Morality is subjective

[Batman]

If you were a cat, you wouldn't classify oppressed human beings as harm. In fact, you wouldn't even care.

Somebody please tell me how this is relevant.

Some mod kindly kill the other one.

[Lord Zentei]

I think morality is subjective due to where it comes from. Morality is ultimately based upon an individual's thoughts, ideas and beliefs. While there may be enormous consenus on extreme examples like murder is wrong; it is still up to the individuals of that majority to have arrived at their own decsion regarding the issue.

I anticipated that position, and preemptively answered it; I'll post it again:

If the definition of right and wrong depends on the philosophy in question, then certainly morality is subjective, but defining morality in this way is cyclic logic, hence fallacious (behaviour XYZ is moral because it is right, it is right according to philosophy ABC, since philosophy ABC defines what is right, it is a moral philosophy, making behaviour XYZ morally right).

Of course, the issue is what constitutes help and harm, how this is defined, and who it should include. However, if it is to be verifiable, your range of freedom is quite restricted.

In any case the argument that "morality has changed => an objective morality does not exist and cannot be discovered" is fallacious; note how our understanding of the laws of nature has changed, yet that does not mean that there is no objective system that governs how the universe functions. The search for a universal morality (with a requirement that it maximise help and minimize harm, however that is defined) is then tied to our improved understanding of our own well being and is dependant on our knowledge of economics, psychology, etc.

Perhaps there is no unique system that allows for this, but subjectivity is a no-go.

[Rye]

There may be a "best" majoritan moral system, but that would just make it popular, not "true."

There may be a "best" means of defining good pies and bad pies, is it objectively a "bad pie" or just a bad pie in the majority of subjective views?

[Pint0 Xtreme]

If you were a cat, you wouldn't classify oppressed human beings as harm. In fact, you wouldn't even care.

Somebody please tell me how this is relevant.

The whole point is that the basis of morality is subjective. Ein keeps on making statements about "scientific harm" and that's an oxymoron if I ever heard one. To you, murder is harmful. To a cat, it is not. Seeing people substantiate (or presume to substantiate in this case) morality as some kind of intrinsic value of natural world is as funny as seeing people substantiate the artistic value of abstract art.

[Batman]

If you were a cat, you wouldn't classify oppressed human beings as harm. In fact, you wouldn't even care.

Somebody please tell me how this is relevant.

The whole point is that the basis f morality is subjective. Ein keeps on making statements about "scientific harm" and that's an oxymoron if I ever heard one. To you, murder is harmful. To a cat, it is not.

Yes it is. The murdered whatever is just as dead. The fact that it is dead can not be denied. The fact that the cat likely doesn't care doesn't figure into it.

Seeing people substantiate (or presume to substantiate in this case) morality as some kind of intrinsic value of natural world is as funny as seeing people substantiate the artistic value of abstract art.

The physical harm done by art is?

[Pint0 Xtreme]

Yes it is. The murdered whatever is just as dead. The fact that it is dead can not be denied. The fact that the cat likely doesn't care doesn't figure into it.

Nice strawman. I never argued that the state of being dead is subjective. I said the perception and ethical values of harm (murder in this case) is subjective. Your basis of morality is based on subjective criteria. What is so difficult about that to comprehend? If a cat doesn't care about human beings being harmed, then human beings being harmed is not evil to the cat. Likewise, tiny brainless lifeforms have no value to you. So theoretical "harm" to bacteria is not evil, and therefore not immoral.

The physical harm done by art is?

I don't know how you figured in that I said art causes physical harm. I think you should read my post more carefully.

[wolveraptor]

Codes of ethics are subjective, but what does or does not cause harm is not. Most peoples' codes of ethics see causing harm as a "bad" (note use of qualitative adjective) thing. Other activities they see as "bad" may not induce such damage.

In the end, it is based on the desires of people. If people wish for the human race to prosper, it is best that they legislate against significant vitiation. Needless to say, biology almost totally ensures that people will want that.

I should point out that consensus clearly not a good method of determining what is not harmful: segregation was not seen as degradative 50 years ago by popular will.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

Well, to an extent, I would agree that morality is metaethically relative, but we really have to clarify what we mean. Foremost, I have been taugh tthat, in ethicsethics, there are various levels of ethical theory: metaethical, normative, and descriptive.

1. Descriptive ethics does not give recomendations. It is sociological and scientific insofar as it states what exists factually.

2. Normative ethics seeks to discuss what people should do given a situation. It is prescriptive. It does not discussion the actual validity of the theories that prescribe X, Y, or Z action.

3. Metaethics discusses the actual validity or correctness, if possible, of any given normative phrase.

Now, there are at least some objective measurements I know of to critique ethical normative theories, but these are rudimentary. They have have to some sense to them; essentially, they cannot give advice that is self-contradicting or impossible. That's worthles in any situation for anyone since it gives no guidance whatsoever.

1. Obviously, different cultures have different moral maxims. This alone does not mean, logically, that ethics IS relative to the culture and that whatever they want to think is moral is moral. That's not true. This would be more in line with descriptive sociological relativism. The fact that lots of people believe X is true does not make it true. However, the flip is also true. The fact that lots of people believe that ethics is comprised of some universally true, "objective" system does also not make it true. What DOES make something true? I would say something is true if it is consistent with fact or reality. This works well in disciplines like Physics or Biology insofar as those theories deal with factual information; they describe factual phenomena and logically explain them and make predictions based off of those facts. Ethics however, works a bit differently

2 In Normative Ethics, we are dealing with prescriptions, which deal with oughts and shoulds. Any normative theory must consist of normative premises and a normative conclusion. This means normatives back up normatives. You cannot go from an is to an ought or a fact to a normative conclusion, prescription. Normatives are essentially oughts and shoulds based off of ideas of what is "good" and "bad." Essentially, you ought not hurt that dog because you ought not want to cause unnecessary pain to others. This is a statement that does not commit the naturalistic fallacy--it's not a factual premise leading to a normative conclusion.

Another point to consider is the nature of metaethics. Metaethics is the foundation for normative ethics. It seeks to describe what is right or the good. It is the discussion of the validity of normative phrases. A problem here is that ethical theories seek to define what is good and bad, and what is good and bad, and the normative sentences that come from them are suggestions and value statments. GE MOORE hit on this when he described ethics as emotive statements from which suggestions are drawn. I believe he was the one who coined the naturalistic fallacy as it applies to ethics. I cannot remember exactly.

Another point to consider is the relativistic fallacy that might also apply here. It might seem that ethical relativism falls into the relativistic fallacy. One criticism of relative ethics is to say that it creates contradictions in that someone can believe something good, thus it is good, and someone else can believe it is bad, and be correctly bad all at the same time. However, the relativistic fallacy only applies in situations in which there is an identifiable, objective standard and the situation does not call for relativisim. The idea here is what is the objective standard. That's easy to find in Science or in descriptive fields, but not in fields that deal with value statements. Does the Relativistic Fallacy apply here or does it not? Is there a real, concrete standard that transcends all individuals?


Let us look at a few theories, for example. Utilitarianism is one theory that is held by a lot of people. Modern Utilitarianism holds that preference satisfaction is the criterion for goodness. Modern Kantianism or Prima Facie Deontology would disagree, as would various other secular ethical theories. The criteria they pick is fairly arbitrary, since it would be fallacious for any one of them to base their good and bad off of fact--it would violate the is/ought fallacy. They are merely thinking up a criterion and rules from them. In Kantianism, it is abstract duty and logic that is the judge of morality regardless of the consequences. In Nicomachean Ethics, it is virtue.

For example: Theory X [Modern Utilitarianism] says preference satisfaction is the moral criterion. It is "intrinsically good" whereas classical Utilitarianism states that the intrinsic good is pleasure. They seek to define what is the good and what you should do stemming from that arbitrary definition. To say that is wrong and Y really is what is intrinsic as mally good means you already must have in mind what is already morally good. Metaethics, however, determines what is good, and I think the dominant They're all value statements based off of hypothetical imperatives. I think ethics is a tool of culture, like most anthropologists, however, it has become far more than just a survival tool for humans. It has gone beyond its original purpouse to help people survive. Today, it applies to areas which have no impact on human society; we have expanded the definition and scope of the tool.

I don't 100% know if ethics is subjective, but I have a hard time seeing the concrete truth or "metaethical objectivism" of value statements. Perhaps someone can point that out. I think the metaethical perspective is that normative phrases are neither right nor wrong. They are neutral. We just use them anyway as hypothetical imperatives.


For the OP, I would suggest the thread starter look up metaethical non-cognitivism vs cognitivism. That's an interesting discussion. I have no read it all. However, of what I have seen so far in metaethics, the bulk of stuff I can find sees ethics as ultimately arbitrary and relative--approval and disapproval statements. This ties into the idea that there are no moral "facts" and coincides with the characteristics of normative ethics--value statements not based on facts, but on hypothetical suggestions. I think there is a lecture on this here:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

Damn it. I am sorry for the typo bullshit. I am on my laptop and I suck at it this midgit keyboard.

[Zero]

Morality is obviously subjective. If there were one universal creed as to what was right or wrong, people wouldn't argue about morality. There wouldn't be kantian ethical systems, utilitarian ethical systems, disputes over whether preference utility is best or not, etc., etc.. If there was some objective concept of morality or ethics, then there wouldn't be disputes over whether abortion was good or bad, or about whether euthanasia was good or bad.

Yes it is. The murdered whatever is just as dead. The fact that it is dead can not be denied. The fact that the cat likely doesn't care doesn't figure into it.

An aborted fetus is dead, too. Someone who's been euthanized, even at their own will, is still dead. Life being valued is something people choose to adopt. I could just as easily state that the most important standard of right and wrong is generating more discord and chaos in the universe. Or the action that is most likely to end in cats reproducing. Or any damned thing I wanted. What you choose to value is subjective.

People value different things. Morality is based on these personal values. Personal values and beliefs are subjective.

[b00tleg]

Well, to an extent, I would agree that morality is metaethically relative, but we really have to clarify what we mean. Foremost, I have been taugh tthat, in ethicsethics, there are various levels of ethical theory: metaethical, normative, and descriptive.

1. Descriptive ethics does not give recomendations. It is sociological and scientific insofar as it states what exists factually.

2. Normative ethics seeks to discuss what people should do given a situation. It is prescriptive. It does not discussion the actual validity of the theories that prescribe X, Y, or Z action.

3. Metaethics discusses the actual validity or correctness, if possible, of any given normative phrase.

Now, there are at least some objective measurements I know of to critique ethical normative theories, but these are rudimentary. They have have to some sense to them; essentially, they cannot give advice that is self-contradicting or impossible. That's worthles in any situation for anyone since it gives no guidance whatsoever.

1. Obviously, different cultures have different moral maxims. This alone does not mean, logically, that ethics IS relative to the culture and that whatever they want to think is moral is moral. That's not true. This would be more in line with descriptive sociological relativism. The fact that lots of people believe X is true does not make it true. However, the flip is also true. The fact that lots of people believe that ethics is comprised of some universally true, "objective" system does also not make it true. What DOES make something true? I would say something is true if it is consistent with fact or reality. This works well in disciplines like Physics or Biology insofar as those theories deal with factual information; they describe factual phenomena and logically explain them and make predictions based off of those facts. Ethics however, works a bit differently

2 In Normative Ethics, we are dealing with prescriptions, which deal with oughts and shoulds. Any normative theory must consist of normative premises and a normative conclusion. This means normatives back up normatives. You cannot go from an is to an ought or a fact to a normative conclusion, prescription. Normatives are essentially oughts and shoulds based off of ideas of what is "good" and "bad." Essentially, you ought not hurt that dog because you ought not want to cause unnecessary pain to others. This is a statement that does not commit the naturalistic fallacy--it's not a factual premise leading to a normative conclusion.

Another point to consider is the nature of metaethics. Metaethics is the foundation for normative ethics. It seeks to describe what is right or the good. It is the discussion of the validity of normative phrases. A problem here is that ethical theories seek to define what is good and bad, and what is good and bad, and the normative sentences that come from them are suggestions and value statments. GE MOORE hit on this when he described ethics as emotive statements from which suggestions are drawn. I believe he was the one who coined the naturalistic fallacy as it applies to ethics. I cannot remember exactly.

Another point to consider is the relativistic fallacy that might also apply here. It might seem that ethical relativism falls into the relativistic fallacy. One criticism of relative ethics is to say that it creates contradictions in that someone can believe something good, thus it is good, and someone else can believe it is bad, and be correctly bad all at the same time. However, the relativistic fallacy only applies in situations in which there is an identifiable, objective standard and the situation does not call for relativisim. The idea here is what is the objective standard. That's easy to find in Science or in descriptive fields, but not in fields that deal with value statements. Does the Relativistic Fallacy apply here or does it not? Is there a real, concrete standard that transcends all individuals?


Let us look at a few theories, for example. Utilitarianism is one theory that is held by a lot of people. Modern Utilitarianism holds that preference satisfaction is the criterion for goodness. Modern Kantianism or Prima Facie Deontology would disagree, as would various other secular ethical theories. The criteria they pick is fairly arbitrary, since it would be fallacious for any one of them to base their good and bad off of fact--it would violate the is/ought fallacy. They are merely thinking up a criterion and rules from them. In Kantianism, it is abstract duty and logic that is the judge of morality regardless of the consequences. In Nicomachean Ethics, it is virtue.

For example: Theory X [Modern Utilitarianism] says preference satisfaction is the moral criterion. It is "intrinsically good" whereas classical Utilitarianism states that the intrinsic good is pleasure. They seek to define what is the good and what you should do stemming from that arbitrary definition. To say that is wrong and Y really is what is intrinsic as mally good means you already must have in mind what is already morally good. Metaethics, however, determines what is good, and I think the dominant They're all value statements based off of hypothetical imperatives. I think ethics is a tool of culture, like most anthropologists, however, it has become far more than just a survival tool for humans. It has gone beyond its original purpouse to help people survive. Today, it applies to areas which have no impact on human society; we have expanded the definition and scope of the tool.

I don't 100% know if ethics is subjective, but I have a hard time seeing the concrete truth or "metaethical objectivism" of value statements. Perhaps someone can point that out. I think the metaethical perspective is that normative phrases are neither right nor wrong. They are neutral. We just use them anyway as hypothetical imperatives.


For the OP, I would suggest the thread starter look up metaethical non-cognitivism vs cognitivism. That's an interesting discussion. I have no read it all. However, of what I have seen so far in metaethics, the bulk of stuff I can find sees ethics as ultimately arbitrary and relative--approval and disapproval statements. This ties into the idea that there are no moral "facts" and coincides with the characteristics of normative ethics--value statements not based on facts, but on hypothetical suggestions. I think there is a lecture on this here:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/

Awesome post, and my OP was pretty shitty for not giving any definition of terms or criteria to start it out with. Sorry about that.

[mr friendly guy]

Of course morality is subjective; moral values are not inherent to anything outside people's perceptions.
<snip>
.

Just clarifying. Are you trying to say that while morality is subjective (as defined as being part of a person's mind and not in external reality) the "right" and "wrong" choices of morality can be determined objectively (say murder is wrong).

With this type of definition, its not possible to use the "since morality is subjective, my view is as valid as yours".

Of course, if I totally misintepreted it, please correct me.

[B5B7]

Codes of ethics are subjective, but what does or does not cause harm is not. Most peoples' codes of ethics see causing harm as a "bad" (note use of qualitative adjective) thing. Other activities they see as "bad" may not induce such damage.

In the end, it is based on the desires of people. If people wish for the human race to prosper, it is best that they legislate against significant vitiation. Needless to say, biology almost totally ensures that people will want that.

I should point out that consensus clearly not a good method of determining what is not harmful: segregation was not seen as degradative 50 years ago by popular will.

Firstly, in response to the OP, morality is not objective.
I disagree with the part of your quote I have bolded eg a certain substance may be harmless to most people, but deadly to someone who is allergic to it.

War is a great example of the subjectivity of morality - kill your neighbour - it's murder; kill your enemy - it's civic duty.

[Lord Zentei]

Morality is obviously subjective. If there were one universal creed as to what was right or wrong, people wouldn't argue about morality. There wouldn't be kantian ethical systems, utilitarian ethical systems, disputes over whether preference utility is best or not, etc., etc.. If there was some objective concept of morality or ethics, then there wouldn't be disputes over whether abortion was good or bad, or about whether euthanasia was good or bad.

And again, I reiterate: what is "morality". Define the term.

Obviously there are multiple ethical systems, that proves jack and shit if the majority of the systems in question are flawed in some way vis a vis if there is a common goal to which they strive.

[Molyneux]

Morality may very well be a subjective social construct, but not all moralities are equal. The value of a moral system, I'd say, can be best measured by its effects on the society where it is prevalent from the medium to long term.

[Rye]

Just clarifying. Are you trying to say that while morality is subjective (as defined as being part of a person's mind and not in external reality) the "right" and "wrong" choices of morality can be determined objectively (say murder is wrong).

Within a system that defines the means and end of a particular morality, sure.

With this type of definition, its not possible to use the "since morality is subjective, my view is as valid as yours".

Of course, if I totally misintepreted it, please correct me.

A view can be more valid within a given system, but that system itself is a case of either convention of subjective opinions, or a single subjective opinion on what we should strive for and how we should behave.

[Darth Wong]

Actually, if you look at the history of our species, it's pretty obvious where the core values of morality come from. We began as small family-unit tribes, like wolf packs. In the tribe, there are certain actions that you cannot take within the tribe if the whole tribe is to thrive, such as killing fellow members of the tribe, hoarding food from them, deceiving them, etc.

People who broke these rules invited tribal in-fighting, and in the marginal survival conditions of the ancient era, that usually meant the extinction of the tribe.

Evolutionary pressures alone would therefore dictate that people with an innate aversion to those kinds of behaviours would tend to reproduce more successfully, with longer-lived offspring.

Today, with superior technology and gigantic nation-states instead of tribes, we have made it possible for people to break all of those rules without threatening the survival of the tribe, but we still have laws to enforce those rules because most humans have the leftover instinctive aversions to those behaviours that allow them to "know" there's something wrong with them even without indoctrination.

The problem comes when you start having extra morality codes layered on top of those basic rules, usually the result of history, religious development, etc. But if you accept those few base elements as universal (and as stated earlier, explainable from an objective evolutionary analysis), then you can "judge" more sophisticated moral codes on their basis.

[Akhlut]

Damn, wish I had my philosophy book on me (it's this book, if you're curious).

At anyrate, I would say that morality is subjective, as it all comes down to opinions, basically. Murder and theft are bad, helping out one's fellow man is good, etc. As it comes down to opinions, it cannot be objective. Any nutjob can say that the earth is flat and we can objectively prove him wrong. But, if some sociopath says that murder is not a problem, how can you objectively prove him wrong? Pain, violation of basic human rights, and potential failure of society (if everyone just kills anyone all willy-nilly like) would not necessarily be a counter-argument, as the sociopath can claim that those aren't objectively bad either (pain isn't bad, it's just chemical signals; human rights are also a fiction; society now has maximized freedom without rule of law).

[Darth Wong]

But, if some sociopath says that murder is not a problem, how can you objectively prove him wrong?

You can objectively show that ancient tribes in which people freely killed each other would have died out. Ancient man had to co-operate in order to survive against physically superior animal threats and the ever-present threat of starvation. The survival imperative is rather difficult to classify as mere subjectivity.

[brianeyci]

ancient era...

I think you mean prehistoric era? Anyway you're right, by the time of Homo Habilis, (and even further back, my limited knowledge is from my first year anthropology course, who says all social sciences are useless lol) there is altriusm... I think it was Homo Habilis, not sure I can look it up, but there was a skeletal graveyard of fused vertabrae, serious deformities, meaning there was a community support system set up. This is serious shit in the prehistoric era, every man (and woman) has to contribute to the community or they starve.

Prehistoric man, I think earlier than homo erectus, had a world spanning trade system that died off suddenly... it's interesting stuff, if the trade network hadn't disappeared we might have a really different world now.

Anyway if killing each other helped mankind in natural selection, for example in an aritifical gladiatorial arena set up by aliens, I still wouldn't agree that killing was moral, just because taking somebody else's life means robbing them of experience, pleasure and joy and I don't think anybody has the right to do that except to protect other people's lives or happiness (my support for life incarceration but not the death penalty).

Brian

[wolveraptor]

Firstly, in response to the OP, morality is not objective.
I disagree with the part of your quote I have bolded eg a certain substance may be harmless to most people, but deadly to someone who is allergic to it.

War is a great example of the subjectivity of morality - kill your neighbour - it's murder; kill your enemy - it's civic duty.

I really fail to see how you addressed my point. It can be objectively provent that milk causes harm to one who is lactose intolerant. The variation of allergic reactions just means that a uniform standard of what is harm cannot be applied to everyone, and even that is true only on a superficial level. The basic rule, "Don't poison people" applies to everyone, regardless of what poison.

Your example of subjectivity is flawed: war and random killing involve completely different situations -- don't try to compare them. Your example only shows that an action can be wrong or right depending on the circumstance, which is still objectively quantifiable.

[Akhlut]

But, if some sociopath says that murder is not a problem, how can you objectively prove him wrong?

You can objectively show that ancient tribes in which people freely killed each other would have died out. Ancient man had to co-operate in order to survive against physically superior animal threats and the ever-present threat of starvation. The survival imperative is rather difficult to classify as mere subjectivity.

Isn't the survival imperative more or less completely amoral, though? I think most would agree that it is more moral to save many people's lives, even if it ends one's own and one has no offspring? Or that it is immoral to kill one's self, even if one is well past reproducing age and has numerous offspring?

Survival imperatives (those things which maximize health and fitness for humans) would probably be the only really objective things which could be moral, I'd think. But, even so, I'd be reluctant to say that they are definite in that regard.

[Darth Wong]

Isn't the survival imperative more or less completely amoral, though?

Species survival, not individual survival. Without the rules programmed into us that suited the prehistoric species survival imperative, we would not be here.

[fgalkin]

Every society in the world, from our own to the remotest tribes of South America, Africa, or New Guinea with no contact with the outside world have come up with a set of baseline morals that is exactly the same. Stuff like rules against murder, rape, theft, some concept of marriage, etc. Moreover, every society in history has had those rules.

We have discovered a genetic basis for alturism, why not this? I think (and I'm hardly the only one) that there is a universal set of morals innate to every human being. It was not given to us by a supreme being, it was given to us by the social interactions of our primate ancestors. What is it? We'll find out when do more research on human genetics. But it's probably something other primates like chimps will have as well.

EDIT: It seems like Mike is advocating a similar view.

Have a very nice day.
-fgalkin

[Darth Cronos the Proud]

You can objectively show that ancient tribes in which people freely killed each other would have died out. Ancient man had to co-operate in order to survive against physically superior animal threats and the ever-present threat of starvation. The survival imperative is rather difficult to classify as mere subjectivity.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but to me this sounds like an appeal to tradition fallacy: "It's objectively wrong to kill because if our ancestors way back in the day didn't say it was wrong to kill others in their tribe, the tribe would die out."

I woudn't argue that the no killing rule wasn't conductive to survival, but I would hardly cite that as evidence of moral objectivity. I could be misinterpreting your post though, and if I am, please correct me.

Every society in the world, from our own to the remotest tribes of South America, Africa, or New Guinea with no contact with the outside world have come up with a set of baseline morals that is exactly the same

What about a civilization like the Aztecs, who sanctioned human sacrifice? It seems to me that they had a moral code which specifically did not say murder was wrong. Or what about the Samurai of Medieval Japan? They advocated suicide before personal dishonor, something that Medieval Western Europe's moral code would have found reprehensible? Or the Medieval Vikings, who's moral code did not condemn the slaughter of innoccent monks in the seaside monasteries they plundered?

All of these cultures, who had little or no contact with each other during the pivotal time of their cultures' forming, developed moral codes that have very different baseline morals.