XPViking

Moderator: Edi
I agree, but all options would have been planned for, and the thread topic is circa 1980. Maybe during the 80's someone grew a brain and realised that wholesale nuclear destruction of the very thing you are trying to protect was not very intelligent?MKSheppard wrote:Actually, No......US doctrine was moving away from the crutch of NUKESphongn wrote: Stuart, the original post said that a conventional conflict broke out - not that either side (for whatever reason) is limited to non-NBC weapons only. It's a rather silly argument, IMHO, to say "no-nukes" when it's pretty clear that they'd be used.
to prop up decaying US ground forces....as we rebuilt our forces in the 80s,
we moved away from the paradigm of "holding the territory we had before
the war" military model to "deep penetrations of enemy territory with massed
divisions".....in short, in the 80s, we were planning on taking the war
through East Germany and into Poland if possible, to push the Bear as far
back as possible....WITHOUT nukes.
I have, and I have conluded that Clancy has decended into fantasy land.XPViking wrote:Speaking of Clancy, did anyone read The Bear and the Dragon?
XPViking
The offensive doctrine I'm speaking of was FORMALIZED in 1982Stuart Mackey wrote: I agree, but all options would have been planned for, and the thread topic is circa 1980. Maybe during the 80's someone grew a brain and realised that wholesale nuclear destruction of the very thing you are trying to protect was not very intelligent?
That was the F-15C's job.....to counter soviet aviation.....the -16 wasVympel wrote:In fact, in the 1980's you had the bizarre situation of most of NATO being equipped with F-16A's with no BVR capability- fighting MiG-23s with BVR.
Yes. I argued that the War of the Grand Alliance could be considered the First World War. Then the Spanish Succession, then the Seven Years, then the French Revolutionary Wars/Napoleonic Wars, then the Great War, then the Second War of the Grand Alliance ("WWII"), and then the Cold War.phongn wrote:OTOH, Marina, it's likely that surviving historians will probably call it WW3, anyways, not inclusive of the rest of the Cold War/Fifty Years War.The Duchess of Zeon wrote: The war you postulate would simply have been the Final Campaign in an alternate WWIII, what we call the Cold War, or the Fifty Years War.
Of course, I have seen you argue for a renumbering of the whole "World War" thing, no?
No, Shep, the plan was indeed to use nuclear warheads, and in quantity - why do you think we had the TLAM-N and Pershing IRBMs stationed in Europe?MKSheppard wrote:Actually, No......US doctrine was moving away from the crutch of NUKES
to prop up decaying US ground forces....as we rebuilt our forces in the 80s,
we moved away from the paradigm of "holding the territory we had before
the war" military model to "deep penetrations of enemy territory with massed
divisions".....in short, in the 80s, we were planning on taking the war
through East Germany and into Poland if possible, to push the Bear as far
back as possible....WITHOUT nukes.
It was one of the few ways to destroy the WARPAC formations without unacceptable levels of defense spending by the West. The technologies available to NATO in the later parts of the 1980s was not yet available and Reagan's buildup wasn't started yet.Stuart Mackey wrote:I agree, but all options would have been planned for, and the thread topic is circa 1980. Maybe during the 80's someone grew a brain and realised that wholesale nuclear destruction of the very thing you are trying to protect was not very intelligent?
Correct. I know for a fact that we had Pershing IRBMs located in Heilbron, Germany up until 1991.(Scared the crap out of the city when the fuel cells of one blew up in the 80s) They were not there just to look pretty you know.phongn wrote:No, Shep, the plan was indeed to use nuclear warheads, and in quantity - why do you think we had the TLAM-N and Pershing IRBMs stationed in Europe?MKSheppard wrote:Actually, No......US doctrine was moving away from the crutch of NUKES
to prop up decaying US ground forces....as we rebuilt our forces in the 80s,
we moved away from the paradigm of "holding the territory we had before
the war" military model to "deep penetrations of enemy territory with massed
divisions".....in short, in the 80s, we were planning on taking the war
through East Germany and into Poland if possible, to push the Bear as far
back as possible....WITHOUT nukes.
A conventional war would spark a nuclear war, either by NATO or the WARPAC. The AirLand battle may have maximised the use of the conventional NATO contingents, but it doesn't stop the massive escalation that war would entail.
*pictures officer getting orders to fire. goes thru firing procedures and is incenerated along with rest of his crew as missile launchesphongn wrote:There apparently was a rather morbid saying amongst the US Army and USAF crews that manned the missile launchers - they'd be the first to die, but not by Soviet hands. IIRC, when the Cold War ended and various information was declassified they found out that said morbid saying had some truth to it.
Vympel wrote:Bear and the Dragon was fucking awful. His comparison of the T-80U to an M60 was particularly IRKSOME.
As to the air war- by 1989 the USSR had some pretty fucking cool air defenses, and it's Su-27/MiG-29/MiG-31/Su-24/Su-25 combination was, and still is, pretty awesome. In fact, in the 1980's you had the bizarre situation of most of NATO being equipped with F-16A's with no BVR capability- fighting MiG-23s with BVR.
FM 100-5 was AirLand, which covered both defensive and offensive aspects. Chances are we would have seen the intital Soviet attack blunted but with most of its force intacted, just very disorginized and suffering from deep strikes, which would then be attacked and destroyed by limited counter offensives.MKSheppard wrote:The offensive doctrine I'm speaking of was FORMALIZED in 1982Stuart Mackey wrote: I agree, but all options would have been planned for, and the thread topic is circa 1980. Maybe during the 80's someone grew a brain and realised that wholesale nuclear destruction of the very thing you are trying to protect was not very intelligent?
in "FM 100-5 Operations", but the shift towards offensive actions
began with the 1976 edition of FM 100-5.
By 1989- there were over 500 Su-27s, and over 900 MiG-29s in service. MiG-31s were purely in the PVO- but I doubt NATO bombing runs into the Motherland would've been very successful with these watchful eyes.Sea Skimmer wrote:Vympel wrote:Bear and the Dragon was fucking awful. His comparison of the T-80U to an M60 was particularly IRKSOME.
As to the air war- by 1989 the USSR had some pretty fucking cool air defenses, and it's Su-27/MiG-29/MiG-31/Su-24/Su-25 combination was, and still is, pretty awesome. In fact, in the 1980's you had the bizarre situation of most of NATO being equipped with F-16A's with no BVR capability- fighting MiG-23s with BVR.
The Entire Soviet Union only had about 1200 Su-27s, MiG-29s and MiG-31's in 1989, and less the 500 faced NATO's central front. MiG-23 BVR was awful at best, only a few hundred examples with High lark radar got built and the PVO got most of them, along with all MiG-31's. The AA-7 Apex was a horrible missile with poor performance and reliability, its very rare that the 23 was seen carrying them because they weren't considered worth the extra drag for the near useless capability. Anyway, there where swarms of BVR Phantoms, Mirages and Eagles on hand, and the worst western BVR capability was as good as the very best Soviet BVR that would have been faced.
NATO planners must have the planning capacity of rabid trekkies. If politians had decided to limit it to conventional only these NATO types would have to prove that the rank they had was a bit more than the qualification to say 'nuke em'.phongn wrote:Stuart Mackey wrote:I agree, but all options would have been planned for, and the thread topic is circa 1980. Maybe during the 80's someone grew a brain and realised that wholesale nuclear destruction of the very thing you are trying to protect was not very intelligent?Doesnt exactly confer much faith in the intelligence of people does it?phongn wrote:It was one of the few ways to destroy the WARPAC formations without unacceptable levels of defense spending by the West. The technologies available to NATO in the later parts of the 1980s was not yet available and Reagan's buildup wasn't started yet.
'We wont spend much on defence, but if the ballon goes up you will see the results of less spending going into radiocative fire.'
phongn wrote:Nuclear plans also had the additional advantage of making it very clear that any invasion would automatically escalate to a strategic exchange, whereas a massive conventional force might deceive the enemy into thinking they can win a conventional war without it going nuclear. NATO planners assumed (even until the end of the Cold War) that any conflict would inevitably go nuclear.
Spending an extra half trillion a year while greatly increasing the risk of war is not a winning strategy. The nuclear option kept costs reasonable while making it impossible for the Soviets to risk war for limited goals. Nothing stupid there.Stuart Mackey wrote:phongn wrote:Stuart Mackey wrote:I agree, but all options would have been planned for, and the thread topic is circa 1980. Maybe during the 80's someone grew a brain and realised that wholesale nuclear destruction of the very thing you are trying to protect was not very intelligent?Doesnt exactly confer much faith in the intelligence of people does it?phongn wrote:It was one of the few ways to destroy the WARPAC formations without unacceptable levels of defense spending by the West. The technologies available to NATO in the later parts of the 1980s was not yet available and Reagan's buildup wasn't started yet.
'We wont spend much on defence, but if the ballon goes up you will see the results of less spending going into radiocative fire.'
NATO planners must have the planning capacity of rabid trekkies. If politians had decided to limit it to conventional only these NATO types would have to prove that the rank they had was a bit more than the qualification to say 'nuke em'.phongn wrote:Nuclear plans also had the additional advantage of making it very clear that any invasion would automatically escalate to a strategic exchange, whereas a massive conventional force might deceive the enemy into thinking they can win a conventional war without it going nuclear. NATO planners assumed (even until the end of the Cold War) that any conflict would inevitably go nuclear.
Also, do you have links to information on these types of plans? or what is public information?
True to an extent, if you assume that the Soviets would play for limited objectives. Trouble is, do you risk the results of MAD in a more protracted conflict? It is all very well to say the plans called for use of nuclear waepons, but their use of is political desition, and politians may well not want to go down that route, and why should they? look at what the result would be.Sea Skimmer wrote:
Spending an extra half trillion a year while greatly increasing the risk of war is not a winning strategy. The nuclear option kept costs reasonable while making it impossible for the Soviets to risk war for limited goals. Nothing stupid there.
The chance was minimal precisely because the Western defense hinged completely on nuclear weapons. The Soviets could not fight without offering massive damage win or lose. With an all-conventional approach they could piss away 30 divisions, lose, but never really be in danger. Quite simply it made war not worth the risks.Stuart Mackey wrote:True to an extent, if you assume that the Soviets would play for limited objectives. Trouble is, do you risk the results of MAD in a more protracted conflict? It is all very well to say the plans called for use of nuclear waepons, but their use of is political desition, and politians may well not want to go down that route, and why should they? look at what the result would be.Sea Skimmer wrote:
Spending an extra half trillion a year while greatly increasing the risk of war is not a winning strategy. The nuclear option kept costs reasonable while making it impossible for the Soviets to risk war for limited goals. Nothing stupid there.
I spoke with my flatmate, who served in the Red army during the 70's and he feels that at that time the chance of a Soviet attack into Germany/Western Europe was about that of NATO attacking the Warsaw pact, and that most of the Soviet posturing was bluster and nothing more.
He also made the comment that the Soviets felt somewhat intimidated by the American/NATO technogical superiority and economic strength.
They had no real desire for war, any more than we did.
Take from that what you will.