NMD test goes balls-up

[SirNitram]

So, in other words, it delivers exactly the sort of message I was expecting from something talking about ABM and calling itself 'Shield Of Faith'. The whole thing is basically a wish and some spit.

ABM supporters tend to forget one huge rule of technology. Defenses are reactive, not proactive. You'll always lag behind. And in a nuclear exchange, you really can't afford to do that. So the intelligent solution is to avoid a nuclear exchange via other avenues.

[Illuminatus Primus]

While we're on the subject of collateral EMP from nuclear ABMs, there's also the scenario of someone deliberatly detonating one or more low megaton-range ICBMs exoatmostpherically over the continental US for the express purpose of creating EMP disruptions: look at the effects of the "Fishbowl" test in 1962, in which a 1.4MT warhead was detonated at an altitude of 250 miles over the Pacific, causing EMP effects (including power blackouts) up to 800 miles from the test: while the damage caused by the EMP was relativly minor and quickly recovered from, that was before the days of the widsporead use of miniturized, solid-state circuits, so if the test was duplicated today, or worse, if the same warhead was detonated at the same altitude over the American west coast, the effects would be devastating to say the least, and the only electronics in the area of effect that would escape intact are the ones specifically hardened against EMP.

No, you're wrong. Modern electronics are more hardened and robust than those hurt by FISHBOWL. And you forget, we're not talking about stopping a Soviet strike coming in waves - the stated purpose of the system is to stop accidental launches or small attacks by rogue states - certainly one-wave scenarios, so I don't see any reason why we should not bet our safety (if we are going to try this) on nuke interceptors. At least then this thing would work already.

OTOH, The effects of even multiple single-digit kiloton range ABMs going off over the Pacific would pale in comparison to the aforementioned scenario. Of course, if it's possible to develop a hard-kill system that can reliably shoot down small numbers of incloming ICBMs, I'd say it would be preferable, but if not, then I'd have no objection to nuclear ABMs...

Likewise.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

So, in other words, it delivers exactly the sort of message I was expecting from something talking about ABM and calling itself 'Shield Of Faith'. The whole thing is basically a wish and some spit.

Which doesn't change the accuracy of its data.

ABM supporters tend to forget one huge rule of technology. Defenses are reactive, not proactive. You'll always lag behind. And in a nuclear exchange, you really can't afford to do that. So the intelligent solution is to avoid a nuclear exchange via other avenues.

This is completely incorrect thanks to that massive little incident in history called World War One that we have for observed data. Defences can completely trump the offense, it's entirely a matter of the technological paradigm available at the time. And defensive technology has been superiour to offensive technology since the invention of phased array radar; this is going going to get worse. Someone will reverse the trend but they won't do it with missiles.

One of the things B. Bruce-Briggs mentions which is very important and telling, and why I want them to press ahead on a mass installation of these missiles (thousands of them--RIGHT NOW) is that back in the old days there was no testing regimen like this. Our famous fighters and bombers of the 1950s and early 1960s that fought in Vietnam, all of our aircraft that fought in WWII--they never went through extensive testing. We're killing our military with this extensive testing.

The majority of procurement costs these days come from the massive testing and research process which goes into needlessly making a weapon perfect and simultaneously justifying its economic viability. The reality is that this process just ends up costing more than a major blunder. We should already be fielding hundreds of these missiles; it doesn't matter if they're fully operational or not because we can make them operational while they're online.

That's how things were done before McNamara fucked up procurement, and we can do them that way again. Just deploy the bloody thing already and then let the crews have free reign to tinker with their problems until they're fixed. It might take a couple of years, granted, but it will be cheap, because your personnel will be the techs, the guys who are going to use the things in combat, and it will be efficient, because when you finish working the problems out then the entire system is there and ready to do.

At any rate, the dangers of nuclear conflict are so great that it always shocks me, no matter how often that I hear it, that people can seriously oppose a defence to it. It's a deluded madness which has festering in the American intellectual community for decades. Who cares if it causes an arms race? Defensive arms races are good. NMD isn't going to kill anyone. Who cares if costs significant amounts of money? Do you really want the risk, however small, of living in a post-conflict world? The irrational nature of this opposition to ABM was summed up in the 60s quite well by Dr. Kahn in a few short sentences:

1. It won't work.
2. It will work to well.
3. Both.


Sadly that hasn't changed and I'm pretty sure I could demonstrate that exact and contradictory line of thinking in several people here if I felt like it.

[MKSheppard]

Your claim of nuclear initations stopping cold the BMD system would only work
if people designing the BMD system forgot to include RAM or Hard drives in the
computers handling the system.

By the time the first nuclear initations in a anti-NMD system occur over the united
States, it will have been 20~ minutes since the first missile launch was detected,
and since everyone operates on the "if one flies, they all fly" principle, the majority
of ICBMs launched in nuclear war will have been launched and tracked by the radar
networks of the US before the first initation.

And each missile and decoy will have had it's trajectory tracked and determined by
the defense...they do call them BALLISTIC missiles for a reason. Meaning that you
can use other methods to identify and track the incoming warheads, such as visual
or infrared sensors, which is not that hard to do, if you can calculate the precise point
in space where the warheads are going to be at every point in their trajectory.

I remind you that the capability to do this is not that hard. In the 1970s, it was estimated
that a 40 million instructions per second computing capacity was required for a national NMD
shield. Guess how fast a Intel Celeron is? About 800~ million instructions per second.

[MKSheppard]

If ABM technology is a pipe dream, why were the Russians so
insistent on retaining the 1972 ABM treaty, especially if it was
as pathetically easy to counter as you claim it is?

Please Patrick, can you explain this Russian reticence to let the
silly Americans waste billions of dollars on something that they
know won't work?

[MKSheppard]

I remind you that the NMD program was started by Clinton...

In one of his triangulation moments, to stave off the Republican Congress
and to appear "tough' on defense.

[MKSheppard]

Oops.

And this has any bearing how to a combat situation?

Launch Control Officer: "Sir, Missile #1 refuses to ignite!"

Commanding Officer: "Well fuck, I guess that's it."

Launch Control Officer: "Sir, What about the other missiles we have?"

Commanding Officer: "Fuck, you're right! Fire off two and three double quick!"

[irishmick79]

If ABM technology is a pipe dream, why were the Russians so
insistent on retaining the 1972 ABM treaty, especially if it was
as pathetically easy to counter as you claim it is?

Please Patrick, can you explain this Russian reticence to let the
silly Americans waste billions of dollars on something that they
know won't work?

Because, although it's easy to develop a counter, it still costs them money to build the new equipment. Since Russia really doesn't want to sink a whole ton of money into the rocket forces when the rest of the military needs help, having the treaty in place gives them a legal recourse to keep things in check.

[Patrick Degan]

Your claim of nuclear initations stopping cold the BMD system would only work if people designing the BMD system forgot to include RAM or Hard drives in the computers handling the system.

My claim, Hans Bethe's claim, Herbert F. York's claim, Phillip Coyle's claim, Bell Labs' claim in 1971, that of every engineer and physicist who's looked at the problem objectively. But just keep pretending that valid objections just don't exist.

By the time the first nuclear initations in a anti-NMD system occur over the United States, it will have been 20~ minutes since the first missile launch was detected, and since everyone operates on the "if one flies, they all fly" principle, the majority of ICBMs launched in nuclear war will have been launched and tracked by the radar networks of the US before the first initation.

Asked and answered by Bell Labs' own engineers in 1971. You have no argument.

And each missile and decoy will have had it's trajectory tracked and determined by the defense...they do call them BALLISTIC missiles for a reason. Meaning that you can use other methods to identify and track the incoming warheads, such as visual or infrared sensors, which is not that hard to do, if you can calculate the precise point in space where the warheads are going to be at every point in their trajectory.

But the problem is that you first need to identify the presence of targets in a large volume of space —without which information tracking efforts will be useless. Hence the entire spectre of radar blinding rears its head once more. This issue has also been answered by the good folks at Ma Bell in 1971. You have no argument.

I remind you that the capability to do this is not that hard. In the 1970s, it was estimated that a 40 million instructions per second computing capacity was required for a national NMD shield. Guess how fast a Intel Celeron is? About 800~ million instructions per second.

Except those calculations aren't based upon estimated data at the outset, but real-time information from sensors picking up contacts. The computer isn't a electronic tarot device; if it doesn't have solid information with which to work with from the outset, it's calculations are useless.

If ABM technology is a pipe dream, why were the Russians so insistent on retaining the 1972 ABM treaty, especially if it was as pathetically easy to counter as you claim it is? Please Patrick, can you explain this Russian reticence to let the silly Americans waste billions of dollars on something that they know won't work?

Trying to avoid the expense and geopolitical destabilisation of a new arms race is a very valid motive for desiring the ABM Treaty to remain in force. And your little bullshit Begging the Question Fallacy does not address the technical problems with NMD which you still refuse utterly to acknowledge.

And this has any bearing how to a combat situation?

A system whose reliability has not been demonstrated to exist I would think has a great deal of bearing on any combat situation you care to imagine. I guess that point is among the many which just flies right over your head at 50,000 ft.

Launch Control Officer: "Sir, Missile #1 refuses to ignite!"

Commanding Officer: "Well fuck, I guess that's it."

Launch Control Officer: "Sir, What about the other missiles we have?"

Commanding Officer: "Fuck, you're right! Fire off two and three double quick!"

Amusing. You really do believe in Faith-Based missile defence.

[Beowulf]

We're supposed to trust our nuclear deterrant to that? Oh, wait...

[Ma Deuce]

Because, although it's easy to develop a counter, it still costs them money to build the new equipment. Since Russia really doesn't want to sink a whole ton of money into the rocket forces when the rest of the military needs help, having the treaty in place gives them a legal recourse to keep things in check.

There's also the issue that they continue to field and improve their own A-135 ABM system that protects Moscow, which is similar in composition and design to the Safeguard system, consisting of 100 missiles, 2/3s of which are hypersonic point-defence "Gazelle" ABMs (similar to the Sprint), and the remaining third are long-range exoatmospheric "Gorgon" ABMs (which were similar to the Spartan but have half the range).

The Russians are in the process of removing the nuclear warheads from these missiles and improving their guidance systems so they can effectivly KE-kill incoming missiles and RVs. Now, if the Russians thought ABM technolegy is inneffective, why would they be bother to keep this system around and continue to upgrade it?

[Patrick Degan]

*snip pretty picture*

We're supposed to trust our nuclear deterrant to that? Oh, wait...

Nice little Red Herring which ignores the overwhelming number of sucessful ICBM and SLBM test-launches and has nothing whatsoever to do with a system involving a far more complicated series of operations which has a consistent record of failure through the testing programme.

Link

U.S. Navy conducts 95th straight successful test launch of TRIDENT II (D5) missile built by Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space Operations

SUNNYVALE, Calif., March 18, 2002 -- The U.S. Navy has successfully test fired a TRIDENT II (D5) Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM), built by Lockheed Martin Space Systems--Missiles & Space Operations, a business area of Lockheed Martin Corporation [NYSE: LMT]. The missile, launched over the weekend from the strategic submarine USS ALASKA (SSBN 732) at the Eastern Range off the eastern Florida coast, extends the D5's record to 95 consecutive successful test launches.

The latest test launch was the final activity of a Demonstration and Shakedown Operation (DASO) exercise conducted by the blue crew of the USS ALASKA (SSBN 732). The DASO's purpose is to collect system performance data in an operational environment and evaluate the readiness of the weapon system, crew and submarine for operational patrol.

This was the first of four launches scheduled over the coming years as part of the Navy program to convert four TRIDENT Ohio-class fleet ballistic missile submarines currently homeported at the Navy strategic submarine base in Bangor, Wash., to TRIDENT II (D5) capability. The four submarines are the USS ALASKA (SSBN-732), USS NEVADA (SSBN-733), USS HENRY M. JACKSON (SSBN-730), and USS ALABAMA (SSBN-731). These submarines previously carried the older TRIDENT I (C4) missiles.

"We are extremely proud of the perfect record of the TRIDENT II (D5) missile system," said Tom Morton, vice president of Strategic Missile Programs at Missiles & Space Operations in Sunnyvale. "Achieving 95 consecutive successful test launches is truly a remarkable feat. We also would like to congratulate the crew of the USS ALASKA for completing a successful DASO."

The USS ALASKA entered Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNS) in April 2000 to begin her conversion to D5 capability. Following the DASO launch, the ALASKA will return to the shipyard for a three-month Post-Shakedown Availability (PSA) period to correct problems and deficiencies discovered during the DASO. The ALASKA will then re-deploy in the Pacific Ocean early this summer.

TRIDENT II (D5) is a three-stage, solid propellant, inertial-guided submarine-launched ballistic missile. It is 44.5 ft in length, 83 inches in diameter, weighs 130,000 lbs., has a range greater than 4,000 nautical miles, and carries up to eight Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs).

TRIDENT II (D5), the sixth generation of FBMs developed by Lockheed Martin for the U.S. Navy, is presently deployed only in the Atlantic Ocean. Recently, the Navy awarded Lockheed Martin the first of several contracts to extend the service life of the TRIDENT II (D5) missile system from 30 to 44 years to match the extended life of the TRIDENT Ohio-class submarine. The D5 service life extension program will extend D5 missile production through 2013. The program is expected to make the D5 missile system operationally viable to 2042.

The Navy selected Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space as its prime missile systems contractor in 1955. Since then, the FBM team has produced six successive generations of Fleet Ballistic Missiles: POLARIS (A1), POLARIS (A2), POLARIS (A3), POSEIDON (C3), TRIDENT I (C4) and the TRIDENT II (D5). Headquartered in Bethesda, Md., Lockheed Martin is a global enterprise principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture and integration of advanced-technology systems, products and services. The Corporation's core businesses are systems integration, space, aeronautics, and technology services. Lockheed Martin had 2001 sales of $24 billion.

Gee... Ninety-five consecutive successful test-launches of Trident as of 2002, pictured during one of its comparatively-rare failures in 1989.

Do come back when you've got something relevant to contribute.

[irishmick79]

Because, although it's easy to develop a counter, it still costs them money to build the new equipment. Since Russia really doesn't want to sink a whole ton of money into the rocket forces when the rest of the military needs help, having the treaty in place gives them a legal recourse to keep things in check.

There's also the issue that they continue to field and improve their own A-135 ABM system that protects Moscow, which is similar in composition and design to the Safeguard system, consisting of 100 missiles, 2/3s of which are hypersonic point-defence "Gazelle" ABMs (similar to the Sprint), and the remaining third are long-range exoatmospheric "Gorgon" ABMs (which were similar to the Spartan but have half the range).

The Russians are in the process of removing the nuclear warheads from these missiles and improving their guidance systems so they can effectivly KE-kill incoming missiles and RVs. Now, if the Russians thought ABM technolegy is inneffective, why would they be bother to keep this system around and continue to upgrade it?

Probably because like the Americans, the Russians have found that the research and development of ABM style technology can lead to some really nifty spin-offs that can make a lot of money.

[Beowulf]

Far more complicated, yes. But that's progress. Programs have problems. That's life.

Demanding something work 100% of the time. That's crazyness.

[Patrick Degan]

Far more complicated, yes. But that's progress. Programs have problems. That's life.

Demanding something work 100% of the time. That's crazyness.

The problem is that, so far, NMD and its white-elephant predecessors haven't shown the ability to work even 50% of the time —particularly the present incarnation of this boondoggle. And if the system doesn't work when the chips are down, it won't ever be good enough to say "programmes have problems, that's life" afterward.

[Beowulf]

Far more complicated, yes. But that's progress. Programs have problems. That's life.

Demanding something work 100% of the time. That's crazyness.

The problem is that, so far, NMD and its white-elephant predecessors haven't shown the ability to work even 50% of the time —particularly the present incarnation of this boondoggle. And if the system doesn't work when the chips are down, it won't ever be good enough to say "programmes have problems, that's life" afterward.

When the first orbital rocket boosters were made, neither did they show the ability to work even 50% of the time. Early ICBM history is littered with examples of rockets blowing up on the pad, going off course, failures to ignite, insufficient amounts of thrust being produced to go up, etc.

[Patrick Degan]

Because, although it's easy to develop a counter, it still costs them money to build the new equipment. Since Russia really doesn't want to sink a whole ton of money into the rocket forces when the rest of the military needs help, having the treaty in place gives them a legal recourse to keep things in check.

There's also the issue that they continue to field and improve their own A-135 ABM system that protects Moscow, which is similar in composition and design to the Safeguard system, consisting of 100 missiles, 2/3s of which are hypersonic point-defence "Gazelle" ABMs (similar to the Sprint), and the remaining third are long-range exoatmospheric "Gorgon" ABMs (which were similar to the Spartan but have half the range).

The Russians are in the process of removing the nuclear warheads from these missiles and improving their guidance systems so they can effectivly KE-kill incoming missiles and RVs. Now, if the Russians thought ABM technolegy is inneffective, why would they be bother to keep this system around and continue to upgrade it?

Probably because like the Americans, the Russians have found that the research and development of ABM style technology can lead to some really nifty spin-offs that can make a lot of money.

Or it could be for a slightly different military purpose:

The new anti-ballistic missile system completed development in 1989 and in 1995 was approved for production with the designation A-135. The system was capable of intercepting any incoming rocket of whatever nature at altitudes of 5 to 30 km, using nuclear warheads for the kill. Basistov revealed that the trials had demonstrates substantial reserves in all parameters compared to the specification. The 53T6 demonstrated 2.5x greater range and triple the velocity capability required. The A-135 in principle could also destroy low earth orbit satellites.

An offensive ASAT system disguised as an ABM system is not entirely outside the realm of possibility.

[Patrick Degan]

Far more complicated, yes. But that's progress. Programs have problems. That's life.

Demanding something work 100% of the time. That's crazyness.

The problem is that, so far, NMD and its white-elephant predecessors haven't shown the ability to work even 50% of the time —particularly the present incarnation of this boondoggle. And if the system doesn't work when the chips are down, it won't ever be good enough to say "programmes have problems, that's life" afterward.

When the first orbital rocket boosters were made, neither did they show the ability to work even 50% of the time. Early ICBM history is littered with examples of rockets blowing up on the pad, going off course, failures to ignite, insufficient amounts of thrust being produced to go up, etc.

Yet another Red Herring. ICBM development never took quite as long to produce an operationally-reliable weapon system as the NMD/BMD/Star Wars efforts have, and to reiterate: involves a relatively simple operation compared to the constellation of operations involved in attempting to stop a full-scale ICBM attack.

[Beowulf]

When the first orbital rocket boosters were made, neither did they show the ability to work even 50% of the time. Early ICBM history is littered with examples of rockets blowing up on the pad, going off course, failures to ignite, insufficient amounts of thrust being produced to go up, etc.

Yet another Red Herring. ICBM development never took quite as long to produce an operationally-reliable weapon system as the NMD/BMD/Star Wars efforts have, and to reiterate: involves a relatively simple operation compared to the constellation of operations involved in attempting to stop a full-scale ICBM attack.

That is partly due to the fact that ICBM development was always a priority. ABM has been on the backburner for sometime. Let's compare the complexity of a ABM system to say, a SAM system. The ABM system's targets are coming in on fixed trajectories, fairly well defined trajectories. A SAM system's targets are coming in fron almost any direction, on a continously varying path (given that most pilots try to avoid getting shot down, and so don't fly a easily mathematically computed path. I don't buy the argument that's it's too complex to be doable.

[Ma Deuce]

An offensive ASAT system disguised as an ABM system is not entirely outside the realm of possibility.

Which ignores the fact that 2/3s of the ABMs in the A-135 system are short-range endoatmospheric "Gazelle" interceptors, which needless to say are useless against satellites. What are they there for, show?

[Andrew J.]

One of the things B. Bruce-Briggs mentions which is very important and telling, and why I want them to press ahead on a mass installation of these missiles (thousands of them--RIGHT NOW) is that back in the old days there was no testing regimen like this. Our famous fighters and bombers of the 1950s and early 1960s that fought in Vietnam, all of our aircraft that fought in WWII--they never went through extensive testing. We're killing our military with this extensive testing.

The technology was less complicated then-military equipment NEEDS more testing nowadays. How muchtesting does a gravity bomb really need, anyway? The only thing it would good for is improved accuracy, and that was given up in favor of carpte bombing anyhow.

That's how things were done before McNamara fucked up procurement, and we can do them that way again. Just deploy the bloody thing already and then let the crews have free reign to tinker with their problems until they're fixed. It might take a couple of years, granted, but it will be cheap, because your personnel will be the techs, the guys who are going to use the things in combat, and it will be efficient, because when you finish working the problems out then the entire system is there and ready to do.

And if the units are sent into combat, and people die because it's too early and noboy's figured out how to make the stuff work yet? However preferable it might be to motivate the techs with death, that just won't fly in today's world, where the lives of soldiers are very important to the public.

At any rate, the dangers of nuclear conflict are so great that it always shocks me, no matter how often that I hear it, that people can seriously oppose a defence to it. It's a deluded madness which has festering in the American intellectual community for decades. Who cares if it causes an arms race? Defensive arms races are good. NMD isn't going to kill anyone. Who cares if costs significant amounts of money? Do you really want the risk, however small, of living in a post-conflict world?

There does come a point, you know, where that risk becomes so small that NO, it is not worth all that money. Frankly, it would be more to the point to just neutralize North Korea one way or another. We're going to have to do it eventually.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

The technology was less complicated then-military equipment NEEDS more testing nowadays. How muchtesting does a gravity bomb really need, anyway? The only thing it would good for is improved accuracy, and that was given up in favor of carpte bombing anyhow.

Of course, the same procedure was used for fighters up to and including the F-4. I note that the F-4 turned out to be such a good fighter using that method of "build it now and tinker later" that had we kept them in service with continuous electronic upgrades they would be perfectly viable frontline aircraft to this day. In fact, the idea of using the F-4 airframe and instead of developing new airframes, pouring money into electronics upgrades for it, might in fact leave us with a better and larger fighter force than we have today.

And if the units are sent into combat, and people die because it's too early and noboy's figured out how to make the stuff work yet? However preferable it might be to motivate the techs with death, that just won't fly in today's world, where the lives of soldiers are very important to the public.

Actually we did just that during WWII. We made the B-26 Marauder operational when it still had exceptionally severe operational difficulties and an incredibly high loss rate. It was called a widowmaker at first, but after a year of this the crews gained experience, the problems were rectified, and it went on to become the best combat aircraft in history. Why is there an aversion to loss of life by mechanical accidents if that loss is simply the byproduct of vastly increasing our combat efficiency? Is it somehow worse if fifty people die in accidents than to have one hundred people die in combat because the systems weren't given to them?

At any rate, the NMD system does not risk the death of anyone, as it is an unmanned missile. In the worst case it doesn't work properly--and then we are right back to where we started, NOT worse off. And even then it should have sufficient effectiveness to be a deterrent against small attacks, and certainly would prevent the nightmare scenario of an accident triggering global thermonuclear war.

There does come a point, you know, where that risk becomes so small that NO, it is not worth all that money. Frankly, it would be more to the point to just neutralize North Korea one way or another. We're going to have to do it eventually.

Perhaps. But you underestimate the potential dangers from other powers. Right now we're playing an incredibly stupid game of encroaching on Russia's territory in the Ukraine. Sane people will still fight a nuclear war if you put their backs up against a wall, and we are, I shall admit, in the habit of doing that at late.

[MKSheppard]

Yet another Red Herring. ICBM development never took quite as long to produce an operationally-reliable weapon system as the NMD/BMD/Star Wars efforts have, and to reiterate: involves a relatively simple operation compared to the constellation of operations involved in attempting to stop a full-scale ICBM attack.

Bald Faced Lie.

Nike-Zeus was operational in the late 1950s. It had completed it's testing
and was proven. It only remained to be deployed nation wide. Despite
it's limitations, Nike-Zeus was effective. Being able to engage only a
single target per battery is not much of a problem when the USSR has
ICBM counts in the single digitis.

Eisenhower deferred construction of Nike Zeus to the next president, and
both Kennedy and McNamara did not like it, and ordered even more
development, which led to Nike-X, and even more development.

When Nike-X was finished, they changed the goalposts yet again,
requiring that it only need to defend against a Chinese threat, instead
of a Soviet threat, respindling it into Sentinel.

When Nixon came along, he respindled and folded Sentinel yet again,
into Safeguard, which was shut down after only a single day of fully
operational service, thus scattering the experience that we had gathered
over the years in ABM systems.

Reagan then came along with a totally different concept, such as orbiting
battlestations, and such.

Clinton finally restarted the ground-based interceptor concept about 20
years after it was cancelled utterly.

Two decades is a long time for institutional memory to be lost.

A pattern emerges. Whenever a system gets to a deployable state, it
gets cancelled, or the design is changed massively, the strategy of
interception changing, and/or the deployment strategies are
changed totally.

Imagine trying to develop an ICBM if your boss in charge kept telling you
that it had to be able to hit the Soviet Union....and then telling you to scrap
your finished design four years later for a much smaller ICBM capable
of only hitting say, China.

You might want to look at the MX program. It's what happened to ABM
programs transferred over to the ICBM program. They dicked around
forever with all kinds of different deployment strategies and designs.

[MKSheppard]

Actually we did just that during WWII. We made the B-26 Marauder operational when it still had exceptionally severe operational difficulties and an incredibly high loss rate. It was called a widowmaker at first, but after a year of this the crews gained experience, the problems were rectified, and it went on to become the best combat aircraft in history.

And it went on to have the lowest loss rate in combat of any USAAF Bomber.

[MKSheppard]

An offensive ASAT system disguised as an ABM system is not entirely outside the realm of possibility.

*Snort*

Been done before.

Page 248 of Shield of Faith


Progress on ballistic missile defense was diverted slightly by a new
mission assigned to the Pacific Missile Test Range by the Secretary
of Defense. After the successful Nike-Zeus shot, McNamara asked
if the system could be used to shoot down satellites. Obviously it
could, because it was designed to intercept objects at the edge of
space, and most early satellites, especially reconnaissance satellites,
were in very low orbits. And like all the Nikes, Zeus was command-
guided, ordered to a spot in the sky where the computer calculated
it should be. Calculating a satellite orbit is a snap.

McNamara asked the Army's research people what it would cost
to give Zeus an antisatellite mission. The estimate was about $20
million. McNamara told them to go ahead. The Army complained
of having no authorization or budget. The Secretary scratched on
his note pad, "I owe the Army $20,000,000," tore off the page,
tossed it over the table, and ordered them to get on with it. Ap-
parently the administration was afraid that Khrushchev would put
a monster hydrogen bomb in orbit to threaten the United States,
not so much as a real weapon but as a publicity stunt like his super-
duper bomb of 1961. By activating Nike-Zeus as an Anti-Satellite
(ASAT—"ay-sat"), the government could assure the nation and the
world that the United States had a riposte to the Red Devil's terror
device.

By the purest chance, the Army was perfectly set up to handle
the mission. Low-flying satellites execute many orbits a day. The
earlier Army radar tracking station at Ascension Island, in the South
Atlantic, was almost exactly on the opposite side of the world from
Kwajalein. The radar on Ascension would pick up a satellite and
transmit the orbit data to Kwajalein. The Kwaj radars were superflous,
with the tracking information from Ascension, Nike-Zeus
could be fired at the precise time to nail a satellite coming over the horizon.

The warhead had been fired in space in the last test series
over Johnston island in 1962—and was ready to go. The nuclear
warheads were surreptitiously brought onto Kwaj and stashed away.
In May 1963, the ASAT was in service. And just to let Khrushchev
know, a stray Soviet booster was potted in space.