Russia: That is only what we WANTED you to think, comrade!!!

[Kuroneko]

Eisenhower had the luxury of a rather potent air-defense and planned missile defenses (as did Kennedy before ARADCOM's dismantlement, ABM's cancellation and before the rise of the ICBM) so he could more comfortably consider nuclear first strike without risking MAD (as an effect rather as policy).

However, from a MAD standpoint, 'the rise of the ICBM' was considerably later than Einsenhower. Under Kennedy, the Soviets had trouble making their warhead smaller, and had virtually no active ICBMs in the very early 1960s, while the US stockpile approached two hundred, and were rapidly making more. That is why even Kennedy could consider nuclear first strike without MAD (although arguably it was likely that he personally never do it, he obviously wasn't around for his full term). It was not at all that they considered Russian retaliation nonexistent, but that they considered the Soviet ICBM capability so small that they were apparently willing to take the possibility of being hit regadless.

[phongn]

The "rise of the ICBM" was in reference to the Kennedy Administration, not Eisenhower's. I've seen some numbers on correlation of forces between the US and the USSR during the Cuban Missile Crisis; the overwhelming American superiority in nuclear arms is a bit amazing.

[Kuroneko]

The "rise of the ICBM" was in reference to the Kennedy Administration, not Eisenhower's. I've seen some numbers on correlation of forces between the US and the USSR during the Cuban Missile Crisis; the overwhelming American superiority in nuclear arms is a bit amazing.

Yes, but the relevant part (the mutually in MAD) of "rise of the ICBM" was even later than the Kennedy Administration, since under Kennedy it was so one-sided that they literally thought they may win a first strike without MAD. The 'window of opportunity' shown in the Burris memorandum was actually planned for Dec. 1963, and Soviets did not have significant ICBM numbers until even later.

[phongn]

Ah, okay. I misunderstood you a bit there.

[MKSheppard]

Penetrating modern ABM defences?! But but but... that's supposed to be impossible —the First Church of NMD says so.

Yes, because we all know those ABM missiles are going to remain at Block I
status for the next twenty years or so.

[Patrick Degan]

Penetrating modern ABM defences?! But but but... that's supposed to be impossible —the First Church of NMD says so.

Yes, because we all know those ABM missiles are going to remain at Block I
status for the next twenty years or so.

And we all know how there's never any such thing as R&D on both sides of an arms race...

[MKSheppard]

And we all know how there's never any such thing as R&D on both sides of an arms race...

And we all know that ICBMs will be able to carry an unlimited number of penaids with no degradation of warhead throw capability.

[Patrick Degan]

And we all know how there's never any such thing as R&D on both sides of an arms race...

And we all know that ICBMs will be able to carry an unlimited number of penaids with no degradation of warhead throw capability.

And we all know that it will never occur to anybody to devise multiple methods of attack to overwhelm an NMD system...

[MKSheppard]

And we all know that it will never occur to anybody to devise multiple methods of attack to overwhelm an NMD system...

And we all know that the NMD system will only use one system to
destroy incoming warheads.

[Patrick Degan]

And we all know that it will never occur to anybody to devise multiple methods of attack to overwhelm an NMD system...

And we all know that the NMD system will only use one system to
destroy incoming warheads.

And we all know how the designers of a counter to NMD won't ever take that into account...

[MKSheppard]

And we all know how the designers of a counter to NMD won't ever take that into account...

And we all know it's possible to counter against everything with no loss in performance or extra expense...

The F-117 is optimised to evade the specific radar bands used by fire control radars, while the B-2 is optimised against search radar bands. Which means
given a reasonably powerful radar opposite of that the plane is countering,
you can track them.

[Patrick Degan]

And we all know how the designers of a counter to NMD won't ever take that into account...

And we all know it's possible to counter against everything with no loss in performance or extra expense...

In much the same way that we know it's possible to build everything with no loss in performance or extra expense. Works both ways, actually.

[MKSheppard]

In much the same way that we know it's possible to build everything with no loss in performance or extra expense. Works both ways, actually.

I'm not exactly getting what you're trying to say here Degan. You say it's
possible to build everything of what? Even if you build a re-entry vehicle
that's invisible to say L-Band radar, the X-Band systems will pick it up, and so on.

[Patrick Degan]

In much the same way that we know it's possible to build everything with no loss in performance or extra expense. Works both ways, actually.

I'm not exactly getting what you're trying to say here Degan. You say it's
possible to build everything of what? Even if you build a re-entry vehicle
that's invisible to say L-Band radar, the X-Band systems will pick it up, and so on.

Simple —if it's not possible to build an anti-NMD offence which won't suffer performance-loss or extra expense, the same condition applies to the building of an NMD system as well. It will not be able to effectively cover every possible avenue of attack efficently and will be horrendously expensive in the attempt to do so. So cease the wanking, Shep, and start actually thinking through what you would do if you were a commander on the Other Side faced with the task of devising a way to overcome an NMD array.

[MKSheppard]

Simple —if it's not possible to build an anti-NMD offence which won't suffer performance-loss or extra expense, the same condition applies to the building of an NMD system as well. It will not be able to effectively cover every possible avenue of attack efficently and will be horrendously expensive in the attempt to do so.

Actually No. The US is currently running a multiple route system right now easily.

Boeing Successfully Tests ABL Laser

The U.S Army and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) announced today it has completed a successful
intercept test flight of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile defense missile system at White
Sands Missile Range, N.M. Preliminary test data indicates both targets were intercepted and mission
objectives were achieved.

On October 22, 2004, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) received the first sea-based interceptor missile that
will be carried by some of the U.S. Navy’s Aegis-class cruisers. This was the first of five Standard Missile 3
(SM-3) interceptors scheduled for delivery by the end of this year.

And there are other systems in the work, a simple perusal of the MDA's site Here will
show that there are multiple options for each phase of flight, Boost, Midcourse, and Terminal.

So cease the wanking, Shep, and start actually thinking through what you would do if you were a commander on the Other Side faced with the task of devising a way to overcome an NMD array.

Ballistic Missiles as a delivery system are soon to be dead. It will become just too cost-inefficient to use them. Smuggling a nuclear weapon
onto US soil is a possibility, but since 9/11 there's been a massive deployment of radiological detectors with US Customs.

We've often commented on the implausibility of the smuggled nuke scenario. At the conference I've been visiting, the company that makes some of the detection equipment used to check for covert nuclear devices had been allowe dto show the gear. One was a detector that can pick up, localize and identify any radioactive material on a fully-loaded, normal-sized container ship - while going past said ship on a small craft. The company has sold 7,000 of them to the appropriate authorities including the Coastguard. Do you know what visits every merchant ship entering a US Port? A Coastguard small craft carrying a pilot.

And there's always the possiblity of losing the weapon en route, which is anathema to most nation states, which desire positive control
of their nukes.

Cruise missiles are another possibility. But their time in their current incarnation is soon to be over, as even in the most primitive air defence
arenas such as Iraq after we shot the hell out of their ADA network, they were still being shot down in unacceptably high rates with primitive
AAA defenses.

Submarine delivered weapons are a very real possibility. As it is, only the French, British, and Russians could possibly
come close to achieving this end, as anyone else would be detected due to the high noise levels of their nuke boats,
or by the simple necessity of having to run the diesel engines en route to recharge the batteries if the submarine
was conventionally powered.

Nobody really knows what the next nuclear deterrence system will be once ICBMs are obsolete; it's said that we are on the last
generation of ICBMS in the world. What is a good candidate to replace them? I think it wil be a derivative of this.

Mach 10+ airbreathing hypersonic cruise missiles powered by scramjets. Any point on Earth in a couple of hours. It should be
interesting to see the air defence networks response to such a threat. Luckily for us....

Aerothermic heating, caused by the friction of air passing the weapon body, is one area of
intensive research. At Mach 4, as the hypersonic weapon passes through the lower atmosphere in the terminal phase of
its flight, its surface reaches about 1200 degrees Fahrenheit. This level is within the tolerance range of new titanium and
inconel materials. At Mach 6, however, the surface temperatures exceed 2800 F and at Mach 8 over 5600 F; skin materials,
as well as internal temperature control, become a much larger issue.

Definitely beyond the means of a pissant country like North Korea. Once the US NMD shield has been sufficiently thickened by oh,
2010 or so, to incorporate all those multiple layers; nothing short of a massive strike with most of the ICBMs in the Russian arsenal
being launched would be able to have a realistic chance of getting through the multiple layers. That effectively removes China's
nuclear blackmail threat against South Korea, Japan, and the US to force a fait accompli with the reunification of Taiwan by
Chinese arms in the future.

So the world will not be capabul of being destroyed in thirty minutes, and Political leaders will have a chance of actually having
time to think through and negotiate complex issues rather than being forced to make world-shaking decisions in the time
it takes for a pizza to be delivered. And of course, the weapons will be capabul of being shot down, so the leaders do not have
to make the one flies, they all fly decision.

[Patrick Degan]

Sigh:

The new missile is only a concept at the moment, but it's already been dubbed "Minuteman IV", and would likely be based on the existing Minuteman III design: Like the Topol-M, the new missile would probably be designed to penetrate modern ABM defences.

The Pentagon so believes in the concept of the "impenetrable" NMD that they're already contemplating a new ICBM designed to penetrate an analogous system deployed by somebody else. Never mind that in history, each and every "ultimate, unanswerable weapon" has proven to be quite answerable and less-than-ultimate.

But by all means, Shep, continue to believe in the NMD sales-pitch...

[Patrick Degan]

Don't go counting the ABLs just yet.

From the .pdf file NMDEXEC.pdf found under Pentagon Cheats Anti-Missile Wargame —click the link underlined as "essentially impossible":

14. The Airborne Laser (ABL) has been designed to intercept theater ballistic missiles and is scheduled to achieve initial operational capability in about 10 years. It could offer some capability for intercepting ICBMs, but would have less range than large ground based hit-to-kill interceptors. ABL aircraft could be rapidly deployed, but several ABL aircraft, as well as tanker support aircraft and defensive air cover, would be required to maintain one ABL aircraft continuously on station. While the ABL has some self-defense capability, without supporting tactical air cover ABL aircraft would be vulnerable to attack by enemy aircraft or surface-to-air missiles.

• Performance requirements for the ABL are driven largely by the construction materials of the missile and the distance to the target missile —engagement time and uncertainty about the target's trajectory are not issues (21).

• The laser fluence needed to disable ICBMs is currently rather uncertain, making it difficult to estimate accurately the ABL's range if used against ICBMs. The ABL's range is expected to be roughly similar to that of the modest-sized interceptors that could be carried by aircraft (21.5). If so, it could engage only long-burning liquid-propellant ICBMs launched form geographically small, accessible countries (8.3-8.5).

• Defense would be possible using the ABL only if it can be stationed within 600 kilometers of the intercept point of a liquid-propellant missile or within 300 kilometers of the intercept point of a solid-propellant missile. The ABL's laser beam would have to heat an ICBM for several seconds to disable it; hence ABL engagements would have to be timed to avoid the brief periods during which one stage burns out and is discarded as the next ignites (8.7).

• The ABL would have substantial ability to defend the U.S. against liquid-propellant ICBMs launched from North Korea; however, it would have no utility in defending the U.S. against these missiles launched from geographically large, less-vulnerable countries such as Iran. Because of the greater heat resistance of solid-propellant missiles, the ABL could not defend against these missiles launched from either North Korea or Iran (8.3-8.5).

• The ABL could not disable nuclear warheads or biological or chemical submunitions that have been hardened to survive re-entry at ICBM speeds (20.1).

It goes without saying that this defence would be useless for stopping Topol-Ms launching from deep inside Russian territory.

Never mind that the system may not even be deployable:

AIRBORNE LASER IN TROUBLE AGAIN

The star-crossed Airborne Laser program could be headed for a big funding cut, and maybe even elimination, Aviation Week reports.

Since the 80's, the U.S. military has toyed with putting a chemical laser on board a commercial jumbo jet, and using that plane to defend against enemy missile attacks. But putting that idea into action has been beyond difficult. Keeping the Airborne Laser's weight down has been a big, fat challenge -- especially with 1,200 gallons of chemicals needed to fire the laser. Test flights have been pushed back, over and over again.

Now, Aviation Week says, the Defense Department is looking to restructure the program, and pare back its budget. Nearly $600 million is supposed to be poured into the Airborne Laser this fiscal year.

"The option of cancelling the program outright" has been raised by Pentagon planners. But the "prevailing view," so far, is to keep the Airborne Laser's near-term work intact, and scale back more future-facing efforts.

As Aviation Week notes, "The Pentagon has already awarded Boeing a contact for design work on a second 747-400F that would be converted into a laser carrier. But the actual aircraft order may be delayed."

And:

excerpt:

TEST & EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

DOT&E has several concerns regarding ABL's potential effectiveness. The effects of atmospheric turbulence and countermeasures may decrease the laser's lethal engagement range and force the ABL platform to move closer to enemy anti-air defenses. In addition, the interoperability aspects of ABL testing, including cross-cueing and damage assessment of successful intercepts and support of other TMD systems, need to be fully explored through simulation and demonstration. These and other issues will continue to be tracked by DOT&E. DOT&E has noted specific technical challenges faced by ABL, including the:

* Development of an autonomous surveillance system onboard the ABL that provides timely, accurate missile targeting information required to meet stressing ABL engagement timelines.

* Contractor's ability to build Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser flight modules that provide adequate power for the operational system and are sufficiently low weight to fit within the current aircraft platform capabilities.

* Development and demonstration of a laser beam compensation and tracking system that meets stringent pointing and tracking requirements for engaging ballistic missiles.

* Demonstration of a fully capable BM/C4I system in the PDRR system that interacts in real-time with other TMD systems for cross-cueing and fire control.

* Ability of the contractor to successfully integrate all of the above systems into the finite weight and volume limitations of the 747-400 aircraft.

* ABL's ability to meet the reliability and maintainability requirements without excessive contractor support.

* Limitations and vulnerabilities of the planned ABL lethality mechanisms against all threat missiles, and the potential effects and responses to predicted enemy countermeasures.

In general, the $25 million FY99 congressional cut slipped most ABL milestones by approximately one year. Risk reduction activities were added to PDRR, but current ABL acquisition strategy remains essentially unchanged; PDRR simply takes place over a longer period of time. The risk reduction efforts added by the Air Force after ATP-1 will serve to demonstrate key ABL operational capabilities through ground testing at the component level as soon as possible.

The top-level ABL operational issue is whether it can meet its Probability of Kill and weapon range requirements in operationally representative scenarios using laser dwell times that support multiple, near simultaneous launches and conserve laser fuels. An important point related to this issue is that the ABL Operational Requirements Document does not currently require ABL to have the capability to handle multiple, near simultaneous theater ballistic missile launches, although the ABL Technical Requirements Document does. This requirement will need to be addressed at future program milestones, and an update to the Operational Requirements Document is expected.

Since the ABL is a radically new weapon system, it is a high-risk development program. There is a significant amount of test activity planned for PDRR. These tests will address the fundamental ABL issues of atmospheric turbulence and compensation, lethality, laser development, and performance. As the system is developed and integrated, tests will demonstrate, in a logical progression, increased capability. In light of these challenges, DOT&E has several concerns regarding the adequacy of the test program planned for ABL. A primary concern is that the EMD phase is very short (24 months); six months have been planned for IOT&E during EMD. Unless tremendous maturity can be demonstrated during PDRR, this compressed schedule adds unnecessary risk to the EMD phase. The ABL schedule is driven by a high risk, success oriented, development program that underestimates the amount of testing required to verify integration and operation of sub-systems (laser generation, target detection, beam control, and BM/C4I) onto the aircraft, as well as the operational utility of the aircraft. Although EMD is still several years away, more definitive test planning for developmental and operational testing must begin now. DOT&E will closely monitor these test activities to ensure that, where possible, risk is reduced. In accordance with DOT&E concerns, we would highlight the following areas:

* Although the PDRR contains a reasonable amount of testing, the pace of test activity is very ambitious and success-oriented. For example, the program plans on conducting 79 engagements during PDRR, but there will only be approximately 14 flight-test months available. Of these 79 engagements, 36 will involve the Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser weapon, with only ten months available between final integration in May 2003 and the Milestone II scheduled for March 2004.

* The EMD schedule is not considered executable as planned. Detailed EMD test planning has not begun, but only two years have been allocated for the entire EMD phase. Fabrication, assembly, and integration of the EMD system will take place during this two-year period, leaving the remaining time to conduct DT&E and OT&E before Milestone III. The short EMD schedule was originally justified on the basis that the PDRR and EMD systems would be very similar, but due to cost and performance trades, the two system designs are diverging.

* The ABL STAR lists approximately 30 missiles that the ABL must effectively negate. These missiles include a diverse range of operating characteristics, including liquid and solid-fueled, single and multi-stage, and metal and composite-body missiles. End-to-end testing may be limited to only one or two of these missile types. Developing surrogates for all threats in the STAR is a costly and unlikely option. Thus, data will have to come from other sources, including laboratory and sub-scale ground testing and modeling and simulation. Many lethality test activities are planned, but a comprehensive lethality plan should be developed to ensure that test activities support the data requirements in the overall test plan.

Operational suitability is an important focus on the ABL because it implements many state-of-the-art technologies. Indeed, many of the ABL technologies, such as high-energy gas lasers and optics, have been traditionally employed in laboratory environments and not on operational, flying military systems. This includes toxic chemicals and attendant safety procedures. The test teams in both PDRR and EMD must ensure attention to operational suitability. The EMD phase must contain enough testing to ensure that suitability can be adequately evaluated.

DOT&E is working with the ABL program office to ensure that critical data concerning ABL's projected performance are available at planned program decision points. DOT&E will continually assess and analyze the technical challenges to ABL to ensure, as possible, that developmental risk is minimized. ABL technical challenges include:

* Effects of atmospheric and airframe generated boundary layer turbulence and the ability of adaptive optics to counteract these effects in a real-time, closed-loop manner against a non-cooperative target.

* Integration of highly sensitive optical instruments into a dynamically vibrating air platform.

* Software development, integration, and testing of the critical ABL BM/C4I system.

* Validation of ABL's potential to achieve expected kill mechanisms against the full spectrum of threats, launch scenarios, countermeasures, and missile dynamics.

Nevermind the lack of anything approaching a realistic range of tests under accurately-staged war conditions:

excerpt:

TEST & EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

Overall, the PDRR program contains reasonable amounts and types of tests, but the schedule is ambitious and clearly success-oriented. Although the proposed EMD schedule has increased from 2 to 4 years since last report, ABL remains a high-technical risk program, and the aggressive schedule allows for no significant problems or test failures. The abbreviated EMD phase was originally justified because the PDRR and EMD systems were assumed to be scalable, identical except for the number of laser modules and weight reduction of basic module design. However, the PDRR and EMD designs are beginning to differ more significantly, and further design changes may be required in the future. The current EMD plan may result in a high degree of concurrency between the PDRR and EMD phases, which would increase risk, and might not provide adequate time to transfer all lessons learned during PDRR testing into the EMD design. When compared to other major acquisition programs that are less complex, the 4-year EMD program is relatively short.

There will be significant challenges involved in adequately testing and evaluating ABL. Specific concerns include the following:

* It will be difficult to test the ABL against an appropriate mix of threat targets the ABL is required to negate. The ABL System Threat Assessment Report (STAR) lists approximately 30 threats that the ABL is required to negate. These missiles include a diverse range of physical and operating characteristics. However, of the various combinations of physical and operating characteristics, it is unlikely that more than one or two of these missiles types will be available for testing, and it is unclear how the program will demonstrate effectiveness against the array of different threat missile types. The Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E) lethality strategy must address targets that will not be included in the flight test program.

* It may be difficult and/or cost prohibitive to perform end-to-end operational tests that cover all of the important parameters of the ABL operating environment. These parameters include range, level of turbulence, azimuth and elevation angles, day and night engagements, and the presence of clouds and other atmospheric conditions.

* Likely countermeasures that reduce ABL's effectiveness need to be identified and included in ABL's test and evaluation program.

* The ABL survivability must be addressed. Early understanding of the threats to the ABL system and ABL system vulnerabilities will be crucial for development of an executable LFT&E strategy for survivability.

* Producing a system that is operationally suitable will be a challenge. The ABL system will have new and unique maintenance requirements compared to other airborne military systems. Thus, adequately assessing the reliability, maintainability, availability, safety, and the required logistics support of the ABL in operationally realistic conditions is an important part of the OT&E.

Or the possibility of the simplest of counters being employed against a complex system, as this Aviation Week & Space Technology excerpt points out:

excerpt:

The Pentagon's midcourse national missile defense program has been sharply criticized for countermeasures vulnerability.

But similar complaints could come up for other missile defense approaches, as well. "Boost-phase intercept has some fairly straightforward countermeasures," said Philip E. Coyle, former director for Pentagon operational test and evaluation. One of the easiest ways to deal with the laser defenses would be to put a reflective coating on the missile that would dissipate energy, he said.

Furthermore, a missile defense system would have to be able to categorize the rocket to distinguish a missile from a satellite launcher. "You can disguise the shape or the radiance of the plume" to make a missile look like a peaceful rocket, he indicated. The scope of the countermeasures problem is being investigated by the American Physical Society, which expects to publish a report highlighting vulnerabilities in several months.

One of the greatest challenges for BPI efforts is that everything from launch detection to intercept has to be completed in a few minutes. With a maximum of 5 min., "that's not a lot of time to intercept a boosting rocket," Kadish acknowledged.

"The timelines are very short and that is a problem," one aerospace industry official emphasized. The system "would have to be a totally computerized system, except perhaps for a default mode" in which an engagement can be called off, he added. But a high degree of automation may raise concerns about inadvertently destroying an unintended object.

In short, people in our own country are already conceiving the various methods ABL-based defences and an NMD system can be circumvented or overwhelmed. It's not an impossible exercise. And this is in addition to problems which may render the system undeployable, or lacking in verifiable certainty that the thing will work as advertised.

[Chris OFarrell]

*bursts out laughing*

Sorry. But Mark and Patrick...reading you two going at it with one sentace replies with the same 'rolleyes' graphic over and over and over...it just cracks me up.

[Justforfun000]

Besides all this technical shit, I want to know what people think about Russia ITSELF. I rarely pay attention to the news in detail, and I haven't been boning up on foreign policy a lot either except for major headlines throughout the years.

The US and Russia seem to be "friends", and it's been a LONG time since there was any truly major dispute between them. Does anyone think it's possible that this could change and they could revert to being a major threat? Do you think the communism that drove them is dead and gone? Are they "enlightened" enough to be the Eurasian's equivalent of the US (if they ever get their economy going strong)?

I would hope that this would ultimately be the case as we have enough problems with Islamic fundie regimes, and that absolutely nutbar Nork Korea country.

Actually, that's something else I don't quite understand. Isn't there some kind of global law against allowing a country to be run by a dictator that is so severely repressing millions of people? If it's moral to remove Saddam, why not Kim Jong Il?

[frigidmagi]

The US and Russia seem to be "friends", and it's been a LONG time since there was any truly major dispute between them. Does anyone think it's possible that this could change and they could revert to being a major threat? Do you think the communism that drove them is dead and gone? Are they "enlightened" enough to be the Eurasian's equivalent of the US (if they ever get their economy going strong)?

Putin (President of Russia) seems to be eyeing the throne of the old Czars, he recently outlawed governor elections and made them an appointment postion, for example. Old Vlad is a cold, sneaky, smart, bastard if it's good for him to make the US into an enemey he'll do it. The only real thing keeping the US and Russia togather is common threats and interest, the War on Terror and the EU for example.

Isn't there some kind of global law against allowing a country to be run by a dictator that is so severely repressing millions of people?

We live in a world where China is a perament member of the UN security counsil and Sudan is on the Human Rights Comission. That means no.

If it's moral to remove Saddam, why not Kim Jong Il?

It's not a question of morals. Saddam could be taken out with minium damage to the surronding nations. Any moves against N Korea ends up in thousands of arty shells slamming into Seoul and possibly a nuclear device hitting Tokyo. Right now no one wants to make that trade and I don't blame them.

And last time we fought N Korea a million screaming Chinese jumped in, while Bejing isn't happy with Kimmy right now, are they pissed off enough to trade him in for a unified Korea with US solders in it?

[Justforfun000]

Putin (President of Russia) seems to be eyeing the throne of the old Czars, he recently outlawed governor elections and made them an appointment postion, for example. Old Vlad is a cold, sneaky, smart, bastard if it's good for him to make the US into an enemey he'll do it. The only real thing keeping the US and Russia togather is common threats and interest, the War on Terror and the EU for example.

Hmmm, but don't you think that common interest also includes keeping the States as a friend? There really is NO benefit I can think of in having the worlds only Superpower as an enemy....

Besides, now that they are enjoying the wonders of democracy, why would they want a differing system?

Seriously though, would the people in Russia stand for a return to hostilities?

We live in a world where China is a perament member of the UN security counsil and Sudan is on the Human Rights Comission. That means no.

Well there should be dammit!! We should be able to go in and oust these dictators and force everyone to follow OUR way. The RIGHT way. The ONLY way. The CHRISTIAN way that is the worlds best chance at morality and...oops. Sorry. Got possessed by a disincarnate fundie for a sec.

It's not a question of morals. Saddam could be taken out with minium damage to the surronding nations. Any moves against N Korea ends up in thousands of arty shells slamming into Seoul and possibly a nuclear device hitting Tokyo. Right now no one wants to make that trade and I don't blame them.

And last time we fought N Korea a million screaming Chinese jumped in, while Bejing isn't happy with Kimmy right now, are they pissed off enough to trade him in for a unified Korea with US solders in it?

Yes, I was a little curious about this though... If it keeps going as it IS, are we not going to have much choice? I suppose to simply say you can't make an omelet without breaking some eggs would be callous inn itself, but is it not somewhat true? War is hell, but how can that country be allowed to continue as it is? Even though China is still communist, they still barely compare to North Korea in the human rights violations dept. They are also slowly absorbing democratic ways of thinking.

North Korea is so self-contained and repressed, there is absolutely NO freedom for anyone. It's disgusting. Is there any way of painlessly assasinating the leader? Or being able to simply aim a massive strike at all major sites with weapons, government buildings, etc?

Of course civilian casualties would be inevitable, wouldn't they all be better off after?

I'm just throwing out speculation here. I'd enjoy some debate on this.

[frigidmagi]

Hmmm, but don't you think that common interest also includes keeping the States as a friend?

Not necessary, China and the US are hardly friends and yet we cooperate.

Besides, now that they are enjoying the wonders of democracy, why would they want a differing system?

Dictatorships rarely give the people under them a choice.

Well there should be dammit!! We should be able to go in and oust these dictators and force everyone to follow OUR way. The RIGHT way. The ONLY way. The CHRISTIAN way that is the worlds best chance at morality and...oops. Sorry. Got possessed by a disincarnate fundie for a sec.

Yes, how dare we force these ideas of people having rights and chosing their leaders in a free elections. We are such bastards.

War is hell, but how can that country be allowed to continue as it is?

So you volunteering to move into downtown Tokyo when the war starts? N Korea has 4 million riflemen and is a mountainous nation. That means footsolders are required, where are we to get them? It's easy to shrug and say war is hell when your cities aren't the ones facing instant sunshine treatment. Iraq taught to sit down and think it through before starting something that can't be stopped.

Even though China is still communist, they still barely compare to North Korea in the human rights violations dept. They are also slowly absorbing democratic ways of thinking.

Learning business modes is not learning democracy. I suggest you take look around and see just how bad the Bejing government is at times. I'm afraid you're indulging in wishful thinking.

[Justforfun000]

So you volunteering to move into downtown Tokyo when the war starts? N Korea has 4 million riflemen and is a mountainous nation. That means footsolders are required, where are we to get them? It's easy to shrug and say war is hell when your cities aren't the ones facing instant sunshine treatment. Iraq taught to sit down and think it through before starting something that can't be stopped.

Yah really. Good point.

Funny too, I just got offered a singing job in Japan. lol.

Of course I wasn't suggesting THAT route. That's why I was trying to think of alternatives to stripping them of their weapons capabilities before they could launch any strikes.

I'm afraid you're indulging in wishful thinking.

*sigh*. I suppose you're right.

What CAN we do with NK then? Surely to God it would be terrible for the regime to go on forever...

[Ma Deuce]

Not necessary, China and the US are hardly friends and yet we cooperate.

Just as Russia and China cooperate to some degree (i.e, the military hardware Russia has been selling to them over the last decade), yet there's a reason Russia stations the bulk of it's conventional forces in the Far East...

[Gandalf]

What CAN we do with NK then? Surely to God it would be terrible for the regime to go on forever...

Right now the best hope is to sit back and hope the regime just crumbles.