Russia: That is only what we WANTED you to think, comrade!!!

[Beowulf]

I see a couple assumptions you're making Degan.

We'll be facing the Russians in a nuclear attack.

They are the only serious ICBM threat which would justify even the attempt at an ABM system, and the recent statements by Vladimir Putin indicate clearly that Russia will not simply allow its nuclear force to be rendered impotent by the country which remains its most logical nuclear adversary —in other words, us. China hasn't upgraded its nuclear force significantly in 30 years (though our attempt at NMD may cause them to rethink that policy) and whatever capability North Korea has is numerically limited and technologically primitive. Liquid-propellant ICBMs have to be jacked into launch position and fueled —a process which takes 15-17 minutes during which the missiles would be vulnerable to preemptive cruise missile strike launched from SSNs 30-60 miles off the Korean coast.

We still utilize Minuteman IIIs, which are getting to be almost 30 years old. China upgrades it nuclear forces? That's money they aren't spending to improve the PLA and PLAN to try and invade Taiwan. Numerically limited and technologically primitive doesn't mean that taking out, for example, Seattle wouldn't be a bad idea if the state is close enough to collapse that they're going to be stuck up against a wall. Maybe we don't have a SSN in range to be able to hit the target. If it actually launches, we don't have anything to do.

Technology won't have advanced since 1975 allowing us better ways to discriminate targets.

I hate to have to remind you of this, but the technology game works both ways.

There hasn't really been any impetus to develop a better decoys and such, because there hasn't been anything to stop a missile. And of course, it works both ways, they improve their decoys to decrease the effectiveness, we improve the system to increase effectiveness.

A system must be 100% effective to be worth buying

When the stakes are the loss of one or more cities with casualties running into the millions in a nuclear attack, 90% won't be good enough. If the system cannot be guaranteed to stop even a limited attack (and this issue is still very much uncertain), then it is worse than useless.

90% of a chance is better than 0%. When the stakes are the loss of one or more cities with casualties running into the millions in a nuclear attack, and you had a possibility of stopping it, then you're going to get raked over hot coals, as opposed to trying to stop it, and failing. How much damage would a successful attack cause? Millions? Billions?

And of course, there's the sheer impossibility of something with a 100% reliability. The more nines you add to 99.9%, the more expensive it gets.

Lastly, just having the system puts doubt into the possibility of a successful ICBM attack, which means it decreases the chance of an attempt occuring.

Causing an aggressor to spend missiles attacking the middle of nowhere is not effective.

Except they won't be "attacking the middle of nowhere". A serious adversary would employ a saturation attack to overwhelm the system. This has been discussed repeatedly not only by critics of the previous attempts at an ABM system in three decades (which included not only Pentagon analysts but scientists at Bell Laboratories —a primary ABM contractor in the 60s and 70s— during the Safeguard debate), but also by U.S. strategic planners designing the best means to overwhelm Galosh —the ABM system defending Moscow— during the height of the Cold War. The employment of decoys and other penaids also cannot be discounted no matter how much the present Cult of NMD wish they could be. A less capable adversary would seek other methods of attack which an NMD system is not designed to counter.

And everyone of those missiles that is trying to saturate the defenses in one area, is a missile not heading for another target. And last I checked, Alaska is the next best thing to middle of nowhere. The only thing better would be a far out to sea platform. Targetting the system itself means you just used a bunch of nukes on the middle of nowhere.

That overwhelming a system can't be taken care of by adding better radars and more missiles.

To which a serious enemy would add more warheads, more decoys and penaids, and more warheads dedicated to an EMP strike —not for the object of wrecking the radar systems themselves but to heavily ionise the atmosphere; which would blind any radar system no matter how good it may be.

And massively increase the cost of their nuclear deterrant. Most countries can't afford to spend $450 billion a year on their armed forces. And of course, as the system get upgraded, they'll deal with this threat, possibly by hitting the warhead bus before debussing begins, as an example of what's possible.

[Patrick Degan]

I see a couple assumptions you're making Degan.

We'll be facing the Russians in a nuclear attack.

They are the only serious ICBM threat which would justify even the attempt at an ABM system, and the recent statements by Vladimir Putin indicate clearly that Russia will not simply allow its nuclear force to be rendered impotent by the country which remains its most logical nuclear adversary —in other words, us. China hasn't upgraded its nuclear force significantly in 30 years (though our attempt at NMD may cause them to rethink that policy) and whatever capability North Korea has is numerically limited and technologically primitive. Liquid-propellant ICBMs have to be jacked into launch position and fueled —a process which takes 15-17 minutes during which the missiles would be vulnerable to preemptive cruise missile strike launched from SSNs 30-60 miles off the Korean coast.

We still utilize Minuteman IIIs, which are getting to be almost 30 years old. China upgrades it nuclear forces? That's money they aren't spending to improve the PLA and PLAN to try and invade Taiwan. Numerically limited and technologically primitive doesn't mean that taking out, for example, Seattle wouldn't be a bad idea if the state is close enough to collapse that they're going to be stuck up against a wall. Maybe we don't have a SSN in range to be able to hit the target. If it actually launches, we don't have anything to do.

Ah, a variation of the old "insane Chinese" argument which was floated during the Sentinel debates back in 1965-68. Back then, it was the PRC who would have gladly accepted incineration for the chance to wipe one or two American cities off the map. The current incarnation of the argument has no more credibility than it did 40 years ago.

And if tensions are rising with North Korea, just why wouldn't we have an SSN or two on patrol off the Korean coast, with standby orders for a preemptive strike? And the Tommohawk has a range of 700 miles. Launched from a submarine off the coast, it would reach its target within four minutes.

And the only reason we haven't abandoned the Minuteman III is due to the present START treaty with Russia limiting land-based missiles. The main strikeforce presently is the more modern Trident SLBM.

Technology won't have advanced since 1975 allowing us better ways to discriminate targets.

I hate to have to remind you of this, but the technology game works both ways.

There hasn't really been any impetus to develop a better decoys and such, because there hasn't been anything to stop a missile. And of course, it works both ways, they improve their decoys to decrease the effectiveness, we improve the system to increase effectiveness.[/quote]

No, there hasn't been any impetus to develop better decoys because nobody until now has seriously attempted to pursue an ABM system and the end of the Cold War removed much of the logic for such measures from the table. And the issue of coutermeasures v. counter-counter measures has been debated before as well the last two times the ABM issue has come up; system improvements are limited by fundamental physical issues which are easier to exploit than overcome —such as radar vulnerability for a start.

A system must be 100% effective to be worth buying

When the stakes are the loss of one or more cities with casualties running into the millions in a nuclear attack, 90% won't be good enough. If the system cannot be guaranteed to stop even a limited attack (and this issue is still very much uncertain), then it is worse than useless.

90% of a chance is better than 0%. When the stakes are the loss of one or more cities with casualties running into the millions in a nuclear attack, and you had a possibility of stopping it, then you're going to get raked over hot coals, as opposed to trying to stop it, and failing. How much damage would a successful attack cause? Millions? Billions?[/quote]

You still don't get it, do you? The playing-percentages argument counts for nothing because an imperfect defence, even if it stops 90% of a strike, is still not going to prevent several million casualties and the loss of one or more cities by the warheads that "leak" through. And if the defence fails to stop even a limited strike, nobody is going to give a flying fuck about the "we tried" argument.

And of course, there's the sheer impossibility of something with a 100% reliability. The more nines you add to 99.9%, the more expensive it gets.

Nowhere near as expensive as trying to attain and then maintain that 99.999% edge.

Lastly, just having the system puts doubt into the possibility of a successful ICBM attack, which means it decreases the chance of an attempt occuring.

No, it increases the chances of an enemy seeking either to overwhelm or circumvent the system. It does not decrease the chance of an attempted attack at all; it simply changes the enemy's strategy.

Causing an aggressor to spend missiles attacking the middle of nowhere is not effective.

Except they won't be "attacking the middle of nowhere". A serious adversary would employ a saturation attack to overwhelm the system. This has been discussed repeatedly not only by critics of the previous attempts at an ABM system in three decades (which included not only Pentagon analysts but scientists at Bell Laboratories —a primary ABM contractor in the 60s and 70s— during the Safeguard debate), but also by U.S. strategic planners designing the best means to overwhelm Galosh —the ABM system defending Moscow— during the height of the Cold War. The employment of decoys and other penaids also cannot be discounted no matter how much the present Cult of NMD wish they could be. A less capable adversary would seek other methods of attack which an NMD system is not designed to counter.

And everyone of those missiles that is trying to saturate the defenses in one area, is a missile not heading for another target. And last I checked, Alaska is the next best thing to middle of nowhere. The only thing better would be a far out to sea platform. Targetting the system itself means you just used a bunch of nukes on the middle of nowhere.[/quote]

No, the point is to saturate the defence as a whole and not to knock out the defence sites. Nobody would be trying to target Alaska; they would instead toss as many warheads and decoys as it would take to ensure that enough got through to take out the main targets which are the object of the attack.

That overwhelming a system can't be taken care of by adding better radars and more missiles.

To which a serious enemy would add more warheads, more decoys and penaids, and more warheads dedicated to an EMP strike —not for the object of wrecking the radar systems themselves but to heavily ionise the atmosphere; which would blind any radar system no matter how good it may be.

And massively increase the cost of their nuclear deterrant. Most countries can't afford to spend $450 billion a year on their armed forces. And of course, as the system get upgraded, they'll deal with this threat, possibly by hitting the warhead bus before debussing begins, as an example of what's possible.[/quote]

It does not require $450 billion a year to build ICBMs and warheads —$23 billion total would buy the Russians a force of 450 Topol-Ms. Furthermore, the Russians have no need to spend $450 billion a year on defence or even half that amount as they no longer have global committments to require financing a large conventional military establishment on the scale of the United States war machine. Most nations have no such need. And the purpose of decoys, chaff and other penaids, and EMP-blinding, is to prevent intercepting the warhead bus; as are measures such as altering the suborbital flight-pattern or the use of independently manoeuverable warheads and warhead-buses.

And the mid-course intercept scenario by any ground-based defence system isn't even remotely realistic.

[Illuminatus Primus]

And the only reason we haven't abandoned the Minuteman III is due to the present START treaty with Russia limiting land-based missiles.

Nitpick: START II is defunct. LGM-116A would be legal once again.

[Vympel]

Nitpick: START II is defunct. LGM-116A would be legal once again.

You mean Peacekeeper, LGM-118A, yeah?. They've gotten rid of Peacekeeper anyway, fortunately/unfortunately depending on what country you're in

[Patrick Degan]

Slight correction:

And the mid-course intercept scenario by any ground-based defence system isn't even remotely realistic.

I meant to say here "the mid-course intercept prior to warhead release by any ground-based defence" isn't remotely feasible.

[Ma Deuce]

IIRC Russian weapons are more durable, cost-effective, *much* more dependable on the battlefield,

Depends which weapon: For example, In most situations I would rather be in an Abrams or a Leopard 2 than a Russian MBT, know why? modern Russian MBTs store their main gun ammo in a carosel at the base of the turret ring, with no seperation from the crew: if the ammo is hit and goes off, it will instantly kill the crew and launch the turret into the air. Meanwhile, an Abrams stores it's ammo in an armored turret bustle that's separated from the crew compartment by an armored bulkhead: if the ammo is detonated, the explosion is simply vented out the turret roof. To my knowledge, not one Abrams crew member has ever been killed directly by an ammo explosion, even though several Abrams have suffered ammo detonations in combat. On the other hand there are numerous instances of T-72s and T-80s "brewing up" after being penetrated in their side hulls, killing their crews in the process. The Abrams and Leo 2 are more expensive to buy and maintain, but I think the cost is worth the increased crew survivability. Also, while Russian MBTs weigh about 50 tons while having similar frontal protection to the 70-ton Abrams (thanks to their K-5 "heavy" reactive armor panels), they achieve this at the cost of having weak-as-piss side armor protection compared to an Abrams or Leo 2.

One other item is the fact that Russian tanks use an automatic loader, which not the most dependable piece of equipment: if it fails or is damaged, the gunner has to load the gun himself, and given the design of their gun breach and ammo storage system of a modern Russian tank, a manual load takes about a minute. Meanwhile, the Abrams and Leo 2 still use a human loader, who if sufficiently experienced can reload the gun in about 5 seconds, even faster than an autoloader. The only Russian tanks that still use human loaders are obsolete T-62s and T-55s. While an autolader allows a tank to be operated with 3 rather than 4 crewmembers, this can actually be considered a disadvantage, as it means one less pair of hands if the tank needs to be repaired in the field.

and easy to maintain, not to mention their ass-kicking performance

Most of the latest Russian stuff definately kicks ass, but alot of it is becomming as expensive and maintenence-intensive as it's Western counterparts.

An example would be infantry rifles: the Russians plan to replace the eminently simple and inexpensive AK74 with the AN94, which is possibly the most complicated and expensive assault rifle ever fielded, and requires cutting-edge manufacturing techniques to produce: It takes so much training to effectivly use and maintain in the field that it's currently impractical for the Russians to use it for any other units but elite Special Forces. This will not change until they go from a conscript army to a professional army.

Another example is aircraft: The latest versions of the Su-27/30 are considered superior to the F-15C, but they are also more expensive.

(read somewhere that German pilots were stunned by Mig-29's performance, couldn't recall the url, though).

That was an exercise in which the MiG-29's helmet mounted sight and R-73 missiles (which could be fired off-boresight using the HMD) allowed the MiGs to assrape USAF F-16Cs ain a simulated dogfight. The Germans credit their victory to the HMD/R-73 combo, as it was found the MiG-29 is only slightly more maneuverable than the F-16: The MiG can turn slightly tighter and "ramp up" to it's max. turn rate faster, but the F-16 maintains it's speed through a high-G turn much better. The exercise prompted the Americans to develop their own helmet mounted sight and a new missile to go with it, the AIM-9X.

Who knows, someday maybe even the United States will start buying Russian weapons!

I can guarantee you that will never happen. Ever. No matter how good Russian weapons are/will become, the US military will never adopt Russian-made equipment.

Besides, the US generally only imports military stuff like small arms and certain electronic equipment. Complete systems like aircraft, ships, vehicles, and missiles they almost always design and build themselves (although some components of these systems are of foreign origin, like the 120mm gun on the Abrams, although the gun is modified from the original German design).

[Beowulf]

If it isn't perfect, it's not worth buying.

If you insist on that, it's not worth the time beating my head against a wall.

[MKSheppard]

If it isn't perfect, it's not worth buying.

If you insist on that, it's not worth the time beating my head against a wall.

Page 108 of Shield of Faith by B. Bruce-Briggs elucidates on this

The standard '50s miliitary procedure, which did not always work but
usually did, was to research until there was a credible theory that the
system would work, then begin to prepare for production while
continuning the development, and then fix any flaws that showed up
in the prototype.

This was how the Air Force had developed the interceptor-fighters
for continental air defense in the 1950s. It may seem inefficient, but
probably was less costly than more careful development, which, as
we know from the '70s and '80s, can devour enormous sums of
money without compensating savings or effectiveness.

SAM-D is a lvoely example of how ytou can burn money with no
real result seeking perfection.

[Illuminatus Primus]

Nitpick: START II is defunct. LGM-116A would be legal once again.

You mean Peacekeeper, LGM-118A, yeah?. They've gotten rid of Peacekeeper anyway, fortunately/unfortunately depending on what country you're in

You're right, LGM-118A

And do not remind me about Peacekeeper! We should get our own answer to Topol-M.

[Ma Deuce]

We should get our own answer to Topol-M.

You probably will...

But only in about 15 years when the Minuteman IIIs expire and need to be replaced .

This isn't a big issue, however: the US doesn't put as much emphasis on land-based ICBMs anymore now that you have the Trident II Swarm of Doom™...

[Vympel]

And do not remind me about Peacekeeper! We should get our own answer to Topol-M.

I was very glad to hear of it, since though Russia still has it's SS-24 SCALPEL/ Molodets force, it's not sustainable since it was built in Ukraine . Which of course is the original topic of this thread, what with designing a replacement with similar specs to the SS-24 and all that.

Also, in order to answer Topol-M, the hypothetical missile would have to be both silo and off-road/road-mobile launch capable

[Ma Deuce]

I was very glad to hear of it, since though Russia still has it's SS-24 SCALPEL/ Molodets force, it's not sustainable since it was built in Ukraine . Which of course is the original topic of this thread, what with designing a replacement with similar specs to the SS-24 and all that.

Also, in order to answer Topol-M, the hypothetical missile would have to be both silo and off-road/road-mobile launch capable

Who cares about all the Russkies' kewl land-based birds? the Trident II Swarm of Doom™ p3nxors all .

[Illuminatus Primus]

And do not remind me about Peacekeeper! We should get our own answer to Topol-M.

I was very glad to hear of it, since though Russia still has it's SS-24 SCALPEL/ Molodets force, it's not sustainable since it was built in Ukraine . Which of course is the original topic of this thread, what with designing a replacement with similar specs to the SS-24 and all that.

Also, in order to answer Topol-M, the hypothetical missile would have to be both silo and off-road/road-mobile launch capable

We'll get on it, don't you worry. And the bus will have 8 MARVs.

[Chris OFarrell]

Bah. ICBM's are overated.

Russia can't come close to matching the shear coolness and power of the Trident II Swarm. From right off your coastline without warning you get blown to all hell.

And Vympel, why do I get the fealing that come any conflict between Russia and the West in the future you're going to get your ass thrown in jail for treason

[Kazuaki Shimazaki]

And Vympel, why do I get the fealing that come any conflict between Russia and the West in the future you're going to get your ass thrown in jail for treason

Bah! Being pro-Russian equipment is part of free speech. Whoever arrests him for that is by far the greater traitor. That is, if Western democracies still plan on embracing free speech as a principle.

[Chris OFarrell]

The words 'Shut' 'Up' and 'Kaz' come to mind now. It was clearly a JOKE bassed on the implication, clearly false, that he is some kind of Russian agent or something. Get a sense of humor for the love of God....

[Vympel]

The words 'Shut' 'Up' and 'Kaz' come to mind now. It was clearly a JOKE bassed on the implication, clearly false, that he is some kind of Russian agent or something. Get a sense of humor for the love of God....

I'd say Kaz's "Bah!" was clearly an indicator that he was being humorous too, personally

We'll get on it, don't you worry. And the bus will have 8 MARVs.

This will not aid you if the replacement ICBM is in actuality an even larger SS-18 SATAN successor. Muahahahahahah!

Who cares about all the Russkies' kewl land-based birds? the Trident II Swarm of Doom? p3nxors all

Bah! Russia still has it's SS-N-18 STINGRAY/ SS-N-20 STURGEON/ SS-N-23 SKIFF swarm ... albeit ... slowly shrinking in respect of SS-N-18 and SS-N-20. But the SS-NX-30 Bulava SLBMs are on the way, what with several tests being carried out already, and the new Sineva SLBMs for the Delta IV SSBNs coming along

Recent dummy-Bulava test link

[Ma Deuce]

Bah! Russia still has it's SS-N-18 STINGRAY/ SS-N-20 STURGEON/ SS-N-23 SKIFF swarm ... albeit ... slowly shrinking in respect of SS-N-18 and SS-N-20. But the SS-NX-30 Bulava SLBMs are on the way, what with several tests being carried out already, and the new Sineva SLBMs for the Delta IV SSBNs coming along

Bah! the Trident II Swarm of Doom™ easly pwns Russia's swiftly shrinking "swarm" of SLBMs: Their current operational fleet of SSBNs including the first Borei (And I'm not counting the Delta IIIs, since they don't really work anymore) is probably only equal to 4, maybe 5 Ohio Batch IIs, and the Americans will have about 3 times as many Batch II boats as that when the four remaining Batch I Ohios are converted to fire Trident IIs. While I'm at it:

Ohio/Trident II combo > Typhoon/SS-N-20 combo

Ohio/Trident II combo > Borei/SS-N-30 combo

Trident II > SS-N-20

Trident I > SS-N-23

and I deresay: Trident II > SS-N-30 (which can only carry six 550 kt warheads even with all shielding and decoys removed, vs. eight 475kt W88 or up to fourteen 170kt W76 warheads for the Trident II)

Pwned!

[phongn]

All your ICBMs are worthless compared to the mighty trinity of Spartan, Sprint and Hibex

[Ma Deuce]

All your ICBMs are worthless compared to the mighty trinity of Spartan, Sprint and Hibex

Which reminds me: what's the designation/name of the new ABM system?

[phongn]

Which reminds me: what's the designation/name of the new ABM system?

National Missile Defense. No fun names like Safeguard or Sentinal. No fancy missile names like Zeus or Spartan.

[Ma Deuce]

Which reminds me: what's the designation/name of the new ABM system?

National Missile Defense. No fun names like Safeguard or Sentinal. No fancy missile names like Zeus or Spartan.

Damn. The DoD is losing it's touch, I say.

[Illuminatus Primus]

This is more obvious when Washington names Operations: Operation JUST CAUSE? Operation RESTORE HOPE? Operation INFINITE JUSTICE?! Operation ENDURING FREEDOM? Operation IRAQI FREEDOM?

Smaller operations are always cool: Operation GOTHIC SERPENT, Operation ANACONDA, Operation IVY CYCLONE II, Operation PHANTOM FURY.

[Ma Deuce]

This is more obvious when Washington names Operations: Operation JUST CAUSE? Operation RESTORE HOPE? Operation INFINITE JUSTICE?! Operation ENDURING FREEDOM? Operation IRAQI FREEDOM?

They do get it right occasionally: DESERT STORM was pretty kewl. But you forgot one of the worst ones: ALLIED FORCE .

[Illuminatus Primus]

A shitty video game got it right for what they should have called Gulf War II; Operation DESERT HAMMER.

How cool is that?