Pentagon Budget: poll

[MKSheppard]

ICBM's are not something you use to take out targets in Bumfuckmeistan.
Oh and speaking of costs.... Add a three zeros behind "million" if you want to know the diffrence between using an ICBM and using a B-2 or Cruise missle
!

Standard ICBM cost for US/Russia is about 30-50 million.

[Mr Bean]

ICBM's are not something you use to take out targets in Bumfuckmeistan.
Oh and speaking of costs.... Add a three zeros behind "million" if you want to know the diffrence between using an ICBM and using a B-2 or Cruise missle
!

Standard ICBM cost for US/Russia is about 30-50 million.

Your forgetting building Silos for the things, transportation costs and Command and Control, all of which vastly ramp up costs compared to fighter planes, You can fly B-2s off of pavement and camo netting bunkers, while Silos must be built for each missle as they have diffrent sizes

[Petrosjko]

Your forgetting building Silos for the things, transportation costs and Command and Control, all of which vastly ramp up costs compared to fighter planes, You can fly B-2s off of pavement and camo netting bunkers, while Silos must be built for each missle as they have diffrent sizes

Ramp it up even more. We're talking SLBMs here, so it's the cost of the vessel plus training and upkeep of the crew.

[Mr Bean]

Ramp it up even more. We're talking SLBMs here, so it's the cost of the vessel plus training and upkeep of the crew.

Sub launched?, minus the silo, add the training, increase the upkeep and tripple the "OSHIT" factor, we can't use them as such because that means telling Russia where our Ohio's are every time we want to use them, which is a definate no no

[Coyote]

I've always felt that too much is spent of big-ticket sexy "Buck Rogers" items while ordinary mud-and-grunt stuff gets overlooked.

10-bil for a damnfool ABM system is downright criminal when we don't have a good and proper armored car to carry out missions here. For 10-bil, we ciould have designed it, prototyped it, tested it, worked out the bugs, manufactured and deployed it fully equiped to every US division and still had change for a gallon of gas.

Rather than cut the budget, I'd redirect it towards personnel needs-- decidedly unsexy stuff that is vitally needed. Also, things like more on-post housing for families, since over half the Army is now married according to the stats I last heard, and other boring infrastructure needs.

[MKSheppard]

For 10-bil, we ciould have designed it, prototyped it, tested it, worked out the bugs, manufactured and deployed it fully equiped to every US division and still had change for a gallon of gas.

Actually, we do have an armored car.

M1117 Guardian Armored Security Vehicle (ASV) ASV-150

The Armored Security Vehicle-150 (ASV-150) is an armored wheeled vehicle equipped with a turret and armament system designed to meet the security mission requirements of the Military Police Corps. The ASV-150 is a 4 wheel drive vehicle equipped with a 260 horsepower diesel engine, 6 speed automatic transmision and all wheel independent suspension that offers a quality ride while providing superior mobility, agility and handling. The ASV-150 turret is equipped with an improved 40mm MK 19 grenade launcher and 12.7mm machine gun and can be traversed 360 degrees and the weapons elevated between -10 to +60 degrees. The vehicle features roll-on/roll-off C130 tranportability in the fully operational configuration.

The ASV is a lightly armored, all wheel drive vehicle that provides ballistic protection for the Military Police crew members against various threats. These threats include: 7.62mm Ball for the entire vehicle; 12.7mm AP to the crew compartment, weapons station and ammunition storage area; overhead protection from 60mm mortar fragments at 10 meters radius of burst, as a minimum, and 155m artillery air-burst @ 15m. Protection is also required against anti-personnel mines and anti-tank mines up to an equivalent of 12 lbs. of TNT.

The ASV-150 is designed to provided maximum survivability with IBD Modular Expandable Armor System (MEXIS) utilizing ceramic composite applique on exterior and a spall liner on interior surfaces. Simula has received an order from Textron Systems to produce lightweight ceramic/composite applique armor kits. The external armor panels provide ballistic protection against various small-arms and fragment threats with a minimum weight penalty.

The ASV employs, as organic weapons, the MK-19 grenade machine-gun (MK-19 GMG) (turret mounted); M2 .50 caliber machine-gun (turret mounted); and the M249 5.56mm Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW). The ASV has a payload of 3,360 lbs. The ASV operates on standard JP8 diesel fuels, is capable of being towed, performs self-recovery, can recover equivalent vehicles and mounts a tow pintle rated at 500 lb. The system accepts current and programmed tactical radio systems with appropriate encryption equipment. The vehicle operates with specified loads under an on-road/off-road mission profile of 50% primary roads, 30% secondary roads, and 20% cross-country conditions.

The ASV is transportable (roll-on/roll-off) by C-130 and larger aircraft, rail, highway and marine transport modes. The ASV is employed by MP three-man teams designed to perform missions across the entire operational continuum. The MP units programmed to receive the ASV perform their four battlefield missions (area security, battlefield circulation control, enemy prisoner of war operations and law and order operations) regardless of the level of combat intensity on the operational continuum. ASV-equipped units will conduct Air-Land Battle/Air-Land Operations (ALO) (at one end of the level of combat intensity continuum) or they will perform force protection and stabilization operations occurring in a low intensity conflict (LIC)/operations short of war contingency environment (at the opposite end of the continuum).

Only problem is, we only built 94 of them in 1999, and assigned them
all to Military Police units. But it's seen combat in Iraq

The ASV production contract for 94 vehicles was awarded on 30 March 1999. Textron Marine and Land Systems, Division of Textron Inc., New Orleans, La., was awarded $14,021,338 as part of a $149,560,243 firm-fixed-price multi-year contract for 94 Armored Security Vehicles (XM1117), engineering services and logistics support, and an option to buy 156 additional vehicles. Work is performed in New Orleans, La., and was expected to be completed by March 30, 2004. This is a sole source contract initiated on Oct. 1, 1998. The U.S. Army Tank-Automotive & Armaments Command, Warren, Mich., is the contracting activity

First Unit Equipped was achieved in February 1998. The new Armored Security Vehicle is used by military police in V Corps' 709th Military Police Battalion, 18th MP Brigade. Fewer than 50 ASVs had been produced by early 2002. By March 2003 a total of 53 were in the inventory.

Where the Soldiers in the first rotation in Iraq were perhaps unprepared for dealing with deadly roadside bombs and ambushes by plainclothes civilians, the Soldiers who took over were able to prepare with the benefit of lessons learned by their comrades in Iraq. Readying for its yearlong tour in Iraq, in early 2004 the 984th Military Police Company spent more time than usual familiarizing itself with its weapons, vehicles and tactics. Armed with the latest addition to the MP’s arsenal of vehicles, the M1117 Guardian Armored Security Vehicle, each team in the 984th carries more firepower than an entire infantry squad. The 984th was the first MP company on Fort Carson to get the new ASVs, each armed with an MK-19 grenade launcher, a .50-caliber machine gun and a squad automatic weapon. The Guardian is designed to be able to take a direct hit from an RPG and keep its crew alive. Whether the vehicle will make it through the hit is another story. In Iraq, one was hit from behind by an RPG and it pretty much took out the entire engine casing, but there were no deaths, no injuries. With better preparation than their predecessors and a dozen new ASVs, the 984th was better outfitted to take over the task of keeping the peace in Iraq than their compatriot MPs who were already there.

And don't know the 10 bn on ABM, Instead, hang Shinkenski in effifgy, for
wasting $10-15 billion of the US Army's money on the STRYKER SWARM,
forcing the upgrades of most of the US Army's combat systems to
be cancelled to pay for the STRYKER SWARM.

[MKSheppard]

And don't know

Argh, typo; should be knock.

[Raptor 597]

I'll readily agree that the Puzzle Palace needs to reprioritize in a big way. You're right, there is no more Cold War, and while we do need conventional military forces for such situations as Korea, our typical military problem is best handled by fast-moving, well-supported forces.

And for that, the carriers are ideal. We can put troops ashore and have them supported anywhere in the world in a great hurry.

If you want to pick something that's an unneeded money soak, I'd point at the B-2 bomber. Even when the Cold War was on its role had been superseded by ICBMs.

I highly disagree with your second point. Carriers are meant to project power into the region and support our chosen land based allies; we should not be tied down too quickly with troop deployments. I think that the carriers like much of naval power makes itself felt through the threat and this has been demonstrated numerous times.

[Ma Deuce]

Instead, hang Shinkenski in effifgy, for
wasting $10-15 billion of the US Army's money on the STRYKER SWARM,
forcing the upgrades of most of the US Army's combat systems to
be cancelled to pay for the STRYKER SWARM.

I though the costs of the FCS program shared the blame with Stryker for the cancellation those upgrades?

[MKSheppard]

I though the costs of the FCS program shared the blame with Stryker for the cancellation those upgrades?

Hmm yea...

Increased funding for Stryker and Future Combat Systems (FCS) came as a result of Army decisions in 2002 to terminate or restructure some 48 systems in the FY ‘04-’09 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) long-term spending plan. Among the systems terminated were: United Defense’s Crusader self-propelled howitzer and the A3 upgrade for the Bradley Fighting vehicle, GD’s M1A2 Abrams System Enhancement Program, Lockheed Martin’s Army Tactical Missile System Block II and the associated pre-planned product improvement version of Northrop Grumman’s Brilliant Anti-armor (BAT) munition, Raytheon’s Stinger missile and Improved Target Acquisition System, and Textron’s Wide Area Mine.

[Chmee]

ICBM's are not something you use to take out targets in Bumfuckmeistan.
Oh and speaking of costs.... Add a three zeros behind "million" if you want to know the diffrence between using an ICBM and using a B-2 or Cruise missle
!

Standard ICBM cost for US/Russia is about 30-50 million.

Your forgetting building Silos for the things, transportation costs and Command and Control, all of which vastly ramp up costs compared to fighter planes, You can fly B-2s off of pavement and camo netting bunkers, while Silos must be built for each missle as they have diffrent sizes

We've already paid for the entire system, except for the cost of the modified conventional warheads. The subs are going to be out there doing their regular patrol mission whether you add this mission or not. The difference in cost between a modified use of an existing system and the R&D, testing & deployment of an entirely new system must be pretty substantial.

Yes, a $30 million missile shot is a damned expensive way to deliver high explosives ... but then if you do it even 10 times a year it's a helluva lot cheaper than deploying an entire new strategic platform.

[MKSheppard]

Yes, a $30 million missile shot is a damned expensive way to deliver high explosives ... but then if you do it even 10 times a year it's a helluva lot cheaper than deploying an entire new strategic platform.

Incorrect. You can't use ICBM fields for this new conventional weapon. You
have to dig your own silos for the new conventional missile. You can't just
reuse existing silos; and the new silos have to be clearly different, IE, your
new conventional missile is going to have to be so big it can't fit into an
existing ICBM silo or sub; as part of "verification".

There's a reason why carriers slowly lost their nuclear attack mission starting
in the 1960s. Because with nuke tasking on CVs, the other guys had to assume
that every airplane launched off a carrier was carrying a nuclear device.

[Chmee]

Yes, a $30 million missile shot is a damned expensive way to deliver high explosives ... but then if you do it even 10 times a year it's a helluva lot cheaper than deploying an entire new strategic platform.

Incorrect. You can't use ICBM fields for this new conventional weapon. You
have to dig your own silos for the new conventional missile. You can't just
reuse existing silos; and the new silos have to be clearly different, IE, your
new conventional missile is going to have to be so big it can't fit into an
existing ICBM silo or sub; as part of "verification".

There's a reason why carriers slowly lost their nuclear attack mission starting
in the 1960s. Because with nuke tasking on CVs, the other guys had to assume
that every airplane launched off a carrier was carrying a nuclear device.

We must be talking about different systems, sorry ... I'm talking about the research going into Enhanced Accuracy for the Trident SLBM, to give it a conventional-warhead bunker-busting mission. At this point the research is entirely on enhanced accuracy for its traditional nuclear role, but the next step when they achieve that accuracy is to investigate the possibilities for using the penetrating power of a re-entry vehicle with conventional warheads in a hard target/bunkerbuster role.

[MKSheppard]

At this point the research is entirely on enhanced accuracy for its traditional nuclear role, but the next step when they achieve that accuracy is to investigate the possibilities for using the penetrating power of a re-entry vehicle with conventional warheads in a hard target/bunkerbuster role.

Which will never happen. It would only happen if we brought some old
Pershing 2s out of storage to act as bunker busters, as their flight profile
is clearly different from a heavy ICBM.

[Chmee]

At this point the research is entirely on enhanced accuracy for its traditional nuclear role, but the next step when they achieve that accuracy is to investigate the possibilities for using the penetrating power of a re-entry vehicle with conventional warheads in a hard target/bunkerbuster role.

Which will never happen. It would only happen if we brought some old
Pershing 2s out of storage to act as bunker busters, as their flight profile
is clearly different from a heavy ICBM.

I'd avoid using absolutist term like 'never' to such research ... the experts doing the research don't seem to feel it's impossible. Maybe the research will ultimately show it's not an optimal solution, but it's premature to say we've reached that conclusion before doing the research.

[MKSheppard]

I'd avoid using absolutist term like 'never' to such research ... the experts doing the research don't seem to feel it's impossible.

The experts once came up with a workable system to defeat ballistic missiles,
by ringing the equator of the earth with rocket engines from the space program
to slow/reverse the earth's rotation, so that the enemy's ballistic missiles would
impact on his own territory.

The projected cost was in multiples of the world's GDP.

Maybe the research will ultimately show it's not an optimal solution, but it's premature to say we've reached that conclusion before doing the research.

It's already not an optimal solution; what happens when a ballistic missile launches from
a Silo in the US? The Russians and Chinese will know of it, and will promptly shit their
pants and go to higher alert because with a heavy ICBM you can hit Moscow or Beijing
from Iowa.

We've already had the Russians go to high alert before and actually open their silo doors
when their computers detected a Norwegian atmospheric sounding rocket, and mistook
it for a Trident enroute for Moscow, despite being informed ahead of time that it was
a sounding rocket.

[Chmee]

I'd avoid using absolutist term like 'never' to such research ... the experts doing the research don't seem to feel it's impossible.

The experts once came up with a workable system to defeat ballistic missiles,
by ringing the equator of the earth with rocket engines from the space program
to slow/reverse the earth's rotation, so that the enemy's ballistic missiles would
impact on his own territory.

The projected cost was in multiples of the world's GDP.

Maybe the research will ultimately show it's not an optimal solution, but it's premature to say we've reached that conclusion before doing the research.

It's already not an optimal solution; what happens when a ballistic missile launches from
a Silo in the US? The Russians and Chinese will know of it, and will promptly shit their
pants and go to higher alert because with a heavy ICBM you can hit Moscow or Beijing
from Iowa.

We've already had the Russians go to high alert before and actually open their silo doors
when their computers detected a Norwegian atmospheric sounding rocket, and mistook
it for a Trident enroute for Moscow, despite being informed ahead of time that it was
a sounding rocket.

I don't know why you keep referring to silos, we're talking about mid-ocean launches, which could be from us ... or the Brits ... or anybody owning a ballistic-missile sub.

In discussing the reaction of other powers to such launches, you're getting into the political element of deployment, not the technical. Different issue. I agree the political element is troubling ... but then we're obviously in an era where we could give a shit about whether what we do destabilizes strategic balance and upsets China and Russia, since we're plowing ahead with SMD despite their objections.

[MKSheppard]

I don't know why you keep referring to silos, we're talking about mid-ocean launches, which could be from us ... or the Brits ... or anybody owning a ballistic-missile sub.

Great, you've just caused them to shit their pants even more, as a SLBM
launch in the atlantic means a much shorter time to impact on Russian targets,
and an even shorter time against chinese targets if it's fired from the pacific.

In discussing the reaction of other powers to such launches, you're getting into the political element of deployment, not the technical. Different issue.

No, the technical and political issues are the same, especially when you deal with
ballistic missiles; If using the system to pop some shitty turd world warlord in his
super secret bunker causes half the world to shit it's pants and go to high alert
and begin opening their silo doors because the missile might be heading for
them, the system will never ever be fired in anger, and will be a big damn waste
of money, which for a conventional-only system is totally unacceptabul.

[Chmee]

I don't know why you keep referring to silos, we're talking about mid-ocean launches, which could be from us ... or the Brits ... or anybody owning a ballistic-missile sub.

Great, you've just caused them to shit their pants even more, as a SLBM
launch in the atlantic means a much shorter time to impact on Russian targets,
and an even shorter time against chinese targets if it's fired from the pacific.

I don't really disagree with that, it seems as destabilizing as SMD to me, but that apparently doesn't stop us any more.

Although I agree they'll crap their pants at an unannounced mid-Atlantic SLBM launch, what are they going to do? Retaliate against the US, UK and France, just to be sure they cover everybody who could have fired it?

[MKSheppard]

I don't really disagree with that, it seems as destabilizing as SMD to me, but that apparently doesn't stop us any more.

There is no such thing as SMD.

Although I agree they'll crap their pants at an unannounced mid-Atlantic SLBM launch, what are they going to do? Retaliate against the US, UK and France, just to be sure they cover everybody who could have fired it?

You are aware that the Soviet Union's plan for nuclear warfare was to
nuke everyone so that everyone started from the same place in the
post-war world?

[aerius]

Although I agree they'll crap their pants at an unannounced mid-Atlantic SLBM launch, what are they going to do? Retaliate against the US, UK and France, just to be sure they cover everybody who could have fired it?

In a word, yes.
And then you get something similar to this scenario.

[Chmee]

I don't really disagree with that, it seems as destabilizing as SMD to me, but that apparently doesn't stop us any more.

There is no such thing as SMD.

Although I agree they'll crap their pants at an unannounced mid-Atlantic SLBM launch, what are they going to do? Retaliate against the US, UK and France, just to be sure they cover everybody who could have fired it?

You are aware that the Soviet Union's plan for nuclear warfare was to
nuke everyone so that everyone started from the same place in the
post-war world?

I'm also aware that there's no Soviet Union any more, and the capabilities of existing Russian strategic forces is severely eroded from the Soviet peak. What their current doctrine is in matters like this is probably unclear.

[Petrosjko]

I highly disagree with your second point. Carriers are meant to project power into the region and support our chosen land based allies; we should not be tied down too quickly with troop deployments. I think that the carriers like much of naval power makes itself felt through the threat and this has been demonstrated numerous times.

When I'm talking supporting the troops I'm talking in terms of quick strike operations and spooky type shit, not necessarily full-scale deployments.

I was reading a year or so ago that the Navy was working on small-unit combined arms ops with the Marines, with an eye toward putting a battalion on shore supported by frigates and a cruiser for quick in and out operations. Anybody have any word on that particular concept and how the development is going?

[Knife]

I was reading a year or so ago that the Navy was working on small-unit combined arms ops with the Marines, with an eye toward putting a battalion on shore supported by frigates and a cruiser for quick in and out operations. Anybody have any word on that particular concept and how the development is going?

*shrug* no. Fortifying a MEU?

[Sea Skimmer]

Yes, a $30 million missile shot is a damned expensive way to deliver high explosives ... but then if you do it even 10 times a year it's a helluva lot cheaper than deploying an entire new strategic platform.

30 million. Try 70 million, without accounting for the cost of the warhead and its reentry vehicle, all thrown down the shitter.

Unless you make some massive breakthrough in ICBM guidance that trillions of dollars spent during the cold war couldn't, you'll have a CEP of perhaps 90 meters at the absolute best, and several hundred is more likely. That's comparable to the accuracy of a high level run with unguided bombs by an F-16 or F-15E. Only when an F-16 or F-15E attacks like that, they drop four to eight bombs minimal, and several planes are probably in the mission. Because a 90-meter CEP will not let a single 2000 pound class warhead (which is the best a conventional ICBM is likely to have) accomplish jack shit. It will be worthless against any form of hard target, the only thing, which could possibul, justify the cost, and even most soft targets are easily going to easily endure it, provided you even get a hit within the CEP, which is only a 50% chance.

So basically you've created a one-use weapon, which costs as much as over ninety new built Tomahawk missiles, is incapable of destroying worthwhile targets, and the use of which will set off nuclear attack warning systems in China and Russia. What a great investment that would be.