nightmare wrote:It's a silly definition. Like in Darth Wong's example, suppose we make a perfect copy of you, and flash-imprint it with your memory and personality. This copy is now just as good as you, and by your definition, is you.
Correct. It has my identity.
So you shouldn't have any objections if I pull the trigger on you,
False comparison. I would be rather more against the transporter if it killed the original in a potentially painful manner, and failed to preserve and transfer all their memories at the time of death - because at that point, C(a) and C(b) have diverged.
while your copy may live merrily on. After all, that's what people transporting do; die willingly and let a copy do their job. It's completely irrelevant if you get killed after being duplicated,
No it's not. Because C(a) and C(b) have diverged, therefore, C(b) is not a copy of C(a) at the time of death, as it would be in a transporter.
as long as the copy is perfect. What you have duplicated is your identity, not yourself. Timing of the action is irrelevant.
If C(b) does not contain all of C(a)'s mind at the time of death, it is not the same as the transporter process. Therefore, timing
is relevant. I would have little problem, for example, with being shot a nanosecond after the copy was made. Slight annoyance at being shot a few seconds after, and serious malcontent if I was killed hours afterwards.
Even worse, if a telepath screw with your mind so that your personality is altered, you are as good as dead with this definition.
Yes. Telepathic invasion and alteration is a violation of a person. Just as much or more so than a mugging or rape.
Or let's say that transported matter actually degrade a little every time, just like replicators, so you don't get a perfect copy.
All your objections to the transporter hinge on changing how it works. I can make up object to medical care of the sick if I change how it works.
Very close to it, but not quite. After a few thousand transports, is it there anything left of you?
As I've said, I wouldn't use it for technical reasons (not trusting Federation technology). This is exactly the same. If it did work like that, I would be very reluctant to use such a device.
Hell, by this kind of logic, Jim Jones suicide cult never commited anything wrong.
There is a damn fine reason, in
this country at least, that suicide is no longer a criminal offence. Efforts to kill yourself are generally seen as a symptom of mental illness, but it is no longer criminal.
After all, the members killed themselves willingly, and firmly believed in that they would be recreated and live on a distant paradise planet., and we can't disprove that it really happened.
We don't need to. We just need to point out there's no evidence of such. There is rock solid evidence (SoD) that transporters work. You don't seriously think I'd be calling it a good idea if we'd never seen anyone who was transported arrive, do you?
Very much like taking a transporter to Risa.
Alright, we'll copy your mind, memories, personality, everything. Then we imprint it into a chimpanzee. After all, the medium doesn't matter, right?
I would be annoyed if I was put in a housing that provided inferior quality of life. On the other hand, I would happily exchange my body to become (assuming I can work it) an advanced Culture Drone.
So we can now kill the original you off with the good feeling of knowing that you now not only can do everything you used to do before, you have been well improved in strength, climbing ability and a good deal many more things.
And socially crippled. Hell, I'm not sure if they can even vocalise human words. On the other hand, I wouldn't mind being uploaded into a body that was superior in all those things without drawbacks.
By your logic, that should even be preferable over keeping the original you around.
Correct. You find me a culture drone, necron lord (:lol:), genetically superior man, and the means to safely upload me into it, and I'll be very happy.
I suppose that you mean that the mind is a seperate entity from the body somehow.
With mind transfer technologies, that is a predicate, yes. It is not demonstratably true IRL.
Otherwise it would be just a matter of duplicating the electrical patterns in your brain. It's true that there is precedence for that in Trek, but how do you transfer a soul?
With a transporter.
Do souls just pop into existance every time a child in concieved? Does Thomas Riker have a soul, or is he a zombie? Why should Data have any rights, since a machine hardly can have a soul?
Do I look like the Voyager writer responsible for this can of worms?
Or, for that matter, a hologram? Huge can of worms, that. I'd rather leave it aside, there's just too many problems with mind transfer concept.
Only in the trek context. Abstracted - as I intended it - there is very little problem.
Problem is, you don't get a say since you're the corpse.
Problem is, my idenity, which is me, has been inherited by the duplicate. At the time of death, my thought patterns are preserved and put into a new body. The 'Me' still exists.