Russia: That is only what we WANTED you to think, comrade!!!

MKSheppard · Post by **MKSheppard** » 2004-11-25 12:43am

Patrick Degan wrote:It goes without saying that this defence would be useless for stopping Topol-Ms launching from deep inside Russian territory.

Which is why we have more than just ABL to defend against ICBMs.

Never mind that the system may not even be deployable:

And there's no date linked to this at all. For all we know it's from 2003, not now.

Nevermind the lack of anything approaching a realistic range of tests under accurately-staged war conditions:

Actually, the tests are working. In order to determine if the proximity fuze of the interceptor works, it has to be tested in real world
conditions, of high stress vibrations from launch, the heat and radiation of space, etc. Now, to do this, the proximity fuse has to
actually pass near the target so we know it works. Hence why we make it so that the intercept happens, so we do not piss away
the cost of that test.

And the Russians already have an operational system based on Hit-to-Kill.

Linka

Jane’s Information Group
Russia’s newest missile defense system, the Samoderzhets, a variant of the S-400, may incorporate
an interceptor which is currently used by the proven S-300V system, according to the Vremya Novostei
Russian newspaper, cited by Jane’s Missiles and Rockets. The Samoderzhets or “Autocrat” system
is said to be “fifth-generation,” one step beyond the “fourth-generation,” and currently state-of-the-art
S-400 interceptor. The Samoderzhets is apparently not Russia’s most advanced system coming—another
system is expected in 2012—but may rather be for export.

Specifically, the Samoderzherts system may use the same 9M96 and 9M96/2 missile interceptors
currently deployed on the S-400, as well as the longer range 9M82M interceptor used by the S-300VM.
The 9M82M interceptor is said to have a maximum range of 200km and can intercept ballistic missiles
with a reentry speed of 4.5km per second.

******************

But similar complaints could come up for other missile defense approaches, as well. "Boost-phase intercept has some fairly straightforward countermeasures," said Philip E. Coyle, former director for Pentagon operational test and evaluation. One of the easiest ways to deal with the laser defenses would be to put a reflective coating on the missile that would dissipate energy, he said.

BWHA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA

*Gasps*

BWHA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA

Seer Stuart wrote:I mentioned it again on the Bad Astronomy Board. Basically what happened was that the old idea about mirroring the outside of a missile against a laser reared its ugly head again. At that time, we had a huge amount of money to get rid of (the problem was we were convincing the Russians that there were black programs that were producing incredibly advanced science all over the place and we had to make money disappear to "fund" them). Anyway, the boys bought a really super-duper mirror, the sort of thing that gets put in super-telescopes and other high-grade optics and hit it with a laser.

It exploded.

It didn't just sag or melt, it blew up. The reason was that it heated so quickly it set up thermal stresses in the glass and the thing just shattered. Apparently, it was quite hairy in the test room. Bits flying around everywhere. That was the end of the "mirror the missiles" theory. It's about due to reappear again. I notice that the old "oh just put some mylar balloons in as decoys" has cropped up again as well.

Seer Stuart on Bad Astronomy wrote:A couple of decades ago we tested a (by the standards of the time) high-energy laser against the finest grade mirror money could buy. I do stress the term money can buy, this was the sort of mirror professional astronomers would cheerfully sell their grandmothers to get for a telescope. We had billions of dollars to get rid of, were running out of ideas and this was a way of disposing of a big chunk. So we got this Rolls-Royce of mirrors and hit it with the laser. The mirror exploded. That laser was several orders of magnitude less powerful than the one proposed for the YAL-1. The problem is that even a small absorption of energy from the laser damages the mirror finish and increases absorptivity so the destruction of the mirror is viciously exponential.

Meanwhile, lets do a real world example of ICBM vs ABM.

Chevaline Link I

By upgrading the penetration aids of the Polaris A2 to produce the A3TK the
UK was able to field a "credible deterrent" capable of tackling targets such as
Moscow, which was protected by the "Galosh" ABM system. One of the decoys
for Chevaline was called Impala, but was never deployed. In the event Chevaline
was the only ballistic missile to employ decoys.

Chevaline Link II

Instead of deploying Poseidon, it was decided to re-direct work at Aldermaston to investigate the possibilities
of designing a new warhead capable of penetrating Soviet defences using decoys, hardening techniques
and penetration aids. Studies of the concept were made in 1967 and the decision to proceed was made
by the first Wilson government that same year. By 1969 the Chevaline concept was defined and by 1972
the system had been worked out in detail. It was approved for deployment by the Heath government (1970-74),
a decision finally ratified by the second Wilson government in February 1974. At the time of the Wilson decision
to proceed the cost was estimated at £250 million. By 1975 this cost had increased to £400 million, and a
review was held to determine whether the program should be cancelled in September. This was an important
moment in British nuclear policy making because the key issue on review was more than just Chevaline - it was
whether the British could afford to maintain its deterrent and competitive in the arena of nuclear arms.

The existence of Chevaline was first disclosed on 24 January 1980 during a debate in Parliament by
Conservative Defence Secretary Francis Pym. The total cost of the project was given as £1,000 million
making Chevaline the most expensive defence project not to be made public. The high cost resulted
in a highly critical report by the Public Accounts Committee published in 1982.

Yes, that's a "cheap" response to an ABM system; a £1 billion "upgrade" in 1980s money.

Link to Costing

£1 billion from 1980 is worth £2.64 billion as of 2002. Converting that using

Link to Currency Converter

£2.64 billion = $4.968 billion.

Russian Expenditure from 1999

According to the 2003 estimate of the 1999 Russian defense budget, it was just $35 bn USD.

Wikipedia 2000 budget

Wikipedia has their budget for 2000 as $14.4 billion USD.

Low end estimate, countering ABM will cost 14% of the Russian Defense Budget. High end, it would
cost 34%. Lets not even get into North Korea, whose entire military budget from Global Security org
lists it as $5~ billion. My god, that would suck up all of their budget for an entire year leaving only
enough money to buy the bullets that Kim Jong Il would use to shoot his officers for high treason.

Of course, that's my costing. Duchess of Zeon's costing is much more high end, assuming that
the £1 billion is in 1970 dollars, not 1980 dollars, meaning that it would be £9.5 billion in 2002,
and about $18 billion USD, which would mean high end, it would require more than the entire
Russian defense budget to pay for the system.

NMD is estimated to cost in the neighborhood of about $10~ billion USD, to set up the basic
infrastructure for future expansion, which is something we can easily afford with our $466 billion
budget, coming out to just 2% of our military spending. Even the most generous estimates of
$50 billion for the Russian 2004 defense budget still means 9% of the Russian defense budget
will be going to ABM counters.

Anyway, at the end of all these upgrades, the British still had to expend their entire deterrent to
have a credible chance to give Moscow a terminal dose of Instant Sunrise; meaning that 31
other targets in the Soviet Union would remain unnuked by the British Deterrent.

Patrick Degan · Post by **Patrick Degan** » 2004-11-25 03:39am

MKSheppard wrote:
Patrick Degan wrote:It goes without saying that this defence would be useless for stopping Topol-Ms launching from deep inside Russian territory.
Which is why we have more than just ABL to defend against ICBMs.

Oh, that's right —all those other toys which haven't been given anything like a realistic combat test or in some cases where the tests were faked or rigged.

Never mind that the system may not even be deployable:
And there's no date linked to this at all. For all we know it's from 2003, not now.

Which defeats the argument... how, exactly?

Nevermind the lack of anything approaching a realistic range of tests under accurately-staged war conditions:
Actually, the tests are working. In order to determine if the proximity fuze of the interceptor works, it has to be tested in real world conditions, of high stress vibrations from launch, the heat and radiation of space, etc. Now, to do this, the proximity fuse has to actually pass near the target so we know it works. Hence why we make it so that the intercept happens, so we do not piss away the cost of that test.

All that demonstrates is that a componnent of the system may work under ideal conditions in a static test. It does not say anything as to how the system will actually perform under war conditions.

And the Russians already have an operational system based on Hit-to-Kill.

Which is not designed to do anything against ICBMs, so there was no point whatsoever in your bringing this up.

But similar complaints could come up for other missile defense approaches, as well. "Boost-phase intercept has some fairly straightforward countermeasures," said Philip E. Coyle, former director for Pentagon operational test and evaluation. One of the easiest ways to deal with the laser defenses would be to put a reflective coating on the missile that would dissipate energy, he said.
BWHA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA

Concession accepted.

Seer Stuart wrote:I mentioned it again on the Bad Astronomy Board. Basically what happened was that the old idea about mirroring the outside of a missile against a laser reared its ugly head again. At that time, we had a huge amount of money to get rid of (the problem was we were convincing the Russians that there were black programs that were producing incredibly advanced science all over the place and we had to make money disappear to "fund" them). Anyway, the boys bought a really super-duper mirror, the sort of thing that gets put in super-telescopes and other high-grade optics and hit it with a laser.

It exploded.

It didn't just sag or melt, it blew up. The reason was that it heated so quickly it set up thermal stresses in the glass and the thing just shattered. Apparently, it was quite hairy in the test room. Bits flying around everywhere. That was the end of the "mirror the missiles" theory. It's about due to reappear again. I notice that the old "oh just put some mylar balloons in as decoys" has cropped up again as well.

Notice how this pathetic attempt at a point completely misses what the original objection was addressing. Yes, a highly-polished, fragile mirror designed, built, and intended for a specific purpose destroyed in a lab at short range by a fixed laser projector will really[/b] be the same thing as a reflective coating on a target attacked by an atmosphere-attenuated beam on a not-wholly stable platform from long distances.

Seer Stuart on Bad Astronomy wrote:A couple of decades ago we tested a (by the standards of the time) high-energy laser against the finest grade mirror money could buy. I do stress the term money can buy, this was the sort of mirror professional astronomers would cheerfully sell their grandmothers to get for a telescope. We had billions of dollars to get rid of, were running out of ideas and this was a way of disposing of a big chunk. So we got this Rolls-Royce of mirrors and hit it with the laser. The mirror exploded. That laser was several orders of magnitude less powerful than the one proposed for the YAL-1. The problem is that even a small absorption of energy from the laser damages the mirror finish and increases absorptivity so the destruction of the mirror is viciously exponential.

Again, no equivalency between a specialised mirror IN A FUCKING LAB and a reflective surface coating on a distant target being hit with an atmosphere-attenuated beam. How you love your Red Herrings.

Meanwhile, lets do a real world example of ICBM vs ABM.

Sigh... If you must:

Chevaline Link I

By upgrading the penetration aids of the Polaris A2 to produce the A3TK the UK was able to field a "credible deterrent" capable of tackling targets such as Moscow, which was protected by the "Galosh" ABM system. One of the decoys for Chevaline was called Impala, but was never deployed. In the event Chevaline was the only ballistic missile to employ decoys.

Chevaline Link II

Instead of deploying Poseidon, it was decided to re-direct work at Aldermaston to investigate the possibilities of designing a new warhead capable of penetrating Soviet defences using decoys, hardening techniques
and penetration aids. Studies of the concept were made in 1967 and the decision to proceed was made by the first Wilson government that same year. By 1969 the Chevaline concept was defined and by 1972 the system had been worked out in detail. It was approved for deployment by the Heath government (1970-74), a decision finally ratified by the second Wilson government in February 1974. At the time of the Wilson decision
to proceed the cost was estimated at £250 million. By 1975 this cost had increased to £400 million, and a review was held to determine whether the program should be cancelled in September. This was an important moment in British nuclear policy making because the key issue on review was more than just Chevaline - it was whether the British could afford to maintain its deterrent and competitive in the arena of nuclear arms.

The existence of Chevaline was first disclosed on 24 January 1980 during a debate in Parliament by Conservative Defence Secretary Francis Pym. The total cost of the project was given as £1,000 million making Chevaline the most expensive defence project not to be made public. The high cost resulted in a highly critical report by the Public Accounts Committee published in 1982.

Yes, that's a "cheap" response to an ABM system; a £1 billion "upgrade" in 1980s money. [/quote]

Which bears upon Russia's ability to respond to a US NMD system... how, exactly?

How you love your Red Herrings.

Link to Costing

£1 billion from 1980 is worth £2.64 billion as of 2002. Converting that using

Link to Currency Converter

£2.64 billion = $4.968 billion.

Which bears upon Russia's ability to respond to a US NMD system... how, exactly?

How you love your Red Herrings.

Russian Expenditure from 1999

According to the 2003 estimate of the 1999 Russian defense budget, it was just $35 bn USD.

Actually, the 2004 estimate lists a figure of $50 billion, but do go on:

Wikipedia 2000 budget

Wikipedia has their budget for 2000 as $14.4 billion USD.

Let's compare to the actual budget allocation for U.S. nuclear weapons, shall we:

Our Hidden WMD Program
Why Bush is spending so much on nuclear weapons.
By Fred Kaplan
Posted Friday, April 23, 2004, at 3:41 PM PT

The budget is busted; American soldiers need more armor; they're running out of supplies. Yet the Department of Energy is spending an astonishing $6.5 billion on nuclear weapons this year, and President Bush is requesting $6.8 billion more for next year and a total of $30 billion over the following four years. This does not include his much-cherished missile-defense program, by the way. This is simply for the maintenance, modernization, development, and production of nuclear bombs and warheads.

Measured in "real dollars" (that is, adjusting for inflation), this year's spending on nuclear activities is equal to what Ronald Reagan spent at the height of the U.S.-Soviet standoff. It exceeds by over 50 percent the average annual sum ($4.2 billion) that the United States spent—again, in real dollars—throughout the four and a half decades of the Cold War.

There is no nuclear arms race going on now. The world no longer offers many suitable nuclear targets. President Bush is trying to persuade other nations—especially "rogue regimes"—to forgo their nuclear ambitions. Yet he is shoveling money to U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories as if the Soviet Union still existed and the Cold War still raged.

These are the findings of a virtually unnoticed report written by weapons analyst Christopher Paine, based on data from official budget documents, and released earlier this month by the Natural Resources Defense Council.

The report raises anew a question that always springs to mind after a close look at the U.S. military budget: What the hell is going on here? Specifically: Do we really need to be spending this kind of money on nuclear weapons? What role do nuclear weapons play in 21st-century military policy? How many weapons do we need, to deter what sort of attack or to hit what sorts of targets, with what level of confidence, for what strategic and tactical purposes?

These are questions that haven't been seriously addressed in this country for 30 years. It may be time for a new look.

Ten years ago, spending on nuclear activities amounted to $3.4 billion, half of today's sum. In President Clinton's last budget, it totaled $5.2 billion, still one-third less than this year's. (All figures are adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2004 dollars.) Have new threats emerged that can be handled only by a vast expansion or improvement of the U.S. nuclear arsenal? Has our nuclear stockpile deteriorated by a startling degree? There's no evidence that either is the case.

Yet Paine quotes a statement from the National Nuclear Security Administration—the quasi-independent agency of the Energy Department that's in charge of the atomic stockpile—declaring, as its goal, "to revitalize the nuclear weapons manufacturing infrastructure." Its guidance on this point is the Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review of December 2001, which stated that U.S. strategic nuclear forces must provide "a range of options" not merely to deter but "to defeat any aggressor."

The one aspect of this reorientation that's attracted some attention is the development of a "robust nuclear earth-penetrator" (RNEP)—a warhead that can burrow deep into the earth before exploding, in order to destroy underground bunkers. The U.S. Air Force currently has some non-nuclear earth-penetrators, but they can't burrow deeply enough or explode powerfully enough to destroy some known bunkers. There's a legitimate debate over whether we would need to destroy such bunkers or whether it would be good enough to disable them—a feat that the conventional bunker-busters could accomplish. There's a broader question still over whether an American president really would, or should, be the first to fire nuclear weapons in wartime, no matter how tempting the tactical advantage.

The point here, however, is that this new nuclear weapon is fast becoming a reality.

As chronicled in a recent report by the Congressional Research Service, when Bush started the RNEP program two years ago, it was labeled as strictly a research project. Its budget was a mere $6.1 million in Fiscal Year 2003 and $7.1 million for FY 04. Now, all of a sudden, the administration has posted a five-year plan for the program amounting, from FY 2005-09, to $485 million. The FY05 budget alone earmarks $27.5 million to begin "development ground tests" on "candidate weapon designs." This isn't research; it's a real weapon in the works.

Paine's report cites other startlers that have eluded all notice outside the cognoscenti. For instance, the Energy Department is building a massive $4 billion-$6 billion proton accelerator in order to produce more tritium, the heavy hydrogen isotope that boosts the explosive yield of a nuclear weapon. (Tritium is the hydrogen that makes a hydrogen bomb.) Tritium does decay; eventually, it will have to be refurbished to ensure that, say, a 100-kiloton bomb really explodes with 100 kilotons of force. But Paine calculates that the current U.S. stockpile doesn't require any new tritium until at least 2012. If the stockpile is reduced to the level required under the terms of the most recent strategic arms treaty, none is needed until 2022.

Similar questions are raised about the Energy Department's plans to spend billions on new plutonium pits, high-energy fusion lasers, and supercomputer systems.

There is some debate within the administration over such matters, but it's a peculiar debate. For instance, some Pentagon officials favor spending $2 billion over the next five years to do a complete makeover on the W-76 warhead inside the U.S. Navy's Trident I missile—giving it an option to explode on the surface, improving its accuracy so it could blow up a blast-hardened missile silo, and so forth. The Trident I is an old missile; it's scheduled to be warehoused in the next few years. But Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has advocated "modernizing" even the "reserve stockpile" of nukes. Opposing this view, many Energy Department officials want to spend less money on these "legacy" weapons and invest it instead on a new generation of smaller, more agile nukes.

The official inside debate, in other words, is whether to build new nuclear weapons that are more usable in modern warfare or whether to do that and make the old nuclear weapons more usable, too. A broader debate—over whether to go down this twisted road generally—has not yet begun.

Fred Kaplan writes the "War Stories" column for Slate.
Photograph of bomb in Iraq on the Slate home page from Reuters.

One of the selling points of nukes has always been their comparatively cheaper cost to the maintenance of a large conventional force structure, and Russia's shed it's imperial committments over the years.

Low end estimate, countering ABM will cost 14% of the Russian Defense Budget. High end, it would cost 34%. Lets not even get into North Korea, whose entire military budget from Global Security org lists it as $5~ billion. My god, that would suck up all of their budget for an entire year leaving only enough money to buy the bullets that Kim Jong Il would use to shoot his officers for high treason.

Since Russian defence philosophy now centres far more upon nuclear deterrence and the fielding of a force sufficent to carry out massive retaliation against an aggressor than in previous decades, this cost would not be outside their ability to bear since they no longer have the global committments of the Soviet era to deal with. Commitment of priorities.

Of course, that's my costing. Duchess of Zeon's costing is much more high end, assuming that the £1 billion is in 1970 dollars, not 1980 dollars, meaning that it would be £9.5 billion in 2002, and about $18 billion USD, which would mean high end, it would require more than the entire Russian defense budget to pay for the system.

NMD is estimated to cost in the neighborhood of about $10~ billion USD, to set up the basic infrastructure for future expansion, which is something we can easily afford with our $466 billion budget, coming out to just 2% of our military spending. Even the most generous estimates of $50 billion for the Russian 2004 defense budget still means 9% of the Russian defense budget will be going to ABM counters.

Again, you assert that low-tech countermeasures must entail far greater expense than hi-tech measures. Most humourous.

Anyway, at the end of all these upgrades, the British still had to expend their entire deterrent to have a credible chance to give Moscow a terminal dose of Instant Sunrise; meaning that 31 other targets in the Soviet Union would remain unnuked by the British Deterrent.

Nevermind the fact that the British had a far smaller economy to work with even from the get-go than what the Russians are working with in the present day.

My my, took you a whole week or two to come up with all that?

MKSheppard · Post by **MKSheppard** » 2004-11-26 03:07pm

Patrick Degan wrote:Oh, that's right —all those other toys which haven't been given anything like a realistic combat test or in some cases where the tests were faked or rigged.

NASA developed their SATURN series of rockets using the same principle that MDA is using to
test out and develop the GBI; one component at a time. We all know how fantastically successful
the Saturn series was.

In fact, the Saturn V would have been tested the same way that previous Saturns would have been,
one stage at a time; with the other stages as deadweight; but time pressures forced von Braun and
his team to do the risky full-up shots right from the beginning in order to meet Kennedy's deadline.

Which defeats the argument... how, exactly?

The Airborne Laser (ABL) successfully fired all six modules of the megawatt-class Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser (COIL), a landmark achievement

The ABL has been integrated into a working weapon. It zaps at full power. Now comes the integration to airframe.

I do grant you that the ABL would have it's capability seriously degraded if the enemy launched his missiles in
a thunderstorm. But that would be a "win" as you would force your opponent to only be able to fire his weapons
when certain conditions are met; those conditions are beyond anyone's control.

All that demonstrates is that a componnent of the system may work under ideal conditions in a static test. It does not say anything as to how the system will actually perform under war conditions.

A "static test" of the proximity fuse on the interceptor would actually be them hanging it by fishing line or some other
material, and then slowly moving it near a re-entry vehicle in a labatory. These tests ARE under combat conditions,
the weapons system is being fired and accelerating at full speed, subjecting all of it's components to the actual
stresses that it would undergo during a combat firing.

It's worth noting that your beloved ICBMs have never actually been "tested under war conditions". They've all been
fired on a pre-determined course onto a missile range in the Pacific. No testing of an ICBM has ever been done
with it being fired on a polar course, which is what it would do if it was the Real Thing (TM) as far as I know, because
of the fear of it being mistaken for an actual live warshot.

Which is not designed to do anything against ICBMs, so there was no point whatsoever in your bringing this up.

Link

However, it was literally a last ditch missile and was designed to intercept an incoming RV at less than 6,100m (20,000ft) altitude. At that altitude, the incoming RV would be traveling at around 3,000m/sec (10,000ft/sec)

Hmm, now what was the S-400 rated at? Lets look at it again.

Janes wrote:The 9M82M interceptor is said to have a maximum range of 200km and can intercept ballistic missiles
with a reentry speed of 4.5km per second.

Concession accepted.

Yes, your concession, if you are stupid enough to believe the "mirrors will defeat lasers" theory.

Notice how this pathetic attempt at a point completely misses what the original objection was addressing. Yes, a highly-polished, fragile mirror designed, built, and intended for a specific purpose destroyed in a lab at short range by a fixed laser projector will really be the same thing as a reflective coating on a target attacked by an atmosphere-attenuated beam on a not-wholly stable platform from long distances.

Yes; because that mirror is the finest, most precise mirror you can buy with money. It has a reflectivity rating
that is unsurpassed by a simple mirrored finish on an ICBM. And it destructed in one second. And of course
this mirror was fixed and not moving, which increases it's reflectivity rating, unlike an ICBM's skin, which will be
constantly stressed by the shock of firing and atmospheric friction.

Also, Boost phase lasts quite a long time.

Link to lengths of Boost Phase

The boost phase of a primitive ICBM is several times longer than that of a theater missile. While the boost phase of a TBM tends to last at most on the order of 100 seconds, the boost phase of an ICBM may last several hundred; for example, that of the SS-18 is about 700 seconds. This allows the laser a longer period of time to focus on the missile, and hence to deposit a greater amount of energy in the missile skin, resulting in a higher kill-probability.

Seven hundred seconds. That's a lot of time for the laser to puncture the skin of the ICBM and cause
it to distengrate from aerodynamic stress.

Which bears upon Russia's ability to respond to a US NMD system... how, exactly?

You always like to point out that it's cheeper to build more missiles or add "cheap decoys" but
the costing proves otherwise. Chevaline remains the only actual example of decoys being
deployed operatinally on an ICBM, so it's the only example for costing of decoys vs ABM.

Which bears upon Russia's ability to respond to a US NMD system... how, exactly?

You always like to point out that it's cheeper to build more missiles or add "cheap decoys" but
the costing proves otherwise. Chevaline remains the only actual example of decoys being
deployed operatinally on an ICBM, so it's the only example for costing of decoys vs ABM.

Actually, the 2004 estimate lists a figure of $50 billion, but do go on:

Link

Actually, the 1996 estimate of the 1994 Russian Defense Budget was $93 Billion. By 2000, it
had been reduced downwards to $61.7 billion. By 2003, the 1994 estimate was $55.2 Billion,
to give one example.

Older data tends to be more reliable as more information leaks into public domain for
countries which tend to be rather secretive about their total defense expenditures.

Let's compare to the actual budget allocation for U.S. nuclear weapons, shall we

And my my my, what a massive fucking Red Herring. You do know that Nuclear Weapons
have a finite shelf life you know? The fissile material decays, among other things; in the
1940s, they had an assembled shelf life measured in less than a week. We have
extended this dramatically, but they still have to be refurbished; and we have to make
up for Clinton halting tritium production in the 1990s as the Tritium in our warheads decays,
and must be replaced, or else they are expensive radioactive paperweights on ICBMs,
bombers, and submarines.

And your highlited part about the Trident I warheads recieving a makeover is pure bullshit,
because it's making a mountain out of a capability that Trident has always had, counter
force capability. That capability is why the left so opposed it in the 1970s and 1980s.

One of the selling points of nukes has always been their comparatively cheaper cost to the maintenance of a large conventional force structure, and Russia's shed it's imperial committments over the years.

And? What? Are you trying to win brownie points for stating the bleeding obvious? Or is this
another of your beloved Red Herrings? Nevermind the fact that Chechnya shows that they
have not shed their imperial commitments either.

Since Russian defence philosophy now centres far more upon nuclear deterrence and the fielding of a force sufficent to carry out massive retaliation against an aggressor than in previous decades, this cost would not be outside their ability to bear since they no longer have the global committments of the Soviet era to deal with. Commitment of priorities.

Actually, their deterrence is shrinking faster than they can replace it. Much of the tooling for their previous generation
of ICBMs is beyond their reach in Ukraine. Hence why they are building Topol-M, because it is the only way they can
keep the Strategic Rocket Forces viabul as a deterrence force.

Link

For his part, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov said Russia’s general purpose forces were not fully up to standard. According to him, the improvement of the army’s combat potential was a priority.

Now, if Russia is shifting to nuclear deterrent as it's primary defense philosophy, why is improving the Army a priority at all?

Again, you assert that low-tech countermeasures must entail far greater expense than hi-tech measures. Most humourous.

Actually. Chevaline was deceptively simple. Instead of making decoys that looked like RVs, it made the
RVs look like Decoys. In other words, they simply put a balloon on the Re-entry vehicle to make it look
like a decoy. Simple eh? Well, it took a damn long time and lots of money to make it work. Most
humourous.

Nevermind the fact that the British had a far smaller economy to work with even from the get-go than what the Russians are working with in the present day.

Linky on Russian GDP

The nominal GDP produced in 2001 was 9,063 billion rubles ($310 billion at the official exchange rate)

UK Stats

Punched in 1970 to 1970.
423,390,000,000 pounds in 1995 market prices.

Link to converter

Converted the UK GDP into dollars. There's probably a squish factor
as I couldn't find the exact 1995 exchange rate.

$802 billion USD

The British Economy in 1970 is about 2.5 times bigger than the current
Russian Economy.

My my, took you a whole week or two to come up with all that?

No I spent about a week jacking off for fun before spending a few minutes to counter you.

Patrick Degan · Post by **Patrick Degan** » 2004-11-26 07:51pm

MKSheppard wrote:
Patrick Degan wrote:Oh, that's right —all those other toys which haven't been given anything like a realistic combat test or in some cases where the tests were faked or rigged.
NASA developed their SATURN series of rockets using the same principle that MDA is using to
test out and develop the GBI; one component at a time. We all know how fantastically successful
the Saturn series was.

In fact, the Saturn V would have been tested the same way that previous Saturns would have been,
one stage at a time; with the other stages as deadweight; but time pressures forced von Braun and
his team to do the risky full-up shots right from the beginning in order to meet Kennedy's deadline.

Nice, but the development of a space rocket, and a defence system, don't quite compare.

Which defeats the argument... how, exactly?
The Airborne Laser (ABL) successfully fired all six modules of the megawatt-class Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser (COIL), a landmark achievement

The ABL has been integrated into a working weapon. It zaps at full power. Now comes the integration to airframe.

Sorry, but until the laser unit and its fueling componnents can be successfully mounted within an airframe without the thing being tail-heavy or otherwise unbalanced in flight, the thing has not been "integrated into a working weapon".

I do grant you that the ABL would have it's capability seriously degraded if the enemy launched his missiles in
a thunderstorm. But that would be a "win" as you would force your opponent to only be able to fire his weapons
when certain conditions are met; those conditions are beyond anyone's control.

And this is based on, what exactly? Operational experience? Oh, that right —there isn't any operational experience with the ABL under field conditions. Trying bullshit arguments about launches in thunderstorms is ridiculous even for you.

All that demonstrates is that a componnent of the system may work under ideal conditions in a static test. It does not say anything as to how the system will actually perform under war conditions.
A "static test" of the proximity fuse on the interceptor would actually be them hanging it by fishing line or some other
material, and then slowly moving it near a re-entry vehicle in a labatory. These tests ARE under combat conditions,
the weapons system is being fired and accelerating at full speed, subjecting all of it's components to the actual
stresses that it would undergo during a combat firing.

Wrong —what part of "static test" do you fail to grasp? If the thing was fired in a laboratory setting with a target at close range and not subject to atmospheric interference to any appreciable degree, that is by definition not a combat-conditional environment.

It's worth noting that your beloved ICBMs have never actually been "tested under war conditions". They've all been
fired on a pre-determined course onto a missile range in the Pacific. No testing of an ICBM has ever been done
with it being fired on a polar course, which is what it would do if it was the Real Thing (TM) as far as I know, because
of the fear of it being mistaken for an actual live warshot.

Cute, but irrelevant. Rocket launches are straightforward operations based only on simple ballistics. Even you cannot imagine that a presumend boost-phase interception of a missile with a weapon that has never been field-tested is remotely the same thing.

Which is not designed to do anything against ICBMs, so there was no point whatsoever in your bringing this up.
Link

However, it was literally a last ditch missile and was designed to intercept an incoming RV at less than 6,100m (20,000ft) altitude. At that altitude, the incoming RV would be traveling at around 3,000m/sec (10,000ft/sec)

Gee —an ABM designed to intercept single warheads which was rendered obsolecent with the advent of the MIRV. We went through this the last go-around on this subject.

Hmm, now what was the S-400 rated at? Lets look at it again.

The 9M82M interceptor is said to have a maximum range of 200km and can intercept ballistic missiles
with a reentry speed of 4.5km per second.

SRBM and MRBM with single warheads are the target parametres of the S-400 system. How you love your Red Herrings.

Concession accepted.
Yes, your concession, if you are stupid enough to believe the "mirrors will defeat lasers" theory.

No, your concession, actually, if you're stupid enough not to understand why "the Rolls-Royce of mirrors" is not even remotely analogous to a solid-fuel missile. Nor was anybody talking about anything as silly as putting mirrors on the rocket or polishing anything on it to a mirror-finish or whatever the discussion-board post you referenced as a technical source was attempting to make as a point.

Notice how this pathetic attempt at a point completely misses what the original objection was addressing. Yes, a highly-polished, fragile mirror designed, built, and intended for a specific purpose destroyed in a lab at short range by a fixed laser projector will really be the same thing as a reflective coating on a target attacked by an atmosphere-attenuated beam on a not-wholly stable platform from long distances.
Yes; because that mirror is the finest, most precise mirror you can buy with money. It has a reflectivity rating
that is unsurpassed by a simple mirrored finish on an ICBM. And it destructed in one second. And of course
this mirror was fixed and not moving, which increases it's reflectivity rating, unlike an ICBM's skin, which will be
constantly stressed by the shock of firing and atmospheric friction.

You really don't understand why this parallel fails, do you?

Link to lengths of Boost Phase

The boost phase of a primitive ICBM is several times longer than that of a theater missile. While the boost phase of a TBM tends to last at most on the order of 100 seconds, the boost phase of an ICBM may last several hundred; for example, that of the SS-18 is about 700 seconds. This allows the laser a longer period of time to focus on the missile, and hence to deposit a greater amount of energy in the missile skin, resulting in a higher kill-probability.
Seven hundred seconds. That's a lot of time for the laser to puncture the skin of the ICBM and cause
it to distengrate from aerodynamic stress.

Oh, really:

Link

The Topol M SS-27 was the first strategic system that was designed and manufactured exclusively in Russia. Research and development started in the early 1990s. The SS-27 is a solid-fueled, single-warhead missile with a size and throw weight exceeding those of the SS-25. Reportedly, it has a two-minute boost phase. The Topol M design permits Russia to transform it without major difficulties into a missile carrying between three and six warheads and false targets. The short boost phase and MIRV potential are important for countering, future missile defenses. The lifetime of the new missile is 15 to 17 years.

Modern ICBMs are solid-fueled, and the Russians will be phasing out their older liquid-fueled rockets as more SS-27s become available. The Taepodongs are liquid-fueled, but might be replaced by a solid-fueled missile at some point in the future. It surely is not necessary to outline the differences between the two types, I hope.

Which bears upon Russia's ability to respond to a US NMD system... how, exactly?
You always like to point out that it's cheeper to build more missiles or add "cheap decoys" but
the costing proves otherwise. Chevaline remains the only actual example of decoys being
deployed operatinally on an ICBM, so it's the only example for costing of decoys vs ABM.

The example of Chevaline hardly bears out your argument, no matter how much you wish to believe otherwise. The development project was dragged out over a period of nearly 20 years, subject to political delays in the intervening period, had its design modified during the process to accomodate the British Trident in 1979, and had only a limited production and deployment. Meanwhile, much of the theoretical and practical development of the decoy concept has already been accomplished, so it's not as if, say, Russia for example (or even the U.S.), would have to start wholly from scratch with formulating first principles and working from that point up.

Oh, and BTW, the 2003 revised estimate for Russian defence spending has been quoted at $65 billion, according to the Centre for Defence Information.

Let's compare to the actual budget allocation for U.S. nuclear weapons, shall we
And my my my, what a massive fucking Red Herring. You do know that Nuclear Weapons
have a finite shelf life you know? The fissile material decays, among other things; in the
1940s, they had an assembled shelf life measured in less than a week. We have
extended this dramatically, but they still have to be refurbished; and we have to make
up for Clinton halting tritium production in the 1990s as the Tritium in our warheads decays,
and must be replaced, or else they are expensive radioactive paperweights on ICBMs,
bombers, and submarines.

NOT a Red Herring. The costs of building and maintaining a strategic nuclear deterrent force incorporate replacement of warhead fuel elements in addition to the construction and maintenance of carrier missiles as part of the budget estimate. Compared to the overall defence allocation, still a cheaper expense than the maintenance of a large conventional force structure with global committments. This was why we turned to the Nuclear Big Stick in the first place.

And your highlited part about the Trident I warheads recieving a makeover is pure bullshit,
because it's making a mountain out of a capability that Trident has always had, counter
force capability. That capability is why the left so opposed it in the 1970s and 1980s.

As you wish...

One of the selling points of nukes has always been their comparatively cheaper cost to the maintenance of a large conventional force structure, and Russia's shed it's imperial committments over the years.
And? What? Are you trying to win brownie points for stating the bleeding obvious? Or is this
another of your beloved Red Herrings? Nevermind the fact that Chechnya shows that they
have not shed their imperial commitments either.

Chechnya happens to be an insurrection within their own territory, numbskull. It is no more an example of an "imperial" committment than the U.S. Civil War was. Nevermind that the very obvious withdrawal of Russian forces from the former satellites and the halving of their fleet makes the point indisputable that the Russians are not funding a military with global committments.

Since Russian defence philosophy now centres far more upon nuclear deterrence and the fielding of a force sufficent to carry out massive retaliation against an aggressor than in previous decades, this cost would not be outside their ability to bear since they no longer have the global committments of the Soviet era to deal with. Commitment of priorities.
Actually, their deterrence is shrinking faster than they can replace it. Much of the tooling for their previous generation
of ICBMs is beyond their reach in Ukraine. Hence why they are building Topol-M, because it is the only way they can
keep the Strategic Rocket Forces viabul as a deterrence force.

Link

For his part, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov said Russia’s general purpose forces were not fully up to standard. According to him, the improvement of the army’s combat potential was a priority.

Now, if Russia is shifting to nuclear deterrent as it's primary defense philosophy, why is improving the Army a priority at all?

They're switching to the Topol-M because their other ICBMs are approaching senesence, as well as the fact that they were manufactured in the former Soviet republics which have since gone independent. As for improving the army, that also is a priority even with a defensive-oriented military establishment. They are not going to pin the primary defence of the nation on a large army against nuclear-armed potential advesaries, and they are not building up a huge conventional force structure to challenge on a global scale as in Soviet days, which means by default they are shifting to the nuclear option as the primary defence of the nation. You certainly cannot be as thick as you're making yourself out to be in this thread.

Again, you assert that low-tech countermeasures must entail far greater expense than hi-tech measures. Most humourous.
Actually. Chevaline was deceptively simple. Instead of making decoys that looked like RVs, it made the
RVs look like Decoys. In other words, they simply put a balloon on the Re-entry vehicle to make it look
like a decoy. Simple eh? Well, it took a damn long time and lots of money to make it work. Most
humourous.

Because the British were working from the ground-up and because the development programme was stretched out over 20 years by political concerns. And next to the expected price-tag for NMD, clocked at around $124 billion at last count, Chevaline was chump-change by comparison.

Nevermind the fact that the British had a far smaller economy to work with even from the get-go than what the Russians are working with in the present day.
Linky on Russian GDP

The nominal GDP produced in 2001 was 9,063 billion rubles ($310 billion at the official exchange rate)

UK Stats

Punched in 1970 to 1970.
423,390,000,000 pounds in 1995 market prices.

Link to converter

Converted the UK GDP into dollars. There's probably a squish factor
as I couldn't find the exact 1995 exchange rate.

$802 billion USD

The British Economy in 1970 is about 2.5 times bigger than the current
Russian Economy.

Sure about that? Because according to the CIA World Factbook entry on Russia, their 2003 GDP is listed as US$1.282 trillion, with a real growth rate of 7.3%.

My my, took you a whole week or two to come up with all that?
No I spent about a week jacking off

Couldn't have described the mechanics of your thought-processes any better myself.

before spending a few minutes to counter you.

Try the results you'd garner by something other than whipping your skippy all the time.

Post by **Beowulf** » 2004-11-26 08:22pm

Would you mind explaining to me why the universally sound engineering principle of testing each part isn't applicable to a missile defence system?

Patrick Degan · Post by **Patrick Degan** » 2004-11-26 08:34pm

Beowulf wrote:Would you mind explaining to me why the universally sound engineering principle of testing each part isn't applicable to a missile defence system?

That isn't the issue under dispute here. The issue is whether or not all of these systems will come together under battle conditions to perform as advertised, and nothing even remotely approaching such a test has been attempted, yet the Bush White House insists upon fielding an untested operational weapon system before its effectiveness has been demonstrated.

Post by **Beowulf** » 2004-11-26 08:38pm

Patrick Degan wrote:
Beowulf wrote:Would you mind explaining to me why the universally sound engineering principle of testing each part isn't applicable to a missile defence system?
That isn't the issue under dispute here. The issue is whether or not all of these systems will come together under battle conditions to perform as advertised, and nothing even remotely approaching such a test has been attempted, yet the Bush White House insists upon fielding an untested operational weapon system before its effectiveness has been demonstrated.

Hmm... could this possibly be because one of the crucial components for such a test would require that we have the radar for it operational?

Patrick Degan · Post by **Patrick Degan** » 2004-11-26 08:43pm

Beowulf wrote:
Patrick Degan wrote:
Beowulf wrote:Would you mind explaining to me why the universally sound engineering principle of testing each part isn't applicable to a missile defence system?
That isn't the issue under dispute here. The issue is whether or not all of these systems will come together under battle conditions to perform as advertised, and nothing even remotely approaching such a test has been attempted, yet the Bush White House insists upon fielding an untested operational weapon system before its effectiveness has been demonstrated.
Hmm... could this possibly be because one of the crucial components for such a test would require that we have the radar for it operational?

No, it's possibly because the battle-condition tests have not been attempted, yet the NMD cheerleaders keep insisting the system works, will work, and should be bought sight-unseen.

Patrick Degan · Post by **Patrick Degan** » 2004-11-26 08:45pm

In regard to an earlier point:

Nevermind the fact that the British had a far smaller economy to work with even from the get-go than what the Russians are working with in the present day.
Linky on Russian GDP

The nominal GDP produced in 2001 was 9,063 billion rubles ($310 billion at the official exchange rate)

UK Stats

Punched in 1970 to 1970.
423,390,000,000 pounds in 1995 market prices.

Link to converter

Converted the UK GDP into dollars. There's probably a squish factor
as I couldn't find the exact 1995 exchange rate.

$802 billion USD

The British Economy in 1970 is about 2.5 times bigger than the current
Russian Economy.
Sure about that? Because according to the CIA World Factbook entry on Russia, their 2003 GDP is listed as US$1.282 trillion, with a real growth rate of 7.3%.

According to this data, the exchange rate between the U.S. and the UK in 1993 was around $1.43 to the pound sterling. This would put the 1970 UK GDP in adjusted dollars at US$605.447 billion —half that of the present Russian GDP in adjusted dollars.

MKSheppard · Post by **MKSheppard** » 2004-11-27 07:13am

Patrick Degan wrote:Nice, but the development of a space rocket, and a defence system, don't quite compare.

Saturn V had to be 99.9999~ reliable. It's been a while since I read a book on the Apollo program, so I don't
remember the exact number of "nines" they fixed it at. There was a big argument during the development
process over how many "nines" to fix reliability at. Too many would drive the cost into astronomical areas.

That kind of reliability is exactly the kind you would want for say...a NMD interceptor, since you obviously
cannot achieve 100% reliability in real life. So why is it that tried and proven methods that were used to
send a man to the moon cannot be used for the task of shooting down incoming ballistic missiles?

Sorry, but until the laser unit and its fueling componnents can be successfully mounted within an airframe without the thing being tail-heavy or otherwise unbalanced in flight, the thing has not been "integrated into a working weapon".

If it's tail heavy or unbalanced, Boeing can just use a time-worn method. Depleted Uranium. A miscalculation
in the 747s design led to slugs of DU being placed into the engine pylons of early-model 747s to balance
the weights out.

And this is based on, what exactly? Operational experience? Oh, that right —there isn't any operational experience with the ABL under field conditions. Trying bullshit arguments about launches in thunderstorms is ridiculous even for you.

No, sir, you are a bleeding idiot if you fail to recognize that a directed energy weapon will crap out as weather
conditions turn from good to shitty.

Wrong —what part of "static test" do you fail to grasp? If the thing was fired in a laboratory setting with a target at close range and not subject to atmospheric interference to any appreciable degree, that is by definition not a combat-conditional environment.

Link to a test

The booster rocket lifted off last night (Jan. 26) at 9:22 p.m. EST (2:22 p.m. Jan. 27 Kwajalein time), and flew to a simulated intercept point approximately 800 miles downrange and to an altitude of approximately 170 miles above the earth. Initial analysis shows that booster performance was nominal, in that it was within design parameters and that payload separation was successful. Program officials will begin an extensive post-test review to determine precise booster performance parameters.

Hmm, 800 miles downrange and 170 miles above the earth is a "close range" target? I did not know that firing a missile into space was
considered a "labatory setting". Perhaps in the Patrick Deegan dictionary, it is, but not mine.

Cute, but irrelevant. Rocket launches are straightforward operations based only on simple ballistics.

Link to Atlas E

Incorrect. If Ballistic missile launches are a straightforward thing, why did Atlas E, with an all-intertial guidance system,
have a CEP of 3.7 km, requiring a megaton-class warhead to be assured of target destruction? I thought ballistics
was simple!

Modern ICBMs do star sightings to refine their inertial guidance system solutions. I suspect that the starfield over
the Pacific is much much different than the Pole. And lets not forget the fact that magnetic fields will be different,
affecting the inertial system.

Even you cannot imagine that a presumend boost-phase interception of a missile with a weapon that has never been field-tested is remotely the same thing.

Actually, we have data on what happens to missiles when struck with lasers. It isn't pretty.

Consider that an ICBM is packed with far more propellant than a mere Katyusha rocket. Makes for a nice fireworks show.
And the Army has also shot down artillery shells in flight with THEL, which are much much more difficult targets to destroy
since they have nice thick steel casings and aren't filled with highly explosive propellant.

Gee —an ABM designed to intercept single warheads which was rendered obsolecent with the advent of the MIRV. We went through
this the last go-around on this subject.

Actually. That was HIBEX, part of the Sprint program.

Link to HIBEX

And you have the wrong program, once again you are talking out your ass about things you do not know shit about.

Nike-Zeus

The other major concern for Nike Zeus was its accuracy and the fact that the TTR and MTR radars could only perform one intercept at a time.

Mechanically scanned radars had that problem, which is why Phased Array Radars were invented and deployed in the next
programme, Nike-X.

Link to Nike-X

The use of phased array radars combined with higher performance data processing systems (computers) allowed the system to track and intercept many targets at once. These basic design requirements overcame many of the short comings of the Nike Zeus system.

Sprint and HIBEX were part of the Nike-X program. HIBEX would have been productionized as Sprint II if it had been built. So
your claim of HIBEX being "rendered obsolecent with the advent of the MIRV" is utterly false.

SRBM and MRBM with single warheads are the target parametres of the S-400 system. How you love your Red Herrings.

How you love bullshit. HIBEX was designed to intercept incoming ICBM re-entry vehicles at the very end of their journey, 2 seconds
from the target, moving at their maximum speed, after they had dropped from orbit, as a last ditch defense of the ABM site. S-400 exceeds
HIBEX's performance envelope. Other sites list S-400 as being capable of 4.8 km/sec intercepts, which puts it just below violating the
now-defunct ABM treaty which forbid development of missiles capabul of 5 km/sec interception or more.

Nor was anybody talking about anything as silly as putting mirrors on the rocket or polishing anything on it to a mirror-finish or whatever the discussion-board post you referenced as a technical source was attempting to make as a point.

Let us see your post:

Patrick Deegan wrote: Or the possibility of the simplest of counters being employed against a complex system, as this Aviation Week & Space Technology excerpt points out:

Articul Quoted by Deegan wrote: But similar complaints could come up for other missile defense approaches, as well. "Boost-phase intercept has some fairly straightforward countermeasures," said Philip E. Coyle, former director for Pentagon operational test and evaluation. One of the easiest ways to deal with the laser defenses would be to put a reflective coating on the missile that would dissipate energy, he said.

Yep, you were talking about mirroring the rocket. Please Patrick, will you please take some vitamins
to improve your short-term memory?

You really don't understand why this parallel fails, do you?

That mirror is far more reflective than your presupposed reflective coating and it blew apart in around a second.

*snip talk about Topol-M*

That mirror detonated in around one second. Even the Topol-M's reduced boost-phase
will leave it open for 120 seconds, or enough time to destroy it dozens of times over with a laser.

It surely is not necessary to outline the differences between the two types, I hope.

Because we know how well solid fuelled rockets hold up aerodynamically when a hole is punched into them. I think
a certain incident from 1986 proves otherwise. Much less the fact that artillery shells are being destroyed by lasers
nowadays, and they are far more hardened than a missile could ever be, by dint of their thick steel casings.

The example of Chevaline hardly bears out your argument, no matter how much you wish to believe otherwise.

It is the only example of a deployed penetration aid system for an ICBM, there's nothing else to
compare it too. And it was rather difficult to design, despite it being simple. Oh, by the way, if people do
widespread decoys, well we can just go to atmospheric sorting, which will tell us precisely what is a decoy
and what is not.

NOT a Red Herring. The costs of building and maintaining a strategic nuclear deterrent force incorporate replacement of warhead fuel elements in addition to the construction and maintenance of carrier missiles as part of the budget estimate. Compared to the overall defence allocation, still a cheaper expense than the maintenance of a large conventional force structure with global committments. This was why we turned to the Nuclear Big Stick in the first place.

And once again, Patrick wins the "Sheppard Award for Stating the Bleeding Obvious". Do you like hearing yourself
talk, or is there anything else you forgot to tell me, like for example, the sky is blue, but in space, it's black?

Chechnya happens to be an insurrection within their own territory, numbskull. It is no more an example of an "imperial" committment than the U.S. Civil War was.

Actually, Chechyna was independent until it was conquered and incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1859, so it's
debatable in some parts whether or not it is part of the Russian Federation like historical areas such as the Voronezhskaya
oblast.

Nevermind that the very obvious withdrawal of Russian forces from the former satellites and the halving of their fleet makes the point indisputable that the Russians are not funding a military with global committments.

If that's true, why is Russia still in the various "stans" and involved in Georgia currently? Or why do they still have the Kuznetzov?

On 24 July 2004 RIA Novosti reported that the Admiral Kuznetsov air-capable cruiser would soon begin performing cruise missions after emergence from preventive maintenance. The headquarters of the Northern Fleet stated that on 06 August 2004 the Admiral Kuznetsov will be released from repair. Its equipment and armaments are in a good state and, after some preparations, the cruiser will be able to perform missions set to it. Carrier-based aircraft would also begin their training sessions soon. The emergence from scheduled repair coincided with the 100th birth anniversary of Admiral Kuznetsov.

Carriers are a power projection tool. And the Russians continue to lay down SSNs. The
Project 971A / 971M Shuka-B (Akula II) Gepard entered service in 2001. Nuclear attack
submarines indicate they want to do global power projection; because diesel boats are just
mobile minefields.

They're switching to the Topol-M because their other ICBMs are approaching senesence, as well as the fact that they were manufactured in the former Soviet republics which have since gone independent.

Thank you for re-stating something which I said before.

Shep wrote:Actually, their deterrence is shrinking faster than they can replace it. Much of the tooling for their previous generation
of ICBMs is beyond their reach in Ukraine. Hence why they are building Topol-M, because it is the only way they can
keep the Strategic Rocket Forces viabul as a deterrence force.

Is there anything else you would like to add, like water is wet?

As for improving the army, that also is a priority even with a defensive-oriented military establishment. They are not going to pin the primary defence of the nation on a large army against nuclear-armed potential advesaries, and they are not building up a huge conventional force structure to challenge on a global scale as in Soviet days, which means by default they are shifting to the nuclear option as the primary defence of the nation. You certainly cannot be as thick as you're making yourself out to be in this thread.

Link

In November 2002 Russian defense minister Sergei B. Ivanov, outlined a package of military reforms. By 2007 soldiers, paratroopers and marines in the most combat-ready units — 10 divisions, 7 brigades and 13 regiments — would all be professionals.

Incorrect. They are shifting their conventional force structure to be more in line with the Western model, which is professional
long-timers operating advanced weaponry. And their professional force structure will be line with the US Army's size, which is
10 divisions. They've learned that in this brave post-Soviet world, they cannot rely on conscripts anymore.

Because the British were working from the ground-up and because the development programme was stretched out over 20 years by political concerns.

It is the only example of a deployed penetration aid system for an ICBM, there's nothing else to compare it to.

And next to the expected price-tag for NMD, clocked at around $124 billion at last count, Chevaline was chump-change by comparison.

Really?

$13-$14 billion is given for NMD as it stands. BULLSHIT DEFEATED.

Sure about that? Because according to the CIA World Factbook entry on Russia, their 2003 GDP is listed as US$1.282 trillion, with a real growth rate of 7.3%.

I would rather trust CSIS, which is an independent analyst group, than the CIA which said
Saddam had WMDs, or could launch in minutes.

Couldn't have described the mechanics of your thought-processes any better myself.

So you don't masturbate at all? How do you avoid sexual frustration driving you to serial murder sprees?

Try the results you'd garner by something other than whipping your skippy all the time.

Actually, I must confess; I don't like sodomizing you constantly in this thread; unlike Einy, I don't like
buggering people. So please, can you proceed to Aisle 12 and Get a Clue (TM)?

MKSheppard · Post by **MKSheppard** » 2004-11-27 07:17am

This farce is beginning to remind me of JOHN FRECK and Japanese Atomic Bombs in WWII

IF A NATION IS PRODUCING LARGE AMOUNT OF ALUMINIUM IT CAN REFINE
URAINIUM.

Patrick Degan · Post by **Patrick Degan** » 2004-11-27 04:30pm

Wading through Shep's latest round of stupidities —Pt. 1:

MKSheppard wrote:
Patrick Degan wrote:Nice, but the development of a space rocket, and a defence system, don't quite compare.
Saturn V had to be 99.9999~ reliable. It's been a while since I read a book on the Apollo program, so I don't
remember the exact number of "nines" they fixed it at. There was a big argument during the development
process over how many "nines" to fix reliability at. Too many would drive the cost into astronomical areas.

That kind of reliability is exactly the kind you would want for say...a NMD interceptor, since you obviously
cannot achieve 100% reliability in real life. So why is it that tried and proven methods that were used to
send a man to the moon cannot be used for the task of shooting down incoming ballistic missiles?

You really don't get it, do you? Next to the problems of shooting down ICBMs at any phase of their flight and ensuring that none of your cities or missile silos are destroyed in the process by "misses", a moon mission is an easy and straightforward operation by comparison.

Sorry, but until the laser unit and its fueling componnents can be successfully mounted within an airframe without the thing being tail-heavy or otherwise unbalanced in flight, the thing has not been "integrated into a working weapon".
If it's tail heavy or unbalanced, Boeing can just use a time-worn method. Depleted Uranium. A miscalculation
in the 747s design led to slugs of DU being placed into the engine pylons of early-model 747s to balance
the weights out.

Nice. Then the whole thing handles like a pig in flight from the extra onboard weight and is even more vulnerable either to enemy attack or from turbulence.

And this is based on, what exactly? Operational experience? Oh, that right —there isn't any operational experience with the ABL under field conditions. Trying bullshit arguments about launches in thunderstorms is ridiculous even for you.
No, sir, you are a bleeding idiot if you fail to recognize that a directed energy weapon will crap out as weather
conditions turn from good to shitty.

Are you insane? Because you continue to push a point that has no point while ignoring the problems a directed-energy weapon will face even in supposedly ideal weather conditions.

Wrong —what part of "static test" do you fail to grasp? If the thing was fired in a laboratory setting with a target at close range and not subject to atmospheric interference to any appreciable degree, that is by definition not a combat-conditional environment.
Link to a test

The booster rocket lifted off last night (Jan. 26) at 9:22 p.m. EST (2:22 p.m. Jan. 27 Kwajalein time), and flew to a simulated intercept point approximately 800 miles downrange and to an altitude of approximately 170 miles above the earth. Initial analysis shows that booster performance was nominal, in that it was within design parameters and that payload separation was successful. Program officials will begin an extensive post-test review to determine precise booster performance parameters.

Hmm, 800 miles downrange and 170 miles above the earth is a "close range" target? I did not know that firing a missile into space was
considered a "labatory setting". Perhaps in the Patrick Deegan dictionary, it is, but not mine.

Nice little Moving the Goalposts Fallacy as well as a Red Herring —as we were talking about the laser.

Cute, but irrelevant. Rocket launches are straightforward operations based only on simple ballistics.
Link to Atlas E

Incorrect. If Ballistic missile launches are a straightforward thing, why did Atlas E, with an all-intertial guidance system,
have a CEP of 3.7 km, requiring a megaton-class warhead to be assured of target destruction? I thought ballistics
was simple!

Strawman Fallacy —your original objection was that an ICBM test launch was "not under combat conditions so there NYAHHH!" Except a test ICBM launch and a combat ICBM launch would be essentially the same fucking operation. This is very different from any ABM operation and certainly worlds apart from a theoretical situation which has never faced a true test in a realistic simulation AND YOU KNOW IT! I grow tired of your increasing dishonesty in this thread.

Modern ICBMs do star sightings to refine their inertial guidance system solutions. I suspect that the starfield over
the Pacific is much much different than the Pole. And lets not forget the fact that magnetic fields will be different,
affecting the inertial system.

Yes, thank you for stating the fucking obvious in the extention of your Strawman Fallacy. ICBM launches will never involve the same level of difficulty as the challenge of knocking down warheads in flight, which was the point of my statement about an ICBM launch being a matter of simple ballistics —which all your diversions regarding the actual aiming mechanics do not refute.

Even you cannot imagine that a presumend boost-phase interception of a missile with a weapon that has never been field-tested is remotely the same thing.
Actually, we have data on what happens to missiles when struck with lasers. It isn't pretty.

Consider that an ICBM is packed with far more propellant than a mere Katyusha rocket. Makes for a nice fireworks show.
And the Army has also shot down artillery shells in flight with THEL, which are much much more difficult targets to destroy
since they have nice thick steel casings and aren't filled with highly explosive propellant.

Yet another Strawman —we're talking about the laser weaponry and not an antimissile system which was not designed to be employed against ICBMs in the first fucking place. We were talking about a weapon system theoretically facing a very different set of combat conditions than what THEL was ever designed for. This isn't the first time you've tried conflating short-range battlefield weapon systems with anti-ICBM defences in the same discussion and that is getting tiresome as well.

Gee —an ABM designed to intercept single warheads which was rendered obsolecent with the advent of the MIRV. We went through
this the last go-around on this subject.
Actually. That was HIBEX, part of the Sprint program.

Link to HIBEX

And you have the wrong program, once again you are talking out your ass about things you do not know shit about.

Oh really:

Linky

Two types of missiles were employed in the SAFEGUARD system. The high-altitude SPARTAN missile was built by McDonnell Douglas. It was a three-stage, solid-propellant rocket armed with a nuclear warhead that killed warheads by blast and X-rays that were lethal to warheads several miles away. SPARTAN was 55 feet long. The second missile, SPRINT, was a marvel of aeronautics and space technology. Built by Martin Marietta, it was designed to operate at hypersonic speeds in the earth's atmosphere; at its top speed, the missile's skin became hotter than the interior of its rocket motor and glowed incandescently. If one somehow could have trained an acetylene torch on the nose of the missile at this speed, the hot gases of the torch would have cooled the nose. The electronic components of the SPRINT were designed to withstand accelerations of 100 times gravity. The missile was 27 feet long, consisted of two stages, and used solid fuel. Like SPARTAN, SPRINT carried a nuclear warhead.

Together these missiles provided a "layered" defense. SPARTAN was designed to attack the incoming "threat cloud" of warheads, boosters and decoys while it was still above the atmosphere. SPRINT would then attack surviving warheads after they had penetrated the atmosphere where the resistance and friction of the air would separate the warheads from decoys and booster debris.

SAFEGUARD's "technical sweetness" was overshadowed by its limitations. With only one hundred missiles, the system could provide only limited protection to the ICBMs near Grand Forks and supply some measure of protection to the central United States against an accidental launch or a light ICBM attack. Moreover, SAFEGUARD was not the optimum system for the point defense of hard targets. It started out as the SENTINEL project, which was supposed to provide nationwide protection against a light ICBM attack. When President Nixon shifted the emphasis of the program to defending ICBM fields, the United States wound up using an area defense system for a point defense mission. The area defense concept involved the use of the large, powerful long-range radar systems that were hallmarks of the Mickelsen complex. In addition to being subject to blackout caused by the detonation of nuclear warheads, these radar systems could be attacked directly. Once they were destroyed, the SPARTAN and SPRINT missiles were electronically blind and therefore useless.

In the fall of 1975, the same limitations that hampered SAFEGUARD led to the inactivation of the Mickelsen SAFEGUARD complex. On Oct. 2, 1975, one day after SAFEGUARD became operational, the House voted to inactivate the system. DoD studies made available to the House Committee on Appropriations in September had shown that Soviet missiles with multiple warheads would be able to overwhelm the system. The vulnerability of SAFEGUARD's radar systems was also a factor in the committee's decision.[/color][/b] DoD itself drove the final nail in SAFEGUARD's coffin. During proceedings of the House, it was discovered that DoD had been planning for two years to inactivate the North Dakota site on July 1, 1976. The House voted against SAFEGUARD, and the Senate voted several times on different proposals. Finally, in November 1975, the Senate passed a bill that would allow operation and testing of the site's perimeter acquisition radar but would close down the remainder of SAFEGUARD. In February 1976, the Army began carrying out the directions of Congress. Specifically, site technicians stopped the radiation of power from the missile site radar and began removing warheads and missiles from their launching cells. Furthermore, the Army started transferring personnel to other locations and began to dispose of excess property. The $5 billion complex, operational for only five months, was placed in caretaker status.

Let's have that again, shall we:

DoD studies made available to the House Committee on Appropriations in September had shown that Soviet missiles with multiple warheads would be able to overwhelm the system.

That was the Department of Defence in 1975 saying it's you who is the one talking out of his ass about things he knows nothing about.

Sprint and HIBEX were part of the Nike-X program. HIBEX would have been productionized as Sprint II if it had been built. So
your claim of HIBEX being "rendered obsolecent with the advent of the MIRV" is utterly false.

Let's have a quick review, shall we:

Linky

Two types of missiles were employed in the SAFEGUARD system. The high-altitude SPARTAN missile was built by McDonnell Douglas. It was a three-stage, solid-propellant rocket armed with a nuclear warhead that killed warheads by blast and X-rays that were lethal to warheads several miles away. SPARTAN was 55 feet long. The second missile, SPRINT, was a marvel of aeronautics and space technology. Built by Martin Marietta, it was designed to operate at hypersonic speeds in the earth's atmosphere; at its top speed, the missile's skin became hotter than the interior of its rocket motor and glowed incandescently. If one somehow could have trained an acetylene torch on the nose of the missile at this speed, the hot gases of the torch would have cooled the nose. The electronic components of the SPRINT were designed to withstand accelerations of 100 times gravity. The missile was 27 feet long, consisted of two stages, and used solid fuel. Like SPARTAN, SPRINT carried a nuclear warhead.

Together these missiles provided a "layered" defense. SPARTAN was designed to attack the incoming "threat cloud" of warheads, boosters and decoys while it was still above the atmosphere. SPRINT would then attack surviving warheads after they had penetrated the atmosphere where the resistance and friction of the air would separate the warheads from decoys and booster debris.

SAFEGUARD's "technical sweetness" was overshadowed by its limitations. With only one hundred missiles, the system could provide only limited protection to the ICBMs near Grand Forks and supply some measure of protection to the central United States against an accidental launch or a light ICBM attack. Moreover, SAFEGUARD was not the optimum system for the point defense of hard targets. It started out as the SENTINEL project, which was supposed to provide nationwide protection against a light ICBM attack. When President Nixon shifted the emphasis of the program to defending ICBM fields, the United States wound up using an area defense system for a point defense mission. The area defense concept involved the use of the large, powerful long-range radar systems that were hallmarks of the Mickelsen complex. In addition to being subject to blackout caused by the detonation of nuclear warheads, these radar systems could be attacked directly. Once they were destroyed, the SPARTAN and SPRINT missiles were electronically blind and therefore useless.

In the fall of 1975, the same limitations that hampered SAFEGUARD led to the inactivation of the Mickelsen SAFEGUARD complex. On Oct. 2, 1975, one day after SAFEGUARD became operational, the House voted to inactivate the system. DoD studies made available to the House Committee on Appropriations in September had shown that Soviet missiles with multiple warheads would be able to overwhelm the system. The vulnerability of SAFEGUARD's radar systems was also a factor in the committee's decision.[/color][/b] DoD itself drove the final nail in SAFEGUARD's coffin. During proceedings of the House, it was discovered that DoD had been planning for two years to inactivate the North Dakota site on July 1, 1976. The House voted against SAFEGUARD, and the Senate voted several times on different proposals. Finally, in November 1975, the Senate passed a bill that would allow operation and testing of the site's perimeter acquisition radar but would close down the remainder of SAFEGUARD. In February 1976, the Army began carrying out the directions of Congress. Specifically, site technicians stopped the radiation of power from the missile site radar and began removing warheads and missiles from their launching cells. Furthermore, the Army started transferring personnel to other locations and began to dispose of excess property. The $5 billion complex, operational for only five months, was placed in caretaker status.

Let's have that again, shall we:

DoD studies made available to the House Committee on Appropriations in September had shown that Soviet missiles with multiple warheads would be able to overwhelm the system.

That was the Department of Defence in 1975 saying it's you who is the one talking out of his ass about things he knows nothing about.

SRBM and MRBM with single warheads are the target parametres of the S-400 system. How you love your Red Herrings.
How you love bullshit. HIBEX was designed to intercept incoming ICBM re-entry vehicles at the very end of their journey, 2 seconds
from the target, moving at their maximum speed, after they had dropped from orbit, as a last ditch defense of the ABM site. S-400 exceeds
HIBEX's performance envelope. Other sites list S-400 as being capable of 4.8 km/sec intercepts, which puts it just below violating the
now-defunct ABM treaty which forbid development of missiles capabul of 5 km/sec interception or more.

I see a subsequent review is in order:

Linky

Two types of missiles were employed in the SAFEGUARD system. The high-altitude SPARTAN missile was built by McDonnell Douglas. It was a three-stage, solid-propellant rocket armed with a nuclear warhead that killed warheads by blast and X-rays that were lethal to warheads several miles away. SPARTAN was 55 feet long. The second missile, SPRINT, was a marvel of aeronautics and space technology. Built by Martin Marietta, it was designed to operate at hypersonic speeds in the earth's atmosphere; at its top speed, the missile's skin became hotter than the interior of its rocket motor and glowed incandescently. If one somehow could have trained an acetylene torch on the nose of the missile at this speed, the hot gases of the torch would have cooled the nose. The electronic components of the SPRINT were designed to withstand accelerations of 100 times gravity. The missile was 27 feet long, consisted of two stages, and used solid fuel. Like SPARTAN, SPRINT carried a nuclear warhead.

Together these missiles provided a "layered" defense. SPARTAN was designed to attack the incoming "threat cloud" of warheads, boosters and decoys while it was still above the atmosphere. SPRINT would then attack surviving warheads after they had penetrated the atmosphere where the resistance and friction of the air would separate the warheads from decoys and booster debris.

SAFEGUARD's "technical sweetness" was overshadowed by its limitations. With only one hundred missiles, the system could provide only limited protection to the ICBMs near Grand Forks and supply some measure of protection to the central United States against an accidental launch or a light ICBM attack. Moreover, SAFEGUARD was not the optimum system for the point defense of hard targets. It started out as the SENTINEL project, which was supposed to provide nationwide protection against a light ICBM attack. When President Nixon shifted the emphasis of the program to defending ICBM fields, the United States wound up using an area defense system for a point defense mission. The area defense concept involved the use of the large, powerful long-range radar systems that were hallmarks of the Mickelsen complex. In addition to being subject to blackout caused by the detonation of nuclear warheads, these radar systems could be attacked directly. Once they were destroyed, the SPARTAN and SPRINT missiles were electronically blind and therefore useless.

In the fall of 1975, the same limitations that hampered SAFEGUARD led to the inactivation of the Mickelsen SAFEGUARD complex. On Oct. 2, 1975, one day after SAFEGUARD became operational, the House voted to inactivate the system. DoD studies made available to the House Committee on Appropriations in September had shown that Soviet missiles with multiple warheads would be able to overwhelm the system. The vulnerability of SAFEGUARD's radar systems was also a factor in the committee's decision.[/color][/b] DoD itself drove the final nail in SAFEGUARD's coffin. During proceedings of the House, it was discovered that DoD had been planning for two years to inactivate the North Dakota site on July 1, 1976. The House voted against SAFEGUARD, and the Senate voted several times on different proposals. Finally, in November 1975, the Senate passed a bill that would allow operation and testing of the site's perimeter acquisition radar but would close down the remainder of SAFEGUARD. In February 1976, the Army began carrying out the directions of Congress. Specifically, site technicians stopped the radiation of power from the missile site radar and began removing warheads and missiles from their launching cells. Furthermore, the Army started transferring personnel to other locations and began to dispose of excess property. The $5 billion complex, operational for only five months, was placed in caretaker status.

Let's have that again, shall we:

DoD studies made available to the House Committee on Appropriations in September had shown that Soviet missiles with multiple warheads would be able to overwhelm the system.

That was the Department of Defence in 1975 saying it's you who is the one talking out of his ass about things he knows nothing about.

Patrick Degan · Post by **Patrick Degan** » 2004-11-27 04:32pm

Wading through Shep's latest round of stupidities —Pt. 2:

Nor was anybody talking about anything as silly as putting mirrors on the rocket or polishing anything on it to a mirror-finish or whatever the discussion-board post you referenced as a technical source was attempting to make as a point.
Let us see your post:

Patrick Deegan wrote: Or the possibility of the simplest of counters being employed against a complex system, as this Aviation Week & Space Technology excerpt points out:

Articul Quoted by Deegan wrote: But similar complaints could come up for other missile defense approaches, as well. "Boost-phase intercept has some fairly straightforward countermeasures," said Philip E. Coyle, former director for Pentagon operational test and evaluation. One of the easiest ways to deal with the laser defenses would be to put a reflective coating on the missile that would dissipate energy, he said.
Yep, you were talking about mirroring the rocket. Please Patrick, will you please take some vitamins
to improve your short-term memory?

The problem isn't my memory but rather your reading-comprehension skills. Phillip Coyle said NOTHING about "mirroring the rocket". Reflecting heat does not absolutely require a mirror finish to a surface.

You really don't understand why this parallel fails, do you?
That mirror is far more reflective than your presupposed reflective coating and it blew apart in around a second.

It just doesn't occur to you that the reason "the Rolls-Royce of mirrors" shattered (not exploded, which was a very inaccurate description of the event from the get-go) is because glass (which is what a mirror is made from, BTW) is a brittle material with zero tensile strength: it doesn't deform or bend under stress, it shatters. With the object being a precision-machined optical mirror making the situation worse, since its structure would be equal in all aspects and therefore would act as a perfect resonator for incoming energy.

Surely you will cease trying to liken the casing of a solid-fueled missile to a glass mirror. Maybe not; you've already demonstrated your unwillingness to abandon a flawed argument even after its flaws have been pointed out.

It surely is not necessary to outline the differences between the two types, I hope.
Because we know how well solid fuelled rockets hold up aerodynamically when a hole is punched into them. I think
a certain incident from 1986 proves otherwise. Much less the fact that artillery shells are being destroyed by lasers
nowadays, and they are far more hardened than a missile could ever be, by dint of their thick steel casings.

Oh for fuck's sake! Not only have you just demonstrated your ignorance of rockets, you have demonstrated your ignorance of the Challenger incident.

The Challenger was destroyed because venting rocket plasma from the SRB was cutting into the external fuel tank and a support strut, not because of the actual O-ring llaw —which had occurred in both the Discovery and the Atlantis prior to the Challenger's last flight. The difference in those incidents was that the O-ring flaws in those two ships weren't located near the tank, and those shuttles made it to orbit. Furthermore, the mechanics of the Challenger's destruction were somewhat more complicated:

The commission's report cited the cause of the disaster as a the failure of an “O-ring” seal in the solid-fuel rocket on the Space Shuttle Challenger's right side. The faulty design of the seal coupled with the unusually cold weather, let hot gases to leak through the joint. Booster rocket flames were able to pass through the failed seal enlarging the small hole. These flames then burned through the Space Shuttle Challenger's external fuel tank and through one of the supports that attached the booster to the side of the tank. That booster broke loose and collided with the tank, piercing the tank's side. Liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen fuels from the tank and booster mixed and ignited, causing the Space Shuttle Challenger to tear apart.

It wasn't just one incident but a whole string of incidents in a machine far more complex than any solid-fueled single rocket.

As to rockets: a liquid-propellant ICBM is potentially more vulnerable to a laser because it's outer skin is practically tinfoil; necessary due to the weight of the fuel. A solid-propellant missile can have a thicker casing because its fuel has a higher energy-density than liquids. This is why a laser would require a much longer contact to affect a solid-propellant missile. To quote again from the American Physical Society's report:

Pentagon Cheats Anti-Missile Wargame

NMDEXEC.pdf wrote:14. The Airborne Laser (ABL) has been designed to intercept theater ballistic missiles and is scheduled to achieve initial operational capability in about 10 years. It could offer some capability for intercepting ICBMs, but would have less range than large ground based hit-to-kill interceptors. ABL aircraft could be rapidly deployed, but several ABL aircraft, as well as tanker support aircraft and defensive air cover, would be required to maintain one ABL aircraft continuously on station. While the ABL has some self-defense capability, without supporting tactical air cover ABL aircraft would be vulnerable to attack by enemy aircraft or surface-to-air missiles.

• Performance requirements for the ABL are driven largely by the construction materials of the missile and the distance to the target missile —engagement time and uncertainty about the target's trajectory are not issues (21).

• The laser fluence needed to disable ICBMs is currently rather uncertain, making it difficult to estimate accurately the ABL's range if used against ICBMs. The ABL's range is expected to be roughly similar to that of the modest-sized interceptors that could be carried by aircraft (21.5). If so, it could engage only long-burning liquid-propellant ICBMs launched form geographically small, accessible countries (8.3-8.5).

• Defense would be possible using the ABL only if it can be stationed within 600 kilometers of the intercept point of a liquid-propellant missile or within 300 kilometers of the intercept point of a solid-propellant missile. The ABL's laser beam would have to heat an ICBM for several seconds to disable it; hence ABL engagements would have to be timed to avoid the brief periods during which one stage burns out and is discarded as the next ignites (8.7).

• The ABL would have substantial ability to defend the U.S. against liquid-propellant ICBMs launched from North Korea; however, it would have no utility in defending the U.S. against these missiles launched from geographically large, less-vulnerable countries such as Iran. Because of the greater heat resistance of solid-propellant missiles, the ABL could not defend against these missiles launched from either North Korea or Iran (8.3-8.5).

• The ABL could not disable nuclear warheads or biological or chemical submunitions that have been hardened to survive re-entry at ICBM speeds (20.1).

And as AIR FORCE Magazine reiterates:

John A. Tirpak, Executive Editor AIR FORCE Magazine wrote:The ABL Meets the Physicists
USAF’s Airborne Laser probably will work against liquid-fueled theater-range ballistic missiles, but its prospective use against ICBMs, particularly those having
solid propellants, could be much less successful, according to a report of private experts that was released in Washington in July. The finding was part of a 400-page technical report prepared by the American Physical Society, a group of 40,000 physicists. The report identified a number of technical challenges within the Administration’s proposed missile defense program that now includes the ABL.
The report, which dedicated about 80 pages to the ABL issue, found an audience on Capitol Hill, and lawmakers pressed the Missile Defense Agency for a thorough response.

MDA said the report was under review and would not comment on it directly, except to say that MDA officials believe the current boost-phase architecture is sound and that the missile defense program is “headed in the right direction.” MDA declared that it would conduct a thorough review of boost-phase progress and problems by December, “before any investments are made in a development activity.” Agency officials emphasized that they “continue to believe that boost-phase technology has great potential for playing a vital role in a layered missile defense.”

The Airborne Laser was intended originally only to shoot down theater missiles as a means to protect US and allied forces during overseas operations. (See “Setting a Course for the Airborne Laser,” p. 46.) The ABL still enjoys support on Capitol Hill.
The physicists believe that the ABL can perform its original mission—that is, it likely will work against short-range, liquid-fueled rockets, if the ABL achieves projected power levels with its high energy laser. However, they maintain that distance to the target is critical. If the distance is too great (more than 372 miles on the ground), they say, the laser’s power will fade, causing the ABL to have to focus the laser on the target for longer periods of time to achieve a kill. A longer attack duration will use more laser fuel— reducing the number of shots the ABL can make and the number of targets it can engage. The report concluded that the ABL, to counteract the range problem, would have to orbit very close to enemy territory, putting it at risk from attack by enemy air defenses.

The physicists argue that solid-fueled ICBMs present an even greater challenge. There are two main obstacles: the ICBM’s tougher “skin” and greater speed. The ABL works by heating up a missile’s skin and causing its fuel tank to rupture. Thus, say the physicists, it would be less effective against a solid-fueled booster, which has a stronger body to withstand its own internal fuel combustion. They estimate the ABL would need to be within about 190 miles (ground range) to be effective against a solid-fueled ICBM. Solid-fueled rockets also fly faster than liquid-fueled rockets and over longer ranges. The targeting task would be much more difficult and require much more precision, said the report.

And in regards to your constantly raking up the performance of THEL against artillery shells:

John A. Tirpak, Executive Editor AIR FORCE Magazine wrote:Patrick P. Caruana, an executive with Northrop Grumman, which is a principal ABL contractor, told Air Force Magazine that targeting is an issue, but it is a manageable one. He pointed out that a related program, the Army’s Tactical High-Energy Laser, has proved effective against live-fire incoming artillery shells. “And that’s not a thin-skinned fuel tank,” said Caruana. “That’s a stainless steel casing.” Northrop Grumman determined, after much research, that there was a vulnerable point on the artillery shell. The THEL was able to maintain the laser on that point and destroy the artillery shell. However, the shell was tracked and lased at fairly close range.

The example of Chevaline hardly bears out your argument, no matter how much you wish to believe otherwise.
It is the only example of a deployed penetration aid system for an ICBM, there's nothing else to
compare it too.

As a rebuttal, that's half-assed even for you.

And it was rather difficult to design, despite it being simple. Oh, by the way, if people do
widespread decoys, well we can just go to atmospheric sorting, which will tell us precisely what is a decoy
and what is not.

We've been through that issue before as well, and this has already been taken into account in the designs for decoys mounted in ICBMs. But keep pretending that it hasn't for as long as you wish it:

NOT a Red Herring. The costs of building and maintaining a strategic nuclear deterrent force incorporate replacement of warhead fuel elements in addition to the construction and maintenance of carrier missiles as part of the budget estimate. Compared to the overall defence allocation, still a cheaper expense than the maintenance of a large conventional force structure with global committments. This was why we turned to the Nuclear Big Stick in the first place.
And once again, Patrick wins the "Sheppard Award for Stating the Bleeding Obvious". Do you like hearing yourself
talk, or is there anything else you forgot to tell me, like for example, the sky is blue, but in space, it's black?

Because you've shown yourself as somebody who needs things explained to him multiple times and using simple words before the point gets across. And even then, it's still akin to talking to a dull-witted child.

Chechnya happens to be an insurrection within their own territory, numbskull. It is no more an example of an "imperial" committment than the U.S. Civil War was.
Actually, Chechyna was independent until it was conquered and incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1859, so it's
debatable in some parts whether or not it is part of the Russian Federation like historical areas such as the Voronezhskaya
oblast.

Wow, what a huge irrelevancy. By that sort of "logic", we should cede California, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, Nevada, and Colorado back to Mexico, since they belonged to that country over a century and a half ago. In practical terms, Chechnya has been a Russian region for 150 years and is part of their territory, not a foreign state, and does not meet the definition of a place subject to imperial conquest in the present day in regards to the current insurrection in which Russian citizens living in Chechnya have been targeted and killed.

Nevermind that the very obvious withdrawal of Russian forces from the former satellites and the halving of their fleet makes the point indisputable that the Russians are not funding a military with global committments.
If that's true, why is Russia still in the various "stans" and involved in Georgia currently? Or why do they still have the Kuznetzov?

Exactly how long will you continue this exercise in picking gnatshit out of pepper? Kindly explain how this refutes Russian withdrawal from Eastern Europe, its abandonment of its former client states around the globe, and the docking of their fleet, along with your evident confusion of the terms "global" and "regional", if you would be so kind.

On 24 July 2004 RIA Novosti reported that the Admiral Kuznetsov air-capable cruiser would soon begin performing cruise missions after emergence from preventive maintenance. The headquarters of the Northern Fleet stated that on 06 August 2004 the Admiral Kuznetsov will be released from repair. Its equipment and armaments are in a good state and, after some preparations, the cruiser will be able to perform missions set to it. Carrier-based aircraft would also begin their training sessions soon. The emergence from scheduled repair coincided with the 100th birth anniversary of Admiral Kuznetsov.

Carriers are a power projection tool. And the Russians continue to lay down SSNs. The
Project 971A / 971M Shuka-B (Akula II) Gepard entered service in 2001. Nuclear attack
submarines indicate they want to do global power projection; because diesel boats are just
mobile minefields.

So... every nation which lays down an aircraft carrier or an SSN presumes global ambitions? By that argument, we must fear the might and ambition of the British Royal Navy, Spain, Italy, and Thailand —all of whom possess or are building aircraft carriers and one of which has SSNs.

Exactly how long will you continue this exercise in picking gnatshit out of pepper?

As for improving the army, that also is a priority even with a defensive-oriented military establishment. They are not going to pin the primary defence of the nation on a large army against nuclear-armed potential advesaries, and they are not building up a huge conventional force structure to challenge on a global scale as in Soviet days, which means by default they are shifting to the nuclear option as the primary defence of the nation. You certainly cannot be as thick as you're making yourself out to be in this thread.
Link

In November 2002 Russian defense minister Sergei B. Ivanov, outlined a package of military reforms. By 2007 soldiers, paratroopers and marines in the most combat-ready units — 10 divisions, 7 brigades and 13 regiments — would all be professionals.

Incorrect. They are shifting their conventional force structure to be more in line with the Western model, which is professional
long-timers operating advanced weaponry. And their professional force structure will be line with the US Army's size, which is
10 divisions. They've learned that in this brave post-Soviet world, they cannot rely on conscripts anymore.

Which still does not refute the fact that they've shed global committments as fast as they've been able to and have reduced the size of their armed forces overall. And it's funny how you selectively quoted the article:

According to the resolutions of the Security Council meeting of 11 August 2000, the major reform measures of the general purpose forces will be accomplished by 2006. By that time these forces will have over 800,000 servicemen, for a total reduction of 400,000 troops [possibly as soon as 2003]. The army would lose 180,000 men.

In November 2002 Russian defense minister Sergei B. Ivanov, outlined a package of military reforms. By 2007 soldiers, paratroopers and marines in the most combat-ready units — 10 divisions, 7 brigades and 13 regiments — would all be professionals. Under earlier plans supported by the uniformed leadership, the transition to a contracted, rather than conscripted force would not begin in earnest until 2011.

—to conveniently leave out the item about how the proposed military reforms will still result in a reduced force and is certainly a smaller army than the two million man force the Soviet Union fielded at the height of the Cold War.

Because the British were working from the ground-up and because the development programme was stretched out over 20 years by political concerns.
It is the only example of a deployed penetration aid system for an ICBM, there's nothing else to compare it to.

A half-assed non-rebuttal —again— which totally fails to address the issue at hand.

And next to the expected price-tag for NMD, clocked at around $124 billion at last count, Chevaline was chump-change by comparison.
Really?
$13-$14 billion is given for NMD as it stands. BULLSHIT DEFEATED.

Yes —yours:

Oh really:

Estimated Costs of Selected NMD Systems—NOTES wrote:Does not include costs to operate and maintain the system. CBO later estimated these costs at $2 billion to $4 billion annually, depending on the system deployed. Based on CBO's reports, the Senate Budget Committee estimated that the cost to operate the systems envisioned under the "Defend America Act" from 1997 to 2030 would be between $47 billion and $124 billion.

Y'see, it's going to cost to actually play with the toys, not just in the buying of them.

Sure about that? Because according to the CIA World Factbook entry on Russia, their 2003 GDP is listed as US$1.282 trillion, with a real growth rate of 7.3%.
I would rather trust CSIS, which is an independent analyst group, than the CIA which said
Saddam had WMDs, or could launch in minutes.

Attacking the Messenger Fallacy. The CIA never said any such thing about launch-in-minutes capability, and your laughable apology of a "rebuttal" says nothing about the report in question. More of your patented handwaving away of inconvenient facts. But let's be fair about it:

World Facts & Figures wrote:GDP per capita**(May 11, 2004)

86 — Russia — $ 8,900 — 2003 est.

Hmm... a population of 143, 782, 338 multiplied by per-capita GDP of US$8900 that works out to, roughly, a national GDP of US$1.28 trillion. The World Facts & Figures site gives this data on Russia according to AD2000 estimates, but even with those figures, the figures dispute yours conclusively. Really, you are getting pathetic at this point.

Couldn't have described the mechanics of your thought-processes any better myself.

So you don't masturbate at all? How do you avoid sexual frustration driving you to serial murder sprees?[/quote]

The retort of an immature mind. How typical.

Actually, I must confess; I don't like sodomizing you constantly in this thread

I'm not responsible for your delusional fantasies.

unlike Einy, I don't like
buggering people. So please, can you proceed to Aisle 12 and Get a Clue (TM)?

My, how... High School. Must've taken you simply hours to come up with that one all by yourself.

frigidmagi · Post by **frigidmagi** » 2004-11-27 05:30pm

Geeze, this is a direct repeat of the WWIII in 1949 thread.

MKSheppard · Post by **MKSheppard** » 2004-11-27 06:39pm

Because I'm incredibably bored and I have other better things to do like bomb
Nazi Germany around the clock from the air with 12 O Clock High: Bombing the Reich,
I'll just dissect this part now, and do the rest later:

Linky

Together these missiles provided a "layered" defense. SPARTAN was designed to attack the incoming "threat cloud" of warheads, boosters

and decoys while it was still above the atmosphere. SPRINT would then attack surviving warheads after they had penetrated the atmosphere where

the resistance and friction of the air would separate the warheads from decoys and booster debris.

So your precious decoys could be defeated easily by SPRINT. A decoy will not come in on the same
ballistic trajectory as a real live RV once it re-enters the atmosphere, due to it's much lighter mass.

SAFEGUARD's "technical sweetness" was overshadowed by its limitations. With only one hundred missiles, the system could provide only

limited protection to the ICBMs near Grand Forks and supply some measure of protection to the central United States against an accidental launch or

a light ICBM attack. Moreover, SAFEGUARD was not the optimum system for the point defense of hard targets. It started out as the SENTINEL

project, which was supposed to provide nationwide protection against a light ICBM attack. When President Nixon shifted the emphasis of the program

to defending ICBM fields, the United States wound up using an area defense system for a point defense mission.

The plan was to wallpaper the country with SENTINEL sites:

Linky

Seattle ACC, WA
San Francisco, CA
Los Angeles, CA
Salt Lake, UT
Malmstrom AFB, MT
Warren AFB ACC 2, WY
Grand Forks AFB, ND
Dallas, TX
Whiteman AFB, MO
Chicago, IL
Detroit ACC 1, MI
Albany, GA
Washington DC
New York, NY
Boston, MA
Fairbanks, AL
Oahu, HI

Each site would have been capabul of defending a large swath of America, and it was approved by McNamara,
in a surprising turnabout from his traditional "bury ABM in the paper wars for a newer and more capabul system"
style, but was cancelled by Nixon, who castrated it down to a single site.

The area defense concept involved the use of the large, powerful long-range radar systems that were hallmarks of the Mickelsen complex. In

addition to being subject to blackout caused by the detonation of nuclear warheads, these radar systems could be attacked directly. Once they were

destroyed, the SPARTAN and SPRINT missiles were electronically blind and therefore useless.

Incorrect. The tactic which GS.org describes, blanketing a ABM site with nuclear warheads, is ineffective. It never got
past the paper wars at the consultant firms, for the simple reason that proximity fused ABMs fired into the blackout based
on previously calculated ballistic trajectories for the targets would kill them.

And phased array radars are a bitch to kill. You can knock a significant number of individual array elements in a PAR out,
but the other arrays in the radar will continue to operate, allowing the radar to continue with a degradation in capability.

This is all elucidated in Shield of Faith by B. Bruce-Briggs, who was a defense industry analyst for many years
at the Hudson Institute.

GS.org is a good site, but occasionally they get things wrong.

Ma Deuce · Post by **Ma Deuce** » 2004-11-28 04:42am

frigidmagi wrote:Geeze, this is a direct repeat of the WWIII in 1949 thread.

Indeed: Now excuse me while I go get some popcorn

.

Kreshna Aryaguna Nurzaman · Post by **Kreshna Aryaguna Nurzaman** » 2004-11-28 08:27am

Considering Russia has been enjoying the evil ways of capitalism for quite a time, I wouldn't be surprised to see the nuke missile system on sale on the international arms market. Now wouldn't be cool to be a Russian, having a country which major commodities are high-tech weapons instead of mundane things like consumer electronics or automobiles?

Patrick Degan · Post by **Patrick Degan** » 2004-11-28 08:41am

MKSheppard wrote:Because I'm incredibably bored and I have other better things to do like bomb
Nazi Germany around the clock from the air with 12 O Clock High: Bombing the Reich,
I'll just dissect this part now, and do the rest later:

Linky

Together these missiles provided a "layered" defense. SPARTAN was designed to attack the incoming "threat cloud" of warheads, boosters

and decoys while it was still above the atmosphere. SPRINT would then attack surviving warheads after they had penetrated the atmosphere where

the resistance and friction of the air would separate the warheads from decoys and booster debris.
So your precious decoys could be defeated easily by SPRINT. A decoy will not come in on the same
ballistic trajectory as a real live RV once it re-enters the atmosphere, due to it's much lighter mass.

SAFEGUARD's "technical sweetness" was overshadowed by its limitations. With only one hundred missiles, the system could provide only

limited protection to the ICBMs near Grand Forks and supply some measure of protection to the central United States against an accidental launch or

a light ICBM attack. Moreover, SAFEGUARD was not the optimum system for the point defense of hard targets. It started out as the SENTINEL

project, which was supposed to provide nationwide protection against a light ICBM attack. When President Nixon shifted the emphasis of the program

to defending ICBM fields, the United States wound up using an area defense system for a point defense mission.
The plan was to wallpaper the country with SENTINEL sites:

Linky

Seattle ACC, WA
San Francisco, CA
Los Angeles, CA
Salt Lake, UT
Malmstrom AFB, MT
Warren AFB ACC 2, WY
Grand Forks AFB, ND
Dallas, TX
Whiteman AFB, MO
Chicago, IL
Detroit ACC 1, MI
Albany, GA
Washington DC
New York, NY
Boston, MA
Fairbanks, AL
Oahu, HI

Each site would have been capabul of defending a large swath of America, and it was approved by McNamara,
in a surprising turnabout from his traditional "bury ABM in the paper wars for a newer and more capabul system"
style, but was cancelled by Nixon, who castrated it down to a single site.

The area defense concept involved the use of the large, powerful long-range radar systems that were hallmarks of the Mickelsen complex. In

addition to being subject to blackout caused by the detonation of nuclear warheads, these radar systems could be attacked directly. Once they were

destroyed, the SPARTAN and SPRINT missiles were electronically blind and therefore useless.
Incorrect. The tactic which GS.org describes, blanketing a ABM site with nuclear warheads, is ineffective. It never got
past the paper wars at the consultant firms, for the simple reason that proximity fused ABMs fired into the blackout based
on previously calculated ballistic trajectories for the targets would kill them.

And phased array radars are a bitch to kill. You can knock a significant number of individual array elements in a PAR out,
but the other arrays in the radar will continue to operate, allowing the radar to continue with a degradation in capability.

This is all elucidated in Shield of Faith by B. Bruce-Briggs, who was a defense industry analyst for many years
at the Hudson Institute.

GS.org is a good site, but occasionally they get things wrong.

Uh huh. Let's do a quick review, shall we:

Linky

Two types of missiles were employed in the SAFEGUARD system. The high-altitude SPARTAN missile was built by McDonnell Douglas. It was a three-stage, solid-propellant rocket armed with a nuclear warhead that killed warheads by blast and X-rays that were lethal to warheads several miles away. SPARTAN was 55 feet long. The second missile, SPRINT, was a marvel of aeronautics and space technology. Built by Martin Marietta, it was designed to operate at hypersonic speeds in the earth's atmosphere; at its top speed, the missile's skin became hotter than the interior of its rocket motor and glowed incandescently. If one somehow could have trained an acetylene torch on the nose of the missile at this speed, the hot gases of the torch would have cooled the nose. The electronic components of the SPRINT were designed to withstand accelerations of 100 times gravity. The missile was 27 feet long, consisted of two stages, and used solid fuel. Like SPARTAN, SPRINT carried a nuclear warhead.

Together these missiles provided a "layered" defense. SPARTAN was designed to attack the incoming "threat cloud" of warheads, boosters and decoys while it was still above the atmosphere. SPRINT would then attack surviving warheads after they had penetrated the atmosphere where the resistance and friction of the air would separate the warheads from decoys and booster debris.

SAFEGUARD's "technical sweetness" was overshadowed by its limitations. With only one hundred missiles, the system could provide only limited protection to the ICBMs near Grand Forks and supply some measure of protection to the central United States against an accidental launch or a light ICBM attack. Moreover, SAFEGUARD was not the optimum system for the point defense of hard targets. It started out as the SENTINEL project, which was supposed to provide nationwide protection against a light ICBM attack. When President Nixon shifted the emphasis of the program to defending ICBM fields, the United States wound up using an area defense system for a point defense mission. The area defense concept involved the use of the large, powerful long-range radar systems that were hallmarks of the Mickelsen complex. In addition to being subject to blackout caused by the detonation of nuclear warheads, these radar systems could be attacked directly. Once they were destroyed, the SPARTAN and SPRINT missiles were electronically blind and therefore useless.

In the fall of 1975, the same limitations that hampered SAFEGUARD led to the inactivation of the Mickelsen SAFEGUARD complex. On Oct. 2, 1975, one day after SAFEGUARD became operational, the House voted to inactivate the system. DoD studies made available to the House Committee on Appropriations in September had shown that Soviet missiles with multiple warheads would be able to overwhelm the system. The vulnerability of SAFEGUARD's radar systems was also a factor in the committee's decision.[/color][/b] DoD itself drove the final nail in SAFEGUARD's coffin. During proceedings of the House, it was discovered that DoD had been planning for two years to inactivate the North Dakota site on July 1, 1976. The House voted against SAFEGUARD, and the Senate voted several times on different proposals. Finally, in November 1975, the Senate passed a bill that would allow operation and testing of the site's perimeter acquisition radar but would close down the remainder of SAFEGUARD. In February 1976, the Army began carrying out the directions of Congress. Specifically, site technicians stopped the radiation of power from the missile site radar and began removing warheads and missiles from their launching cells. Furthermore, the Army started transferring personnel to other locations and began to dispose of excess property. The $5 billion complex, operational for only five months, was placed in caretaker status.

Let's have that again, shall we:

DoD studies made available to the House Committee on Appropriations in September had shown that Soviet missiles with multiple warheads would be able to overwhelm the system.

That was the Department of Defence in 1975 saying it's you who is the one talking out of his ass about things he knows nothing about.

Post by **Vympel** » 2004-11-28 08:44am

Kreshna Aryaguna Nurzaman wrote:Considering Russia has been enjoying the evil ways of capitalism for quite a time, I wouldn't be surprised to see the nuke missile system on sale on the international arms market.

I would. It would spectacularly violate numerous missile and nuclear treaties, and is not in Russia's interests.

Now wouldn't be cool to be a Russian, having a country which major commodities are high-tech weapons instead of mundane things like consumer electronics or automobiles?

Well, high-tech weapons are one of Russia's major commodities- that and raw materials. If you're not a US ally, if you can't afford "western" weapons, or whatever, Russia is the place to go for your weapons needs. Who else are you going to go to? China? Don't make me laugh

Patrick Degan · Post by **Patrick Degan** » 2004-11-28 08:45am

Oh, and in regards to this little gem:

MK Sheppard wrote:GS.org is a good site, but occasionally they get things wrong

Such as when it presents "badfact" which contradicts your endless wanking, presumably...

Kreshna Aryaguna Nurzaman · Post by **Kreshna Aryaguna Nurzaman** » 2004-11-28 09:48am

Vympel wrote:
Kreshna Aryaguna Nurzaman wrote:Considering Russia has been enjoying the evil ways of capitalism for quite a time, I wouldn't be surprised to see the nuke missile system on sale on the international arms market.
I would. It would spectacularly violate numerous missile and nuclear treaties, and is not in Russia's interests.

I know. I just can't imagine Bush's face if Putin goes too far, protesting against nuclear treaties because "it is against the spirit of free market".

Vympel wrote:
Now wouldn't be cool to be a Russian, having a country which major commodities are high-tech weapons instead of mundane things like consumer electronics or automobiles?
Well, high-tech weapons are one of Russia's major commodities- that and raw materials. If you're not a US ally, if you can't afford "western" weapons, or whatever, Russia is the place to go for your weapons needs. Who else are you going to go to? China? Don't make me laugh

IIRC Russian weapons are more durable, cost-effective, *much* more dependable on the battlefield, and easy to maintain, not to mention their ass-kicking performance (read somewhere that German pilots were stunned by Mig-29's performance, couldn't recall the url, though). All they need to do is to improve the ergonomics (for some product lines like aircraft) and hired some aggresive marketing people. Who knows, someday maybe even the United States will start buying Russian weapons!

Pu-239 · Post by **Pu-239** » 2004-11-28 12:00pm

Kreshna Aryaguna Nurzaman wrote:Now wouldn't be cool to be a Russian, having a country which major commodities are high-tech weapons instead of mundane things like consumer electronics or automobiles?

SIGGED!

Post by **Beowulf** » 2004-11-28 04:25pm

I see a couple assumptions you're making Degan.

We'll be facing the Russians in a nuclear attack.
Technology won't have advanced since 1975 allowing us better ways to discriminate targets.
A system must be 100% effective to be worth buying
Causing an aggressor to spend missiles attacking the middle of nowhere is not effective.
That overwhelming a system can't be taken care of by adding better radars and more missiles.

The Duchess of Zeon · Post by **The Duchess of Zeon** » 2004-11-28 08:04pm

Beowulf wrote:I see a couple assumptions you're making Degan.
We'll be facing the Russians in a nuclear attack.
Technology won't have advanced since 1975 allowing us better ways to discriminate targets.
A system must be 100% effective to be worth buying
Causing an aggressor to spend missiles attacking the middle of nowhere is not effective.
That overwhelming a system can't be taken care of by adding better radars and more missiles.

Or as Herman Kahn famously summarized the arguments of anti-defence advocates fourty years ago:

1. It won't work.
2. It will work to well.
3. Both.

Patrick Degan · Post by **Patrick Degan** » 2004-11-29 12:36am

Beowulf wrote:I see a couple assumptions you're making Degan.

We'll be facing the Russians in a nuclear attack.

They are the only serious ICBM threat which would justify even the attempt at an ABM system, and the recent statements by Vladimir Putin indicate clearly that Russia will not simply allow its nuclear force to be rendered impotent by the country which remains its most logical nuclear adversary —in other words, us. China hasn't upgraded its nuclear force significantly in 30 years (though our attempt at NMD may cause them to rethink that policy) and whatever capability North Korea has is numerically limited and technologically primitive. Liquid-propellant ICBMs have to be jacked into launch position and fueled —a process which takes 15-17 minutes during which the missiles would be vulnerable to preemptive cruise missile strike launched from SSNs 30-60 miles off the Korean coast.

Technology won't have advanced since 1975 allowing us better ways to discriminate targets.

I hate to have to remind you of this, but the technology game works both ways.

A system must be 100% effective to be worth buying

When the stakes are the loss of one or more cities with casualties running into the millions in a nuclear attack, 90% won't be good enough. If the system cannot be guaranteed to stop even a limited attack (and this issue is still very much uncertain), then it is worse than useless.

Causing an aggressor to spend missiles attacking the middle of nowhere is not effective.

Except they won't be "attacking the middle of nowhere". A serious adversary would employ a saturation attack to overwhelm the system. This has been discussed repeatedly not only by critics of the previous attempts at an ABM system in three decades (which included not only Pentagon analysts but scientists at Bell Laboratories —a primary ABM contractor in the 60s and 70s— during the Safeguard debate), but also by U.S. strategic planners designing the best means to overwhelm Galosh —the ABM system defending Moscow— during the height of the Cold War. The employment of decoys and other penaids also cannot be discounted no matter how much the present Cult of NMD wish they could be. A less capable adversary would seek other methods of attack which an NMD system is not designed to counter.

That overwhelming a system can't be taken care of by adding better radars and more missiles.

To which a serious enemy would add more warheads, more decoys and penaids, and more warheads dedicated to an EMP strike —not for the object of wrecking the radar systems themselves but to heavily ionise the atmosphere; which would blind any radar system no matter how good it may be.