Occupation

[Darth Wong]

I don't see how being transported in inherently more disturbing than say, the Culture's general policy of mindstate-backup for reincarnation. It is of course, a literal reincarnation, as your soul, (which stupidly, exists) is reborn in the reassembled body.

Who said it was more disturbing than that? I'd put it on the same level too, which is to say "if I'm going to die anyway, it would be nice to have another incarnation of myself somewhere that carries on my personality, but it certainly wouldn't be the same thing as surviving."

[Wyrm]

Except that in your case, you contradicted yourself earlier by admitting that the copy was a separate and distinct being from yourself, as per my scenario.

Except that in your scenario, you've deliberately introduced an asymmetry into the situation. In sending Wyrm2 off to Florida and pointing a gun to my head in an interrogation room, we've already become different.

Totally irrelevant. Even if the two of you were kept together and subjected to the same experiences, you would still be distinct individuals.

Woah there! To say that we will be distinct individuals means that you can tell the difference between me and me. Praytell, what test would you use to distinguish between us, and how does it distinguish between us if we're perfect copies?

[NecronLord]

Who said it was more disturbing than that?

I considered it implied in equating it with proper death, as opposed to something that is essentially a temporary discontinuity. Certainly not the same as the deliberate, permanant and malicous destruction of persons for no reason, as in the Galactic Empire, which is what people here are comparing it to.

[Darth Wong]

Woah there! To say that we will be distinct individuals means that you can tell the difference between me and me.

Bullshit. The fact that there are two of you means that you are distinct by definition. Unique identifiers are not required.

I considered it implied in equating it with proper death, as opposed to something that is essentially a temporary discontinuity. Certainly not the same as the deliberate, permanant and malicous destruction of persons for no reason, as in the Galactic Empire, which is what people here are comparing it to.

See the cloning argument. If a copy of you was made before I disintegrated you with a handwavium weapon, would you be any less concerned about seeing that handwavium weapon pointed at your face?

[NecronLord]

See the cloning argument. If a copy of you was made before I disintegrated you with a handwavium weapon, would you be any less concerned about seeing that handwavium weapon pointed at your face?

If I knew that after being shot with the handwavium weapon, my mind would reappear in a new body, (like the necrons I'm named after ) I would mostly be bothered about whether it would hurt me (I've never figured out whey transporting doesn't hurt). For it to be an entirely accurate analogue, the copy would have to have my own memories up to the shooting. When it is created, the copy diverges from me, wheas if it has my memories, including the 'death' it is a much more linear thing, and my major concern would be transporter accidents and pain.

[Darth Wong]

See the cloning argument. If a copy of you was made before I disintegrated you with a handwavium weapon, would you be any less concerned about seeing that handwavium weapon pointed at your face?

If I knew that after being shot with the handwavium weapon, my mind would reappear in a new body, (like the necrons I'm named after ) I would mostly be bothered about whether it would hurt me (I've never figured out whey transporting doesn't hurt).

Irrelevant to the transporter argument in which we know from both theory and precedent that a physical copying process is going on. It's not your mind moving magically into the new body; it's a copy of your mind being created in a copy of your body. The original is still at the end of my handwavium weapon and about to die.

For it to be an entirely accurate analogue, the copy would have to have my own memories up to the shooting. When it is created, the copy diverges from me, wheas if it has my memories, including the 'death' it is a much more linear thing, and my major concern would be transporter accidents and pain.

Both you and Wyrm seem to be labouring under the delusion that the distinction between death and survival is all about timing; in other words, if you can time the end of your existence and the start of the copy's existence so that one ends as the other begins, then somehow it becomes completely different than if you're off by even a few seconds either way.

[Noble Ire]

lol well I think we should drop this as we're going in circles.. because all I'm about to say is that your mind doesn't continue to exist.. of copy of it is made. A copy with your memories and feelings yes.. but a copy. The original you no longer experiences life.. You get in, get disintergrated (roll the credits cos your story is over). That is what Wong and I were trying to get accross with "kill you after the clone leaves bit". Not to question whch has a right to live, but to see if you fear death... because people don't understand they don't wake up on the other side.. a copy begins it's existance created from your remains.

To me, the distinction is purely acedemic.

But as you say, this is going in circles. I will not say my own view is more valid than yours; it simply what I believe, as you believe yours, undoubtedly.

Except that in your case, you contradicted yourself earlier by admitting that the copy was a separate and distinct being from yourself, as per my scenario.

In your scenario, my two duplicates have existed simultaneously. In normal transport, they do not, since the compenents of one are required to create the next. There is only one me.

[NecronLord]

Irrelevant to the transporter argument in which we know from both theory and precedent that a physical copying process is going on. It's not your mind moving magically into the new body; it's a copy of your mind being created in a copy of your body.

So? The mind remains, at the beginning of the process, there is one mind, and at the end, there is one mind. At no stage are there two seperate minds.

In contrast, the Empire's mass-murdering takes x minds and makes them into 0 minds. They're not comparable.

The original is still at the end of my handwavium weapon and about to die.

And in a transporter, it will then be recreated.

Both you and Wyrm seem to be labouring under the delusion that the distinction between death and survival is all about timing; in other words, if you can time the end of your existence and the start of the copy's existence so that one ends as the other begins, then somehow it becomes completely different than if you're off by even a few seconds either way.

Yes. It does. Because at no stage has the prestransport person's mind contained seperate data from the posttransport person's mind. Therefore, the posttransport includes everything that made the pretransport the pretransport However, if you make a copy, from that moment, the original person is gaining experiences that the copy does not have, and its mind is therefore seperate.

The copy is a continuation of the person who existed precopy, as is the original, if not destroyed in the transport process.

[Wyrm]

Woah there! To say that we will be distinct individuals means that you can tell the difference between me and me.

Bullshit. The fact that there are two of you means that you are distinct by definition. Unique identifiers are not required.

I don't want your "distinct by definition" crap; I want "distinct by physical test". I can define my ass any way I want to, but it's still just a butt. Unless your definition of "distinct" includes a way to physically distinguish between two identical copies of Wyrm, then your definition is irrelevant to us. We want to know which Wyrm is the original Wyrm and which is the copy, and we don't want any arbitrary labeling bullshit either.

To put it another way, suppose that you succeed in copying me, and before releasing us from stasis, you then go have a nice, long celebratory shag with Rebecca. While you're doing your business, your two boys get into the Wonglab and make a right mess of things. In particular, the pull our (otherwise identical) pods out of the Xerox-plus, mix them about, and manage to blast either the original Wyrm or the copy Wyrm into his component atoms. So you come back, find there's only one pod left, and a very confused-looking Wyrm sitting up in it. Your boys don't remember which pod got zapped, so the Wyrm we have left is as equally likely to be the original as he is to be the copy. Am I dead?

[PayBack]

And? As a matter of fact, they experience a remarkably continous sensation throughout the process.

Well that's just flat out wrong. The copy that gets out the other end THINKS he's the same person, he has the memories of getting in, but he is NOT the same person who got into the transporter. The person who gets out is a new entity created using the matter from the person who was destroyed.. they are different people. Why do you think they're the same person just because they're identical? You get in but you do NOT experience anything after being disintegrated, your copy does.

[NecronLord]

Well that's just flat out wrong. The copy that gets out the other end THINKS he's the same person, he has the memories of getting in, but he is NOT the same person who got into the transporter. The person who gets out is a new entity created using the matter from the person who was destroyed.. they are different people. Why do you think they're the same person just because they're identical? You get in but you do NOT experience anything after being disintegrated, your copy does.

I'm talking about the stupidity of some guy once being concious in the buffer. IIRC, that was in Voyager once.

[PayBack]

Irrelevant to the transporter argument in which we know from both theory and precedent that a physical copying process is going on. It's not your mind moving magically into the new body; it's a copy of your mind being created in a copy of your body.

So? The mind remains, at the beginning of the process, there is one mind, and at the end, there is one mind. At no stage are there two separate minds.

So, the reason many people fear death is that the no longer get to experience life. You seem to be saying you don't care that you die as long as another identical brain gets to experience it in your place?

The two bodies or brains or separate minds, existing at the same time scenerio that Wong is using is merely to try and use a model that's easier to understand as too many people can't understand that they don't get in and get out again.. they get in and it's over for them.. life begins for the copy. There ARE two minds, just not at the same time... first there's one that's destroyed, then a new one that's created. It's beyond me that people can't understand that they do not get to experience life through the new mind that's created.

[PayBack]

Well that's just flat out wrong. The copy that gets out the other end THINKS he's the same person, he has the memories of getting in, but he is NOT the same person who got into the transporter. The person who gets out is a new entity created using the matter from the person who was destroyed.. they are different people. Why do you think they're the same person just because they're identical? You get in but you do NOT experience anything after being disintegrated, your copy does.

I'm talking about the stupidity of some guy once being concious in the buffer. IIRC, that was in Voyager once.

Ah.. yeah that is dumb... experiencing anything after you've been taken apart atom by atom makes not sense at all.

[Darth Wong]

So? The mind remains, at the beginning of the process, there is one mind, and at the end, there is one mind. At no stage are there two seperate minds.

Sure there are; they are separated by time and space. They aren't the same object; one is a copy of the other. What part of this do you not understand, for fuck's sake?

In contrast, the Empire's mass-murdering takes x minds and makes them into 0 minds. They're not comparable.

The fact that one is not as bad as the other does not excuse your bullshit about pretending that if the characteristics of A and B match, then A is B.

[Darth Wong]

I don't want your "distinct by definition" crap; I want "distinct by physical test".

You're a fucking moron. If there's two of you standing side by side, then you are distinct by definition. The physical test is that there's two of you, you goddamned idiot.

[NecronLord]

So, the reason many people fear death is that the no longer get to experience life. You seem to be saying you don't care that you die as long as another identical brain gets to experience it in your place?

Quite. If there was an invisible monster that came and painlessly ate you, but replaced you with a duplicate that had your memories up until the point of eating, would it be anywhere near as fearsome as one that just ate you? I'd call it 'mildly disconcerting.'

Ultimately, I am the sum of my thoughts and memories. That is me. A copy will have all that, and will therefore be me, to all philosophically meaninful purpouses, even if it is actually a copy shat out by an invisible monster.

[Darth Wong]

Ultimately, I am the sum of my thoughts and memories. That is me. A copy will have all that, and will therefore be me, to all philosophically meaninful purpouses, even if it is actually a copy shat out by an invisible monster.

This logic of "A like B, therefore A is B" is totally indefensible no matter how many times you use it. You can apply it to countless other situations and scenarios with animate or inanimate objects and creatures to see how fallacious it is.

[PayBack]

So, the reason many people fear death is that the no longer get to experience life. You seem to be saying you don't care that you die as long as another identical brain gets to experience it in your place?

Quite. If there was an invisible monster that came and painlessly ate you, but replaced you with a duplicate that had your memories up until the point of eating, would it be anywhere near as fearsome as one that just ate you? I'd call it 'mildly disconcerting.'

Ultimately, I am the sum of my thoughts and memories. That is me. A copy will have all that, and will therefore be me, to all philosophically meaninful purpouses, even if it is actually a copy shat out by an invisible monster.

So again I say.. you don't fear death as long as a copy lives in your place? ffs mankind has evolved without me.. I'm still selfish and fear death due to my enjoying experiencing life.

[NecronLord]

Sorry, no, that does not parse. What value does continuity of existance have? Why should I care about a brief moment of nonexistance, when something that will have everything I have, will be everything I am, and will do as I do will reappear afterwards? What's so bad about that? When I sleep, I lose continuty of existance - but I wake up. In much the same way, an entity that is in every way me would wake up after the transport, so what's the issue?

Death is bad because the sentience is destroyed, we treasure the existance of self aware minds, and thus define their destruction as bad. Identical sentiences will be at the start and end of the transporter process, so what is so bad about it? Especially as, in most cases, it is a process undertaken with the full informed consent of the subject.

[NecronLord]

So again I say.. you don't fear death as long as a copy lives in your place?

Indeed not. Especially as in this example, my mindstate will be captured at the moment of death, and reborn shortly after. What's to fear about death when there is a rebirth almost immediately after?

[Darth Wong]

NecronLord, the fact that you are a moderator does not mean I should take particularly kindly to the fact that you are ignoring my point. Once more, THE LOGIC "A LIKE B, THEREFORE A IS B" IS FALLACIOUS

[PayBack]

Ok great.. there's a rebirth straight after.. but you don't know about because you're dead! And the "go to sleep and wake up" bit is just bullshit because you DO NOT WAKE UP. You are dead.. ok? roll the credits.. the movie is over.. you no longer experience anything ever again!!!

Yes, some copy with your mind pops into exisitance.. but you don't know about it because you're dead. You do not experience life through it's eyes, and think it's thoughts.. because it's not you.. you're dead!

That's what seems so hard to get into peoples heads.. they think they're conciousness is magically transferred from one brain to another.. but it's not.. and brand new conciousness with your memories in created. You don't now blank out for a split second then wake up.. you blank out and it's over... for ever.

[PayBack]

On the plus side.. at least now I know how the Feds get away with it

[Darth Servo]

Making a copy of your favorite movie at the moment of the original's destruction does not make the copy the same thing as the original.

[Wyrm]

I don't want your "distinct by definition" crap; I want "distinct by physical test".

You're a fucking moron. If there's two of you standing side by side, then you are distinct by definition. The physical test is that there's two of you, you goddamned idiot.

Okay, from the top:

Did I ever claim that there weren't two of us? NO! The entire examples were predicated on the premise that there are two of us.

In what way was I denying that we were "distinct"? I was claiming that we were "not distinct" in the sense that we were "indistinguishable", as in "interchangable", as in "it doesn't make a fucking difference which of us you send off to Florida, because the results of your experiment will be the same!" I think the context in which I was using "distinct" made it clear that this was what I meant, and not "distinct" in the sense of "there are two of me".

If it was improper to do that, then I apologize.

Now that's cleared up, let's move on:

I consider the fact that there are two of us to be completely beside the point. There are about 1e30 protons in my body, all "distinct" in the sense that there are a fuckload of them (your sense), but they are also identical, or indistinguishable, in that you can exchange any number of them and still wind up with a configuration that behaves completely identically. Indeed, to obey the Pauli Exclusion Principle, any two protons have to be indistinguishable particles. It takes something more than being "distinct" (as in, more than one) to make two objects distinguishable.

You say that if I get into a transporter, I die, and although a copy of me continues on, I'm still dead because the original is destroyed and only the copy lives on. Okay, but in order for this definition of death to be useful, you have to be able to distinguish between me and my identical copy.

Ontologically speaking, we're not the same person even in stasis, but physically, we're just a bunch of matter that happen to have identical constituents and are in identical quantum states. We will be have the same way (in a QM sense) in any physical test you wish to perform on us.

Because there is no test that may be used to distinguish us physically, what's the fucking problem? The distinction between an original object and its perfect copy seems to be physically meaningless. Since the distinction between original and perfect copy is physically meaningless, so too is your definition of me being dead.