Lightsaber or Site-to-site transporter?

[Dooey Jo]

Give me one piece of evidence that your biological based conciousness exists.

He wrote to you, isn't that enough? Are you going to do a Turing test on him? Perhaps you can give one piece of evidence that a non-biological based consciousness exists?

You can't because it is fundamentaly unverifiable, and therefore has no place in a materialist / scientific outlook.

This is a biological approach of consciousness, and you are arguing against it? Are you claiming that consciousness does not exist? That a materialist must not recognise any such thing as a consciousness, even if it can be explained through neurobiology (by which I mean that it can be explained, we're just quite not there yet).

If a theory on something, like conciousness, can not be tested in some manner then the only way to beleive in it is with faith. This is pretty basic stuff. Either give me some evidence (or at the very least a test) for your biological conciousness, or except that you belief in it is paramount to faith.

Yeah, here's a test for you.
1. Are you conscious?
If yes, proceed to 2, if not, wake up then proceed to 2
2. Where does this consciousness exist?
We will assume it exists somewhere in your body. In order to deduce where exactly it is, you will have to destroy all possible bodyparts of test-subjects and see what bodypart's destruction invariable leads to non-consciousness.
3. Realise that your consciousness exists in your brain. Or at the very least cannot exist without it.

Now for the conclusion: A consciousness exists. It cannot exist independantly of your brain. Are we to assume that it is a property of the constituent neurons of the brain, or that is the property of an immaterial soul which exists within the brain? With the material/scientific outlook the answer is obvious.


Now, can you explain what your competing theory on consciousness is? I hope it's not the Appeal to Ignorance...

[petesampras]

The original argument was that if you take someone apart atom by atom and then re-assemble perfectly then some magical property called 'consiousness' is still lost or changed.

If the copy is perfect then they will behave identically to before, thus this 'consciousness' which is lost cannot be tested for by speaking to the person or by physical examination.

If you cannot test for something then, from a scientific point of view, you cannot claim it's existance - without resorting to faith.

I am not claiming that consciousness is non-biological, I don't believe it exists at all. If you want to claim that it does you must either provide evidence or rely on faith.

I thought I explained this in the last post.



[/quote]

[petesampras]

Answering your test...

1. Are you conscious?

No, consiousness does not exist. My brain is just a biological machine that processes information. The brain generates this concept of consiousness to help it make sense of the world, that does not make it a real thing. A computer program could be easily written that claims to be consious, that is not evidence that it is or that such a thing exists.

2. Where does this consciousness exist?

It doesn't exist.

3. Realise that your consciousness exists in your brain. Or at the very least cannot exist without it.

It doesn't exist at all.

[Dooey Jo]

No, consiousness does not exist. My brain is just a biological machine that processes information. The brain generates this concept of consiousness to help it make sense of the world, that does not make it a real thing.

Then what would a "real" consciousness be like? How would it differ from the illusion?

A computer program could be easily written that claims to be consious, that is not evidence that it is or that such a thing exists.

Why can't programmed consciousness exist? Also, what is your definition of "easily" here? How would you easily write a program that simulates consciousness?

The original argument was that if you take someone apart atom by atom and then re-assemble perfectly then some magical property called 'consiousness' is still lost or changed.

Yes, because the original is effectively destroyed and a duplicate exists in its stead. Trying to ignore that point by saying that consciousness is an illusion doesn't change anything, as the percieved consciousness will still end when it's destroyed.

If the copy is perfect then they will behave identically to before, thus this 'consciousness' which is lost cannot be tested for by speaking to the person or by physical examination.

So two persons that looks exactly the same and behaves exactly alike, are actually one and the same consciousness, or percieved consciousness? Do you think they, themselves, would really think so?

If you cannot test for something then, from a scientific point of view, you cannot claim it's existance - without resorting to faith.

You cannot test the claim that people have dreams either. Are we to assume that people do not dream? This sure seems like an Appeal to Ignorance to me.

I am not claiming that consciousness is non-biological, I don't believe it exists at all. If you want to claim that it does you must either provide evidence or rely on faith.

Everyone experiences consciousness. If you think it's all an illusion, then the burden of proof is actually on you to prove that. Where's the science in assuming something which we observe is not real?

[petesampras]

Everyone experiences consciousness. If you think it's all an illusion, then the burden of proof is actually on you to prove that. Where's the science in assuming something which we observe is not real?

The vast majority of people experience a relationship with a higher power (eg God), does that qualify as proof of the existance of god? The fact that people claim to experience consciousness does not mean that it exists, anymore than people claiming to experience a relationship with God means that god exists.

The burden of proof in science is always on the side trying to show the existance of something, rather than the side claiming that it does not exist.

[Winston Blake]

The transporter = death argument simply comes down to whether you believe in a non-material soul. If you don't then nothing is lost in transportation. You can't say you don't believe in a soul and then claim to believe in conciousness (the philisophical rather than medical term), you are just changing the name of near identical concepts.

Of course you can. There's a pretty big difference between considering consciousness to be an emergent phenomenon based on simple neurobiological processes and believing that a supernatural ghost inhabits you and will fly away to paradise when you die.

From a materialist perspective you brain is just a bunch of neurons processing information. There is no ghost in the machine, no secret observer that experiences the redness of red. There are no issues with having multiple copies of yourself. There is no need for continuity of conciousness because conciousness does not really exist.

I think there is something strange in the way you define the idea of 'consciousness'. Oh look, the internet is just a bunch of microchips processing information, therefore this board does not really exist.

Give me one piece of evidence that your biological based conciousness exists. You can't because it is fundamentaly unverifiable, and therefore has no place in a materialist / scientific outlook.

How about the fact we're talking to you? What, that could be simulated? Well give me one piece of evidence that your biological based pain-sensation exists. You wouldn't mind if i kicked you in the nuts then? It's impossible for me to know if you're actually suffering or just a fleshbot who's simulating it, therefore pain doesn't exist.

If a theory on something, like conciousness, can not be tested in some manner then the only way to beleive in it is with faith. This is pretty basic stuff. Either give me some evidence (or at the very least a test) for your biological conciousness, or except that you belief in it is paramount to faith.

FFS it's obvious. I don't know, I'm sure somebody who's really into philosophy will come by soon and explain all this much better.

The original argument was that if you take someone apart atom by atom and then re-assemble perfectly then some magical property called 'consiousness' is still lost or changed.

No, the argument is that if you take someone apart atom by atom then you've killed them. Let me guess, you're going to say death doesn't exist?

If the copy is perfect then they will behave identically to before, thus this 'consciousness' which is lost cannot be tested for by speaking to the person or by physical examination.

Captain Picard, alive. Enters transporter. Torn apart into subatomic particles. Captain Picard, dead. Why all the bizarro mind-bending philosophy?

If you cannot test for something then, from a scientific point of view, you cannot claim it's existance - without resorting to faith.

I am not claiming that consciousness is non-biological, I don't believe it exists at all. If you want to claim that it does you must either provide evidence or rely on faith.

What exactly is this definition of consciousness that you're using?

1. Are you conscious?

No, consiousness does not exist. My brain is just a biological machine that processes information. The brain generates this concept of consiousness to help it make sense of the world, that does not make it a real thing. A computer program could be easily written that claims to be consious, that is not evidence that it is or that such a thing exists.

A computer program could be written that immerses you in virtual reality while your brain floats in a jar. Prove that hamsters exist. So you show me a hamster and it squeaks and nuzzles my hand. I could just as easily say that the cute little hamster is merely a construct generated by my brain, and i have no way of knowing if it actually exists or not. Have you heard of solipsism?

Everyone experiences consciousness. If you think it's all an illusion, then the burden of proof is actually on you to prove that. Where's the science in assuming something which we observe is not real?

The vast majority of people experience a relationship with a higher power (eg God), does that qualify as proof of the existance of god? The fact that people claim to experience consciousness does not mean that it exists, anymore than people claiming to experience a relationship with God means that god exists.

Everything that those people experience can be explained by more parsimonious mechanisms than the existence of supernatural beings. The vast majority of people also claim to experience pain, do you think pain doesn't exist too, that it's just another unprovable illusion?

OK, how about we ignore whether or not 'consciousness' exists and just consider the quality of being alive. Spot the Dog is alive. Spot the Dog enters the Transporter. Spot the Dog has just been broken apart into a cloud of tiny particles. Do you think Spot is still alive?

[petesampras]

Everything that those people experience can be explained by more parsimonious mechanisms than the existence of supernatural beings.

Just as peoples claim that they have consious experiences can be explained without the need for consiouness to actually exist. Peoples claim that they are consious is merely evidence that the human brain thinks consiousness exists. A philisophical 'zombie' would claim consious experience without having it.

The vast majority of people also claim to experience pain, do you think pain doesn't exist too, that it's just another unprovable illusion?

Pain has an effect on brains that can be observed, it also produces a behavoural response. There is clearly evidence that pain exists in that sense. There is no evidence that the subjective conscious experience of pain exists. People claim to experence pain, but again, so would the philosophical zombie without actually having subjective experience of it.

OK, how about we ignore whether or not 'consciousness' exists and just consider the quality of being alive. Spot the Dog is alive. Spot the Dog enters the Transporter. Spot the Dog has just been broken apart into a cloud of tiny particles. Do you think Spot is still alive?

Our concepts of the terms alive and dead are coloured by the fact that death is irreversable. In our world, once you are dead you are dead. I don't think that you can apply them to a situation when living creatures can be instantly disassembled and reassembled like in star trek.

Of course star trek does still have irreversable death, which makes no sense when they can just recreate people with the transporters. That's just shitty writing though.

[petesampras]

an article on these kinds of issues...

http://members.aol.com/lshauser/zombies.html

[Winston Blake]

OK, how about we ignore whether or not 'consciousness' exists and just consider the quality of being alive. Spot the Dog is alive. Spot the Dog enters the Transporter. Spot the Dog has just been broken apart into a cloud of tiny particles. Do you think Spot is still alive?

Our concepts of the terms alive and dead are coloured by the fact that death is irreversable. In our world, once you are dead you are dead. I don't think that you can apply them to a situation when living creatures can be instantly disassembled and reassembled like in star trek.

Alright, if Spot is disassembled in the transporter but then the process is stopped, his matter is discarded and he's never reassembled, i think we can both agree he's totally dead.

Your position is that if he was reassembled, then he would truly be the same dog as before disassembly.

Now, each subatomic particle that he's been broken down into is identical to every other particle of that type (a proton is a proton). So you wouldn't necessarily need to use Spot's own particles to rebuild him, you could instead merely transmit information (obtained during dissasembly) about the location and identity of all his particles to the destination and then arrange particles drawn from a 'soup' into the exact same form. As i understand you, you would still consider this dog to be the same Spot.

But why stop there? Let's say Heisenberg isn't a problem, and we put Spot into a scanner that records all that information perfectly. We then take him out of the scanner and put him in a transporter, where he's disassembled. Now, rather than transmit his complete information from one transporter to another, we could simply use the information we obtained by scanning him earlier. So we feed that information we got earlier into the destination transporter, which uses the soup to build Spot in precisely every way as he was when scanned. The cloud of particles and information from disassembling him is discarded. Now, is the produced dog still the same Spot?

What if we assembled that dog from the scanner information and soup without disassembling Spot first? Then we now have two Spots, one of which we know is a built copy, the other which has experienced no discontinuity in integrity at all. Obviously, they're not the same dog.

However, if we now disassemble the original Spot and discard his information and particles, what we have done is identical to the previous scenario where we disassembled him before building the copy. The origin machine is no longer a 'transporter', just a 'disassembler'. Would you consider the single dog left to truly be the original Spot now? How is that possible when he wasn't just a moment before, and nothing about him has changed?

In that final scenario, imagine you're in Spot's place and meet the soup-built copy of yourself before walking into the disassembler (which merely destroys then discards you). Would you be comfortable in the knowledge that once you've been destroyed, the real 'you' still exists exactly as if this didn't happen?

[Winston Blake]

an article on these kinds of issues...

http://members.aol.com/lshauser/zombies.html

Sorry, but that's just too obscure and full of jargon for me to bother reading. I reached that conclusion by the time i got to about here:

I have a plan. Other zombies -- good (qualia eating) zombies -- can battle their evil (behavior eating) cousins to a standoff. Perhaps even defeat them. Familiar zombies and supersmart zombies resist disqualefication, making the world safe, again, for materialism. Behavioristic materialism. Alas for functionalism, good zombies still eat programs. Alas for identity theory, all zombies -- every B movie fan knows -- eat brains.

[Dooey Jo]

Everything that those people experience can be explained by more parsimonious mechanisms than the existence of supernatural beings.

Just as peoples claim that they have consious experiences can be explained without the need for consiouness to actually exist. Peoples claim that they are consious is merely evidence that the human brain thinks consiousness exists.

Isn't "something which thinks it is conscious" one of the very definitions of consciousness?

A philisophical 'zombie' would claim consious experience without having it.

How would anyone know it doesn't have it? If it just experiences an illusion of a consciousness, then why should it be any different from it actually being conscious? If a p-zombie is reactive to its envoriment and seems to be thinking in terms of an "I", why should we think that it is not conscious?

The vast majority of people also claim to experience pain, do you think pain doesn't exist too, that it's just another unprovable illusion?

Pain has an effect on brains that can be observed, it also produces a behavoural response.

So does consciousness.

The vast majority of people experience a relationship with a higher power (eg God), does that qualify as proof of the existance of god? The fact that people claim to experience consciousness does not mean that it exists, anymore than people claiming to experience a relationship with God means that god exists.

No it does not. The vast majority does not experience a relationship with the same god or higher power, and many does not experience anything at all. Everyone experiences consciousness. And there are infact less and different activities in certain parts of the brain when people are unconscious, so it is even measureable.

The burden of proof in science is always on the side trying to show the existance of something, rather than the side claiming that it does not exist.

You're not claiming it doesn't exist, you're claiming it's an illusion. If you would claim that it doesn't exist, that people are not reactive to their environment and not qualifies for every criteria of being conscious, you would be wrong, because it is evident people does just that.

Similarly you could say the speed of light is not invariant, because that's just the way it seems to be, and the reality would be something different. But what would be the point? You'd still need the same theories to explain the effects of the illusion.


And the whole arguement is pointless in the scope of transporters anyway. It doesn't matter wether the transportee is conscious, unconscious or just experiences an illusion. A copy is made, and the original is destroyed. A copy is identical to the original, but it cannot be the original itself, which has already been explained several times over.

[petesampras]

Imagine an alternative analogy.

A computer is running a piece of software which is capable of saving it's complete state at any point in time. I save the state and exit the software. At a later stage I re-open the software and load the state I saved earlier. Has anything important changed in my execution of the software in doing this rather than just working continuously? I would argue no.

What is I load it on a different machine? Again, I can't see how anything of fundamental importance has changed. What if I run two copies of the software on different machines loading the same state? Which is the 'real' copy? Does it matter?



If I make an identical copy of a rock and give them both to someone, is there any way for the person with the two rocks to identify the original? I would say that there isn't, and hence the question of which is the original is meaningless. If you can't test for a property, then scientificaly, it is meaningless to talk of it's existance. 'Original versus Copy' and 'continuity of existance' become such properties if you allow the existance of perfect matter replication a la startrek.

[petesampras]

A better way to illustrate the argument is as follows..

Imagine I make a perfect copy of you.

Your claim boils down to their being some property about the 'original' that is not present in the 'copy' which means that the original is 'you', but the copy is not.

In science, in order for a property to be said to exist, there must exist some means of testing for it.

There can exist no test, in the general case, that can distingish between a perfect copy and the original. Therefore there cannot exist a property possessed by the original that is not possessed by the copy.

[Winston Blake]

A computer is running a piece of software which is capable of saving it's complete state at any point in time. I save the state and exit the software. At a later stage I re-open the software and load the state I saved earlier. Has anything important changed in my execution of the software in doing this rather than just working continuously? I would argue no.

That's more like suspended animation than teleportation. A person's bodily functions can be slowed to a standstill, but they still maintain complete physical integrity, i.e. they don't technically die.

What is I load it on a different machine? Again, I can't see how anything of fundamental importance has changed. What if I run two copies of the software on different machines loading the same state? Which is the 'real' copy? Does it matter?

To transfer the state from one software-hardware system to another means making a copy. To obtain that copy you need to tell your computer to study each bit of the original and alter a blank medium to match it. The original continues to exist, while the copy was only recently brought into existence. They might behave identically, but that doesn't mean they're actually the same thing.

If I make an identical copy of a rock and give them both to someone, is there any way for the person with the two rocks to identify the original? I would say that there isn't, and hence the question of which is the original is meaningless. If you can't test for a property, then scientificaly, it is meaningless to talk of it's existance.

You made the copy at some point in time, so one of them was scanned and the other was recently constructed out of raw materials. The person you give them to might have no idea, hell, you might have jumbled them in bag so even you don't know which is which, but that doesn't mean that one of them isn't the original.

You're specifically restricting the observer. If they had access to camera footage of the copying being done and kept track of which was constructed and which existed beforehand, they could tell you which was the original. If you put someone into a coma then give them a cat and a dog, is there any way for the person with the two animals to identify which is which? No? Well i guess cats and dogs are the same then.

On the theme of cats, do you consider a hidden Schroedinger's cat in a box to be indistinguishably alive and dead at the same time, or it's actually one or the other and you just happen to not know which?

[Winston Blake]

A better way to illustrate the argument is as follows..

Imagine I make a perfect copy of you.

Your claim boils down to their being some property about the 'original' that is not present in the 'copy' which means that the original is 'you', but the copy is not.

In science, in order for a property to be said to exist, there must exist some means of testing for it.

There can exist no test, in the general case, that can distingish between a perfect copy and the original. Therefore there cannot exist a property possessed by the original that is not possessed by the copy.

OK, i just had an idea. Here's a difference: let's say i walk into a copying booth. Copying is done, then a perfect copy of me walks out of the construction booth beside me. Now, his location is different to mine, hence he experiences ever so slightly different air pressure, temperature, sound, etc and sees things from a slightly different angle to me. If we had the technology to analyse his brain and withdraw images from it, we could see that from his point of view that he entered the copying booth but exited the construction booth. Analyse my brain and you'll see that i walked out of the copying booth instead. So there's a difference.

In general, the very moment anything in the universe interacts with that copy (e.g. photons entering it's eyes), it has been changed, however slightly, from a copy of me to an original object in it's own right. Now, i figure before anything in the universe interacts with it, it's existence is absolutely irrelevant- so it effectively did not exist until it was already no longer identical to me. So that should mean the copy and the original are fundamentally different from the very beginning, even if it's not currently practical for a person to examine those differences, cf previously mentioned coma patient.

[Eframepilot]

This argument is silly. In Star Trek, consciousness can exist separately from the body (see Chakotay's "spirit" wandering around Voyager possessing people in that 1st season Voyager ep) and isn't destroyed by the transporter's dematerialization process. In the transporter process, consciousness can be paused (Scotty), copied (Riker), split (Kirk), merged (Neelix and Tuvok), dilated to perceive a tiny lapse of time as several days (Hoshi), or even not affected at all (Barclay). Hell, Picard beamed himself off the ship as "energy" and later managed to return into the ship's systems (without the help of the "energy" being previously possessing him) and find his way back to the transporter buffer, as a purely dematerialized being! This proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that the transporter process does not (usually) kill you, as Picard's consciousness continued to function even in a non-material state totally outside the control of the transporter. He even left a "P" in the bridge's displays as a hint to his identity.

Is all of the above complete, utter bullshit? You bet! However, it's part of the canon workings of the transporter and can't be dismissed. So we can assume that if the transporter functioned in real life it would have exactly the same effects on us as it does on the Star Trek characters, including not killing and replacing us with exact doubles.

[drachefly]

aah, back from vacation...

In that final scenario, imagine you're in Spot's place and meet the soup-built copy of yourself before walking into the disassembler (which merely destroys then discards you). Would you be comfortable in the knowledge that once you've been destroyed, the real 'you' still exists exactly as if this didn't happen?

I know, you were talking to the tennis player when you said this, but it applies equally well to my statements.

Still, I'd like to point out that I dealt with this by pointing out that the copier would create two instances of an individual who start off identical but would rapidly diverge. It's OK to zap one of me so long as both of me are identical, but once you get to the point where we have met, it's way too late. The overlap in their existence should be kept shorter than the time it takes to form a thought. Note that the termination of consciousness for the disintegrated instance must then itself be shorter than the time it takes to form a thought.

Or, as a site-to-site transporter would operate under normal circumstances, there is no overlap at all. There is no parallel progression of the mind -- even that progression which occurs while disintegrated is kept in the new constructed mind.


I mentioned pain in an earlier post. The reason is twofold: first, to get rid of the ridiculous 'midget nut kicking death' argument; and second, as an incidental note based on the abruptness of termination of consciousness in the disintegrated individual.

[applejack]

This argument is silly. In Star Trek, consciousness can exist separately from the body (see Chakotay's "spirit" wandering around Voyager possessing people in that 1st season Voyager ep) and isn't destroyed by the transporter's dematerialization process. In the transporter process, consciousness can be paused (Scotty), copied (Riker), split (Kirk), merged (Neelix and Tuvok), dilated to perceive a tiny lapse of time as several days (Hoshi), or even not affected at all (Barclay). Hell, Picard beamed himself off the ship as "energy" and later managed to return into the ship's systems (without the help of the "energy" being previously possessing him) and find his way back to the transporter buffer, as a purely dematerialized being! This proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that the transporter process does not (usually) kill you, as Picard's consciousness continued to function even in a non-material state totally outside the control of the transporter. He even left a "P" in the bridge's displays as a hint to his identity.

Would you happen to have episode titles for these instances? I want to try look them up in the database.

Still, I'd like to point out that I dealt with this by pointing out that the copier would create two instances of an individual who start off identical but would rapidly diverge. It's OK to zap one of me so long as both of me are identical, but once you get to the point where we have met, it's way too late. The overlap in their existence should be kept shorter than the time it takes to form a thought. Note that the termination of consciousness for the disintegrated instance must then itself be shorter than the time it takes to form a thought.

What does it matter if their brain patterns or whatever are identical right after the moment of rematerialization? Once they're separated aren't they still distinct individuals in that neither takes in experiential input through the same perspective? There are two separate and independantly operating brains after rematerialization, aren't there?

[Eframepilot]

This argument is silly. In Star Trek, consciousness can exist separately from the body (see Chakotay's "spirit" wandering around Voyager possessing people in that 1st season Voyager ep) and isn't destroyed by the transporter's dematerialization process. In the transporter process, consciousness can be paused (Scotty), copied (Riker), split (Kirk), merged (Neelix and Tuvok), dilated to perceive a tiny lapse of time as several days (Hoshi), or even not affected at all (Barclay). Hell, Picard beamed himself off the ship as "energy" and later managed to return into the ship's systems (without the help of the "energy" being previously possessing him) and find his way back to the transporter buffer, as a purely dematerialized being! This proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that the transporter process does not (usually) kill you, as Picard's consciousness continued to function even in a non-material state totally outside the control of the transporter. He even left a "P" in the bridge's displays as a hint to his identity.

Would you happen to have episode titles for these instances? I want to try look them up in the database.

Picard: TNG "Lonely Among Us" 1st season
Scotty: TNG "Relics". Refers to his ~80 year storage in a transporter buffer by specially modifying it.
Riker: TNG "Second Chances" Origin of Thomas Riker
Kirk: TOS "The Enemy Within" The one where Kirk is split into passive and aggressive selves
Neelix and Tuvok: VOY "Tuvix" They're merged into Tuvix, a single being with their combined physiology and memories
Barclay: TNG "Realm of Fear" Barclay is conscious and has freedom of movement inside the transporter buffer and throughout the process
Hoshi: ENT "Vanishing Point" Never seen it personally, only read reviews

[Eframepilot]

I forgot Chakotay: Voyager's 1st season "Cathexis". Not in the database, unfortunately. "Lonely Among Us" is, luckily, and the entries contain all of the most interesting parts relative to transporter functioning and the effect of being dematerialized on humanoid consciousness.

[drachefly]

What does it matter if their brain patterns or whatever are identical right after the moment of rematerialization? Once they're separated aren't they still distinct individuals in that neither takes in experiential input through the same perspective? There are two separate and independantly operating brains after rematerialization, aren't there?

Because being extremely similar to what I am is what makes me "me".

Okay, how about we consider some other situations?

A radical new medical procedure involves replacing your blood with cold saline fluid and stopping your heart, then performing surgery and restoring your blood and body temperature (this has been successfully done in rats and dogs to no permanent ill affect in many cases).

While cold, you appear dead and have no brain activity. However, you 'wake up' just the same as when you went under (aside from having had surgery done).

Did you die?

Okay, now suppose the surgery was REALLY radical and involved slicing your body into little pieces then putting them back together again. But otherwise pretty much the same as before.

Did you die?

Now the medical procedure involves doing all that then taking apart the pieces down to their component particles and reassembling them from other identical particles.

Did you die?

How does this differ from teleportation in-location, except it's much more excruciatingly slow?

[drachefly]

Incidentally, here is a relevant link:

http://www.philosophersnet.com/games/identity.htm

It doesn't answer one way or another, but it is informative...

[applejack]

Picard: TNG "Lonely Among Us" 1st season
Scotty: TNG "Relics". Refers to his ~80 year storage in a transporter buffer by specially modifying it.
Riker: TNG "Second Chances" Origin of Thomas Riker
Kirk: TOS "The Enemy Within" The one where Kirk is split into passive and aggressive selves
Neelix and Tuvok: VOY "Tuvix" They're merged into Tuvix, a single being with their combined physiology and memories
Barclay: TNG "Realm of Fear" Barclay is conscious and has freedom of movement inside the transporter buffer and throughout the process
Hoshi: ENT "Vanishing Point" Never seen it personally, only read reviews

I forgot Chakotay: Voyager's 1st season "Cathexis". Not in the database, unfortunately. "Lonely Among Us" is, luckily, and the entries contain all of the most interesting parts relative to transporter functioning and the effect of being dematerialized on humanoid consciousness.

Okay, thanks. I'll look through those when I can.

Because being extremely similar to what I am is what makes me "me".

But I'm inclined to think that, with the exception of the first scenario you gave, and maybe even the second, neither your third scenario nor the idea of transportation have enough degree of continuity (yeah Eframe, I'll look through the episodes when I can) of my current composition and thoughts to warrant the end product of both of those processes to be called "me". It'd be a great duplicate, no doubt about it. Even a fully functioning version of me. But with both my consciousness and biological hardrive having been disintigrated, I don't see how the perspective from my current consciousness will continue on in the duplicate. Look at it this way. I don't consider the pre-materialized transporter subject to be the exact same person as the post-materialized subject in terms of individual sentient perspective anymore than Tom Riker is the exact same person as Will Riker the moment they were split and rematerialized in different places.

Okay, how about we consider some other situations?

A radical new medical procedure involves replacing your blood with cold saline fluid and stopping your heart, then performing surgery and restoring your blood and body temperature (this has been successfully done in rats and dogs to no permanent ill affect in many cases).

While cold, you appear dead and have no brain activity. However, you 'wake up' just the same as when you went under (aside from having had surgery done).

Did you die?

Of course, but the hardrive still maintained its integrity, assuming there was no brain damage. I still think people who were medically dead then revived to be essentially the same person after that they were before.

Okay, now suppose the surgery was REALLY radical and involved slicing your body into little pieces then putting them back together again. But otherwise pretty much the same as before.

Did you die?

Now the medical procedure involves doing all that then taking apart the pieces down to their component particles and reassembling them from other identical particles.

Did you die?

How does this differ from teleportation in-location, except it's much more excruciatingly slow?

The difference between the last and second to the last scenario is the sheer totality in which my body is disassembled, which was part of my objection to transporting people in the first place. There is no obvious technological explanation of the transporter mechanism as we know it that allows uninterrupted continuity of your "self" in any form.

[Winston Blake]

This argument is silly. In Star Trek, consciousness can exist separately from the body (see Chakotay's "spirit" wandering around Voyager possessing people in that 1st season Voyager ep) and isn't destroyed by the transporter's dematerialization process. In the transporter process, consciousness can be paused (Scotty), copied (Riker), split (Kirk), merged (Neelix and Tuvok), dilated to perceive a tiny lapse of time as several days (Hoshi), or even not affected at all (Barclay). Hell, Picard beamed himself off the ship as "energy" and later managed to return into the ship's systems (without the help of the "energy" being previously possessing him) and find his way back to the transporter buffer, as a purely dematerialized being! This proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that the transporter process does not (usually) kill you, as Picard's consciousness continued to function even in a non-material state totally outside the control of the transporter. He even left a "P" in the bridge's displays as a hint to his identity.

Is all of the above complete, utter bullshit? You bet! However, it's part of the canon workings of the transporter and can't be dismissed. So we can assume that if the transporter functioned in real life it would have exactly the same effects on us as it does on the Star Trek characters, including not killing and replacing us with exact doubles.

I have to agree with that evidence- in Star Trek people really do have immaterial souls that can fly through space. It's not hard to imagine the transporter acting as a 'soul catapult' when the things being catapulted can have arbitrary properties. So i think i would use a trekporter, provided i could learn roughly how it works first.

[Winston Blake]

Edit for above: I meant to say after that "However, this thread has developed into a discussion about the general idea of teleporting and the consequences of a 'dematerialise-transmit-rematerialise' model (and its variants) rather than pure Trek."

Still, I'd like to point out that I dealt with this by pointing out that the copier would create two instances of an individual who start off identical but would rapidly diverge. It's OK to zap one of me so long as both of me are identical, but once you get to the point where we have met, it's way too late. The overlap in their existence should be kept shorter than the time it takes to form a thought. Note that the termination of consciousness for the disintegrated instance must then itself be shorter than the time it takes to form a thought.

The point of my progressive list of scenarios above was to ask 'At what time difference between dematerialisation and copy-building does it supposedly stop being death and become transportation?'. Why stop at 'the time it takes to form a thought'? Before the final 'positive overlap' one, one of my scenarios had a negative overlap- you could destroy the original before the copy has even been built yet. We're not talking about creating a copy and then destroying it within a (undefinable) time in which it can form its first independent though. You're destroying the original at some point, and being destroyed means dying, whether a copy exactly similar to you (though impossible as i mentioned above) was recently constructed or not.

Or, as a site-to-site transporter would operate under normal circumstances, there is no overlap at all. There is no parallel progression of the mind -- even that progression which occurs while disintegrated is kept in the new constructed mind.

Short version of my reply to petesampras above: What is the big difference between being dematerialised a few minutes before having a copy constructed from your scanned information, and being dematerialised a few minutes after a copy is built? Why should a lack of 'parallel progression of the mind' mean you were moved from A to B when it's occurrence pretty obviously means you are killed?

I mentioned pain in an earlier post. The reason is twofold: first, to get rid of the ridiculous 'midget nut kicking death' argument; and second, as an incidental note based on the abruptness of termination of consciousness in the disintegrated individual.

And? All i can find is you saying that the transportation process must not be painful because people transported don't remember any pain. Now, I admit the 'death by nuts stabbing' was a bit facetious, but it was merely to 'drive home' the idea that the original is obviously killed in a 'positive overlap' scenario.