Kuroneko wrote:... applying Bayes' theorem on both sides of P(H|G)>P(H|¬G) and rearranging gives P(G|H)/P(¬G|H) > P(G)/P(¬G). For this to turn into P(G|H) > P(¬G|H), which is what is wanted, it must be the case that P(G) ? P(¬G), i.e., probability prior to evidence, but there is no reason to believe that.
You have taken the stronger form of what I said and greatly weakened it here. Recall, I was positing that they would put forth some concrete figure of how much more likely history was with God in place, not merely say that it was genericaly 'more' likely.
The claims I was supposin they might make, in order:
P(H|G) = X P(H|¬G), with X >> 1 (your version: P(H|G)>P(H|¬G) )
P(G|H)/P(¬G|H) = X P(G)/P(¬G) ( your version: P(G|H)/P(¬G|H) > P(G)/P(¬G) )
they then only need to suppose P(G)/P(¬G) > 1/X
instead of P(G)/P(¬G) > 1
So yeah, the 50% figure is just as bad. Ok. However, merely getting P(G)/P(¬G) < 1/2 or something like that just wouldn't be an adequate counterargument, if X > 2.