Welfarist approaches to ethics

[Jew]

The universe does not think you're allowed to live.

Of course not. The right to life means the right not to be killed by another person. It doesn't mean that the universe owes me life. Nature isn't a conscious being, and thus it is amoral. It is incapable of acting morally or immorally. Morality exists in the context of conscious beings who act out of their own free will.

All sources of morality are going to be subjective, because they all have their own premises which are logically impossible to prove. Yes, even 'Do no harm' is not logically, objectively 'right'. It's part of the nature of logic. Once you have your premise, you can expand from there to what Rights people should have, and you can ennumerate them legally and conceptually.

That's the real point of difference between us. We're starting from different premises.

'Inherent' rights? How? Go on, try and prove they're inherent.

It's at this point that I begin to wonder if this discussion is about the free exchange of ideas, or whether it's about winning a debate. Of course nobody can prove anything; as I said, philosophers and ethicists have been debating these ideas for centuries. I'm just offering an individualist point of view because Boyish-Tigerlilly asked for a critique of utilitarianism.

[Darth Wong]

I'm just offering an individualist point of view because Boyish-Tigerlilly asked for a critique of utilitarianism.

And that critique should find some flaw in utilitarianism. As I have pointed out already, simply saying "it's not the same as my system!" is not necessarily a flaw. You have to show how it fails to achieve its goals.

And don't give me this "free exchange of ideas" bullshit. What kind of idiot thinks he can critique something without facing criticism of his critique? You are free to say what you think, and we are free to point out that you are full of shit. There's your free exchange of ideas.

[Jew]

You have to show how it fails to achieve its goals.

Or I could show it to be based on a faulty premise. You don't have to agree with individualism, but the concept of individual rights is an important idea that should not be overlooked in any study of philosophy and ethics. I would be remiss not to bring it up.

You are free to say what you think, and we are free to point out that you are full of shit. There's your free exchange of ideas.

It is your forum.

[Darth Wong]

You have to show how it fails to achieve its goals.

Or I could show it to be based on a faulty premise.

And what faulty premise is that?

You don't have to agree with individualism, but the concept of individual rights is an important idea that should not be overlooked in any study of philosophy and ethics. I would be remiss not to bring it up.

Wrong. If you are critiquing an ethics system which expressly seeks to find some way other than individual rights to define what's right and wrong, it is a red herring to say "but it doesn't respect individual rights". This is like criticizing an electric car by saying that the designers forgot to include the gas tank.

[SirNitram]

The universe does not think you're allowed to live.

Of course not. The right to life means the right not to be killed by another person. It doesn't mean that the universe owes me life. Nature isn't a conscious being, and thus it is amoral. It is incapable of acting morally or immorally. Morality exists in the context of conscious beings who act out of their own free will.

Therefore rights cannot be inherent.

All sources of morality are going to be subjective, because they all have their own premises which are logically impossible to prove. Yes, even 'Do no harm' is not logically, objectively 'right'. It's part of the nature of logic. Once you have your premise, you can expand from there to what Rights people should have, and you can ennumerate them legally and conceptually.

That's the real point of difference between us. We're starting from different premises.

Yet I can show your premise to be invalid; rights cannot be inherent or exist without a community.

'Inherent' rights? How? Go on, try and prove they're inherent.

It's at this point that I begin to wonder if this discussion is about the free exchange of ideas, or whether it's about winning a debate. Of course nobody can prove anything; as I said, philosophers and ethicists have been debating these ideas for centuries. I'm just offering an individualist point of view because Boyish-Tigerlilly asked for a critique of utilitarianism.

Except you aren't making a critique of it! You declare rights must be inherent, but you won't support this. You aren't even addressing utilitarianism; you're just saying 'It's not mine' and sitting with a snit.

Rights can be shown to be philosophical, conceptual concepts. By definition, that means they aren't inherent. It's a simple bloody idea.

It's really annoying to be trying to get a simple, uncomplicated point across to someone and they begin to cry that it's not a 'free exchange of ideas'. Since when is a free exchange hinged upon your idea not being criticized for being pink fluff?

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

One problem I had when I studied ethics was I could never understand how people came to ethical consensus to solve problems. There were so many ethicists who had completely different systems comming to different conclusions. WHich one do you choose?

It was as if one topic had multiple conclusions, and no one was willling to accept the conclusions of anyone else.

[Darth Wong]

One problem I had when I studied ethics was I could never understand how people came to ethical consensus to solve problems. There were so many ethicists who had completely different systems comming to different conclusions. WHich one do you choose?

It was as if one topic had multiple conclusions, and no one was willling to accept the conclusions of anyone else.

That's why I've said many times that you need to set a criterion for judging the performance of ethical systems, so you need to agree on a goal. Every ethical system seeks to improve society in some way, so the question becomes: which one produces the best society? Of course, that leads to the question of what the best society is, but that's still a much better way of comparing ethical systems than to point out that system A does not incorporate the assumptions of system B.

[Jew]

Every ethical system seeks to improve society in some way, so the question becomes: which one produces the best society? Of course, that leads to the question of what the best society is.

Right. And even utilitarians disagree on the way to produce the best society. Utilitarianism breaks down into two major schools of thought. According to Wikipedia:

• Act-utilitarianism: "the best act is whichever act would yield the most happiness"
• Rule-utilitarianism: "the best act is to follow the general rule which would yield the most happiness."

So act-utilitarianism would allow you to murder an innocent man in cold blood if that murder would lead to an overall increase in happiness. But rule-utilitarianism logic is more along the lines of this: "If murdering people were a general rule, that would cause more harm than good. Therefore murder is always wrong, even if it might appear justifiable in one particular case."

[Darth Wong]

Every ethical system seeks to improve society in some way, so the question becomes: which one produces the best society? Of course, that leads to the question of what the best society is.

Right. And even utilitarians disagree on the way to produce the best society. Utilitarianism breaks down into two major schools of thought. According to Wikipedia:

• Act-utilitarianism: "the best act is whichever act would yield the most happiness"
• Rule-utilitarianism: "the best act is to follow the general rule which would yield the most happiness."

So act-utilitarianism would allow you to murder an innocent man in cold blood if that murder would lead to an overall increase in happiness. But rule-utilitarianism logic is more along the lines of this: "If murdering people were a general rule, that would cause more harm than good. Therefore murder is always wrong, even if it might appear justifiable in one particular case."

So you presumably prefer rule-utilitarianism. So what?

[Kuroneko]

So act-utilitarianism would allow you to murder an innocent man in cold blood if that murder would lead to an overall increase in happiness.

Right. Some fully accept this conclusion of what most take to be a reductio ad absurdum, most famously the philosopher J.J.C.Smart, which gave rise to the tounge-in-cheek meaning of "outsmarting" someone in philosophy.

But rule-utilitarianism logic is more along the lines of this: "If murdering people were a general rule, that would cause more harm than good. Therefore murder is always wrong, even if it might appear justifiable in one particular case."

Not only is this functionally equivalent to having a right to live, since a 'right to live' entails that it is morally impermissible to kill the holder of that right and no more than that, but it is also superior to the rights-based ethics from a theoretical perspective, since it derives many rights from a single, plausible principle. On the other hand, someone who holds that rights are inherent, when asked to defend there some particular set of rights rather than another, has no recourse but to either restate his or her claims more forcefully or admit having no justification. As always, the theory with the larger number of primitives or axioms is worse. Absolute-rights theories lose by a large margin.

Seriously, if you were that unsure about the details of the various theories which are put under the umbrella of utilitarianism, you could have just asked how utilitarianism could be resolved with rights (why you think they must be inherent, I cannot comprehend).

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

Right. Some fully accept this conclusion of what most take to be a reductio ad absurdum, most famously the philosopher J.J.C.Smart, which gave rise to the tounge-in-cheek meaning of "outsmarting" someone in philosophy.

This would depend. Some utilitarian calculations have an anti-malicious acts point to include in your calculous. I think it would be ok to kill someone if that were the only way to:

A. Defend yourself
B. Save more lives which would otherwise be lost.

[Jew]

But rule-utilitarianism logic is more along the lines of this: "If murdering people were a general rule, that would cause more harm than good. Therefore murder is always wrong, even if it might appear justifiable in one particular case."

Not only is this functionally equivalent to having a right to live, since a 'right to live' entails that it is morally impermissible to kill the holder of that right and no more than that, but it is also superior to the rights-based ethics from a theoretical perspective, since it derives many rights from a single, plausible principle.

Meh. Utilitarianism as a whole breaks down in practice when one realizes that it is impossible to accurately compute utility without being omniscient, and without knowing the future. Not that utilitarianism is therefore unusable; we can still make fairly good guesses about most things. It's just not infallible or entirely objective, which might upset some people. *cough*Ayn Rand*cough* That doesn't mean it isn't useful, or that utilitarianism isn't used in decision-making by politicians and bureaucrats today.

Rule-utilitarianism seems to break down, though. Consider: act-utilitarianism says it's OK for me to kill a man if his death will cause an increase in utility. Rule-utilitarianism says no, it's not. But what if I can make it look like an accident? I will have increased happiness and no one need ever know I murdered him. My one specific murder won't make murder a general rule, so I don't have to worry about the effects of my action as a general principle. Should I really refrain from a murder that no one will ever know about and that will increase utility, simply because most other murders are bad? Why should I judge the rightness or wrongness of this one action by the rightness or wrongness of other actions? Who am I to deny the public the utility that this murder will bring?

Of course I can't always know that I'll be able to perfectly disguise the murder as an accident, but as I mentioned before, the whole concept of utilitarianism is based on our best guess at the future utility of an action. Rule-utilitarianism seems a lot better than act-utilitarianism in most cases, but it some specific cases it devolves back into a case of act-utilitarianism.

[Kuroneko]

Meh. Utilitarianism as a whole breaks down in practice when one realizes that it is impossible to accurately compute utility without being omniscient, and without knowing the future. Not that utilitarianism is therefore unusable; we can still make fairly good guesses about most things. It's just not infallible or entirely objective, which might upset some people. *cough*Ayn Rand*cough*

This is an incredibly senseless criticism. To pretend that this is some 'problem' present in utilitarianism but not in the misnamed 'Objectivism' is ridiculous. One can also be wrong about things perceived to be in one's interest actually being in one's interest; even Rand is sane enough to admit this. Besides, why should this be considered a problem in the first place? Is there any reason why one should be able to determine absolutely that one would be doing the right thing before it is actually done? This is an advantage, not a problem--life is unpredictable, so an ethical system that recognizes this is more reflective of society that one that does not.

Rule-utilitarianism seems to break down, though. Consider: act-utilitarianism says it's OK for me to kill a man if his death will cause an increase in utility. Rule-utilitarianism says no, it's not. But what if I can make it look like an accident? I will have increased happiness and no one need ever know I murdered him.

Incorrect. Unless this person's existence would have caused great misery, you would have decreased the net utility in the world. Note that the identification of utility with personal happiness is only found in hedonistic utilitarianism, which has a long history of being criticized even by other utilitarianists--that has already been covered in this thread. If your purpose here is to reject hedonism, I have absolutely no objections there.

Should I really refrain from a murder that no one will ever know about and that will increase utility, simply because most other murders are bad? Why should I judge the rightness or wrongness of this one action by the rightness or wrongness of other actions? Who am I to deny the public the utility that this murder will bring?

How does no one finding out about it change the fact that your action decreased net utility in the world? This entire example is flawed.

[Jew]

How does no one finding out about it change the fact that your action decreased net utility in the world? This entire example is flawed.

The whole point of the dilemma is that the murder will cause a net increase in utility, but rule-utilitarianism says you shouldn't do it anyway. I apologize for using the word "happiness" if that's what you objected to. I didn't intend that to imply hedonism. Scratch the phrase "increased happiness" and insert "increased net utility" into my earlier statements. We can assume this guy's continued existence would cause great misery, as you suggested.

[Kuroneko]

The whole point of the dilemma is that the murder will cause a net increase in utility, but rule-utilitarianism says you shouldn't do it anyway. I apologize for using the word "happiness" if that's what you objected to. I didn't intend that to imply hedonism. Scratch the phrase "increased happiness" and insert "increased net utility" into my earlier statements. We can assume this guy's continued existence would cause great misery, as you suggested.

But if we assume that, what exactly is the problem? I wouldn't condemn von Stauffenberg even if he was successful in 1944, and I see no reason to condemn him if it was 1939 instead--the only difference would be the amount and nature of the evidence available to him of his assassination target's evil-producing nature. In fact, this appears to be one of those cases where failure to act is the more morally irresponsible course. Note additionally that cases like the framing of an innocent person for a crime that was already commited but in which no suspect is available just to provide public reassurance is still immoral in non-hedonistic utilitarianism.

[Jew]

But if we assume that, what exactly is the problem?

The problem is that rule-utilitarianism forbids you to kill the man. I'm just pointing out that if rule-utilitarianism is your ethical principle, you must be willing to sometimes not take the course of action that maximizes utility. And that, of course, is contrary to the goal of utilitarianism.

In practice it's not a very big issue, because come on, how many times have you had the chance to get away with murdering a man whose continued existence would cause extreme misery?

[Kuroneko]

The problem is that rule-utilitarianism forbids you to kill the man.

First, you found a problem with rule-utilitarianism allowing you to kill the man, since you claimed it degenerated into act-util in this instance and that it allowed it (not quite), which you judged worse (er, not better), as well as this being implied by your rhetorical questions. Now, you find a problem with utilitarianism forbidding the deed. I'm quite confused as to what exactly your grievance is, but assuming this latest iteration is your current one, I see no reason why an 'unless there is strong evidence that the person in question will cause great harm and there is no lesser way of effectively stopping it' clause cannot be introduced in the 'thou shalt not kill' rule.

I'm just pointing out that if rule-utilitarianism is your ethical principle, you must be willing to sometimes not take the course of action that maximizes utility. And that, of course, is contrary to the goal of utilitarianism.

You're equivocating by substituing the goal of act-utilitarianism for where the goal of rule-utilitarianism should be. Rule-utilitarianism is framed in terms of rules that would maximize utility if they were universally accepted; the fact that under specific situations they react suboptimally is not a contradiction because it was never a claim of rule-utilitarianism that it maximizes utility in every conceivable situation. Note that this puts a stopper on the degree to which exceptions to rules can be introduced, since allowing the introduction frivolous exceptions would destroy any assurance that the rules are followed, which would be harmful for society. This factor of societal confidence in its moral agents makes it very plausible that rule-utilitarianism's acceptance of suboptimal performance in some particular cases leads to higher long-term performance when compared to act-utilitarianism.