just existence (There is the true morality and the "simulacrum" moralities[the many versions of each culture]), but your answers is more than enough to not try to make something more complex than it should. (perhaps only when its drunks, it is past midnight or creating a romance )

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

See. Now that you answered his question, I understand your possition better, Koureneko.

My basic believe is that not ALL things are relative. Take my belief, for example.


Morality is created by culture, however culture has a direct purpose as a result of basic naturalistic needs. Culture is a tool used by groups of humans to flourish, to get along, and to work productively. It allows for survival and productivity as a species.

The way a culture does this is through the enculturation process. It teaches these values and ways to fulfill them (biological, instrumental, and integrated).

Morality is a sub-tool devised by culture and relative to culture, but not in every sense: One CAN judge a relativistic moral system based on

1. Functionality
2. Empirical Evidence

A. If the said moral belief is true or false, one judges it on if it, as a cultural tool, allows for the fulfillment of cultures desires/needs. The idea can be right/wrong, but is it logically pragmatic? If it creates cultural dysfunction, I say it isn't, since why would a culture create a tool which does the opposite of what a tool is supposed to do?

B. Is the evidence there? I believe the moral truth of a belief is relative, but a belief is only valid if it is based on justified evidence. In my opinion, the only real evidence is observation/fact. If there are no facts behind belief, there is no reason to believe in it. As well, the facts have to avoid being non-sequitor (sp). They have to pertain.

For example. YOu can't justify killiing certain individuals because they have green eyes. That is neither an important nor moral issue. The fact must be relevant to the issue at hand. How are they not allowing for the purpose of culture to take place?

I believe there can be a mix of relativism and objectivism (in a sense).

Culture is subject to it's own purpose? MOrality is a tool made to serve that purpose. If it doesn't, then I can't see it as being moral and/or practical, and you shouldn't believe it.

[Frank_Scenario]

All this talk of philosophy has roused me from a year-long slumber.

There have been attempts to formalize one sort of ethics into a logical system. Deontic logic is the result. Typically, these systems build on modal systems. Here's one such system (called D). D has operators for "not" and "if...then," like propositional logic (and you can derive conjuction, disjunction, and biconditionals). It adds as primitive symbols "O" for "it is obligatory that," "P" for "it is permissible that" and "F" for "it is forbidden that." These are defined as follows:

PA=~O~A
FA=O~A

D uses analogs of the axioms of the modal logic K, avoiding axiom M "if it is necessary that p, then p." Obviously, "it is obligatory that p" does not imply that p is the case. It adds axiom D: OA > PA. Some systems add O(OA>A). There is some debate about how deontic logics should handle iterated operators; does OOA say anything different than OA? There are also deontic analogs of other modal systems like B, S4, and S5, which add different axioms.

[Frank_Scenario]

And to address where this discussion has gone. I apologize if I'm repeating anything. I didn't see anyone saying what I'm about to say, but it's a seven page thread, and it's easy to miss things.

John Searle makes an instructive distinction in The Construction of Social Reality (and also in Mind, Language, and Society) between ontological and epistemic objectivity. For Searle, a proposition is ontologically objective iff it's about the "brute facts" of the world. Searle's figure is molecules and mountains. I'd imagine theists would also want to put statements about God in this category, and substance dualists would want to put facts about the mind here. In general, a proposition is ontologically objective iff it is true or false only in virtue of some feature of the world which does not depend on our consent. However, some things that do depend on our consent are still objective. This is epistemic objectivity. Searle's example is money; mine is usually language. I can't walk into a store, pick up some merchandise, and expect to pay using tales of adventure. I need to use money. Similarly, I can't just start typing gibberish and claim I'm using English. Both money and English exist as institutions; nothing about the underlying structure of the universe makes a dollar a dollar or a word a word. If we wanted to, we could all declare something else money, or that "outgrabe" was a word with a unique meaning. But we can't do this in isolation, and if we try, we are wrong - and objectively so.

This suggests that morality might be epistemically objective, whether or not it's ontologically objective (the latter implies the former but not vice versa, by the way). This means you can give an objective account of morality that makes no reference to any features of the universe that are independent of human construction.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

well. I according to the AAA it's not objective I thought it was funny when I brought it up in class haha.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

I like the essays of GE MORE. He's pretty well-known.

[Kuroneko]

Morality is a sub-tool devised by culture and relative to culture, but not in every sense: One CAN judge a relativistic moral system based on

1. Functionality
2. Empirical Evidence

A. [...] If it creates cultural dysfunction, I say it isn't, since why would a culture create a tool which does the opposite of what a tool is supposed to do?

B. Is the evidence there? I believe the moral truth of a belief is relative, but a belief is only valid if it is based on justified evidence. [...]

The pure relativist position would be that such judments are only possible via other moral systems. Here you can appreaciate Wong's point all the more: the very possibility of such judgements as you describe requires there can be objective criteria. For example, although cultural dysfunction is something very hard to pin down in precise terms, its extremizations are very apparent--dwindling population, civil wars, etc.--and can be objectively measured.

I believe there can be a mix of relativism and objectivism (in a sense).

I agree. However. the core objectivist claim is that there are some principles [ethics], and criteria for judging them [metaethics], that are objective (not influenced by opinion), not that all of them are.

John Searle makes an instructive distinction in The Construction of Social Reality (and also in Mind, Language, and Society) between ontological and epistemic objectivity. For Searle, a proposition is ontologically objective iff it's about the "brute facts" of the world. Searle's figure is molecules and mountains. [...]

For the scientific anti-realist, however, the former is only epistemically objective. But that doesn't change your main point.

This suggests that morality might be epistemically objective, whether or not it's ontologically objective (the latter implies the former but not vice versa, by the way). [...]

I like your account of it. It cuts right to the (minimal) objectivist vs. realist distinction in ethics in a very clear way. Only the latter is commits to the claim that morality is ontologically objective.