universe a simulation

[Keevan_Colton]

World simulations are affected the same way by parsimony the same way that fusion reactors are, and if world simulations exist, parsimony doesn't give us any clue whether we are inside or outside one.

If our world is a simulation it has to have been created by someone, adding a creator to a system that all our observations show doesnt need one is pissing right in the face of parsimony.

Its also false to say that the argument attempts to establish a world outside our universe. The stuff on the outside and on the inside of the simulation are of course both the same universe, a universe that has the same complexity in terms of physical laws and roughly the same complexity in terms of information content as the world we commonly believe that we occupy.

Except, the idea proposed is that due to probability (fucking idiots...) that we are in a simulation.

At any rate there are many reasons why the hypothesis is not untestable. At the very least any possible simulator will only have a finite maximum complexity, giving a finite maximum complexity to the civilization being simulated, which if the hypothesis is true would become obvious in some way eventually.

Except the hypothesis is that as a simulation is an imagined possibility, that our world is a simulation as there will be lots of simulations and only one real. This requires it to be created in some manner, by an unknown mechanism by an unknown entity. This is classic creationist bullshit (in the literal, not religious sense). To have a simulation you are adding a CREATOR that is OUTSIDE of the simulation. Any observations of our universe around us will just show what our universe is like, it cannot show whether it is a simultion or not because whatever it simulates IS what our universe really is...

[Kuroneko]

If our world is a simulation it has to have been created by someone, adding a creator to a system that all our observations show doesnt need one is pissing right in the face of parsimony.

It seems you haven't really been reading this thread. However, it is immune to parsimony in the way you are attempting to use it. Don't take this fact as a personal affront; the premise of this simulation-argument is controversial enough all by itself, so if you wish to question it, there are several ways to do so.

Except, the idea proposed is that due to probability (fucking idiots...) that we are in a simulation.

Would you like to show exactly how such a probabilistic argument is flawed?

Except the hypothesis is that as a simulation is an imagined possibility, that our world is a simulation as there will be lots of simulations and only one real. This requires it to be created in some manner, by an unknown mechanism by an unknown entity. This is classic creationist bullshit (in the literal, not religious sense). To have a simulation you are adding a CREATOR that is OUTSIDE of the simulation. Any observations of our universe around us will just show what our universe is like, it cannot show whether it is a simultion or not because whatever it simulates IS what our universe really is...

By humans. The premise of the whole thing is that future-humans will have the resources to run ancestor-simulations, and such things will be common. Such a thing is not precluded by parsimony simply because there is no reason why this is physically impossible, but it is a strong claim all by itself nonetheless, and hardly an undeniable one. Any connection with creationism is a construction of your mind only.

[Darth Wong]

What we have here is a failure to communicate.

Keevan, the problem here is that the argument in question does not say "we believe we are living in a simulation"; it says "if seamlessly perfect simulations are possible, then it becomes more likely that we are living in one". Occam's Razor is applicable insofar as one could argue that the entire argument is pointless and unnecessary, but it does not reveal a flaw within the argument itself. I'll admit that this strikes me as a somewhat trivial distinction too.

This is not a new argument by any means; the "brain in a bottle" hypothesis is probably discussed in every Philosophy 101 class, and has been since long before the idea of computerized virtual realities was ever conceived or "The Matrix" was written (or plagiarized, as the case may be). In the past, the agent of the simulation was usually described only as a superior being of some sort; this version merely substitutes "future human" for "superior being".

And with all due respect to Kuroneko, while I realize that the argument has its consistent self-contained logic, this is the kind of thing that gives philosophers a bad name among the general public, because it is so utterly pointless.

[Kuroneko]

This is not a new argument by any means; the "brain in a bottle" hypothesis is probably discussed in every Philosophy 101 class, and has been since long before the idea of computerized virtual realities was ever conceived or "The Matrix" was written (or plagiarized, as the case may be). In the past, the agent of the simulation was usually described only as a superior being of some sort; this version merely substitutes "future human" for "superior being".

It is not different in its claims, no, but its motivations are somewhat novel. This particular argument seems to be a bastard offspring of the Doomsday Argument, which, while still of questionable merit in itself, at least would have actual consequences for humans if it were valid. It's sad that this issue has received more press than it deserves, but to his credit, Dr. Bostrom (the author of this argument), has denied accepting the simulation conclusion and disclaimed any ultimate relevance to both daily life and science.

And with all due respect to Kuroneko, while I realize that the argument has its consistent self-contained logic, this is the kind of thing that gives philosophers a bad name among the general public, because it is so utterly pointless.

I won't even try to contest that.

[Keevan_Colton]

Occam's Razor is applicable insofar as one could argue that the entire argument is pointless and unnecessary, but it does not reveal a flaw within the argument itself. I'll admit that this strikes me as a somewhat trivial distinction too.

You can create a perfectly self consistent logic arguing anything (for example a theory about how pink faries are responsible for moving car keys), it just runs into problems when you go outside of its own setup. The entire argument is exactly what I'm refering to. As its real observational consequences are nil, then when offered, we are in the "real" universe and the one which offers no different predictions, but says we're in a simulation inside the real universe...then occam's razor can come into play to dismiss the idea of being inside the perfect simulation as it adds an extra term.

And for a kicker, even if its an imperfect simulation, the observational consequences are still nil, as we construct our model of the unvierse based on observation, ergo any "errors" in the simulation are all "correct".

[Kuroneko]

As its real observational consequences are nil, ...

They aren't. For example, in denying such a conclusion, one is free to employ modus tollens and deny its premise.

... then when offered, we are in the "real" universe and the one which offers no different predictions, but says we're in a simulation inside the real universe...then occam's razor can come into play to dismiss the idea of being inside the perfect simulation as it adds an extra term.

It doesn't. Your approach is rather baffling--Ockham's Razor does not attempt to cut conclusions, but rather the postulates invoked to explain those conclusions. The simulation argument does not postulate anything external to the known universe, since its premise is a claim about the current universe, or more precisely the technological abilities of future humans.